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foreword
This book contributes to the increasing discourse on the challenges 
presented by water scarcity. Located in the Namibian context, the book 
argues for the existence of  a court enforceable human right to water that is 
implied from the right to life in Article 6 of  the Namibian Constitution. The 
book achieves this through an elaborate interpretative examination and 
comparative analysis, principally invoking the African value of  ubuntu. 
Ubuntu – which is legally developed through its four key principles of  
community, interdependence, dignity and solidarity – is anchored in a 
novel approach to Namibian constitutional interpretation that is coined 
and substantively conceptualised as ‘re-invigorative constitutionalism’.  
The book advances the ‘AQuA’ (adequacy – quality – accessibility) 
content of  water and articulates the various correlative duties within the 
context of  the respect – protect – fulfil trilogy, duties that are imposed upon 
the Namibian state as the primary duty bearer for the right to water. These 
duties include irreducible essential content duties that are argued to be 
immediate when compared to general obligations. In giving substance to 
these duties, critical recourse is had to the international law interpretative 
resources including General Comment No.15 by the United Nations 
Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights on the human right 
to water, the African Commission’s Principles and Guidelines on Social 
and Economic Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the Nairobi Principles), and the World Health Organisation’s 
Drinking-water Quality Guidelines. 
Moreover, the book addresses the various justiciability concerns 
that may arise, arguing that Namibian courts are indeed institutionally 
competent and legitimate in enforcing right to water claims through 
the application of  the bounded deliberation model. It also argues that, 
because the Principles of  State Policy (PSPs) in Article 95 are rendered 
court unenforceable by Article 101, this does not undermine the claim 
that the right to water, anchored in the right to life, can be enforced in the 
courts. This is considering the PSP in Article 95(j) for the State to raise and 
maintain an acceptable standard of  living, which would include water as a 
viii
socio-economic good. The book additionally demonstrates the normative 
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Water scarcity, inaccessibility and insecurity are some of  the most pressing 
global challenges. The African continent and Namibia are no exceptions. 
Against this backdrop, this book centres on Namibia by assessing the legal 
status of  water, which is understood at the basic level of  personal and 
domestic use, as a court-enforceable human right.1 The book advances that 
a human right to water may be implied from the right to life in article 6 of  
the Namibian Constitution. This is despite the absence of  a right to water 
from the text of  the Constitution. The book achieves this by applying the 
value of  ubuntu as part of  the re-invigorative constitutionalism approach 
that is advanced. To sustain this argument, the book addresses significant 
legal issues that include constitutional interpretation and socio-economic 
rights justiciability so as to establish a constitutional basis for interpreting 
a right to water as a court-enforceable right. This also requires a close 
examination of  the various approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
Further, the potential legal objections that must be addressed include water 
as non-justiciable owing to the court-unenforceable Principles of  State 
Policy in the Constitution, and the institutional and legitimacy limitations 
of  courts to adjudicate right to water claims, particularly in light of  the 
difficulties in advancing the normative and substantive content of  water. 
Water access is but one of  many socio-economic challenges that 
Namibians face. While Namibia is well-endowed with natural resources, 
the country faces significant socio-economic challenges that manifest 
through, among others, landlessness, inequality, corruption and high 
unemployment rates.2 On the inequality front, Namibia has the unenviable 
1 The reference to a ‘right to water’ throughout this book should thus be understood 
in the anthropocentric sense of  a human right to water, unless the context suggests 
otherwise.
2 National Planning Commission of  Namibia ‘The root causes of  poverty in Namibia’, 
https://www.npc.gov.na/?wpfb_dl=303#:~:text=Rated%20as%20a%20high%20
middle,%25)%20than%20man%20(26%25) (accessed 16 June 2021).
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claim of  being among the most unequal countries in the world.3 Many 
Namibians continue to live below the poverty line.4 The physical limits on 
water supply are indeed widely acknowledged by authorities, including 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as amongst the 
root causes of  poverty, inequality and unequal power relations.5
This book converges on water accessibility as a particularly seminal 
socio-economic concern. Without water, a dignified life with meaningful 
and feasible opportunities for self-actualisation would not be possible. 
Indeed, without water, other human rights, whether civil-political or 
socio-economic, cannot be fully realised. This assertion is made without 
necessarily laying claim to a right to water as the ‘right of  rights’6 or as a 
meta right. 
This prolegomenon chapter will outline the arguments advanced in 
the subsequent chapters, situate the water controversies, and clarify the 
methodological approach. It will set out the law in the context of  water 
challenges in Namibia and globally. 
1.2 Water as a global and local concern
Approximately 71 per cent of  the earth’s surface area is covered by water. 
Of  this, only approximately 3 per cent is freshwater, with the majority 
being seawater or forming part of  the cryosphere (solid water). Access 
to water is increasingly recognised as of  universal concern.7 The annual 
3 UNDP ‘Income inequality trends in sub-Saharan Africa: Divergence, determinants 
and consequences’ 2017 3, http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/
Reports/Overview-Income%20inequality%20Trends%20SSA-EN-web.pdf ?download 
(accessed 14 January 2020).
4 World Bank ‘World development indicators’ 2016, http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SI.POV.GINI&country= (accessed 29 July 2017); 
Office of  the Ombudsman ‘A baseline study and household survey on human rights 
in Namibia’ 2012, https://www.ombudsman.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
Baseline_Strudy_Human_Rights_2013.pdf  (accessed 11 November 2016); see 
specifically Part 4 140-209. For a critical take on indicators as human rights measures, 
see S Merry ‘Measuring the world: Indicators, human rights, and global governance’ 
(2011) 53 Current Anthropology 583. 
5 UNDP ‘Human development report 2019: Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond 
today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century’ (2019) 191. 
6 J Waldron Law and disagreement (1999) 232. 
7 Illustratively, in 2017 water scarcity already affects four out of  every ten people, 
while 2,1 billion people lack access to safely-managed drinking water services. See 
UN ‘Water’, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/water/ (accessed 9 May 
2019).
Introduction   3
World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report8 has identified water crises 
as among the top five risks in terms of  impact for eight consecutive years. 
Water remains entrenched among a cluster of  other risks that are rated 
as having both a very high likelihood of  the risk occurring globally within 
the next 10 years, and negative impact for several countries over the same 
timeframe.9 This worldwide recognition has moved the debate from 
the traditional assumption that water is only of  concern to the Global 
South (developing countries) to that of  a universal challenge that also 
confronts the Global North (developed countries). As such, Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 6 of  the United Nations (UN) endeavours to 
pursue the global aim to ‘ensure availability and sustainable management 
of  water … for all’,10 while appreciating that water challenges manifest 
differently depending on the context. 
In response to water challenges across different geographies, the legal 
arguments that assert a binding right to water in both the domestic and 
international spheres have garnered significant attention.11 In the domestic 
context, from physical geography and climatic perspectives alone, the 
Namibian water situation is dire. Ninety-two per cent of  Namibia’s land 
area is defined as hyper-arid, arid, or semi-arid with two major deserts – 
the Namib and the Kalahari to the east and west – while only the north-
eastern strip is sub-tropical. Rainfall is variable and seasonal with some 83 
per cent of  rainfall estimated to evaporate.12
While the coastline stretches 1 572 kilometres, there is a limited 
supply of  freshwater.13 Most of  the rivers are ephemeral, while all the 
perennial rivers are located along the national boundaries of  Namibia, 
the use of  which is subject to watercourse agreements with neighbouring 
countries. There thus is a significant reliance on rainwater that collects 
in lakes, oshanas (lakes periodically filled with water) and earth dams, as 
well as subterranean water sources of  boreholes and hand-dug wells.14 
8 World Economic Forum ‘The global risks report’ 2019 5, http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf  (accessed 8 November 2019). 
9 As above. 
10 UN ‘Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development’, https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg6 (accessed 20 April 2019).
11 See ch 4. 
12 Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation, Addendum: Mission to Namibia, HRC (28 June 2012) UN Doc A/
HRC/21/42/Add.3. (2012) paras 14-15.
13 E Bird et al ‘Namibia’ in E Bird (ed) Encyclopedia of  the world’s coastal landforms (2010) 
968. 
14 As above.
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The only desalination plant that exists in the country is privately owned 
and is mainly used for industrial uranium production.15 
Although there is limited up-to-date data available on water access, the 
2009/2010 Namibia Household Income and Expenditure (NHIE) Survey 
reports that 75 per cent of  all households had piped water as their main 
source of  drinking water, while 12 per cent had boreholes or protected 
wells, 8 per cent had only stagnant water and 5 per cent used flowing 
water/rivers.16 A large percentage of  urban households use piped water: 
99 per cent compared to 58 per cent in rural households.17 The NHIE 
survey further revealed that 72 per cent of  the households in the country 
were situated less than 1 kilometre from their source of  drinking water. 
A small percentage of  households had up to 2 kilometres in distance 
between household and the source of  drinking water.18 Out of  all 
households, 7 per cent had a distance of  3 kilometres or more from their 
water source. Among urban households, 96 per cent had a distance of  less 
than 1 kilometre to a source of  drinking water. In the central regions of  
Khomas, Erongo and Otjozondjupa, 97 per cent, 95 per cent and 91 per 
cent of  households respectively had a distance of  less than 1 kilometre 
between the homestead and the source of  drinking water. In the largely 
rural north-central regions of  Kavango, Ohangwena and Oshikoto, the 
distance to the source of  drinking water was 3 kilometres or more.19 
Access to water has also been cited as a significant challenge in urban 
areas as a result of  the rapid growth in informal settlements due to high 
rates of  urbanisation.20
Significantly, there has been a recent discovery of  the underground 
Ohangwena Aquifer II in the north-central parts of  Namibia. These are 
the most densely-populated areas, and thus where the greatest demand 
for water for domestic and personal use lies.21 The Ohangwena Aquifer 
15 NAMWater ‘Sea desalination’, https://www.namwater.com.na/index.php/services/ 
56-hydrological-services?start=5#:~:text=SEA%20DESALINATION&text 
=Currently%2C%20Namibia%20has%20a%20desalination,meters%20of%20
water%20a%20year (accessed 20 June 2021).
16 Consideration of  reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of  the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Initial Reports of  
States Parties Due in 1997 – Namibia, CESCR (13 February 2015) UN Doc E/C.12/
NAM/1 (2014) para 283.
17 Consideration of  reports (n 16) para 283.
18 Consideration of  reports (n 16) para 284.
19 As above.
20 R Marenga & J Amupanda ‘The Coronavirus and social justice in Namibia’ (2021) 48 
Politikon, South African Journal of  Political Studies 206 214.
21 P Sorensen ‘The massive Ohangwena II aquifer in Northern Namibia’ (2013) 70 
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II, which is recharged by mountains in Southern Angola, is estimated to 
retain a stored volume of  5 billion cubic metres of  water. Even without a 
recharge, hydrologists estimate that the resource could supply the entire 
population of  Northern Namibia – numbering some 800 000 – for 400 
years.22 This profile of  freshwater complicates the ‘water-scarce’ label of  
Namibia as water often is available in reasonably sufficient quantities and 
quality, but remains inaccessible to communities owing to (an alleged) 
lack of  resources, particularly at the local and regional council level.23 
Nevertheless, given the low rainfall received over most of  Namibia, 
water stress has been an increasing challenge. The last five years saw a 
succession of  drought periods,24 with the 2019 drought being claimed as 
the worst drought in 40 years.25 The Namibian President thus declared a 
drought-related state of  emergency under article 26 of  the Constitution.26
The 2019 drought and the ongoing impact of  climate change have 
further exacerbated water insecurity. Indeed, different communities are 
affected differently depending on factors including geography and socio-
economic resources. Some suffer more water precariousness than others, 
as can be seen in the frequent media reports on the lack of  potable water 
for basic needs.27 Although there are few reports of  death by dehydration, 
in certain extreme circumstances there have been reports such as death 
International Journal of  Environmental Studies 173.
22 As above.
23 New Era ‘Lack of  budget hinders water provision in Ohangwena’ 10 April 2019, 
https://reliefweb.int/report/namibia/lack-budget-hinders-water-provision-
ohangwena (accessed 10 November 2019).




droughts%20since%202013 (accessed 9 November 2019).
25 African Development Bank ‘Namibia – Humanitarian emergency assistance to 
mitigate effects of  the 2018-2019 drought – Emergency and special assistance grants’ 
13 August 2019, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/namibia-humanitarian-
emergency-assistance-mitigate-effects-2018-2019-drought-emergency-and-special-
assistance-grants (accessed 9 November 2019).
26 Proclamation 14 ‘Declaration of  State of  Emergency: National Disaster (Drought): 
Namibian Constitution’ 6 May 2019, read with the Disaster Risk Management Act 10 
of  2012 sec 30(3).
27 Namibian Broadcasting Corporation ‘Namwater to stop free water provision 
to residents of  Otjimbingwe and surrounding’, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jKVmpRd6UPo (accessed 9 November 2019); Namibian Broadcasting 
Corporation ‘Potable water’, https://www.nbc.na/potable-water (accessed 
9 November 2019).
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by being buried alive after a well collapsed during digging28 and crocodile 
attacks when accessing rivers for domestic use.29 In a harrowing video 
circulated widely on social media, testimonies were shared of  some 
drought-stricken Ohangwena region households collecting their own 
urinal ‘water’ and those of  their animals for domestic use of  preparing 
the oshipale, the area used for thrashing the staple harvest of  omahangu 
(millet).30 The urgency of  water access for many communities is self-
evident. 
1.3 Situating the book 
With the above context of  the water situation in Namibia, this book 
considers the various issues through the prism of  constitutional law, 
human rights and, specifically, socio-economic rights claims before the 
Namibian courts. The Namibian context is one where there is a dearth 
in express mention of  socio-economic rights in the Constitution’s Bill of  
Rights. Chapter 3 of  the Constitution advances rights protection that on 
the face of  it is predominantly of  a civil-political nature. 
The foundational legal argument of  the book is the interpretative 
existence of  a constitutional human right to water and one that can feasibly 
be enforced in Namibian courts. The book seeks to both develop new legal 
ideas and escape from old ideas. In so doing, it will develop the various 
sub-issues to be analysed in the various chapters of  the book. Including 
this introductory chapter, the book is organised through seven chapters. 
Chapter 2, ‘Interpreting the Namibian Constitution’, considers 
the legal interpretative basis for a human right to water under the 
Constitution. It advances that a right to water can be claimed through the 
courts, notwithstanding the textual omission of  water as an express right 
in chapter 3 of  the Constitution. Chapter 3, ‘Interpreting life to imply a 
right to water from ubuntu’, builds on chapter 2 by developing ubuntu as 
an African value and normative concept under the idea of  ‘re-invigorative 
constitutionalism’, which is coined as an interpretative approach to imply 
a right to water from the article 6 right to life. Ubuntu will therefore feature 
28 ‘Two men buried alive after well caves in’ The Namibian 17 June 2019, https://www.
namibian.com.na/79674/read/Two-men-buried-alive-after-well-caves-in (accessed 
9 November 2019).
29 ‘Woman saves hubby from jaws of  crocodile’ New Era 26 February 2016, https://
neweralive.na/2016/02/29/woman-saves-hubby-jaws-crocodile/ (accessed 10 July 
2019); ‘Crocodile kills mother and child’ New Era 27 March 2018, https://neweralive.
na/posts/crocodile-kills-mother-and-child (accessed 10 July 2019).
30 Video on record with the author. 
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throughout the book in aiding the analysis of  various issues relating to a 
right to water and the corollary duties arising.
Chapter 4, ‘A right to water under international law’, draws on 
international law broadly by examining a right to water as both a binding 
source and interpretative resource. This discussion is located in the 
Namibian approach to the domestic application of  international law 
sources. Chapter 5, ‘Addressing the justiciability concerns’, sets out to 
resolve the various justiciability objections that may arise where a right to 
water is claimed through the courts. The justiciability analysis will relate 
to normative considerations (the desirability of  courts to adjudicate a right 
to water and the corollary duties of  the state), institutional considerations 
(the institutional competence and capacity of  courts) and textual 
considerations (the implication of  court-unenforceable Principles of  State 
Policy that includes the policy objective for the state to raise and maintain 
adequate standards of  living, including water). The penultimate chapter 
6, ‘The content of  a right to water and the Namibian state’s obligations’, 
advances an analysis of  the ‘AQuA’ (Available, of  Quality and Accessible) 
content of  a right to water that is claimed in the Namibian courts with an 
emphasis on the adjudication of  the various state obligations. Chapter 7, 
‘Conclusion: Omeya ogo omwenyo’,31 draws the book to a close by bringing 
together the interlocking arguments made in the book and offers some 
reflections on the COVID-19 pandemic’s lessons and implications for 
water access. 
This book considers a right to water from the perspective of  the 
constitutional right primarily, and under international law, to the extent 
that the Constitution ordains such international law as part of  Namibian 
law. It will thus exclude the analysis of  a right to water as a statutory right or 
common law right. A statute such as the Water Resource Management Act 
of  201332 includes a reference to fundamental principles such as equitable 
access to safe drinking water as an essential basic human right to support 
a healthy productive life, and access by all people to a sufficient quantity 
of  safe water within a reasonable distance from their place of  abode to 
maintain life and productive activities. Legislative prescriptions such as 
the Act’s fundamental principles may well be the basis of  a statutory right 
to water that can be claimed before the courts. The importance of  national 
legislation is also to be heeded in light of  the potential application of  a 
principle of  subsidiarity where courts are faced with right to water claims. 
However, this book constructs its argument at the constitutional level. This 
31 An Oshindonga language expression translating to ‘water is life’.
32 Water Resource Management Act 11 of  2013 secs 3(a) & (b).
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is with a view to offering a solid normative basis that can subsist beyond a 
given legislative majority that affirms water as a human right. 
Moreover, this book primarily considers a right to water from an 
anthropocentric perspective, and insofar as a right extends to personal and 
domestic use rather than commercial use. While this delimitation certainly 
is complicated in a Namibian context, where a significant cross-section of  
society relies on the land directly for their subsistence through horticultural 
activities and animal husbandry, this book is not a socio-legal study, but 
rather a doctrinal and normative examination of  the actionability of  a 
right to water. Further, the book exclusively locates a right to water in 
claims by individuals or communities as against the Namibian state – the 
vertical application of  the right. While reference is made to non-state 
actors through a horizontal application (and third states’ duties) who 
would invariably bear right to water duties under certain circumstances, 
the duty-bearer primacy of  the Namibian state is the enduring concern of  
the book. 
1.4 A note on comparativism 
This book is the result of  qualitative research and principally invokes 
doctrinal and normative research methods. The doctrinal method draws 
on legal concepts and principles of  all types, including cases, statutes 
and rules.33 It provides a systematic exposition of  the rules governing 
a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, and 
explains areas of  legal difficulty.34 In theorising the doctrinal method, I 
follow the normal two-part process: first, locating the sources of  the law; 
and, second, interpreting and analysing the relevant text.35 
The book is also a normative research endeavour as it does not 
simply attempt a description of  the law as it exists, but seeks to make 
the best sense of  the law with a view to offering more coherence and 
more justifiable interpretations and suggesting alternative approaches.36 
This is to foster ‘a more complete understanding of  the conceptual bases 
of  legal principles and of  the combined effects of  a range of  rules and 
procedures that touch on a particular area of  activity’.37 Pertinently, in 
33 T Hutchinson & N Duncan ‘Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal 
research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83.
34 Hutchinson & Duncan (n 33) 101. 
35 As above.
36 D Hellman & S Moreau ‘Introduction’ in D Hellman & S Moreau (eds) Philosophical 
foundations of  discrimination law (2013) 1.
37 Hutchinson & Duncan (n 33) 101.
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applying these methods, the book endeavours throughout to embrace an 
emic approach38 by demonstrating an acute awareness of  the legal, cultural, 
political, and social context of  Namibia and majestic Africa. In this light, 
the book considers the text of  the Constitution as well as judicial decisions 
drawn principally from the Supreme Court. Scholarly literature is also 
considered. International law methods also receive attention in chapter 
4 of  the book. Throughout the book, comparative material, mainly in the 
form of  judicial decisions of  foreign jurisdictions, is relied upon.39
The Constitution is silent on comparative law.40 A brief  clarification 
on why comparative law is relied on in this book, therefore, is 
appropriate. The role of  comparativism in constitutional and human 
rights law in Namibia remains under-theorised.41 The relevance and 
utility of  comparative material generally lie in the dearth of  Namibian 
jurisprudence that adjudicates claims of  socio-economic rights, including 
water rights. A right to water claim before Namibian courts, thus, would 
likely give rise to various unchartered and under-studied legal questions. 
This necessitates familiarity with ‘new’ substantive rights developments, 
and with hermeneutic approaches that may find a genesis in foreign 
experiences and legal cultures. 
38 Ninnemann concisely explains the emic approach as follows: ‘The term “emic” 
originates in linguistics, and is used regularly within the fields of  anthropology and other 
social and behavioral sciences. The word emic can be used to describe perspectives, 
constructs, data, or methodology, and in all uses serves a descriptor of  positionality. 
Sometimes referred to as the insider’s view, emic perspectives strive to recognize and 
understand the meaning of  a concept from within the cultural framework in which 
it is being observed. An emic approach attempts to assess and convey conceptual 
schemes, categories, and/or culture in terms of  members’ own indigenous and 
meaningful criteria. Intensive longitudinal, qualitative, and ethnographic methods 
are touted generally as the most effective means of  gleaning an emic perspective of  
cultural phenomena.’ K Ninnemann ‘Etic’ in S Loue & M Sajatovic (eds) Encyclopedia 
of  immigrant health (2012). 
39 See K Kariseb ‘Reflections on judicial cross-fertilisation in the adjudication of  human 
rights and constitutional disputes in Africa: The case of  Namibia’ (2021) 35 Speculum 
Juris 19.
40 On comparative law theory, see W Kamba ‘Comparative law: A theoretical framework’ 
(1974) 23 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 489; I Cram ‘Resort to foreign 
constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism 
cases’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 118 121; R Leckey ‘Thick instrumentalism and 
comparative constitutionalism’ (2009) 40 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 425 433; 
H Gutteridge Comparative law: An introduction to the comparative method of  legal study and 
research (2015).
41 See I Spigno ‘Namibia: The Supreme Court as a foreign law importer’ in T Groppi 
& M Ponthoreau (eds) The use of  foreign precedents by constitutional judges (2013) 154; 
R Hirsch Comparative matters: The renaissance of  comparative constitutional law (2014).
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Nevertheless, I approach comparative methods with caution. First, 
comparative law is prone to being unprincipled with the consequence of  the 
illegitimacy of  the resulting judgments.42 Related to this, comparativism 
can give rise to selectivity with foreign law being ‘simply results-driven’ 
to support particular outcomes.43 Selectivity is metaphorically likened 
to courts ‘looking over the crowd to find [its] friends’44 in the judicial 
reasoning process. While acknowledging the difficulty in refuting 
selectivity, Fredman offers a theoretical method to mitigate this risk of  
‘cherry-picking’ as, instead of  abandoning it, comparativism is to be 
applied through a bounded deliberation model that holds foreign law as 
a deliberative resource in human rights and constitutional law decision 
making.45 Bounded deliberation will be fully developed in chapter 5 and 
applied in chapter 6.
A second argument against comparativism concerns personal 
predilections. Although related to selectivity, the charge here is that only 
those ‘like-minded foreigners’46 whose decisions conform with a judge’s 
own ‘personal predilections’,47 or their personal, intellectual or moral 
preconceptions’,48 are likely to be invoked. This results in the use of  
foreign law as confirmatory, simply buttressing one’s value judgments, 
thereby lending apparent legitimacy to their political decisions. The 
selection of  comparative materials, the argument goes, is results-driven, a 
view concisely captured by late US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
as a pretext to impose a judge’s subjective values, invoked ‘when it agrees 
with one’s thinking’ and therefore ‘not reasoned decision making, but 
sophistry’.49 
In response to the selectivity concern, former South African Chief  
Justice Pius Langa retorts with a healthy sense of  judicial candour by not 
42 A Dodek ‘Complementary comparativism: A jurisprudence of  justification’ 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of  Toronto, 2008 12; Leckey (n 40) 433.
43 C McCrudden ‘Common law of  human rights? Transnational judicial conversations 
on constitutional rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 527; S Fredman 
‘Foreign fads and fashions? The role of  comparativism in human rights law’ (2015) 64 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 631 648; Cram (n 40) 123. 
44 Quote attributed to US Supreme Court Justice Harold Leventhal. See P Wald ‘Some 
observations on the use of  legislative history in the 1981 Supreme Court term’ (1982) 
68 Iowa Law Review 195 214.
45 Fredman (n 43) 647.
46 Roper v Simmons 543 US 551 (2005).
47 Planned Parenthood of  Southeastern Pa v Casey 505 US 833 (1992) 984 (Scalia J).
48 D Moseneke ‘The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture: Transformative 
adjudication’ (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 309 317.
49 Roper v Simmons (n 46). 
Introduction   11
altogether denying the inevitable influence of  a judge’s personal views in 
decision making, particularly in the transformative adjudicative setting.50 
For Langa, ‘constitutional legal culture requires that we expressly accept 
and embrace the role that our own beliefs, opinions and ideas play in our 
decisions’.51 Langa holds this to be ‘vital if  respect for court decisions is to 
flow from the honesty and cogency of  the reasons given for them rather 
than the authority with which they are given’.52 Comparativism allows 
us to consider the often ignored ‘sociopolitical context within which 
constitutional courts and judges operate, and how this affects whether and 
where the judicial mind travels in its search for pertinent foreign sources 
to reference’.53 This emic sentiment is particularly brought to the fore in 
this book’s consideration of  re-invigorative constitutionalism and ubuntu. 
A third criticism of  comparativism is that it is anti-democracy, anti-
sovereignty and, consequently, illegitimate. Judges, it is asserted, are not 
bound by any law other than domestic law and international law that 
binds their jurisdiction.54 The reliance upon foreign law thus is deemed 
an assault upon the democratic underpinnings of  the state by allowing 
the subversion of  domestic representatives and a decline in democratic 
decision making.55 As such, the concern is that judges take a ‘kingly role 
for themselves’56 by surrendering national sovereignty to a foreign legal 
system with no democratic accountability.57 
The debate on the role of  comparative material in Namibian 
constitutional adjudication has been largely settled since the Reverse 
Onus case58 in which the Supreme Court, per Shivute CJ, observed that 
while foreign decisions may be persuasive under certain circumstances, 
Namibian courts ‘have developed a reservoir of  distinctly Namibian 
jurisprudence based on the Constitution and Namibian law’ since 
50 P Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 4. 
51 As above. 
52 As above.
53 Hirsch (n 41) 9.
54 T Graziano ‘Is it legitimate and beneficial for judges to compare?’ in M Andenas & 
D Fairgrieve Courts and comparative law (2015) 27. For further criticisms of  
comparativism, see A Thiruvengadam ‘Forswearing “foreign moods, fads or fashions”? 
Contextualising the refusal of  Koushal to engage with foreign law’ (2014) 6 National 
University of  Juridical Sciences Law Review 595.
55 McCrudden (n 43) 530.
56 F Easterbrook ‘Foreign sources and the American Constitution’ (2006) 30 Harvard 
Journal of  Law and Public Policy 223 242.
57 Fredman (n 43) 649. 
58 Attorney-General of  Namibia v Minister of  Justice & Others 2013 (3) NR 806 (SC) (Reverse 
Onus case) para 8 (Shivute CJ concurring).
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independence.59 Namibian courts may thus follow only those decisions 
that they found persuasive due to the similarity of  applicable principles, 
provisions, issues, and other circumstances relevant to matters at hand on 
principle rather than precedent.60 Shivute CJ affirmed that ‘[u]ltimately 
the meaning and import of  a particular provision of  the Constitution must 
be ascertained with due regard to the express or implicit intention of  the 
founders of  the Constitution’.61 Shivute CJ proceeded to state that the 
value judgment that a Namibian court has to make in interpreting the 
provisions of  the Constitution must be based on the values and aspirations 
of  Namibian society.62
This book thus relies on comparative perspectives throughout, drawing 
on African jurisdictions, including those of  Kenya, Lesotho, Uganda, 
Botswana and South Africa.63 It will also tap into jurisdictions beyond the 
continent, including those of  Ireland, Canada, India and the US, as well 
as regional comparatives from the Inter-American and European human 
rights institutions. 
In order to ensure the application of  principled comparativism in the 
book, I provide justifications for any comparative material upon which 
59 See also In Re Ex Parte Attorney-General: Corporal Punishment by Organs of  State 1991 
NR 178 (SC) 188 paras 2-3, where Berker CJ, commenting on the limited utility of  
foreign precedents in determining the constitutionality of  corporal punishment by 
state organs, observed that comparative analysis could be ‘extremely instructive and 
useful’. He qualified it by stating that ‘the Namibian people are now in the position to 
determine their values free from such foreign values imposed by their former colonial 
rulers’.
60 As above.
61 Reverse Onus case (n 58) para 8 (my emphasis); internal footnotes omitted. A similar 
caveat to the reliance on foreign authorities has been adopted in South African 
jurisprudence because, as the South African Constitutional Court observed in 
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 37, ‘our society and criminal justice system 
differ’, while Kriegler J in Bernstein v Bester NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 133 
expressed himself  strongly: ‘I wish to discourage the frequent – and I suspect – often 
facile resort to foreign “authorities”. Far too often one sees citation by counsel … in 
support of  a proposition relating to our Constitution, without any attempt to explain 
why it is said to be in point … (the) blithe adoption of  alien concepts or inapposite 
precedents.’
62 Reverse Onus case (n 58) para 8.
63 As above.
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I rely and demarcate any distinguishing features from the Namibian 
context.
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the contours of  the book. The book represents 
an effort to contribute to the pursuit of  a project of  socio-economic justice 
for the majority who remain marginalised. The book thus is a project 
anchored in the promises and possibilities offered by the Constitution. 
As a decolonial and re-invigorative endeavour, the book thus stands to 
empower Namibians to recognise and claim water as an entrenched 
constitutional right. Water is not merely a welfare policy ‘good’ within the 
exclusive remit of  often unfulfilled political promises and benevolence. 
All Namibians must enjoy a life that fully realises their shared sense of  
ubuntu, thereby allowing the courts to give substance to the reality that 
omeya ogo omwenyo: ‘water is life’.
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inTerpreTing The namibian 
consTiTuTion2
2.1 Introduction
The kernel of  the argument that the book will develop in this chapter and 
in chapter 3 is that, while no express fundamental right to water exists 
under the Constitution, a judicially enforceable right to water can be read 
in or implied from the article 6 right to life. This conclusion can only be 
arrived at after evaluating, determining and applying legally cogent and 
legitimate interpretative approach(es) to constitutional interpretation in 
Namibia. This chapter will engage in a detailed analysis of  the various 
approaches to constitutional interpretation generally and as applied 
primarily by the Namibian Supreme Court. In so doing, the book takes a 
critical view of  the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the interpretation of  
the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights provisions, which will be evaluated with 
the aid of  scholarly debates around the various interpretative approaches.
Absent from the Constitution is an express internal interpretative 
clause, whether general or specific to the Bill of  Rights.1 I will adopt an 
eclectic methodology in considering the application of  original intent, 
textualism, and purposivism in chapter 3’s argument for implying a right 
to water. To clarify, this book is not specifically aimed at proving that any 
given interpretative approach or judicial decision is right or wrong. I will 
thus not engage in a ‘full-blown’ analysis of  the interpretative approaches 
or case law but will limit myself  to a concise and analytical engagement of  
what these approaches represent, as well as their respective strengths and 
weaknesses in implying a right to water. 
This chapter lays the foundation for subsequently applying the 
methods of  constitutional interpretation to the argument of  implying a 
right to water from the right to life. While the original intent, textualism 
and purposivism approaches that I will engage lie on well-trodden ground, 
they remain contentious and will be conceptualised in the Namibian 
1 Compare 2010 Kenyan Constitution arts 20(4) and 259(1); 1996 Constitution of  the 
Republic of  South Africa, 1996 sec 39(1).
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context. I will also argue that the Constitution is a transformative document 
within the meaning of  ‘transformative constitutionalism’. This is a 
neologism that has come to the fore in the last two decades to characterise 
and conceptualise the advent of  constitutionalism in jurisdictions such as 
those of  South Africa and Kenya. 
In the same breath, I will develop a further normative argument: A 
plausible reading of  the Constitution also supports what I term as the ‘re-
invigorative constitutionalism’ method. Re-invigorative constitutionalism 
is an approach that I uniquely coin and conceptualise within this 
chapter. This builds up to chapter 3 which will employ transformative 
constitutionalism and re-invigorative constitutionalism approaches – in 
addition to original intent, textualism and purposivism – to assert the 
normative basis of  reading a right to water into the right to life which will 
be rooted in the value premise of  ubuntu.
At this stage of  the analysis, this chapter refrains from substantively 
applying the different interpretative approaches to my argument of  reading 
a right to water into the right to life in article 6 of  the Constitution. Rather, 
this chapter focuses on setting up the interpretative resources that will be 
invoked to argue for an implied right to water in later chapters of  the book. 
2.2 Original intent 
One approach to constitutional interpretation is that of  original intent. 
Original intent is a species of  the broader category of  originalism, which 
seeks to prioritise determining and applying the meaning of  a provision 
based on the intention of  those who drafted a given text. As there is no 
single approach to originalism, figure 1 below by Brink is a useful graphic 
representation of  the many forms that originalism takes.2
2 See D Brink ‘Originalism and constructive interpretation’ in W Waluchow & 
S Sciaraffa (eds) The legacy of  Ronald Dworkin (2016) 273.
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Figure 1: Varieties of  originalism3
My analysis of  constitutional interpretation will focus on originalism 
as the original intent of  the framers.4 This is distinct from the genre of  
originalism of  the textualist form that claims that interpretation must be 
faithful to the original meaning of  the language of  legal provisions.5 These 
parameters are set with the aim of  focusing the analysis within a dense 
area of  jurisprudential debate and on the premise that original intent of  
the framers often is asserted in Namibian case law, as will be seen below. 
The book will consider textualism in more depth in the next part.
An original intent approach is one that enquires into what the drafters 
of  a constitution intended to include (and exclude) within the scope of  
the relevant provision in the manner that they have framed it. Therefore, 
original intent can generally be described as an interpretative exercise in 
historicism, one that limits the eligible interpretations to the principles 
that express the historical intentions of  the drafters of  a constitution.6 
3 Brink (n 2) 288.
4 R Dworkin Law’s empire (1989) 360.
5 Brink (n 2) 282; M Berman & K Toh ‘On what distinguishes new originalism from old: 
A jurisprudential take’ (2013) 82 Fordham Law Review 545; K Thomas Selected theories 
of  constitutional interpretation (2011).
6 Dworkin (n 4) 360.
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2.2.1 Critiquing the justifications 
Two principal reasons for adopting original intent in constitutional 
interpretation are identified.7 First, the approach claims legitimacy 
by allowing the law to reflect the original values that the drafters of  a 
constitution had adopted. This is an argument put forward by one of  
originalism’s main adherents, Antonin Scalia,8 who argues for originalism 
as an approach that is more compatible with the nature and purpose of  
a constitution in a democratic system. Scalia argues that constitutional 
human rights should not aim to mimic contemporary values, which is a 
function to be performed by elections and the elected.9 
The second advantage is that original intent can avoid personal 
predilections of  judges from creeping into their judicial decision making. 
The judge’s role thus is confined to ‘a matter of  discovery rather than 
invention’.10 This circumvents what Scalia calls the ‘judicial personalisation 
of  the law’.11 Thus, as Ronald Dworkin frames it, judges do not make 
substantive choices themselves but only enforce the choices made by a 
constitution’s drafters.12 
Original intent, however, is problematic in interpreting the Namibian 
Constitution. First, the advantage of  legitimacy that original intent may 
bring is undercut because, while the elected representatives of  the people 
– the Constituent Assembly members – did indeed draft the Constitution, 
there was limited wider popular public participation in determining its 
substantive provisions.13 It is a truism that human rights exist and are 
7 Discussion in S Fredman Comparative human rights law (2018); S Fredman ‘Living trees 
of  deadwood: The interpretive challenges of  the ECHR’ in N Barber et al (eds) Lord 
Sumption and the limits of  the law (2016) 5.
8 A Scalia ‘Originalism: The lesser evil’ (1988-1989) 57 University of  Cincinnati Law 
Review 849 852. 
9 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 118. 
10 A Kavanagh ‘The idea of  a living constitution’ (2002) 47 America Journal of  Jurisprudence 
255 260.
11 As above. 
12 R Dworkin A matter of  principle (1985) 34. 
13 Cottrell in her empirical study of  constitution-making and public participation in the 
Nepalese and Kenyan context makes unique observations on socio-economic rights 
by concluding: ‘Extensive public input through consultation is likely to lead to strong 
demands for the inclusion in the constitution of  issues that are closely related to 
the daily concerns of  the people, such as schooling, water, health, and roads, which 
traditionally either had no place in constitutions or were included only as policy 
directives or guidelines.’ ‘Ordinary citizens may be prepared to accept imprecise 
language that promises a great deal in terms of  life improvements for the people but 
that has little in the way of  legal teeth.’ ‘Popular input through a referendum is likely to 
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formulated for the benefit of  all people. Yet, an originalist interpretation 
would effectively prioritise, hegemonise and staticise the views of  founders 
(and their technical advisors) in establishing the meaning of  constitutional 
rights. 
Further, the relatively ‘hasty’ drafting process of  the Namibian 
Constitution undermines the claim of  the drafter’s legitimacy as 
irreproachable. It is a matter of  historical record that the Constituent 
Assembly first sat on 21 November 1989 and within three months agreed 
on the text of  the Constitution on 9 February 1990 without demur.14 The 
Constitution subsequently came into force on the date of  independence – 
21 March 1990 – as the supreme law of  Namibia.15 While the adoption 
of  the Constitution within such a comparatively short timeframe can be 
politically heralded, it has (inadvertently or otherwise) resulted in limited 
debate and meaningful engagement with all of  the provisions of  the then 
draft Constitution. 
The difficulty in discerning the intention of  the drafters is revealed 
in the Constituent Assembly Debates.16 Even though the Constitution 
is relatively recent, the Constituent Assembly Debates lack substantive 
content as they span only two volumes that total 470 pages – yet with 
generous line spacing. Beyond the abolition of  the death penalty, the 
minutes of  the Constituent Assembly Debates record no discussion on 
what was meant by ‘life’ or the reasons behind the laconic phraseology 
adopted in article 6 of  the Constitution, for instance.17 Comparatively, 
constituent assembly debates from countries such as India, Kenya and 
South Africa run into volumes with thousands of  pages; yet, even in those 
jurisdictions, the courts have hesitated over attaching significant weight 
upon the views contained therein.18 
turn on issues of  political power and on those that are the concerns of  leaders, rather 
than on those of  the people at the grass roots, including [economic, social, and cultural 
rights].’ See J Cottrell ‘Ensuring equal rights in constitutions: Public participation in 
drafting economic, social and cultural rights’ in J Heymann & A Cassola (eds) Making 
equal rights real (2012) 80-81.
14 Namibia National Archives Namibia Constituent Assembly Debates 21 November 1989-21 
January 1990 Vol 1 and 2 (1990) (Constituent Assembly Debates).
15 Constitution art 1(6). 
16 The Constituent Assembly Debates are only available as hard copies at the National 
Archives of  Namibia, although a digital version is now on record with this author.
17 While the right to life’s meaning may have been discussed by the Standing Committee 
mandated to produce a draft Constitution, the said Committee’s deliberations were 
confidential and there is no record that can be relied upon. 
18 See also S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (Makwanyane) para 18. The legislature 
in Botswana has even gone as far as proscribing the interpretative recourse to the 
debates in the National Assembly of  Botswana. Botswana Interpretation Act sec 24(1).
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Second, in response to the justification for originalism as avoiding the 
‘personal predilections’ of  judges from informing their judicial decisions, 
this may be counteracted by the argument that the recourse to original 
intention is ‘mischievous’ as it can cover up the subjective decisions 
that judges inevitably make and yet may pretend have not occurred.19 
Furthermore, polyvocality in perspectives is revealed in the Constituent 
Assembly Debates which, by and large, reflect the comments of  individuals 
or, at best, the collective position of  a given political formation that 
participated in the drafting. Considering that there were numerous parties 
and positions, one ought to be abundantly cautious with the role that such 
views are to play and the weight to be attached to them in determining the 
original intent of  the framers.20
Third, a recourse to determining and applying the intention of  the 
drafters gives rise to the so-phrased ‘dead hands of  the past’ argument.21 
The essence of  this argument opposes an interpretation that is wedded to 
the views of  people who have long departed and who lived in radically 
different societies and social environments. While the ‘dead hands’ 
argument is most prominently asserted in comparative constitutional 
contexts such as the US, it is not necessarily fatal, so to speak, when 
applied to a Namibian context: The Constitution was drafted less than 
three decades ago; all of  the founding drafters are alive or are in living 
memory. This is unlike older constitutions such as that of  the US where 
there is an entrenched pre-occupation with originalism (in both the 
textualist and framer’s intent moulds) in constitutional interpretation. In 
the US, the ‘dead hands’ that drafted the US Constitution were indeed sex, 
race, and class homogeneous, at the exclusion of  women, racial minorities, 
the enslaved and the poor.22 
Nevertheless, the core of  the problem identified by the ‘dead hands’ 
argument not only applies to ‘old’ constitutions; one should be mindful 
that the Namibian Constitution will not be ‘young’ forever. This is 
well-illustrated in the Canadian Charter of  Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, which is a relatively recent document adopted in 1982. Yet, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has not held itself  to be bound by the founder’s 
original intention and has preferred a purposive approach to Canadian 
19 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) citing Dworkin (n 12) 34.
20 Makwanyane (n 18) para 18. 
21 Kavanagh (n 10) 291; M McConnell ‘Textualism and the dead hand of  the past’ (1997) 
66 George Washington Law Review 1127.
22 Fredman Comparative human rights (n 7).
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constitutional interpretation.23 The book will return to comprehensively 
consider purposivism later in this chapter. 
At this stage of  the analysis it is of  persuasive value to draw on the 
wisdom of  the Kenyan Supreme Court in Speaker of  the Senate & Another v 
Attorney-General (Speaker of  the Senate)24 which rejected a binding recourse 
to, and finality of, the original intention of  the drafters of  the Kenyan 
Constitution. It clarified that in interpreting the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, 
the Kenyan Supreme Court exercises its constitutional powers to ‘provide 
high-yielding interpretive guidance on the Constitution’, which must be 
done in a manner that advances the Kenyan Constitution’s ‘purposes, 
gives effect to its intents, and illuminates its contents’.25 The Kenyan 
Supreme Court pointed out that it must also remain conscious that 
‘constitution-making requires compromise, which can occasionally lead to 
contradictions; and that the political and social demands of  compromise 
that mark constitutional moments, fertilise vagueness in phraseology 
and draftsmanship’.26 The Court’s role is to ‘resolve these contradictions; 
clarify draftsmanship-gaps; and settle constitutional disputes’.27 The 
Kenyan Supreme Court further proceeded to state:28
Constitution-making does not end with its promulgation; it continues with 
its interpretation. It is the duty of  the Court to illuminate legal penumbras 
that constitutions borne out of  long drawn compromises, such as ours, tend 
to create. The constitutional text and letter may not properly express the 
minds of  the framers, and the minds and hands of  the framers may also fail to 
properly mine [sic] the aspirations of  the people. The limitations of  mind and 
hand should not defeat the aspirations of  the people. It is in this context that 
the spirit of  the Constitution has to be invoked by the Court as the searchlight 
for the illumination and elimination of  these legal penumbras.
Related to the ‘dead hands of  the past’ argument, even if  one is to 
have recourse to the original intention of  the drafters of  the Namibian 
Constitution, the reality is that such intention may (i) not factually exist; 
or (ii) be ambiguous and indeterminate. In the Namibian context, this is 
further complicated by the reality that even where the drafting intention 
23 S Beaulac ‘Constitutional interpretation: On issues of  ontology and of  interlegality’ in 
P Oliver et al (eds) Oxford handbook of  the Canadian Constitution (2017) 867. 




28 As above (emphasis in original).
Interpreting the Namibian Constitution   21
does exist, for the most part it is confidential and privileged, and thus not 
recorded anywhere.29 
Again, I turn to Canada to best illustrate this problem. In Re BC 
Motor Vehicle Act30 the Canadian Supreme Court was faced with the 
challenge of  determining the intention behind the phrase ‘principles of  
fundamental justice’ in section 7 of  the 1981 Canadian Charter of  Rights 
and Freedoms, which states: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of  the person and the right not to be deprived thereof  except in 
accordance with the principles of  fundamental justice’. One of  the main 
sources relied upon to support the argument that ‘fundamental justice’ was 
simply synonymous with natural justice was the minutes of  Procedure of  
the Special Joint Committee that drafted the Canadian Charter. Although 
the Court considered this as evidence of  the intent of  the legislative bodies 
that adopted the Canadian Charter, it took the view that it would be 
‘erroneous to give these materials anything but minimal weight’31 given 
the unreliability of  such speeches and statements. The Court also avoided 
an approach that would effectively render the Canadian Charter ‘frozen 
in time to the moment of  adoption with little or no possibility of  growth, 
development and adjustment to changing societal needs’.32 
It is not a foregone conclusion that the founders of  the Namibian 
Constitution, wise and gallant as many of  them were, had expressed 
an opinion or intention on all the issues addressed in the Constitution. 
Dworkin captures the essence of  the ‘frozen in time’ concern by cautioning 
that interpreting a constitution from the perspective of  historical intent 
as exhaustive ‘is tantamount to denying that the Constitution expresses 
principles, for principles cannot be seen as stopping where some historical 
statesman’s time, imagination, and interest stopped’.33 Thus, Dworkin 
aptly concludes that ‘[t]he Constitution takes rights seriously; historicism 
does not’.34
29 Both the technical advisors and the Standing Committee of  21 Constituent Assembly 
members tasked to prepare the draft of  Constitution were bound by confidentiality as 
to their drafting deliberations. See Constituent Assembly Debates (n 16) 158-160.
30 Re BC Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 SCR 486 para 52.
31 Re BC Motor Vehicle Act (n 30) para 53.
32 As above. 
33 Dworkin (n 4) 368-369, commenting in the context of  historicism as the express 
historical intention of  the framers. Compare discussion in R Ekins The nature of  
legislative intent (2013) 16, for a summation of  Dworkin’s scepticism to legislative intent.
34 As above. 
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2.2.2 Original intent in Namibian courts 
While I have complicated the recourse to original intent in constitutional 
interpretation, the Namibian Supreme Court has variously asserted 
the relevance of  original intent in interpretating the provision of  the 
Constitution. Here, I consider three decisions that affirm this: Cultura 
2000, the Reverse Onus case and Kashela.35 These decisions reveal that the 
Supreme Court holds the intention of  the Constitution’s founders to be 
relevant to the interpretative enquiry, although such an intention is not 
determinative in and of  itself. 
In Cultura 2000 the issue was the constitutionality of  a piece of  
legislation enacted to repudiate the actions of  the pre-independence 
South West African administration to donate monies and property to 
an organisation established for the promotion and preservation of  the 
cultures of  persons of  European descent. The Supreme Court expressly 
referred to and relied upon the original intention behind the founders’ 
inclusion of  article 144 on international law.36 
Again, in the Reverse Onus case37 the Supreme Court was directly 
petitioned as a court of  first and final instance by the Attorney-General 
to determine whether certain provisions of  the Criminal Procedure Act 
that had cast a reverse onus on an accused person were in conflict with the 
presumption of  innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination and fair 
trial rights in the Constitution. The Supreme Court stated that ‘[u]ltimately 
the meaning and import of  a particular provision of  the Constitution must 
be ascertained with due regard to the express or implicit intention of  the 
founders of  the Constitution’.38 
Further, in Kashela – a case concerning the fundamental right to 
property in article 16 of  the Constitution – Damaseb DCJ asserted that 
‘[i]t could not have been the intention of  the framers of  the Constitution 
to grant a right which was unenforceable by the courts; for where there is 
35 See also Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of  the Republic of  Namibia 2009 
(2) NR 596 (SC); Hendricks & Others v Attorney-General, Namibia & Others 2002 NR 353 
(HC) 358; S v Van den Berg 1995 NR 23 (HC) 39H-J.
36 Government of  the Republic of  Namibia & Another v Cultura 2000 1993 NR 328 (SC) 333 
(Cultura 2000).
37 Attorney-General of  Namibia v Minister of  Justice & Others 2013 (3) NR 806 (SC) (Reverse 
Onus case).
38 Reverse Onus case (n 37) 817.
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a right, there must be a remedy to be fashioned by the court seized with 
the matter’.39
In light of  the Supreme Court’s determination that the founders’ 
intention is relevant to the interpretative enquiry, the constitutional 
analysis to be pursued in subsequent chapters will include recourse to the 
original intent of  the founders. This is to the extent that original intent 
is practically relevant, bearing in mind that, as argued above, original 
intention may be difficult to ascertain, ambiguous or even non-existent. 
Thus, this inherently limits the relevance of  original intent in practice, 
especially in light of  the normative challenge as to the extent to which 
founders’ intent should continue to be binding upon the interpreter.
2.3 Textualism 
The textualist approach to constitutional interpretation focuses on the 
plain meaning of  the language of  the Constitution. Although I consider 
it independently in this analysis, textualism is often conceptualised as a 
species of  originalism where one seeks to determine the original meaning 
(either the public meaning or the speaker’s meaning) that the text of  the 
provision under interpretation was accorded.40 Fredman observes that 
textualism’s closeness to originalism ensues because its rationale is often 
stated to be in originalist terms: The text is the surest guide to the intention 
of  those who frame it.41 
Textualism emphasises the meaning of  words or phrases used by the 
constitutional provision in question. Textualism requires a somewhat 
sequential engagement with the text of  the Constitution which, as a 
general methodology, is pithily captured by Calabresi and Prakash42 as 
embodying the following four stages:
(1) Consider the plain meaning of  the words, while construing them 
holistically in light of  the entire Constitution. 
(2) If  the original meaning of  the words remains ambiguous after consulting 
a dictionary or grammar book, consider next any widely read explanatory 
statements made about them in public contemporaneously with their 
39 Kashela v Katima Mulilo Town Council 2018 (4) NR 1160 (SC) para 70, where the 
Supreme Court appears to adopt an inductive method of  inferring the intention of  
the founders without citation. This inductive approach to the founders’ intention is 
frequently seen in the literature.
40 Brink (n 2) 288.
41 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 125.
42 S Calabresi & S Prakash ‘The President’s power to execute the laws’ (1994) 104 Yale 
Law Journal 541 553.
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ratification. These might shed light on the original meaning that the text 
had to the drafters. 
(3) If  ambiguity persists, consider any privately-made statements about 
the meaning of  the text that were uttered or written prior to or 
contemporaneously with ratification into law. These statements might be 
relevant if, and only if, they reveal something about the original public 
meaning that the text had to the drafters. 
(4) If  ambiguity still persists, consider lastly any post-enactment history or 
practice that might shed light on the original meaning the constitutional 
text had to those who wrote it into law. Such history is the least reliable 
source for recovering the original meaning of  the law, but may in some 
instances help us recover the original understanding of  an otherwise 
unfathomable and obscure text. 
From the above the ‘plain meaning of  words’ would constitute the guiding 
light in interpretation as it is assumed that the founders must have intended 
words to have the plain meaning that words bear.43 Textualism arguably 
may also permit the interpreter to go beyond some of  the strictures of  
originalism as a textualist would not necessarily be concerned with the 
subjective intentions of  the framers nor with the idiosyncratic use of  
language. Rather, they aim to understand how language is understood.44 
While it may be accepted that, to the extent that one can discern meaning 
from the text, one should give effect to it, the meaning is not easily 
discernible from the text.
As noted earlier, there is some overlap between textualism and 
originalism, which is revealed in that various originalists are co-identified 
as textualists, including Scalia.45 As such, it is not surprising that the 
shortcomings of  the textual approach mirror those found in original 
intent. I will examine the most prominent drawbacks, although it is not 
within the province of  the book to exhaustively consider the same.46 
First, textualism, like original intent, may require judges to masquerade 
as historians; yet this too is not certain to provide a sufficiently determinate 
result.47 Second, to establish the ‘plain meaning’ of  words, dictionaries are 
frequently used as interpretative resources. However, rarely do dictionaries 
43 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 125. Note Waldron’s different account of  
textualism: J Waldron ‘Partly laws common to all mankind’ in J Waldron (ed) Foreign 
law in American courts (2012) 155.
44 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 125.
45 Calabresi & Prakash (n 42) 983. 
46 Discussion in Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 125.
47 Critique in Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 125.
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provide us with a conclusive answer on the interpretation of  a word, even 
less so for the often technical, legalistic and context-sensitive phrases 
used in constitutions. This is the inherent limitation in the interpretive 
recourse to dictionaries. They are difficult to be effectively utilised without 
giving rise to the risk of  judicial manipulation in light of  the reality that 
dictionaries do not offer a single, true meaning of  a word. Rather, they 
often offer multiple, sometimes obscure, meanings that are intended to 
capture a wide range of  possible usages.48 Third, even if  we were to seek to 
establish the plain meaning of  the words that the framers intended, this is 
likely to be indeterminate from the historical sources of  the Constitution. 
This is assuming and to the extent that the drafting history is available for 
critical consultation in the first place. 
Turning to case law, the Namibian Supreme Court has recognised the 
role of  the Constitution’s text in interpretation but has rejected the strict 
construal of  words and phrases in the narrow and precise manner that 
some textualists advocate. While the Supreme Court has largely adopted a 
purposive approach – which is expanded upon below – it has not rendered 
the language used in a given text irrelevant to the interpretative enquiry. 
The Supreme Court stated in the Reverse Onus case that ‘in interpreting 
constitutional rights, close scrutiny should be given to the language of  the 
Constitution itself in ascertaining the underlying meaning and purpose of  
the provision in question’.49 Further, it is arguable that the Namibian High 
Court in Kauesa50 endorsed textualist considerations when it comes to 
reconciling the position dictated by international law with the provisions 
of  the Constitution.51 Kauesa determined that an international law position 
will only be overridden where the Constitution’s provisions are ‘equivocal 
or uncertain’.52
48 For a critique of  dictionaries in constitutional interpretation, see P Rubin ‘War of  the 
words: How courts can use dictionaries in accordance with textualist principles’ (2010) 
60 Duke Law Journal 167. 
49 Reverse Onus case (n 37) 816-817 (my emphasis). 
50 Kauesa v Minister of  Home Affairs 1994 NR 135 (HC) (Kausea). Kauesa concerned the 
constitutionality of  a provision in the Regulations to the Police Act that prohibited 
police officers from commenting unfavourably against the government and its 
conformity with the freedom of  expression in the African Charter. 
51 Kauesa (n 50) is discussed in the context of  international law in ch 4.
52 Kauesa (n 50) 141.
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2.4 Purposive or ‘living tree’ interpretation
2.4.1 A historical and theoretical account 
Purposive interpretation aims to identify the purposes, core values and 
principles that a constitution seeks to achieve. As such, it gives effect to 
them, protects them and promotes them.53 The process of  interpretation 
thus is geared to unearthing the purpose of  the provision and not merely 
the meaning of  the words used to communicate such purpose.54 
Purposivism is said to retain its epistemic origins in Canadian 
statutory interpretation, specifically in the 1930 decision of  Edwards v 
Attorney-General for Canada,55 widely known as the Persons case. There, 
the dispute centred around whether the word ‘persons’ in a statute was 
to be understood as meaning only men to the exclusion of  women, in 
the context of  voting rights and women’s eligibility to hold public office. 
In interpreting the legislation in question, the Privy Council rejected an 
originalist approach that would render the word ‘persons’ susceptible to 
a narrow and technical construction. Rather, the Court determined that 
the relevant statute was a ‘living tree capable of  growth and expansion 
within its natural limits’.56 It was thus held that there was no present 
reason to exclude women from the meaning of  ‘persons’. Purposivism is 
often expressed metaphorically as ‘living tree’ interpretation. In this vein, 
the Constitutional Court of  Uganda in Tinyefuza v Attorney-General aptly 
captures the essence of  a ‘living’ constitution which embraces purposivism 
in the context of  fundamental rights thus:57 
Constitutional provisions should be given liberal construction, unfettered with 
technicalities because while the language of  the Constitution does not change, 
the changing circumstances of  a progressive society for which it was designed 
may give rise to new and fuller import to its meaning. A constitutional provision 
containing a fundamental right is a permanent provision intended to cater 
for all time to come and, therefore, while interpreting such a provision, the 
approach of  the Court should be dynamic, progressive and liberal or flexible, 
53 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7) 125.
54 A Barak & S Bashi Purposive interpretation in law (2007).
55 Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada [1930] AC 124 (Judicial Committee of  the Privy 
Council (Canada)) (Persons case). 
56 Persons case (n 55) 107.
57 Tinyefuza v Attorney-General [1997] UGCC 3. See also M Ssenyonjo ‘The domestic 
protection and promotion of  human rights under the 1995 Ugandan Constitution’ 
(2002) 20 Netherlands Quarterly of  Human Rights 445 457.
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keeping in view ideals of  the people, socio-economic and politico-cultural 
values so as to extend the benefit of  the same to the maximum possible.
With the Persons case establishing purposive interpretation in Canada, it 
has since been transplanted to other jurisdictions.58 Indeed, since the advent 
of  constitutional supremacy, purposivism has now been well-entrenched 
in Namibian constitutional interpretation. In the process, it upended the 
previous tradition characterised as ‘extreme legal positivism’59 that was 
rooted in parliamentary sovereignty60 and that ultimately informed the 
strict textualist approach to interpretation. 
What follows is a critique of  Namibian jurisprudence which Amoo 
terms ‘a natural law cum realist or a purposive approach’.61
2.4.2 Purposive interpretation in Namibian courts
The Namibian High Court in Acheson asserted that although the 
Constitution is enacted in the form of  a statute, it is sui generis.62 In 
Acheson Mahomed J63 had to reconcile the bail provisions of  the Criminal 
Procedure Act of  1977 with the then newly-entrenched right to personal 
liberty in article 7 of  the Constitution. Mahomed J in a famous passage 
recalled the nature of  a constitution as not merely mechanically defining 
the government and the relations between the government and the 
governed. Rather, a constitution is 
a ‘mirror reflecting the national soul’, the identification of  the ideals and 
aspirations of  a nation; the articulation of  the values bonding its people and 
disciplining its government. The spirit and the tenor of  the constitution must 
58 B Miller ‘Origin myth: The Persons case, the living tree, and the new originalism’ in 
G Huscroft & B Miller (eds) The challenge of  originalism (2013) 120.
59 S Schulz ‘In dubio pro libertate: The general freedom right and the Namibian Constitution’ 
in A Bösl et al (eds) Constitutional democracy in Namibia: A critical analysis after two decades 
(2012) 169 174.
60 See also M Hinz ‘Justice: Beyond the limits of  law and the Namibian Constitution’ in 
Bösl et al (n 59) 159.
61 S Amoo An introduction to Namibian law: Materials and cases (2008) 41, citing J Dugard 
‘The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty’ (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 
181.
62 S v Acheson 1991 NR 1 (HC) 10.
63 This part will reference the jurisprudence of  Justice Ismail Mahomed at length given 
his prominent role in the incipient stages of  constitutional interpretation jurisprudence. 
Justice Mahomed served as a Namibian High Court judge (Mahomed J), then as a 
Namibian Supreme Court Judge of  Appeal (Mahomed JA) and finally as Namibian 
Chief  Justice (Mahomed CJ) before retiring to join the South African Constitutional 
Court as Chief  Justice. 
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therefore preside over and permeate the processes of  judicial interpretation 
and judicial discretion.64 
Although decided in the High Court, Acheson is the pioneering 
decision that has set the tone for constitutional interpretation. The 
Acheson dictum has been ubiquitously quoted, endorsed and applied by 
the Supreme Court, perhaps most prominently in Minister of  Defence v 
Mwandinghi (Mwandinghi),65 where the Supreme Court had to decide on 
whether the post-independence Namibian Minister of  Defence could be 
substituted for the pre-independence South African Minister of  Defence. 
The factual context was a delictual claim for damages arising out of  an 
injury caused to the respondent, Mr Mwandinghi, by South African forces 
operating in Namibia before independence. The Supreme Court declined 
to employ a narrow and mechanical interpretation of  the phrase ‘anything 
done’ in article 140(3) of  the Constitution which would have limited the 
application of  the provisions to lawful actions. While approvingly citing 
the Acheson dictum, Mahomed JA66 elaborated upon the substance of  
purposivism in the following terms:67 
A constitution is an organic instrument. Although it is enacted in the form of  
a statute, it is sui generis. It must broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted 
so as to avoid the ‘austerity of  tabulated legalism’ and so as to enable it 
to continue to play a creative and dynamic role in the expression and the 
achievement of  the ideals and aspirations of  the nation, in the articulation of  
the values bonding its people and in disciplining its government. 
Since the adoption of  the Constitution, Namibian courts, by and large, 
have followed this purposive approach to constitutional interpretation.68 
Moreover, the ‘organic instrument’ nature of  the Constitution that 
Mahomed CJ describes in Cultura 200069 justifies the analogy of  the 
Constitution as a ‘living tree’ that allows for an evolutionary interpretation. 
64 Acheson (n 62) para 10. 
65 Minister of  Defence v Mwandinghi 1993 NR 63 (SC) 69. See also Minister of  Defence v 
Mwandinghi 1993 NR 263 (HC) 273; Cultura 2000 (n 36); S v Van Wyk 1993 NR 426 
(SC) 456; S v Kandovazu 1998 NR 1 (SC) 3; Alexander v Minister of  Justice & Others 2010 
(1) NR 328 (SC); MW v Minister of  Home Affairs 2016 (3) NR 707 (SC) 719.
66 Mahomed subsequently became a justice of  the Namibian Supreme Court. 
67 Mwandinghi (n 65) 69 (my emphasis); Cultura 2000 (n 36).
68 Kauesa (HC) (n 50) 118; Rally for Democracy and Progress v Electoral Commission of  
Namibia 2013 (3) NR 664 (SC).
69 Cultura 2000 (n 36) 340.
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In the 2013 Reverse Onus case, Shivute CJ approvingly cites the dicta in 
Mwandinghi and Acheson in asserting the two general principles on how the 
Constitution should be interpreted: The first principle is in a broad, liberal 
and purposive manner; where generous and purposive interpretations 
do not coincide, generous interpretations are to yield to purposive 
interpretation.70 Shivute CJ identifies the second principle in the following 
terms: ‘In interpreting constitutional rights, close scrutiny should be given 
to the language of  the Constitution itself  in ascertaining the underlying 
meaning and purpose of  the provision in question.’71 
This second principle thus demonstrates that while purposivism 
constitutes the primary approach to constitutional interpretation, textual 
considerations remain relevant as a secondary recourse. While Shivute 
CJ’s dictum in the Reverse Onus case is one of  the more lucid accounts 
of  the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation, 
ambiguity remains as to how the different interpretative approaches are 
to be reconciled given the suggestion that purposive interpretation applies 
alongside original intent and textualism. 
2.4.3 Purposivism as value judgments
An analysis of  the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence further evinces that, in 
adopting purposivism, the Supreme Court has followed a value-oriented 
approach that emphasises an interpretative recourse to value judgments. 
These value judgments must be objectively articulated and identified.72 
Value judgments, however, raise various pertinent methodological and 
evidentiary questions which include the following:73 How are these values 
to be identified and what is their authoritative source? How do judges 
overcome the inherent subjectivity in making value judgments? What is the 
binding effect of  these values? I will not attempt to address these questions 
exhaustively but will tackle some of  the most prominent concerns below 
insofar as relevant to the ubuntu discussion in chapter 3.
70 Reverse Onus case (n 37) 816. While the Supreme Court does not expressly define a 
‘generous’ interpretation, we can glean from Botswana’s Court of  Appeal, where 
generous construction means that one ‘must interpret the constitution in such a way as 
not to whittle down any of  the rights of  freedom unless by very clear and unambiguous 
words such interpretation is compelling’. Unity Dow v Attorney-General of  Botswana 1992 
BLR 119 (CA) 165 (Aguda JA).
71 Reverse Onus case (n 37) 817.
72 In Re Ex parte Attorney-General: Corporal Punishment by Organs of  State 1991 NR 178 (SC) 
188 (Corporal Punishment). 
73 S Amoo ‘The constitutional jurisprudential development in Namibia since 1985’ in 
N Horn & A Bösl (eds) Human rights and the rule of  law in Namibia (2010) 49. 
30   Chapter 2
I consider the two approaches to value identification that can be traced 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: (a) constitutionally expressed 
values; and (b) values as identified by ‘national institutions’. Both these 
approaches, however, are caught on the horns of  a dilemma, as revealed 
below. 
Purposivism through constitutional values
The first approach of  identifying values from the Constitution74 finds 
support in the Corporal Punishment75 decision. However, using the 
Constitution’s provisions as a reference point is insufficiently conclusive 
in identifying values: The possibilities are simply endless. Also, those 
very provisions in the Constitution that often are invoked for value 
identification (such as equality, dignity, non-discrimination, the rule of  
law, and so forth) are couched in inherently broad and vague language 
that would themselves require a judicial interpretation that has recourse to 
values;76 in other words, a determination of  the values within the values. The 
utility of  ubuntu in overcoming this challenge will be revealed in chapter 
3.
Purposivism through national institutions
The second approach would be to use ‘national institutions’ to identify 
values. This was also the approach of  the Supreme Court in Corporal 
Punishment77 where Mahomed AJA offers national institutions as an 
‘objective’ source with due regard to the values of  the ‘civilised international 
community’.78 The claim here is that national institutions are an objective 
source for the determination of  values. However, this needs further 
interrogation. As Fiss sets out, objectivity (in the legal sense rather than 
the scientific sense) connotes standards and implies that an interpretation 
can be measured against a set of  norms that transcend the particular 
vantage point of  the person offering the interpretation.79 
74 Amoo (n 73) 49. Amoo derives this approach from the former Namibian Chief  Justice 
Johan Strydom in an extra-judicial address that Amoo cites.
75 Corporal Punishment (n 72) 188, where the Supreme Court had to determine whether a 
particular form of  corporal punishment that was administered by or on the authority 
of  a state organ constituted cruel or inhumane treatment which is prohibited under the 
right to dignity in art 8 of  the Constitution.
76 Amoo (n 73) 50.
77 Corporal Punishment (n 72). 
78 Corporal Punishment (n 72) 188.
79 O Fiss ‘Objectivity and interpretations’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739 744.
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One can appreciate the attractiveness of  asserting values through 
recourse to objective sources: Courts must guard against the temptation 
of  judges to introduce their preferences or – to invoke US Chief  Justice 
Warren Burger’s famous phraseology – their ‘personal predilections’ to 
inform their judicial choices in constitutional interpretation.80 However, 
even assuming that national institutions indeed are an objective source, 
the norms, values and aspirations that are asserted by national institutions 
may well be those of  the majority but may equally run contrary to the 
values of  the Constitution, which is the ultimate touchstone. A classic 
example is in the context of  sexual minorities where the majority may be 
in favour of  discrimination based on ‘sex’, yet ‘sex’ is a protected category 
under the aegis of  the Constitution81 (assuming ‘sex’ includes ‘sexual 
orientation’).82 
The quandary persists: What constitutes national institutions and 
how objective are these sources of  values? One possible answer is that 
the appropriate national institution is Parliament as the Supreme Court 
determined in Namunjepo v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison concerning 
the constitutionality of  placing prisoners in chains: ‘Parliament, being 
the chosen representatives of  the people of  Namibia, is one of  the most 
important institutions to express the current day values of  the people.’83 
The use of  Parliament as a values benchmark may indeed be 
‘objectively’ justified if  we consider that Parliament is constituted of  
the National Assembly (96 of  the 102 members with voting rights are 
periodically elected through party political lists) and the National Council 
(all members are periodically elected as representatives from all the 
regions of  Namibia through their respective regional councils). As such, 
Parliament may be deemed appropriate because of  its representative 
nature and thus is the ‘voice of  the people’. 
Nevertheless, recourse to Parliament for values determination 
remains problematic for various reasons. First, the Namunjepo guidance 
is inadequate as it is imprecise as to whether the contemporary values 
or norms of  Namibian peoples are those that have been articulated and 
enacted in the form of  legislation, or whether they are those that constitute 
80 Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 (1972) 376. 
81 The Constitution, art 10(2). 
82 Chairperson of  the Immigration Selection Board v Frank & Another 2001 NR 107 (SC) 
(Frank); Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of  Republic of  Namibia & 
Others 2009 (2) NR 596 (SC); see Amoo (n 73) 49. 
83 Namunjepo & Others v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison & Another 1999 NR 271 (SC) 
284.
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the expressed – verbal or written – opinions of  parliamentarians in the 
form of  parliamentary debates, or even extra-parliamentary speeches. 
Indeed, politicians are not known to be non-capricious with the views 
they hold. Moreover, drawing on national institutions alone would fail to 
protect potentially silent majorities (or minorities) against an assertion of  
values by those minorities (or majorities) who may hold greater influence 
through the institutional offices they retain. 
Second, it is often difficult, sometimes impossible, to discern from 
parliamentary debates (such as those drawn from Hansard) what the 
singular view of  Parliament is on a specific issue. The reality is that some 
parliamentarians’ voices may be more vocal than others. For legislation, this 
is equally problematic as, in addition to the potential nebulosity of  what the 
relevant values they embody, this approach runs the risk of  subordinating 
the Constitution to the views expressed in legislation in determining values 
whereas constitutional supremacy prevails in Namibia.84 In this vein, a 
departure from the constitutional values in the process of  constitutional 
interpretation can be seen in Mushwena. Here, the Supreme Court’s majority 
held that the High Court could exercise its criminal jurisdiction under the 
Criminal Procedure Act of  1977, notwithstanding the illegal refoulement 
of  the accused persons (the respondents) from Namibia – contrary to the 
specifications of  the extradition agreements in force between Namibia, 
and Zambia and Botswana, respectively.85 Mushwena was thus a departure 
from the constitutional value of  upholding the rule of  law.86
Thirdly, if  we are to have recourse to Parliament – whether through 
the views it expresses in legislation or through debates – this risks reducing 
the court’s role to one of  norm-reflector rather than norm-setter, as Fredman 
has explained.87 The challenge with a court being a norm-reflector is that 
it risks relegating the court’s role to a populist endeavour of  what the 
majority deems appropriate at a given time (considering that views are 
inherently liable to change), which alone is insufficient to ascertain values 
that determine the existence, or otherwise, of  a human right or a violation 
thereof.
84 K Mundia ‘Ronald Dworkin and the Supreme Court of  Namibia’ unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of  Pretoria, 2014 72. 
85 S v Mushwena 2004 NR 276 (SC); see Mundia (n 84).
86 See also S v Likanyi 2017 (3) NR 771 (SC) (Shivute CJ concurring) para 8 where the 
Supreme Court, addressing the facts similar to those in Mushwena, re-affirmed the 
constitutional commitment to the rule of  law.
87 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7).
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Parliament is not the only institution (national or otherwise) that the 
Supreme Court has identified to source values. In Frank,88 O’Linn AJA 
went further in stating that those institutions that can provide evidence of  
values include: ‘Parliament, courts, tribal authorities, common law, statute 
law and tribal law, political parties, news media, trade unions, established 
Namibian churches and other relevant community-based organizations’.89 
The use of  this miscellany of  institutional sources to determine values can 
also be criticised for inviting an unprincipled approach and risking the 
displacement of  constitutional values such as human dignity and equality. 
This renders the Frank approach vulnerable to the criticism of  reducing 
value judgment-making to an unsystematic determination of  what is the 
‘national popular opinion’. Even if  we assume homogeneity in the public’s 
perspective on a given issue, popular opinion is inherently vulnerable to 
the momentary whims and caprices of  the public. The problematic nature 
of  public opinion is appositely summed up when Chaskalson P cautioned 
in Makwanyane thus:90 
Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but in itself, it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and 
to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If  public opinion were decisive 
there would be no need for constitutional adjudication.
Further, it is not hard to imagine a lack of  consensus between and even 
within the dense plurality of  institutions upon which O’Linn AJA relies 
to source values. For example, Namibian tribal authorities, churches, and 
community-based organisations may likely assert diametrically opposed 
values. Arguably, the use of  these multiple sources as evidence of  values 
had led the Supreme Court to apply a restrictive and narrow interpretation 
to ‘sex’ in Frank. 
In this context, Kenneth Mundia has diligently studied the 
jurisprudence of  the Supreme Court and identified glaring inconsistencies 
in the application of  purposive interpretation and, as a corollary, the 
values that have been judicially asserted and applied.91 Mundia finds that 
the Supreme Court’s record in particularly ‘hard cases’ such as Frank and 
Mushwena is thus wanting because of  ‘myopic and pedantic’92 approaches 
88 Frank (n 82).
89 Frank (n 82) 137.
90 Makwanyane (n 18) para 88.
91 Mundia (n 84). 
92 K Mundia ‘A constructive interpretation of  the Namibian Constitution: Transposing 
Dworkin to Namibia’s constitutional jurisprudence’ (2017) 31 Southern African Public 
Law 73 81. 
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to constitutional interpretation. While engaging in a full-blown critique 
of  the value judgments jurisprudence of  the Supreme Court is beyond the 
remit of  this book, it is appropriate to conclude that the use of  institutions, 
whether national or otherwise, risks leading one into the minefield of  
problems identified above. 
2.4.4 Purposivism concluded 
To sum up, I have argued in this section that the Supreme Court has 
adopted the purposive approach to constitutional interpretation with a 
principal recourse to value judgments. The first principle is for a broad, 
liberal, and purposive reading, with the Constitution being likened to a 
living tree. The second principle requires scrutiny of  the language of  the 
Constitution itself  in ascertaining the underlying meaning and purpose 
of  the provision in question. However, the Supreme Court’s approach 
to purposivism has not been consistent. The earlier critique has exposed 
various flaws. In particular, there remains ambiguity in determining which 
values are to be engaged and the source of  such values. Without entirely 
rejecting the relevance of  the objective sources cited in various Supreme 
Court decisions, I will venture to offer an approach to purposivism that 
invokes African values as informed by the re-invigorative constitutionalism 
method and specifically ubuntu as advanced in chapter 3. 
Before elaborating on re-invigorative constitutionalism, the book will 
substantiate my claim for the Namibian Constitution as ‘transformative’, 
in order to develop a framework for locating the values that inform 
constitutional rights interpretation appropriately. 
2.5 A transformative constitution 
The notion of  ‘transformative constitutionalism’ is a method through 
which to understand purposive constitutional interpretation. While 
constitutions drafted in the context and mould of, for example, the 1996 
South African Constitution and the 2010 Kenyan Constitution93 are 
widely characterised as transformative, I will substantiate my claim that 
the Namibian Constitution, too, falls within this cluster of  constitutions. 
93 Speaker of  the Senate (n 24) para 51: ‘Kenya’s Constitution of  2010 is a transformative 
charter. Unlike the conventional “liberal” Constitutions of  the earlier decades which 
essentially sought the control and legitimization of  public power, the avowed goal of  
today’s Constitution is to institute social change and reform, through values such as social 
justice, equality, devolution, human rights, rule of  law, freedom and democracy’ (emphasis in 
original).
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By way of  epistemological background, the neologism ‘transformative 
constitutionalism’ first found substantive coinage in the American scholar 
Karl Klare’s seminal article in 1998 on ‘Legal culture and transformative 
constitutionalism’,94 which was published against the backdrop of  the 1996 
South African Constitution and the early jurisprudence from the South 
African Constitutional Court. While transformative constitutionalism 
is rooted in the South African experience, the historic social, economic, 
political and legal context of  South Africa is largely shared by Namibia 
although there are significant differences in the respective constitutional set-
ups. The idea of  transformative constitutionalism has further been carried 
forward in not only South Africa’s jurisprudence95 but also developed in 
scholarship, most notably by former Justices Langa96 and Moseneke97 
writing extrajudicially.98 Scholars such as Horn99 and Mundia100 have 
also characterised Namibia’s Constitution as a transformative document. 
Importantly, transformative constitutionalism is not restricted to post-
authoritarian or African contexts as various scholars have persuasively 
argued for transformative constitutionalism’s relevance, application and 
manifestation in the broader Global South contexts of  Latin America101 
and even in the Global North.102 This examination of  transformative 
94 K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 146. See also Roux whose central critique is that Klare’s article 
defines the project of  transformative constitutionalism in too exclusive a fashion: T 
Roux ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the best interpretation of  the South 
African Constitution: Distinction without a difference?’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 258. 
95 Makwanyane (n 18) para 262: ‘What the [South African] Constitution expressly aspires 
to do is to provide a transition from these grossly unacceptable features of  the past to a 
conspicuously contrasting ... future’ (my emphasis); Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk 1996 
(3) SA 850 (CC) para 157: ‘[The South African Constitution] is a document that seeks 
to transform the status quo ante into a new order’ (my emphasis).
96 P Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351.
97 D Moseneke ‘The fourth Bram Fischer memorial lecture: Transformative adjudication’ 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 309.
98 See also sources cited in S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (2010) 25. 
99 N Horn ‘Interpreting the constitution: Is transformative constitutionalism a bridge too 
far?’ (2014) 2 University of  Namibia Law Review 1. For a critical take on transformative 
constitutionalism’s application in Namibia, see D Zongwe ‘The dangers of  
transplanting transformative constitutionalism into Namibia’ in A Nhemachena et al 
(eds) Governing universalism or a variant of  apartheid particularism? Global jurisprudential 
apartheid and decolonisation as 21st century questions (2021).
100 Mundia (n 92) 100.
101 A von Bogdandy et al (eds) Transformative constitutionalism in Latin America: The 
emergence of  a new ius commune (2017).
102 M Hailbronner ‘Transformative constitutionalism: Not only in the global south’ (2017) 
65 American Journal of  Comparative Law 527; U Baxi ‘Preliminary notes on transformative 
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constitutionalism thus is not rooted exclusively in Karl Klare’s account, 
which has been significantly critiqued, but will draw on the strongest 
arguments that are appropriate for Namibia. 
What transformative constitutions generally share is that they are 
a ‘break from the past’. In the context of  Namibia and South Africa’s 
Constitutions specifically, they present ‘framework[s] for a transformed 
society which can heal the scars of  apartheid [and colonialism]’, 
thereby being ‘expressly value-driven’.103 While one would rarely find an 
explicit description of  the Constitution as ‘transformative’ in case law, 
transformative constitutionalism is a question of  substance rather than 
mere affirmation. The Constitution’s transformative character is indeed 
evident in the jurisprudence of  Namibian courts, in particular, those early 
Supreme Court decisions on constitutional interpretation. For example, 
in Cultura 2000 Mahomed CJ asserted that the Constitution ‘articulates a 
jurisprudential philosophy which, in express and ringing tones, repudiates 
the legislative policies based on the criteria of  race and ethnicity, often 
followed by previous administrations prior to the independence of  
Namibia’.104 Mahomed CJ affirmed earlier in S v van Wyk:105 
Throughout the preamble and substantive structures of  the Namibian 
Constitution there is one golden and unbroken thread – an abiding ‘revulsion’ 
of  racism and apartheid. It articulates a vigorous consciousness of  the 
suffering and the wounds which racism has inflicted on the Namibian people 
‘for so long’ and a commitment to build a new nation ‘to cherish and protect 
the gains of  our long struggle’ against the pathology of  apartheid. I know of  
no other Constitution in the world which seeks to identify a legal ethos against 
apartheid with greater vigour and intensity … That ethos must ‘preside and 
permeate the processes of  judicial interpretation and discretion’.
A transformative constitution does not present itself  as ‘timeless and 
metahistoric’ or as being carried down and founded through the ‘single 
magic moment of  “social contract”’. Rather, it ‘evinces an understanding 
that legal and political institutions are chosen, not given, that democracy 
must be periodically reinvented, and that the Constitution itself  is the 
constitutionalism’ in O Vilhena et al (eds) Transformative constitutionalism: Comparing the 
apex courts of  Brazil, India and South Africa (2013) 28.
103 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7).
104 Cultura 2000 (n 36) 332-333.
105 S v van Wyk 1993 NR 426 (SC) 456G-H. Given that Justice Mahomed moved from 
the Namibian to the South African bench, it may be argued that South African 
jurisprudence on the substance of  transformative constitutionalism was developed in 
his pioneering Namibian decisions. 
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contingent (even fragile) product of  human agency’.106 Klare proceeds to 
capture the essence of  a transformative constitution as a long-term project 
rooted in a constitution’s enactment, its interpretation and enforcement, 
with due regard to the historical context and political developments. What 
is to be ‘transformed’ is the country’s political and social institutions and 
power relationships with the view to follow a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction.107 Klare states that ‘[t]ransformative constitutionalism 
connotes an enterprise of  inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent 
political processes grounded in law … a transformation vast enough to be 
inadequately captured by the phrase “reform”, but something short of  or 
different from “revolution” in any traditional sense of  the word’.108 Klare 
further identifies the core ideals of  transformation: a society that is highly 
egalitarian, caring and multicultural, and one that is governed through 
participatory, democratic processes in both the polity (public) and private 
spheres.109
Like Klare, I advance the view that transformative constitutionalism 
necessarily entails a transformation in two senses: first, in the operative 
legal culture with the aim to reflect new values expressed; and, second, 
it is underpinned by the newly introduced constitutional democratic 
dispensation and the prevailing socio-economic injustices through distributive 
justice.110 In expanding on transformative constitutionalism, Langa 
describes the idea of  transformation as a change from ‘a legal culture of  
authority to a culture of  justification’,111 which is a conceptualisation that 
draws on what Mureinik seminally describes as a legal culture, where 
‘every exercise of  power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership 
given by government rests on the cogency of  the case offered in defence of  
its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new 
order must be a community built on persuasion, not coercion.’112 
106 Fredman Comparative human rights law (n 7).
107 Klare (n 94) 150.
108 As above (my emphasis). Klare has been quoted with approval in defining transformative 
constitutions in Speaker of  the Senate (n 24) para 52.
109 Klare (n 94) 150.
110 One should note that the South African constitutional context within which Klare 
avers transformative constitutionalism is one where there is a strong and express 
commitment to social and economic justice through their inclusion as fundamental 
enforceable rights. They are largely absent expressly from the Namibian Constitution.
111 Langa (n 96) 353.
112 E Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of  Rights’ (1994) 10 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 31 32.
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In realising the culture of  justification, the Constitution serves as 
the touchstone.113 This shift in legal culture is one that was asserted by 
Damaseb DCJ in Kashela: ‘The Constitution represents a fundamental 
break with the past and infuses a culture of  rationality and fairness in the 
manner the state relates to and deals with the citizens over whom it holds 
sway.’114
Klare argues that transformative constitutionalism is ‘transformation 
vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase “reform”, but 
something short of  or different from “revolution” in any traditional sense 
of  the word’.115 In contrast, Langa does invoke the language of  ‘revolution’ 
by likening the transformation that is required of  the South African 
Constitution to that of  ‘a social and an economic revolution’,116 and cites 
the prevailing unequal and insufficient access to housing, food, water, 
health care and electricity in South Africa. He points to the need to level 
economic provision that was previously skewed by apartheid as a central 
tenet of  transformative constitutionalism.117 
In considering other comparative constitutional contexts, the Kenyan 
Supreme Court has further clarified the pivotal role of  a judiciary in 
‘midwifing transformative constitutionalism’.118 Moreover, in a treatise 
dedicated to advocating the Indian Constitution as a transformative 
constitution – as distinguished from a ‘conservative constitution’ – Bhatia 
advances the view that transformative constitutionalism takes the text of  
the Constitution, its structure, and the historical moment of  its framing 
seriously. 119 In the same breath, Bhatia points out that a constitution is 
113 See also Kaulinge v Minister of  Health and Social Services 2006 (1) NR 377 (HC) 385I-
J: ‘By the adoption of  the Constitution of  Namibia, we have been propelled from a 
culture of  authority to a culture of  justification.’
114 Kashela (n 39) para 65.
115 Klare (n 94) 150.
116 Langa (n 96) 352.
117 As above. I recognise the predominantly South African literature rooted in jurisprudence 
and political theory that questions whether a constitution, and by extension the law, 
can bring about a truly transformed society. See, eg, A Kok ‘Is law able to transform 
society’ (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 58; J Modiri ‘Law’s poverty’ (2015) 18 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 223. While interesting and meritorious, this book 
will not engage these critiques. 
118 Communications Commission of  Kenya & Others v Royal Media Services & Others [2014] 
eKLR para 377; W Mutunga ‘The 2010 Constitution of  Kenya and its interpretation: 
reflections from the Supreme Court’s decisions’ (2015) 1 Speculum Juris 6.
119 Transformative constitutions can be contrasted with conservative constitutions; the 
Indian Constitution of  1950 has been characterised by some quarters as conservative, 
owing to the transfer of  power at the moment of  independence rather than the 
transformation of  power. See G Bhatia The transformative constitution (2019) and sources 
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‘not frozen at the moment of  framing. While taking text, structure, and 
history as crucial building blocks of  constitutional meaning, it does not 
accord an overriding veto power to any of  them.’120
At the heart of  this book’s right to water focus is the creation of  a strong 
nexus between the pursuits of  socio-economic equality and progression, 
catalysed by constitutional interpretations that enhance transformation 
in the substantive sense and not merely the formal sense. As such, a 
constitutional commitment to a socially and economically just society 
would imply that there is a need to restructure the underlying institutional 
arrangements that generate various forms of  political, economic, social and 
cultural injustice.121 Whether a transformative constitutionalism approach 
can truly remedy gross structural inequality and pervasive poverty has 
been the subject of  rigorous debate.122 Enriching and important as it may 
be, this is a debate that is outside the purview of  this book. Further, at 
an institutional level at least, transformative constitutionalism arguably 
is consonant with what has been conceptualised by Barber as positive 
constitutionalism, distinguishable from the traditional negative dimensions 
of  constitutionalism.123 
In subscribing to a transformative constitutionalism approach, 
I align with the essence of  the constructive interpretation approach of  
cited therein; R West ‘Progressive and conservative constitutionalism’ (1989/90) 88 
Michigan Law Review 641.
120 Bhatia (n 119) (emphasis in original).
121 Liebenberg (n 98) 27.
122 Sibanda critiques transformative constitutionalism as the preferred approach to reading 
and understanding the (South African) Constitution as inadequate to deliver poverty 
eradication given its claim to post-liberalism yet remaining deeply embedded in liberal 
discourse. S Sibanda ‘Not fit for purpose: Transformative constitutionalism, post-
independence constitutionalism and the struggle to eradicate poverty’ (2011) 22 
Stellenbosch Law Review 482. 
123 N Barber ‘Constitutionalism: Negative and positive’ (2015) 38 Dublin University Law 
Journal 249. Barber argues that the negative model of  constitutionalism endeavours 
to regulate the political (government) through recourse to democratic means and 
the application of  principles such as the separation of  powers doctrine. Negative 
constitutionalism thus stands in opposition to arbitrary rule; law, applied by judges 
through judicial review mechanisms, is used as a tool to control and constrain state 
power. In contrast, the positive (modern) model of  constitutionalism requires more 
than the mere application of  law to the state institutions. Positive constitutionalism 
creates institutions that do not merely limit the power of  the state, but also ensure 
that the state must be able to act pursuant to its ‘role in advancing the wellbeing of  its 
people’. As such, positive constitutionalism acknowledges ‘the need for constitutional 
structures to guard against abuses of  power’ but is not utopian as it is ‘focused on 
creating a strong state able to work for the good of  its people’. 
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Ronald Dworkin:124 Transformative constitutionalism is one of  the 
plausible methods to interpret the Namibian Constitution, but it is not 
the only method. Therefore, in order to both address the deficiencies 
of  transformative constitutionalism and respond to the peculiarities 
of  the Namibian context, I advance an approach of  re-invigorative 
constitutionalism, to which this chapter turns next. 
2.6 A re-invigorative constitution
2.6.1 Introducing re-invigorative constitutionalism
What follows is my original conception of  the Constitution as a re-
invigorative document. Re-invigorative constitutionalism is located within 
the purposivism approach discussed earlier and draws on the core premises 
of  transformative constitutionalism: The role of  the Constitution is to 
induce large-scale social change through non-violent and legally-grounded 
political processes with judicial oversight. As such, re-invigorative 
constitutionalism follows the articulate and inarticulate objects and 
core values of  a transformative constitution, including egalitarianism, 
care, multicultural community and participatory democracy, as Klare 
explicates. 
Distinctively, however, re-invigorative constitutionalism responds to 
what I view as transformative constitutionalism’s incompleteness and 
inadequate sensitivity to context, particularly in the identification and 
application of  values in constitutional interpretation. It advocates a more 
grounded and pan-African imbued understanding of  ‘transformation’, 
particularly concerning socio-economic status and the legal culture.
Re-invigorative constitutionalism breaks from the past of  state 
oppression, domination, and social and economic deprivation of  the 
African masses perpetuated through the imposed foreign legal culture. 
As such, in undoing the past and realising the Constitution’s ideals, re-
invigorative constitutionalism advances – as the phrase suggests – the 
re-invigoration of  African values to create a new legal culture that also 
emphasises the achievement of  social and economic redistributive justice. 
Thus, my conception of  re-invigorative constitutionalism does 
not seek to ‘renovate [the] legal infrastructure’,125 as transformative 
constitutionalism may be understood as being conceptually conceived 
124 Dworkin (n 12) 52.
125 D Davis & K Klare ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary 
law’ (2010) 26 South African Journal of  Human Rights 410.
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to pursue. Rather, what re-invigorative constitutionalism advances is 
an attitudinal reorientation away from the legal infrastructure that was 
operative during apartheid and colonialism and before the Constitution.126 
In my view, fully achieving socio-economic transformation through 
the Constitution requires critical engagement with and rethinking of  legal 
culture. Problematic colonial values must be rejected while purposefully 
infusing the legal culture with positive Afrocentric values. For the purpose 
of  this book, I adopted Klare’s definition of  legal culture as ‘professional 
sensibilities, habits of  mind, and intellectual reflexes [and the] inarticulate 
premises culturally and historically ingrained in the professional discourse 
and outlook’.127 
From the sources that I have cited, we can observe that South Africa 
and Kenya128 are two prominent examples of  jurisdictions that continue to 
grapple with redefining their legal cultures under their new constitutional 
dispensations after long periods of  insidious legal and political practices. 
In Namibia, similarly, it is counter-intuitive to pursue a transformation 
agenda through recourse to only those sources rooted in a legal culture 
that largely remains the product of  colonial and apartheid legal thinking 
which had actively facilitated the gross negation of  human rights – 
whereas human rights are at the heart of  the Constitution’s transformative 
aspirations. 
Re-invigorative constitutionalism thus is advanced to usher in 
the re-orientation of  the legal culture to allow for the reconstruction 
and transformation of  the state and society. Transformation ought 
to encapsulate, as Goldblatt and Albertyn understand it, a deliberate 
redistribution of  power and resources along egalitarian lines.129 I propose 
that this be achieved through vigorously pursuing the rebirth, renewal and 
revitalisation of  an Afrocentric legal culture to co-exist within Namibia’s 
legally pluralistic society.130 
126 C Odinkalu ‘Back to the future – The imperative of  prioritising for the protection of  
human rights in Africa’ (2003) 47 Journal of  African Law 1 2.
127 Klare (n 94) 166-167.
128 See V Miyandazi ‘Competing and interrelated conceptions of  equality in Kenya’s 2010 
Constitution’ unpublished DPhil thesis, University of  Oxford, 2018 28, and sources 
cited therein.
129 B Goldblatt & C Albertyn ‘Facing the challenge of  transformation: Difficulties in 
the development of  an indigenous jurisprudence of  equality’ (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 248 249.
130 C Mapaure ‘Reinvigorating African values for SADC’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 148.
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To clarify, in line with the ethos of  the Dworkinian plausible reading 
theory, my conception of  re-invigorative constitutionalism does not 
seek to displace transformative constitutionalism. This may give rise to 
the question: Why then an additional approach? My response is that 
re-invigorative constitutionalism is advanced based on two overarching 
premises: (i) prescriptions of  the Constitution: textual, structural, and 
contextual; and (ii) the Africanisation of  the legal culture imperative, 
which is drawn from the observed theoretical neglect of  transformative 
constitutionalism to recognise and appropriately respond to the reality 
that the South African-cum-Namibian legal culture was – and largely 
remains – one that is predicated upon the superimposed common law 
and exogenous values at the expense of  customary laws and indigenous 
values.131 The chapter will elaborate upon these overarching premises 
below. 
A legal culture that has the prospect of  realising the transformation 
described earlier must be contextually sensitive, responsive and, crucially, 
rooted in African legal thought. This pursuit of  Afrocentricity is to be 
advanced without entirely jettisoning that legal culture, which is anchored 
in the common law, although one ought to accept that the common law’s 
dethronement from its former pedestal of  dominance is constitutionally 
recognised, necessary, desirable, and even inevitable. This requires us to 
reject an ahistorical approach to constitutional interpretation as we pursue 
more responsive, imaginative and novel approaches. We can, I argue, 
envisage this through the prism of  re-invigorative constitutionalism. 
2.6.2 The case for re-invigorative constitutionalism
In this part the chapter will establish the legal, theoretical and philosophical 
pillars of  the argument for re-invigorative constitutionalism. Re-invigorative 
constitutionalism invites us to critique our normative foundations for the 
conception of  rights in the Constitution, in this context a right to water’s 
normative basis. As mentioned, the book grounds this on the Constitution’s 
text and the ideological need to pursue the Africanisation of  legal culture 
in Namibia. These grounds should be considered as mutually reinforcing. 
131 Notably, common law in the Namibian context is to be understood as the legal system 
that is an amalgamation of  Roman-Dutch and English common law. See S v Hangue 
2016 (1) NR 258 (SC) para 17 (Maritz JA): ‘[Namibian] common law and that of  
South Africa are both rooted in Roman-Dutch law and, by and large, the development 
thereof  in the two countries prior to independence was the same. The Roman-Dutch 
law, as it existed and was applied in the Province of  the Cape of  Good Hope at the 
time, was introduced by’ the provisions of  sec 1(1) of  the Administration of  Justice 
Proclamation, 1919 (Proclamation 21 of  1919); S Amoo Introduction to Namibian law 
(2008) 62.
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Text-based justifications
The text of  the Constitution is the anchor for a re-invigoration of  African 
legal culture. There is specific textual anchorage in at least three composite 
provisions of  the Constitution: the Preamble’s repudiation of  colonialism 
and its assertion of  Namibian peoples as sovereign; the right to culture 
in article 19; and the ‘redemption’ of  customary law in article 66. These 
provisions are to be cumulatively understood in the drafting context and 
architecture of  the Constitution. I address these seriatim. 
The Preamble
First, there is express preambular recognition that Namibian peoples of  
African ancestry have historically been denied their agency, sovereignty 
and rights through, most prominently, colonialism and apartheid.132 
These denials took imperialist forms including social, political, military, 
economic and legal domination.133 While all these forms of  domination 
intersected to create the perfect storm of  colonialism and apartheid, legal 
imperialism is of  particular interest here as this manifested in the rejection 
and subservience of  those norms, cultures, customs and values that were 
indigenously African in their pedigree. Drawing attention to and exposing 
this reality allow us to understand the Constitution not only as reflecting 
transformative aspirations, but also as a document that embodies 
decoloniality. This responds to the reality that, insofar as the common law 
is concerned, the legal culture ‘mostly remains intellectually colonised … 
still functioning within the domain of  Western legal values’.134 
The Constitution’s repudiation of  colonialism thus implicitly 
enjoins the judiciary – as a postcolonial and constitutionally entrenched 
institution – to be wary of, and refrain from, (even inadvertently) 
perpetuating colonialism through the inherited legal culture.135 A reading 
132 The Constitution, Preamble paras 4-5: ‘Whereas these rights [to inherent dignity and 
alienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of  happiness] have for so long been 
denied to the people of  Namibia by colonialism, racism and apartheid; Whereas 
we the people of  Namibia – have finally emerged victorious in our struggle against 
colonialism, racism and apartheid’.
133 P Glenn Legal traditions of  the world (2007) 248.
134 J Faris ‘African customary law and common law in South Africa: Reconciling 
contending legal systems’ (2015) 10 International Journal of  African Renaissance Studies - 
Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity 177. 
135 Note the function of  Cabinet and National Assembly members in arts 40(l) and 63(2)
(i) respectively, to ‘remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of  ensuring that the 
scourges of  apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest themselves in 
any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect and assist disadvantaged 
citizens of  Namibia who have historically been the victims of  these pathologies’. 
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of  the Constitution’s text and the Constituent Assembly Debates does not 
suggest an indifference to the (continued) manifestation of  neo-colonial 
vices within the legal culture. Sachs J’s ratio decidendi on the sources of  
values to apply in assessing the constitutionality of  capital punishment 
under the 1996 South African Constitution in Makwanyane concisely 
captures this obligation towards African legal culture:136 
The secure and progressive development of  our legal system demands that it 
draws the best from all the streams of  justice in our country [which above all] 
means giving long overdue recognition to African law and legal thinking as 
a source of  legal ideas, values and practice. We cannot unfortunately extend 
the equality principle backwards in time to remove the humiliations and 
indignities suffered by past generations, but we can restore dignity to ideas 
and values that have long been suppressed or marginalised.
Sachs J refers to the legal system as drawing from all streams of  justice; 
indeed, legal systems are defined by the legal culture that they embrace. 
Constitutional scholars have correctly cautioned against placing 
excessive weight and logic on a constitution’s preamble to ground an 
interpretative approach as this, by itself, is inadequate. Preambular 
formulations, for Waldron, are ‘intended as prefatory pieces of  rhetoric; 
they are not noted for their philosophical rigour; they probably represent 
political compromises; and they are not always consistent, at least not to 
the eye of  a pedant’.137
However, the Constituent Assembly Debates suggest that the drafters 
did not see the Preamble to the Namibian Constitution as ‘rhetorical’, 
‘empty’ and ‘inconsistent’. In fact, the drafters of  the Constitution 
deliberately and diligently considered certain nuances in the Preamble 
by expressing their views with explicit references to colonialism, racism 
and apartheid, for example, in a context where little debate of  other parts 
of  the draft Constitution is on record, as I have discussed.138 Hence, the 
Preamble’s pronouncements and central spirit, read in light of  other 
provisions, are to convey the overarching new decolonial legal order that 
the Constitution ushered in. 
136 Makwanyane (n 18) paras 364-365 (my emphasis).
137 J Waldron ‘Is dignity the foundation of  human rights?’ in R Cruft (ed) Philosophical 
foundations of  human rights (2013) 118.
138 Constituent Assembly Debates (n 16) 191, where there is a fair degree of  debate driven 
by Fanuel Kozonguizi on the ‘isms’ of  colonialism, apartheid and racism, which 
language was debated, and agreement arrived at on their specification and ordering in 
the Preamble. The Constitution can thus be described as ‘colour-conscious’. 
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Drawing further on comparative perspectives, Sachs J in Mhlungu 
emphasised the value of  preambular provisions in stating that ‘the 
Preamble in particular should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational 
and throat clearing exercise of  little interpretative value. It connects up, 
reinforces and underlies all of  the text that follows. It helps to establish the 
basic design of  the Constitution and indicate its fundamental purposes.’139
The right to culture
The second textual anchor is the right to culture. Article 19 of  the 
Namibian Constitution guarantees that ‘[e]very person shall be entitled 
to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, tradition or 
religion subject to the terms of  this Constitution and further subject to the 
condition that the rights protected by this Article do not impinge upon the 
rights of  others or the national interest’. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter),140 which Namibia has also ratified, under article 17(2) and (3) 
protects the individual’s right to freely take part in the cultural life of  their 
community, and places a duty on the state to promote and protect the 
morals and traditional values recognised by the community.141 The state 
is the primary duty bearer for chapter 3 rights in the Constitution. The 
African Charter also duty binds the individual to ‘preserve and strengthen 
positive African cultural values’142 under article 29(7). I will return to 
assessing the meaning of  ‘positive’ in this expression at a later stage in the 
book.
While no definition for ‘culture’ is offered by the Namibian Constitution 
or the article 19 jurisprudence,143 we can draw on the persuasive authority 
of  the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) in Endorois.144 The Commission stated that ‘culture’ under 
article 17 of  the African Charter is understood to mean 
139 S v Mhlungu & Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para 112. 
140 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 
217 (entered into force 21 October 1986), discussed in ch 4. 
141 African Charter arts 17(2) and (3).
142 My emphasis. 
143 Cultura 2000 (n 36); Cultura 2000 v Government of  the Republic of  Namibia & Another 1992 
NR 110 (HC).
144 Centre for Minority Rights Development & Others v Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 
2009) (Endorois). See also M Ssenyonjo ‘The protection of  economic, social and 
cultural rights under the African Charter’ in D Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The protection 
of  economic, social and cultural rights in Africa: International, regional and national perspectives 
(2016) 114-15. 
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that complex whole which includes a spiritual and physical association with 
one’s ancestral land, knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by humankind as a member of  society 
– the sum total of  the material and spiritual activities and products of  a given 
social group that distinguish it from other similar groups.145
This definition exposes the collective underpinnings of  culture which, as I 
put forward, would include a prominent role for, and reflection of, Namibia’s 
particularly unique socio-cultural diversity146 within the prevailing legal 
culture.147 This challenges the reality that the contemporary legal culture 
remains one that is firmly anchored in the common law principles, values 
and traditions, as will be unpacked below. This untenable status quo has 
had the effect of  rendering ‘legally illiterate’ many Namibians of  African 
indigeneity who are learned primarily in their customary laws, values and 
norms, which are scarcely reflected in the prevailing mainstream legal 
culture. 
Notable, too, is the relationship between culture and customary law. 
Customary law has been explained as ‘customs and usages traditionally 
observed among the indigenous African peoples ... and which form part of  
the culture of  those people’.148 From this, it is apparent that customary law 
is derived from unique and significant long-established cultural practices 
of  a group, which solidify and give rise to rules that are then considered 
customary law. 
Therefore, what re-invigorative constitutionalism responds to and 
facilitates is that it allows for the lived experiences and knowledge of  
145 Endorois (n 144) para 241.
146 Namibia’s cultural diversity is revealed in that there are 13 distinct ethnic groups and 
52 traditional authorities, each with their own customs and laws, for a Namibian 
population of  approximately 2,5 million.
147 M Hinz ‘Traditional governance and African customary law’ in N Horn & A Bösl 
(eds) Human rights and the rule of  law in Namibia (2008) 67; M Hinz ‘Legal pluralism in 
jurisprudential perspective’ in M Hinz (ed) The shade of  new leaves (2006) 29; O Ruppel 
& K Ruppel-Schlichting ‘Legal and judicial pluralism in Namibia and beyond: A 
modern approach to African legal architecture?’ (2011) 64 Journal of  Legal Pluralism 
33 36, stating that the law in place in Namibia today is ‘the product of  different 
sources: firstly, Roman law; secondly, the fusion of  Roman law and Roman-Dutch 
customary law – hence the term Roman-Dutch law – which came in the wake of  
Dutch colonisation at the Cape of  Good Hope; thirdly, from the early 19th century 
onwards English law asserted itself, leaving deep traces in Roman-Dutch law, after 
British hegemony in southern Africa had been established; and fourthly, indigenous 
customary law from time immemorial’.
148 See T Bennett ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal 
system’ (2009) 57 American Journal of  Comparative Law 27.
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communities to percolate back into the legal system.149 This invites a 
constitutional interpretative approach that legitimates, ascribes value and 
credence to, and borrows from, the ultra-heterogeneity found in Namibia 
in the process of  asserting values. 
Redeeming customary law (and deprivileging common law)
The third, and perhaps most authoritative and compelling, textual anchor 
is the Constitution’s validation of  customary law, and its jurisprudential 
equity and equality within the legal culture. Article 66(1) of  the 
Constitution, a provision that falls outside chapter 3 Bill of  Rights, states: 
‘Both the customary and common law of  Namibia in force on the date of  
independence shall remain valid to the extent to which such customary 
or common law does not conflict with this Constitution or any other 
statutory law.’
Customary law now is not only constitutionally valid within the legal 
system, but is also equal to the common law.150 What requires further 
elaboration is that customary laws had long existed throughout the history 
of  the African indigenous justice systems of  those peoples who inhabited 
the territory that is present-day Namibia before and during contact with 
European settlers and imposed colonial administrations which were 
characterised by the co-existence of  multiple normative systems. During 
the colonial period, although customary law was recognised and applied, 
this was limited and remained largely displaced to the socio-judicial 
periphery in favour of  the common law.151 Since this imposition, an unequal 
relationship within the legal culture arose: Common law was centralised 
and upheld as of  presumed normative superiority, while customary law 
played second fiddle, particularly where its prescriptions were deemed to 
be at odds with the underlying rules, values or ethos of  common law.152 
What should be clarified here is that this ‘oppositionalisation’ of  
customary law vis-à-vis common law is ordinarily unnatural; different 
legal systems have co-existed (albeit not without tension) throughout 
149 Faris (n 134) 177.
150 Compare the South African constitutional approach that arguably subordinates 
African customary law to both the common law and the South African Constitution. 
See E Zitzke ‘A decolonial critique of  private law and human rights’ (2018) 34 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 14.
151 For a history of  the common law, see Ruppel & Ruppel-Schlichting (n 147) 38-39.
152 Prior to independence, customary law was ‘jurisprudentially classified as a second-
class type of  law’. Hinz The shade of  new leaves (n 147) 19; V Palmer & M Mattar Mixed 
legal systems, east and west (2015) 226. 
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human history.153 However, the confrontation between customary law 
and common law arises mainly out of  the latter’s historic superimposition 
upon Africans at the expense of  the former. This was further perpetuated 
by attempts to codify customary law,154 which usurped and distorted its 
organic development.155 Absent this ‘rivalry’ there would ostensibly be 
no need to re-invigorate the values, traditions and norms of  an African 
inheritance and, indeed, no need to indict the common law’s validity and 
encroaching dominance. 
Article 66 of  the Constitution recognises both customary law and 
common law as remaining in force as at the date of  independence, subject 
to the ‘superiority clause’ that qualifies this where customary law and 
common law conflict with the supreme Constitution or other statutory 
law.156 Article 66 can thus be regarded as redeeming customary law from 
its previously infantilised and subservient status, forcefulness and effect, 
representing a constitutional acknowledgment of  Namibia’s previously 
ignored, denied and violated multicultural fabric in the legal culture.
At the same time, the point is rarely made that article 66 is also an 
expiation provision for the common law. Article 66 is a recognition of  
the need to avoid creating a ‘black hole’ in the legal culture that would 
likely have arisen had an absolute repudiation of  the common law been 
pursued by the framers of  the Constitution. In other words, article 66 can 
be read as atoning for the common law’s historical ‘wrongs’ by placing it 
on par with customary law while allowing for its continued validity and 
de-monopolising it. 
153 Compare Oyowe’s concise contrasting (different form oppositionalisation) of  law in 
African societies with European societies: O Oyowe ‘What is law? I: positivism and 
traditional African societies’ in D Bilchitz et al (eds) Jurisprudence in an African context 
(2017) 19.
154 Codification has rightly been lamented as ‘necessarily antithetical to customary law … 
because of  the social distance between the legislator and the people, [and] the possibility 
that the views of  the two will not coincide is increased’. W Bennett & R Vermeulen 
‘Codification of  African law’ (1980) 24 Journal of  African Law 206 219.
155 Namibia’s post-1990 development of  customary law at the state level has thus rejected 
codification in favour of  the ‘ascertainment’ approach which is the process of  the ‘self-
statement’ of  customary law ‘by the owners of  the law to be ascertained, namely the 
people and the traditional leaders as the custodians of  customary law’. M Hinz ‘The 
ascertainment of  customary law: What is ascertainment of  customary law and what is 
it for? The experience of  the customary law ascertainment project in Namibia’ (2012) 
2 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 85, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2100337 (accessed 17 February 
2019); M Hinz Customary law ascertained: Volume I (2010).
156 The Constitution art 66(2).
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Significantly, article 66 does not create an express hierarchy between 
customary law and common law, as may be intuitively expected in the 
de-colonial constitutional context explored earlier. It thus is open to the 
argument that because article 66 refers to customary law in the first instance, 
whereas common law would ordinarily come first if  the alphabetical order 
were followed at drafting, this may suggest an intentional hierarchy or 
preference, perhaps akin to customary law being the first among equals. 
However, this assertion, based on the conventions of  legal drafting 
technique alone, is insufficient to establish a hierarchy between customary 
law and common law as even the Constituent Assembly Debates are silent 
on the rationale behind this ordering. 
Courts and commentators alike have interpreted article 66 as placing 
customary and common law on ‘equal footing’,157 thereby renouncing 
customary law’s previous subordination as facilitated by various 
repugnancy clauses that had nullified customary law that was repugnant 
to justice or morality or inconsistent with common law or codified law 
during colonialism. This is despite the tainted genesis and iniquitous use of  
common law in Anglophone Africa and the ensuing legitimacy deficiency 
attributable to its role in perpetuating pre-constitutional injustices through 
subjugation, deprivation and conquest, as argued at greater length below. 
It can further be discerned that article 66 also represents the founders’ 
resigned acceptance of  the enduring fact of  European influence – as 
institutionalised in the common law – on post-colonial Africans. While 
the article 66 compromise may be a hard pill to swallow in light of  the 
desire to achieve complete sovereignty for Africa, this is necessitated 
by the reality that African identities, ways of  life and trajectories have 
been irreversibly changed and shaped – for better or for worse – by their 
interactions with Europeans and their legal systems.158 African customary 
law can thus shed new and autochthonous light on the understanding of  
the values that underpin the legal culture in Namibia, particularly within 
the constitutional Bill of  Rights provisions. 
157 Hinz The shade of  new leaves (n 147) 186; Faris (n 134) 175. As was stated by Strydom 
CJ in Myburgh v Commercial Bank of  Namibia 2000 NR 255 (SC) 261: ‘The language of  
[art 66] means what it says namely that customary and common law in force on the day 
of  independence only survive insofar as they are not in conflict with the Constitution.’
158 T Bennett Human rights and African customary law (1995) 10. 
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The Africanisation of  legal culture imperative
In the following parts this chapter will build the normative and philosophical 
underpinnings for re-invigorative constitutionalism to inform the above-
analysed textual provisions of  the Constitution. 
Developing an African legal culture for human rights
I commence on an obnoxious note: It was the historian Trevor-Roper who 
dismissively decreed that the entire history of  Africa prior to the arrival of  
Europeans was nothing more than the ‘unedifying gyrations of  barbarous 
tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of  the globe’.159 While it requires 
minimum substantiation to disprove Trevor-Roper’s assertions, it perhaps 
is only a slight hyperbole to affirm that these views were widely held of  
African peoples and their values, ways of  life and practices by European 
settlors-cum-colonisers who came to define and dominate African legal 
culture. 
Constitutional and human rights laws, like all laws, are social 
constructs, as Hart argued.160 The transformative nature of  Namibia’s 
Constitution has been established earlier. I thus associate with what I hold 
to be Himonga’s irrefutable proposition: Transformative constitutions in 
Africa demand the ‘inclusion of  African legal ideas and values in the legal 
order’.161 The reference to customary law in article 66 of  the Constitution 
is inherently African in both its origins and scope of  application. As such, 
customary law intrinsically retains greater internal (or at the very least 
perceived) legitimacy and familiarity among the majority of  Namibians. 
Indeed, it is a falsity to deem law and its interpretation, whether 
constitutional law, common law or customary law, as ostensibly value-
neutral.162 As Mokgoro J reflects in Makwanyane, the interpretation of  a 
supreme constitution’s entrenched rights provisions involves a balancing 
exercise that 
[c]an often only be done by reference to a system of  values extraneous to the 
constitutional text itself, where these principles constitute the historical context 
in which the text was adopted and which help to explain the meaning of  the 
text. The constitution makes it particularly imperative for courts to develop the 
159 A Jackson The British empire – A very short introduction (2013) 104. 
160 HLA Hart The concept of  law (1994) 116. 
161 C Himonga ‘The right to health in an African cultural context: The role of  ubuntu’ 
(2013) 57 Journal of  African Law 165; D Kuwali ‘Decoding Afrocentrism: Decolonising 
legal theory’ in O Onazi (ed) African legal theory and contemporary problems (2014) 72.
162 Klare (n 94) 178.
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entrenched fundamental rights in terms of  a cohesive set of  values, ideal to an 
open and democratic society ... To achieve the required balance will of  necessity 
involve value judgments. This is the nature of  constitutional interpretation.163 
In the earlier discussion of  purposivism, we have already established 
that constitutional interpretation involves making value judgments. 
What Mokgoro J illuminates further is that the sources of  these values 
need not be pronounced within the Constitution itself  but can retain an 
extraneous origin. In this light, customary law, as ‘a system of  values 
to the constitutional text itself ’, is advanced. Customary law allows us 
to pursue a re-invigorative constitutionalism paradigm that assists in 
building a new society that is based on ideologies and philosophies that are 
fashioned within the cultural, political, social and historical experiences 
of  Namibians and Africans.164 Keeping a historical and constitutional 
context in mind allows one to identify values that are closer to objective 
(appreciating the difficulty in asserting absolute objectivity) and permits us 
to move towards the Africanisation of  the legal culture by – in the context 
of  human rights – having interpretative recourse to African indigenous 
values and world views, of  course, without jettisoning the other traditional 
tools in the interpreter’s arsenal.
Similarly, Faris, who opines from a South African perspective, 
advocates an ‘African Renaissance’165 (re-birth) that facilitates the 
achievement of  jurisprudential parity between customary law and 
common law.166 Achieving this demands deliberate interventions that are 
directed towards the revival, revitalisation and restoration of  Afrocentric 
legal cultures. If  we are to take seriously the assertion that the Constitution 
is a ‘mirror reflecting the national soul’, as Mahomed J famously put 
it, it follows that this soul is found within the African. Therefore, like 
transformative constitutionalism, what re-invigorative constitutionalism 
puts forward is not intended to be neutral; it is a concept that carries the 
‘positive valence’167 of  Africanness. 
163 Makwanyane (n 18) paras 302-304 (my emphasis).
164 W Abraham The mind of  Africa (2015).
165 The African Renaissance is largely attributed to former South African President Thabo 
Mbeki in his venerated ‘I am an African’ speech to the Constitutional Assembly 
of  South Africa. He subsequently adopted it as his governing ideology during his 
presidency. See E Bongmba ‘Reflections on Thabo Mbeki’s African renaissance’ (2004) 
30 Journal of  Southern African Studies 291.
166 Faris (n 134). 
167 Klare (n 94) 150. 
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Borrowing from discrimination law theory, the historical and 
contemporary disadvantage that customary law has suffered is what 
necessitates an approach akin to ‘affirmative action’ to achieve the 
jurisprudential parity envisaged by article 66. Notably, however, re-
invigoration goes beyond a mere re-introduction: it connotes a de-
ossification, de-marginalisation and de-stagnation of  African legal cultures 
in light of  the reality of  epistemic injustice. This is through ‘strengthening 
it, and filling it with life and energy’.168 Re-invigoration thus asserts that 
African legal cultures are profoundly – although not unequivocally169 – 
just and worthy. This renders the values that underpin African legal 
cultures as invaluable in constitutional interpretation. As Mahomed J 
aptly illuminated obiter in Makwanyane: 170 
In some countries, the Constitution only formalises, in a legal instrument, a 
historical consensus of  values and aspirations evolved incrementally from a 
stable and unbroken past to accommodate the needs of  the future. The South 
African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensible 
and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of  
the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive and 
a vigorous identification of  and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, 
caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the 
Constitution.
When applied to Namibia, Mahomed J’s understanding of  a constitution 
requires retaining from the past those ‘defensible’ aspects of  African 
legal culture.171 This implies that there is something in the past that was 
previously rejected but now requires re-invigoration. It is in this context that 
the re-invigoration that I advocate is preceded by the prefix ‘re-’ to signify 
the recognition of  the previous invigoration of  such African principles, 
values and norms in the legal culture preceding the arrival and domination 
of  European legal systems as perhaps most prominently institutionalised 
within the common law. 
168 ‘Invigoration’ Shorter Oxford English dictionary (2007).
169 I address the problematic aspects of  African legal cultures below.
170 Makwanyane (n 18) para 261 (my emphasis).
171 The approach of  drawing from the past is distinguishable from the backward-looking 
approach in transitional justice settings that is advanced by scholar Ruti Teitel, the 
normative originator of  the concept ‘transitional justice’. What transitional justice 
seeks to achieve is the self-conscious construction of  a distinctive conception of  
justice associated with periods of  radical political change following oppressive rule, 
characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoing. Compare R Teitel 
Transitional justice (2000) 123-124.
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Dethroning the common law and its underlying value 
There is much to be independently said of  common law – both past 
and present – as the enduring foundational legal culture and the need 
to affirm alternatives. As Klare and Davis point out, ‘the [South African 
Constitution’s] drafters believed that transformation must build up 
from the legal substructure as well as flow downward from majestic 
constitutional heights’.172 Indeed, a constitution’s basic assumption is that 
society fails to progress towards social justice where the legal system ‘rigs 
a transformative constitutional superstructure onto a common law base 
inherited from the past and indelibly stained by apartheid’.173 Klare and 
Davis proceed to indict the common law in the following terms: 174
[T]he common law as it stands today largely reflects, constitutes, and sustains 
existing social relationships, power structures, and inequalities. The common 
law’s cherished value of  individual autonomy remains meaningless and unfulfilled in a 
society as radically unequal as South Africa, where millions live in conditions of  
absolute deprivation. Untransformed, the common law supports and shields 
this distributional status quo. Unless their legal foundations are transformed, 
social arrangements constituted (in part) by the common law will exercise 
a permanent inhibiting effect on the Constitution’s transformative project, 
possibly subverting it altogether.
Liebenberg adds to this concern by exposing the ‘classic liberalism’ of  the 
legal culture in South Africa (which also holds true for Namibia) such 
as formalism, deference to legislative choices, and various dichotomous 
conceptions: negative and positive rights, public and private law, law 
and politics.175 Botha further cautions that one should resist the naive 
temptation that the post-constitutionalism legal culture is liberated from 
apartheid’s yoke merely because of  the process of  constitutionalisation 
and the repeal of  apartheid and other offensive laws. For Botha, ‘[i]t 
would be wrong to think of  legislation and the common law (or public 
and private law) as two distinct entities (containers!), the one affected by 
apartheid’s blemish, the other not. To do so would be to fail to see how 
apartheid law was complemented by the common law; how the apartheid 
logic of  separation and inequality was reinforced and normalised by the ostensibly 
neutral system of  common law.’176 
172 Davis & Klare (n 125) 411.
173 As above.
174 As above (my emphasis) (internal footnotes omitted).
175 Liebenberg (n 98) 43. 
176 H Botha ‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (Part 1)’ (2002) 
Journal of  South African Law 624 (my emphasis).
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Indeed, if  it is accepted that the Namibian Constitution envisages an 
equipollence in the prevailing legal culture, the corollary is that courts are 
not only permitted to interpret constitutional rights in light of  customary 
norms and values, but are also obligated to fully ‘mainstream’ customary 
law in the pursuit of  societal transformation. As will be elaborated in 
chapter 3, I argue that customary law as recognised in article 66 of  the 
Constitution is important as it embodies African values, particularly 
ubuntu. 
The question nevertheless remains: How do we most effectively achieve 
a mainstreaming of  customary law and African values?177 Commenting on 
the re-introduction of  African customary law, Bennett points out that in 
essence ‘the issues go to the validity of  existing knowledge as well as the 
introduction of  new knowledge into the legal system’. Bennett thereby 
takes the view that the common law’s deconstruction is preferable, 
without ‘reject[ing] the exogenous source of  law that is of  a Western legal 
knowledge base’.178 This progressive approach finds endorsement from 
the spirit of  the Constitution’s article 66(1) and is one that re-invigorative 
constitutionalism endeavours to observe. 
What re-invigorative constitutionalism permits is the development 
of  a new legal culture that in part simultaneously retains the reasonable 
parts of  the common law, breaks from the iniquitous manifestations of  the 
common law, and re-invigorates the positive yet neglected aspects of  African 
customary law to create a novel, effective and legitimate legal culture for 
facilitating socio-economic transformation for all Namibian peoples. 
2.6.3 Caveats and clarifications on re-invigorative constitutionalism
The notion of  ‘Africanising’ the legal culture, as re-invigorative 
constitutionalism pursues, is one that is rooted in the need to, and value 
in, asserting ‘Global South’ theories179 that seek to decolonise human 
rights understandings.180 Nevertheless, in pursuing re-invigorative 
constitutionalism, three points are necessary. 
177 This is a challenging question, one which evidently is beyond the scope of  this book. 
However, South African and, by extension, Namibian legal history present useful 
lessons on the interaction of  English law with the then resurgent Roman-Dutch 
law from 1910 through deliberate and concerted efforts aimed at deconstructing the 
English law and its values in order to achieve a semblance of  this parity. At the time, 
English law ‘was not discarded but rather retained in so far as Roman-Dutch law was 
given the capacity to develop and expand’. Bennett (n 158) 29.
178 As above.
179 J Comorofff  & J Comoroff  Theory from the south (2011). 
180 S Jensen The making of  international human rights: The 1960s, decolonization and the 
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First is a clarification on the implications for universal human rights 
that re-invigorative constitutionalism brings. My claim is that the values 
underpinning human rights are not all universal or to be drawn from a 
single source.181 The development of  the re-invigorative constitutionalism 
paradigm indeed is informed by the reality that legal imperialism can 
masquerade through claims to universalism,182 aculturality, and neutrality 
of  values and legal systems.183 This formulation responds to Mutua’s 
seminal critique that particular conceptions of  human rights perpetuate 
problematic ‘savage-victim-saviour’ complexes that promote Eurocentric 
ideals to transform non-Western cultures that are deemed inferior to 
Eurocentric prototypes.184 
Re-invigorative constitutionalism thus allows us to use African values 
to determine the substance or content of  rights, their interpretation, and 
their form of  implementation and enforcement.185 Scott drives home the 
reality that legal interpretation, particularly in human rights, inherently 
is value-laden.186 In this light, this project is both counter-colonial and a 
rejection of  Western claims to a monopoly of  ‘positive’ values.187
reconstruction of  global values (2016) 4-6, whose overarching argument is to rebuff  
the myth that human rights are a Western invention, drawing attention to the work 
of  actors from the Global South at the formative stages of  human rights notions. 
In Jensen’s own words: ‘From within postcolonial studies, human rights have been 
strongly criticized, frequently linking human rights with Western essentialism and 
neo-colonialist agendas, but it may be that this critique has only been able to sustain 
itself  through its amnesia about the postcolonial moment, that is, its own historical 
foundations. If  a number of  key countries from the Global South were the driving force 
behind the breakthrough of  universal human rights, how Western, then, is the concept 
of  human rights?’ 
181 Lord Hoffmann frames it thus: ‘While human rights are universal at the level of  
abstraction, they are national at the level of  application.’ Lord Hoffmann ‘The 
universality of  human rights’ Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture 19 March 2009, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_
Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Human_Rights.pdf  (accessed 27 August 2018). 
182 C Josiah ‘African values and the human rights debate’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 
309; M Mutua ‘Savages, victims, and saviours: The metaphor of  human rights’ (2001) 
42 Harvard International Law Journal 201.
183 Bennett (n 158) 29.
184 Mutua (n 182) 205.
185 J Donnelly ‘Cultural relativism and universal human rights’ (1984) 6 Human Rights 
Quarterly 400 401.
186 C Scott ‘Interdependence and permeability of  human rights norms: Towards a partial 
fusion of  the international covenants on human rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 769.
187 E Reichert ‘Human rights: An examination of  universalism and cultural relativism’ 
(2006) 22 Journal of  Comparative Social Welfare 23 28.
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In relating re-invigorative constitutionalism to socio-economic 
provision such as water, one must pause to acknowledge that taking human 
suffering seriously through the institution of  human rights means also 
taking seriously the reality that the poorest and most vulnerable members 
of  all societies suffer deprivations that include a lack of  socio-economic 
entitlements such as water.188 Re-invigorative constitutionalism allows us 
to recognise fundamental yet generalisable differences in the philosophy 
of  human rights as being Afro-communitarian189 in the African-cum-
Namibian world view.190 The ubuntu analysis in the subsequent chapters 
will carry this forward. 
This presents a rejoinder to the often strictly individualistic human 
rights conceptions that are advanced in Western or Eurocentric settings.191 
Notably, scholars such as Fredman persuasively argue against atomistic 
conceptions of  the individual as ‘prior to society’. These conceptions fail 
to appreciate the indispensability of  social input to the individual, given 
that ‘individual identity is essentially based on interpersonal recognition 
and relationships’.192 
Moreover, the advancement of  re-invigorative constitutionalism is not 
at the expense of  the minimum standards of  international human rights.193 
Indeed, as I develop and rely on international human rights law in this 
book, I accept that human rights and the values that underpin them should 
remain the subject of  internal and external contestation in a deliberative 
process that allows rigorous and evidence-based assessment194 but which, 
crucially, privileges the local that is rooted in Afrocentricity. The book will 
thus advance the bounded deliberativism model in chapter 5. 
Second is a caveat: While re-invigorative constitutionalism stresses 
a greater prominence for customary law, norms and values and 
jurisprudential parity with the common law in the legal culture, re-
188 Scott (n 186) 778.
189 See A Wing ‘Communitarianism vs individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and 
South Africa’ (1993) 11 Wisconsin International Law Journal 295. 
190 Josiah (n 182) 331: ‘An Africentric approach is particularly suitable for taking economic 
[and social] rights seriously’; compare A Dundes ‘Human rights and regionalism in 
Southeast Asia’ unpublished PhD thesis, University of  Sydney, 2014.
191 Donnelly (n 185) 411; E Brems ‘Enemies or allies? Feminism and cultural relativism as 
dissident voices in human rights discourse’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 136 142. 
192 S Fredman Human rights transformed (2008) 18. 
193 M Robinson ‘Human rights at the dawn of  the 21st century’ (1993) 15 Human Rights 
Quarterly 629 632; R Howard Human rights in commonwealth Africa (1986) 17.
194 S Fredman ‘Are human rights culturally determined? A riposte to Lord Hoffmann’ in 
P Davies & J Pila (eds) The jurisprudence of  Lord Hoffmann (2015).
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invigorative constitutionalism should not be understood as a blanket, 
idyllic and uncritical endorsement of  African customary law. As argued, 
article 66(1) is unambiguous as to the Constitution and statutory law’s 
supremacy and primacy over customary (and common) law; the invocation 
of  customary law derived values in constitutional interpretation must, 
therefore, concord with the Constitution’s provisions. 
It is also accepted that there are those underpinnings of  customary law 
– however held in good faith – that are in tension with the Constitution 
itself, such as those rooted in heteronormativity and patriarchy that infract 
upon gender equality and women’s property rights.195 What is sought to be 
re-invigorated is only that which is defensible.196 Comparative perspectives, 
when invoked as a deliberative reasoning resource, are particularly utile in 
responding to these drawbacks. 
I have noted earlier that article 17(2) of  the African Charter only 
affords protection to ‘positive African values’. In this context, the African 
Commission has stated that this right to culture only protects ‘positive 
African values consistent with human rights standards, and implies an 
obligation on the State to ensure the eradication of  harmful practices 
that negatively affect human rights’.197 No doubt, precisely which 
African cultural values would fall within the remit of  ‘positive’ and how 
these are determined would raise many questions. The guidance of  the 
African Commission nonetheless remains ambiguous, not least because 
of  the challenge in defining ‘positive African cultural values’ given the 
heterogeneity of  values across Africa.198 
195 Myburgh (n 157); Cultura 2000 (n 36); Müller v President of  the Republic of  Namibia 1999 
NR 190 (SC). It is worth observing that there is growing evidence that some of  the 
nefarious aspects of  African customary law actually find a genesis in the commitments 
to patriarchy, homophobia, and heteronormativity that coloniser missionaries instilled 
in African communities. See E Zitzke ‘A decolonial critique of  private law and human 
rights’ (2018) 34 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 15; S Tamale ‘Exploring the 
contours of  African sexualities: Religion, law and power’ (2014) 14 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 150 155.
196 Makwanyane (n 18) para 261 (Mahomed J). 
197 ‘African Commission Principles and Guidelines on Social and Economic Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (Nairobi Principles), adopted at the 
47th ordinary session, Banjul, The Gambia, 12-26 May 2010, formally launched at the 
Commission’s 50th ordinary session, Banjul, The Gambia, 24 October-7 November 
2011, https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=30 (accessed 17 September 
2019) para 75.
198 N Udombana ‘Between promise and performance: Revisiting states’ obligations under 
the African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of  International Law 105 
111.
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While this question of  which African cultural values to include under 
‘positive’ is challenging, it certainly is not insurmountable. Ssenyonjo 
offers a potential solution as he argues, in the context of  women’s rights 
in Africa, for taking the totality of  the African Charter into account so 
that positive African cultural values would be ‘those that are consonant 
with principles of  equality and non-discrimination’, thereby applying a 
‘progressive and liberal construction of  the [African] Charter seems to 
leave no room for the discriminatory treatment of  women’.199 Indeed, 
the ‘living law’ nature of  African custom inherently allows one to adopt 
a ‘severance’ approach to African values by embracing its adaptation 
through internally and externally inspired shifts in values, norms and 
customs, although not without practical difficulties.200 I will be deliberate 
in advancing those ‘positive’ aspects of  the value of  ubuntu to interpreting 
the right to life to imply a right to water in chapter 3 of  the book.
The third is a clarification: Re-invigorative constitutionalism that is 
rooted in African customary law accepts that there is no singular notion but 
a plurality of  customary laws within Namibia, which must be recognised 
and responded to appropriately. Heightened sensitivity and awareness are 
required to avoid biases in favour of  those norms, values and customs 
of  some majoritarian ethnic groups over others, particularly in light of  
a history where apartheid’s architects and agents were responsible for 
perversely creating and stressing ethnocultural cleavages for systematic 
exploitation through corrupting the socio-economic and political order.201 
This legacy continues in contemporary Namibia and is a reality that the 
pursuit of  re-invigorative constitutionalism must take into account. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has established the framework for interpreting the Bill of  
Rights provisions in the Constitution. The next chapter will turn to apply 
the various interpretative approaches to specifically interpret article 6 
of  the Constitution in order to imply a right to water from the express 
right to life. After the chapter’s survey of  the debate on original intent 
and textualism, the conclusion is that constitutional interpretation in 
Namibia is primarily guided by a purposive approach, one which at its 
core requires a broad, generous and purposive approach that is laden with 
199 See M Ssenyonjo ‘Culture and the human rights of  women in Africa: Between light 
and shadow’ (2007) 51 Journal of  African Law 39 44.
200 Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) para 54, where the South African 
Constitutional Court noted the ‘adaptive’ nature of  African customary law. See also 
Bhe & Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) para 109.
201 Bennett (n 158) 7.
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value judgments. As such, one’s application of  purposive constitutional 
interpretation must be alive to this reality. 
In determining the Namibian Supreme Court’s approach to 
purposivism, the shortcomings in the identification of  values have 
been exposed. To partially remedy this, I have also applied the idea of  
transformative constitutionalism to Namibian constitutionalism. However, 
I further advanced a novel conception of  the Namibian Constitution as re-
invigorative of  African values in constitutional adjudication, which values 
themselves are neglected within legal and human rights discourse in 
Namibia. Re-invigorative constitutionalism thus provides the conceptual 
infrastructure to advance African values in interpreting the provisions in 
the Bill of  Rights. As such, the African value of  ubuntu will be advanced 
in the next chapters to normatively ground a right to water as a socio-
economic dimension of  the right to life in article 6 of  the Constitution, a 
right that the state is duty-bound to realise.
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inTerpreTing The righT To life To 
imply a righT To waTer using ubunTu3
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the book moves on to argue for the existence of  a right to 
water as a fundamental right implied from the article 6 right to life in the 
Constitution. I endeavour to affirm that a right to water imposes three 
correlative duties upon the state: to respect, to protect and, crucially, to fulfil. 
This is notwithstanding the textual absence of  the fulfil duty from the text 
of  article 6. In arriving at these conclusions, the chapter will principally 
apply the purposive interpretation approach as critiqued and advocated 
in the preceding chapter. To reiterate, purposive interpretation invites a 
broad, liberal, and generous reading of  fundamental rights provisions, 
which are infused with values that are central to the Constitution, while 
maintaining fidelity to the text and history of  the Constitution. In applying 
purposivism, the chapter embraces both transformative and re-invigorative 
constitutionalism ideals and will thus invoke the African value of  ubuntu 
as an enriching, durable, and ‘animating’ value to build the normative 
basis for implying water from the right to life. 
In so doing, I will unpack the etymology, origins, and meaning of  
ubuntu, in the process asserting its appositeness and applicability to 
Namibia. I will tease out what I consider to be the four pillar principles 
of  ubuntu – community, interdependence, solidarity, and dignity – to 
establish the normative content of  ubuntu and offer justifications for 
asserting the various correlative duties that are imposed upon the state in 
the context of  water as a socio-economic right. The chapter will also rebut 
some of  the objections to ubuntu while carving out an understanding of  
ubuntu that navigates around the more meritorious objections.
Having established that a right to water can be implied as a socio-
economic dimension of  the right to life with the use of  ubuntu, the chapter 
will address the potential interpretative obstacles or objections that may 
arise in implying water from life. The first set of  objections are rooted in 
original intent and enquire: Did the Constitution’s drafters intentionally 
omit socio-economic rights such as water from being protected as 
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enforceable rights? To refute this objection, the analysis sharpens the 
focus to the travaux préparatoires of  the Constitution, principally the 1982 
Constitutional Principles and the Minutes of  the Constituent Assembly 
Debates. It is argued that the 1982 Constitutional Principles that guided 
the Constitution’s drafters expressly required that the Constitution’s Bill 
of  Rights be faithful to the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 
(Universal Declaration).1 A reading of  the Universal Declaration reveals 
the inclusion of  socio-economic entailments as enforceable rights. This 
argument will assume the relevance of  original intent approaches in 
Namibian constitutional interpretation, in full awareness of  the drawbacks 
to original intent that was teased out in chapter 2.
The second objection is potentially more challenging and is rooted in 
the text of  the Constitution: The omission of  the ‘fulfil’ duty from the text of  
article 6 inhibits positive duties from accruing to the state in its realisation 
of  an implied right to water. I will refute this argument by debunking the 
arguably orthodox conceptualisation of  life in strictly the civil-political 
sense to the exclusion of  any of  its social and economic dimensions. For 
this, I will principally rely on Shue and Fredman’s conceptualisation that 
every right attracts three correlative duties to protect, respect, and fulfil, 
as well as by drawing perspectives from international law, specifically the 
right to life provision of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) as interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee. 
In the final part the chapter turns to comparative resources. From 
India, I consider the interpretation of  the right to life in article 21 of  the 
Indian Constitution, whose courts have variously interpreted the provision 
as including a right to water. I will, however, expose the limited utility of  
the Indian approach in light of  the textual differences between the right 
to life provisions in the Namibian and Indian constitutions, respectively. 
From Botswana, I analyse right to water case law that has been developed. 
As in India, I will also lament the lack of  a robust normative foundation 
to justify implying water. This deficiency results in problematic limitations 
in the judicial determination of  the state’s obligations – negative and, 
particularly, positive. In the process I will aver that normatively founding 
the Namibian constitutional right to water in ubuntu can equip courts with 
the ability to navigate potential competing rights claims. The principled 
approach grounded in ubuntu that is advanced in this chapter thus robustly 
affirms that a right to water finds a normative basis in the Constitution’s 
article 6 right to life. Ubuntu will then become a resource to flesh out the 
1 Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
217 A(III) of  10 December 1948. 
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normative content of  water and to define the various obligations of  the 
state concerning water.
A methodological point is worth stressing here: While the doctrinal 
method is strongly represented throughout the book, it is particularly 
asserted in this chapter, alongside other methods discussed in the first 
chapter. The doctrinal method is to be distinguished from ‘empirical’ or 
evidence-based methods that are directed at ‘observing and/or measuring 
social phenomena’.2 Thus, my analysis of  ubuntu is rooted in doctrinalism 
rather than empiricism.
3.2 Purposively interpreting the right to life through ubuntu 
to imply a right to water
In this part I argue for the existence of  an implied right to water using 
the purposive approach to constitutional interpretation. I have determined 
in chapter 2 that the Namibian Supreme Court’s approach to the 
interpretation of  constitutional fundamental rights is purposive which, 
by and large, has been informed by a value-judgment approach. I have 
critiqued the inconsistencies in the identification and application of  values 
seen in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. My argument has been to 
approach the interpretation of  the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights through 
transformative constitutionalism and re-invigorative constitutionalism. 
In this part I will apply these interpretative approaches to the right to 
life and invoke ubuntu as the normative basis to justify implying a right 
to water. In adopting a value-judgment approach, I align with Dworkin’s 
‘constructive interpretation’ approach with a view to ascertaining the 
best interpretation of  the right to life by constructing the value behind 
the provision and describing the interests, goals, or principles that the 
provision can be taken to serve.3 I thus invoke ubuntu as a value premise 
that is aptly motivated by the re-invigorative constitutionalism proposition 
put forward in chapter 2. 
Ubuntu is a seminal meta-concept that is drawn from African 
indigenous justice systems4 to normatively ground the interpretation of  life 
in article 6 of  the Constitution. But why ubuntu? I will comprehensively 
address this question at a later stage of  this chapter, but I draw attention 
2 T Hutchinson & N Duncan ‘Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal 
research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83.
3 R Dworkin Law’s empire (1989) 52. 
4 O Elechi et al ‘Restoring justice (ubuntu): An African perspective’ (2010) 20 International 
Criminal Justice Review 73 75. 
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to the following pertinent normative justifications. Himonga has observed 
that enhancing human rights implementation in Africa is a prominent 
justification for, at least, investigating the role that African concepts can 
play in the realisation of  human rights.5 
The lack of  cultural legitimacy – actual or perceived – of  human rights 
among its intended (African) beneficiaries is often cited and recognised 
as one of  the foremost challenges to enforcing human rights in Africa.6 
Scholars have exposed the continuing incongruence between those 
values that have come to underpin the dominant Euro-American human 
rights paradigm and ‘alien’ notions of  justice that have come to entrench 
themselves in the societies of  formerly colonised peoples, including 
Africans.7 Moreover, top-down transplantations of  legal approaches have 
rarely rooted themselves. At best, they yield poor results.8 As Mahao 
explains:9
[T]he values underpinning the dominant rights paradigm are, by and large, 
removed from notions of  justice as understood and lived by the vast majority 
of  people previously colonised in places such as Africa. Thus, mainstreaming 
indigenous juridical principles in the legal system holds the promise of  going 
some distance towards legitimising the system. Inherently, however, this 
entails an epistemological shift in world outlook.
Taking a cue from Mahao, imbuing human rights with localised, 
participative approaches such as African values can enhance the 
legitimacy of  the idea of  human rights. In the forthcoming parts I advance 
the substantive justifications for ubuntu, its etymology, meaning and 
underlying principles, and engage with prominent objections to it. While 
ubuntu does not find express mention in the Namibian Constitution (or 
5 C Himonga ‘The right to health in an African cultural context: The role of  ubuntu’ 
(2013) 57 Journal of  African Law 165; B Ibahwoh ‘Between culture and constitution: 
Evaluating the cultural legitimacy of  human rights in the African state’ (2000) 22 
Human Rights Quarterly 838.
6 Himonga (n 5) 165 and authorities cited. 
7 Y Mokgoro & S Woolman ‘Where dignity ends and ubuntu begins: An amplification 
of, as well as an identification of  a tension in Drucilla Cornell’s thoughts’ (2010) 25 
Southern African Public Law 400 406 and sources cited. 
8 Lord Denning’s comments regarding the English common law’s transplantation 
are apt: ‘Just as with an English oak, so with the English common law. You cannot 
transplant it to the African continent and expect it to retain the tough character which 
it has in England.’ Nyali Ltd v Attorney-General (1955) 1 All ER 646 653. 
9 N Mahao ‘Can African juridical principles redeem and legitimise contemporary 
human rights jurisprudence?’ (2016) 49 Comparative and International Law Journal of  
Southern Africa 455 456. 
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in any other African constitution),10 it can, as an inexpress constitutional 
value, be asserted and grounded in the Constitution provided that such an 
ubuntu reading does no violence to the text or spirit of  the Constitution.11 
I thus advance ubuntu as an apposite value premise owing to its 
epistemology that exists within the various African indigenous justice 
systems of  Namibia and given its wide acceptance as accurately capturing 
an overarching African world view, although ubuntu approaches are not 
without demur. There is also a comparatively advanced understanding 
of  ubuntu, which may be attributed to its extensive application, 
deconstruction, and endorsement in African socio-cultural life, within the 
academic literature, and in leading judicial pronouncements drawn from 
African comparative perspectives.12
3.2.1 The etymological origins and definition of  ubuntu13
In this part I introduce the substance of  ubuntu and address its etymological 
origins as an African value. Significant energy is expended for this analysis 
with the principal aim of  countering the potential assertion that ubuntu 
is not a Namibian value or that ubuntu is insufficiently ubiquitous to be 
determined as an African value. Ubuntu will be defined with its principles 
identified so as to comprehend ubuntu legally, principles that will be the 
premise for interpreting article 6 of  the Constitution as implying a right to 
water. I will also evaluate and offer a retort to some objections raised by 
certain ubuntu sceptics. 
10 The 1993 interim South African Constitution mentions ubuntu in its postamble/
epilogue in the context of  providing ‘a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a 
need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation’. 
For a history of  ubuntu in South Africa, see D Cornell & N Muvangua Ubuntu and 
the law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 7. For a viewpoint on 
the textual omission of  ubuntu from the final 1996 South African Constitution, see 
S Motha ‘Archiving colonial sovereignty: From ubuntu to a jurisprudence of  sacrifice’ 
(2009) 24 South African Public Law 305 306, who speculates that this may be attributed 
to the ‘the North American “plain language” drafters’, or ubuntu as ‘merely an 
indigenous flourish that got people through hard times?’ or ‘[w]as ubuntu’s momentary 
appearance in the interim Constitution the excessive mark of  an excessive demand for 
peace, forgiveness, and community?’
11 Mokgoro & Woolman (n 7) 402.
12 For a rich resource exploring ubuntu in Africa broadly through theory, judicial 
decisions and legislation, see C Rautenbach ‘Exploring the contribution of  ubuntu 
in constitutional adjudication: Towards indigenisation of  constitutionalism in South 
Africa?’ in C Fombad (ed) Constitutional adjudication in Africa (2017) 293. 
13 N Ndeunyema ‘Reforming the purposes of  sentencing to affirm African values in 
Namibia’ (2019) 63 Journal of  African Law 329.
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The etymological origins of  ubuntu
When Achebe in his much-acclaimed novel Things fall apart asserted that 
‘proverbs are the palm-oil with which words are eaten’,14 he captured the 
essence that the tissue of  African language is figurative. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the etymological roots of  ubuntu15 are to be found in 
proverbial expressions. An etymological analysis is particularly apt in 
order to anticipate and counteract the potential difficulty claiming that 
ubuntu is insufficiently shared by Namibian-cum-African societies where 
the value may not be well understood. A more ‘neutral’ value, such as 
dignity, for example, the argument goes, would be more unifying in value-
pluralist societies.16
Ubuntu’s most common formulation is umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, an 
isiZulu expression of  the Nguni people of  South Africa that proximately 
translates to the laconic phrase ‘a human being is a human being through 
(the otherness of) other human beings’.17 Nevertheless, ubuntu’s essence 
remains an expression of  African philosophy,18 and has been described 
as a centuries-old African philosophy and way of  life that has sustained 
African communities and continues to be ‘a set of  institutionalised ideals 
which guide and direct the patterns of  life of  Africans’.19 I will return 
to defining ubuntu and elaborating its principles in the legal sense in the 
forthcoming parts of  this chapter and thus focus on the etymological 
aspects here. 
Although of  Nguni extraction, Kamwangamalu20 has compre-
hensively studied ubuntu’s meaning from an African linguistic perspective. 
14 C Achebe Things fall apart (1958) 6.
15 Scholars have employed linguistic and stylistic variations in their writings of  ubuntu, 
including ‘ubuntu’, ‘Botho’ or ‘ubuntu’. I will prefer a reference to ‘ubuntu’.
16 D Blichitz ‘How should judges adjudicate in an African constitutional democracy’ in 
D Bilchitz et al (eds) Jurisprudence in an African context (2017) 67 94. 
17 Ubuntu is often contradistinguished to René Descartes’s cogito ergo sum or ‘I think 
therefore I am’, which is often said to have become a fundamental element of  so-
called Western individualism. See D Tutu ‘Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation’, http://
www.tutufoundationusa.org/desmond-tutu-peace-foundation/ (accessed 3 December 
2018).
18 MW Ngugi ‘Africa is not a proverb’ Black Commentator 23 April 2009, http://
www.blackcommentator.com/321/321_africa_not_proverb_guest_wa_ngugi.html 
(accessed 10 June 2017).
19 G Sogolo Foundations of  African philosophy (1993) 11; M Mluleki ‘The African concept 
of  ubuntu/Botho and its socio-moral significance’ (2005) 3 Black Theology 215; see 
also VY Mudembi The invention of  Africa – Gnosis, philosophy and the order of  knowledge 
(1988).
20 N Kamwangamalu ‘Ubuntu: A sociolinguistic perspective to a pan-African concept’ 
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Kamwangamalu persuasively argues that ubuntu is pan-African and 
as a concept can be found in many other African languages. While not 
necessarily under a common name, ubuntu, Kamwangamalu determines, 
permeates across African societies through Gimuntu (giKwese, Angola); 
Bomoto (iBobangi, Congo); Umundu (Kikuyu, Kenya); Vumuntu (shiTsonga, 
Mozambique); and Bumuntu (kiSukuma, Tanzania), to mention a few.21 
Other similar concepts would include ubumwe22 (Kinyarwanda, Rwanda) 
and humwe23 (Shona, Zimbabwe). 
In Namibia ubuntu finds equivalence in expressions such as omundu 
menarovandu among the OvaHerero; uuntu wuuntu or omuntu omuntu 
omolwa aantu among the aaNdonga, and uuntu wamuntu in Gciriku, to 
mention24 only some Namibian ethnic groups.25 Despite ubuntu’s various 
renditions, the suffix -ntu, -nhu or -ndu found in many African language 
groups almost invariably connotes ‘person’ or ‘people’ or ‘humanness’.26
Beyond linguistic intersections, scholars have identified expressions 
conveying the ethos of  ubuntu in parts of  East, West and Southern Africa 
such as cieng (pronounced ‘cheng’) of  the Dinka peoples in South Sudan 
(1990) 13 Critical Arts 24.
21 C Gade ‘What is ubuntu? Different interpretations among South Africans of  African 
descent’ (2012) 31 South African Journal of  Philosophy 486; D Louw ‘The African 
concept of  ubuntu and restorative justice’ in D Sullivan & L Tifft (eds) Handbook of  
restorative justice (2008) 161. 
22 A Purdeková Making ubumwe: Power, state and camps in Rwanda’s unity-building project 
(2015) 147.
23 B Chigara ‘The Humwe principle: A social ordering grundnorm for Zimbabwe and 
Africa?’ in R Home (ed) Essays in African land law (2011) 113.
24 I have not established the existence of  ubuntu in the non-Bantu language groups of  
Namibia such as the Khoisan peoples. However, this may be ascribed to the lack of  
research that traces the value rather than it being foreign to these groupings altogether. 
It is notable that ubuntu has been applied to other areas such as education in Namibia 
without there being an empirical claim as to the ubiquity of  ubuntu as a value. 
Compare R Shanyanana ‘Examining the potential of  an ethics of  care for inclusion of  
women in African higher education discourse’ unpublished PhD thesis, University of  
Stellenbosch, 2014. 
25 Given the ethnic and linguistic diversity of  Namibia which is a unitary (as opposed to 
federal) state, for practical and legitimacy reasons, I will employ the term ‘ubuntu’ as 
opposed to any specific Namibian expression of  the concept. This is to ensure that no 
one dominant group is linguistically privileged at the expense of  others, resulting in the 
concept’s rejection based on a perceived lack of  local legitimacy. See also the reference 
to ubuntu as a principle of  corporate governance in Namibia under the Corporate 
Governance Code of  Namibia (Namcode).
26 S Lwanga-lunyiigo & J Vansina ‘The Bantu-speaking peoples and their expansion’ in 
M Fasi et al The general history of  Africa (1993) 140-142.
Interpreting the right to life to imply a right to water using ubuntu   67
and the Upper Nile region.27 The Afrocentric philosopher Sheik Anta 
Diop has gone even further in demonstrating ubuntu’s permeation of  the 
Sahara-North Africa divide through the Egyptological concept of  Ma’at.28 
However, I confine the claim and analysis to ubuntu as a sub-Saharan 
African value based on the strength of  authority evaluated herein. 
Ubuntu’s ubiquity across sub-Saharan Africa deserves emphasis given 
the reality that Namibia – in its existing territorial sense at least – can be 
described as an accident of  history, conceived through the political and 
economic self-interestedness of  its former colonial powers.29 Therefore, 
while a plurality of  ethnicities, traditions, cultures, norms and values 
exists in Namibia, ubuntu remains a unifying and enduring value that cuts 
across Namibian communities of  African indigeneity. 
I hasten to provide the caveat that while the book proclaims ‘Africa’, it 
is done with ambivalence and caution that aims to avoid the problematic 
‘white gaze’ of  homogenising Africa or perpetuating the monolithisation 
of  her people. This is in full appreciation of  the reality that Africa is not a 
country. Africa’s diversity is as voluminous as its geography, a truism that 
cuts across ethos, values, cultural, and social slants.30 
Defining ubuntu
In African social-cultural life, the substance of  philosophies, concepts and 
values such as ubuntu is often communicated creatively. This is because, as 
Ongyango and Mapaure both suggest, African indigenous justice systems 
and customary laws reflect those values enshrined over time by ancestors.31 
African customary laws and values such as ubuntu thus are generationally 
27 M Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of  
the language of  duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of  International Law 339.
28 SA Diop Pre-colonial black Africa (1988) 141; cf  Manden Charter of  13th century 
Malian empire, during the reign of  Sunjata Keita, which was enacted in the Malian 
Empire and is considered one of  the earliest human rights documents. The Manden 
Charter is often compared with the Magna Carta of  1215, although the Magna 
Carta was specifically focused on the freedom of  privileged landlords to control their 
own property. L Quaynor ‘Remembering West-African indigenous knowledges and 
practices in citizenship education research’ (2018) 48 Compare: A Journal of  Comparative 
and International Education 362. 
29 See S Akweenda ‘International law and the protection of  Namibia’s territorial 
integrity: Boundaries and territorial claims’ (1997); E Okupa Carrying the sun on our 
backs: Unfolding German colonialism in Namibia from Caprivi to Kasikili (2006).
30 K Appiah ‘The arts of  Africa’ (1997) 44 New York Review of  Books 46.
31 P Ongyango African customary law: An introduction (2013) 153; C Mapaure 
‘Reinvigorating African values for SADC’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 148 152.
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passed down by elders through oral traditions32 that include idioms, 
musicology and folklore, in the process becoming binding on community 
members ‘since time immemorial’.33 The artistic communication of  ubuntu 
sometimes results in varied interpretative renditions from one community 
to another. This reality may have invited the view by some scholars that 
ubuntu resists easy definition, being ‘recognised when practised’, existing 
‘only when people interact with each other’, and ‘cannot be neatly 
categorised and defined [as] any definition would only be a simplification 
of  a more expansive, flexible and philosophically accommodative idea’.34 
Some scholars such as Mokgoro assert that ubuntu’s content becomes 
‘elusive’ when discussed in a foreign language.35 However, the more 
persuasive approach in my view is that advanced by Himonga et al who 
maintain that while it is not easy to define, one must nevertheless be able 
to discuss ubuntu and understand it in what many may regard as foreign 
languages.36 The difficulty in expressing ubuntu should neither surprise 
nor delegitimise it as a value premise; expressive obtuseness is a norm 
that cuts across various abstract notions (including established concepts 
of  dignity, equality, and liberty) that inform constitutional values, rules, 
and principles across societies. This reality must be grappled with and 
debated through language, even in colonial ones. Indeed, there is no 
plausible reason why ubuntu should be an exception; the challenge is 
to ‘strive towards a shared and accepted understanding of  ubuntu for 
communicating how to interpret the Bill of  Rights’.37 This, in my view, is 
a sine qua non for the acceptance and efficacy of  ubuntu as a viable legal 
concept for re-invigoration. To this end, I will endeavour to grapple with 
defining ubuntu and teasing out its substance.
When defined through a socio-cultural lens, ubuntu represents 
multi-generational experiences. It is a multi-dimensional and relational 
worldview of  African ontological values of  interconnectedness, 
32 E Okupa ‘Is African customary law just?’ in M Hinz (ed) In search of  justice and peace: 
Traditional and informal justice systems in Africa (2010) 341. 
33 The phrase ‘since time immemorial’ is the formulation widely used in an African 
traditional context to ascertain legitimacy. M Hinz ‘Traditional governance and 
African customary law’ in A Bösl Human rights and the rule of  law in Namibia (2008) 59.
34 Y Mokgoro ‘Ubuntu and the law in South Africa’ (1998) 1 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 1 2; J Faris ‘African customary law and common law in South Africa: 
Reconciling contending legal systems’ (2015) 10 International Journal of  African 
Renaissance Studies – Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity 177 178.
35 As above.
36 C Himonga et al ‘Reflections on judicial views of  ubuntu’ (2013) 16 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 374.
37 Himonga (n 36) 378.
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common humanity, collective sharing, obedience, humility, solidarity, 
communalism, dignity, and responsibility to one another.38 Relatedly, 
ubuntu is a prescription for treating others as one would like to be treated. 
It also represents a command to care for one another and to embrace the 
principles of  reciprocity and mutual support.39 
While this definitional exposition of  ubuntu is a good starting point, it 
is overly cross-cutting and unhelpfully dense, and thus will not suffice for 
purposes of  ubuntu’s legal conceptualisation. This is because the objective 
of  this chapter is to establish a normative basis for a constitutional right 
to water. The normative basis will then inform the determination of  the 
substantive content of  a right to water through recourse to ubuntu as a 
non-textual constitutional value that can retain legal character. 
Given the absence of  Namibian jurisprudence that asserts African 
values including ubuntu, recourse is had to comparative perspectives – 
based on justifications articulated in chapter 1 – from other African 
jurisdictions. The celebrated Makwanyane40 decision of  the South African 
Constitutional Court had pioneered the judicial explication of  ubuntu as 
a legal concept. While Makwanyane addressed ubuntu in relation to the 
constitutionality of  capital punishment under the 1996 South African 
Constitution, the South African Constitutional Court’s various concurring 
opinions were able to define and isolate the key features of  ubuntu. These 
features can aid our understanding of  the concept in the context of  a right 
to water. 
Ubuntu carries ideas of  ‘humaneness, social justice and fairness’41 
and places ‘emphasis on communality and on the interdependence of  
the members of  a community’, thereby recognising a person’s status as 
a human being who is entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value, 
and acceptance from community members.42 Mahomed J’s obiter in 
Makwanyane that articulates the ethos of  ubuntu is worth quoting:43
[Ubuntu] expresses the ethos of  an instinctive capacity for and enjoyment of  
love towards our fellow men and women; the joy and the fulfilment involved in 
38 Elechi et al (n 4) 75; Kamwangamalu (n 20) 26; Mluleki (n 19) 215.
39 As above.
40 S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
41 Makwanyane (n 40) (Madala J) para 237.
42 Makwanyane (n 40) para 224.
43 Makwanyane (n 40) (Mahomed J) para 263. Cf  Afri-Forum & Another v Malema & Others 
2011 (6) SA 240 (EqC) para 18, where the South African Equality Court identifies 12 
salient features of  ubuntu.
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recognizing their innate humanity; the reciprocity this generates in interaction 
within the collective community; the richness of  the creative emotions which 
it engenders and the moral energies which it releases both in the givers and the 
society which they serve and are served by.
Mahomed J continues that ubuntu is personhood and morality, and 
describes the significance of  group solidarity on survival issues so central 
to the survival of  communities.44 For her part, Mokgoro J asserts that 
ubuntu ‘envelops the key values of  group solidarity, compassion, respect, 
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, [which] in 
its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality’.45 
Moreover, beyond the South African judicial landscape, ubuntu has 
been judicially recognised and asserted in other African jurisdictions. The 
Lesotho High Court in Mokoena v Mokoena,46 a case concerning succession 
under customary land rights, determined:47
[T]he widow has a customary law right to expect her late husband’s relatives 
to protect her and the property that her husband left her with … It is contrary 
to Basotho culture, good conscience and a sense of  what is right in the African 
sense – that applicant should be attempting to deprive the widow of  her house 
and arable lands (masimo). It is not botho or ubuntu to dispossess a widow.
Similarly, the Lesotho High Court in Thabo Fuma,48 while not referring to 
ubuntu per se, quotes the South African Constitutional Court’s Hoffmann49 
decision that linked dignity and ubuntu to conclude that the denial of  
employment to an HIV-positive soldier constituted unfair discrimination. 
In Uganda, the Constitutional Court in Abuki – a case concerning the 
constitutionality of  the Ugandan Witchcraft Act – stated:50 
44 Makwanyane (n 40) (Mahomed J) para 263. 
45 Makwanyane (n 40) (Mokgoro J) para 307.
46 Mokoena v Mokoena [2007] LSHC 14 (Lesotho High Court).
47 Mokoena (n 46) paras 36-37 (my emphasis). Commenting on Mokoena’s recourse to 
ubuntu, Rautenbach remarks: ‘The court did not explain the meaning of  ubuntu, and it 
is evident that, being a native Sesotho speaker, he, and probably everyone else involved 
in the case, knew exactly what it meant from “experience”.’ Rautenbach (n 12) 300.
48 Thabo Fuma v The Commander, Lesotho Defence Force (2013) LSHC 68 (Lesotho High 
Court).
49 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).
50 Solvatori Abuki & Another v Attorney-General [1997] UGCC 10 (my emphasis). Cf  Satrose 
Ayuma v Registered Trustees of  the Kenya Railways Staff  Retirement Benefits Scheme (2013) 
eKLR para 26, where the Kenyan High Court in the context of  the right to housing 
and forced evictions refers to the submission of  Professor Yash Ghai on ubuntu where 
he refers to Makwanyane, one of  the petitioners, but does not expressly accept or reject 
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Of course, the concept of  ‘ubuntu’, the idea that being human entails 
humaneness to other people, is not confined to South Africa or any particular 
ethnic group in Uganda. It is the whole mark [sic] of  civilised societies ... It will be 
recalled that the word ‘ubuntu’, though linguistically peculiar to only certain groups, is 
a concept embraced by all the communities of  Uganda.
Abuki’s assertion is that ubuntu is not confined to South Africa. It also 
holds true for Namibia in light of  the etymological analysis above. 
In the same vein, it is essential to avoid ‘oppositionalising’ ubuntu as 
a value within African law and philosophy as opposed to, for example, 
Eurasian law and philosophy. Admittedly, the attraction towards 
oppositionalisation is a strong one given the replete nature of  binarised 
approaches in legal conceptions. While one should be alive to the danger 
of  seeking to legitimise the legal worth of  knowledge from the Global 
South and perspectives such as ubuntu through the prism of  Western 
sensibilities, drawing on non-African thought can also be helpful in 
imagining and understanding ubuntu as a relatively under-explored legal 
concept. 
Letseka, for instance, invokes comparativism in the context of  
education to identify the shared traits between ubuntu and the Germanic 
notion of  bildung. Bildung ‘is about linking the self  to the world in the 
most general, most animated and most unrestrained interplay … bildung 
as mimetic, that is, as non-teleological, undetermined and uncertain, 
and aimed at the reconciliation between outer historic-social and inner 
individual conditions’.51 Additionally, the concept of  ‘recognition’, as 
developed by Hegel and cited by Fredman, has a notable foundational 
view that retains ubuntu-esque features. Like ubuntu, ‘recognition’ holds 
that individual identity derives from inter-subjective recognition within the 
context of  social relations which, again like ubuntu, allows an individual 
to only become an individual by recognising others and being recognised 
by them.52 
the ubuntu reference. 
51 M Letseka ‘In defence of  ubuntu’ (2012) 31 Studies in Philosophy and Education 47-60 
cites the German bildung scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt. Relatedly, the common law 
remedy of  amende honourable (honourable amends) has been likened to ubuntu in 
Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) (separate opinion of  Sachs J) para 116; for a 
critique of  this approach, see Rautenbach (n 12) 300.
52 G Hegel Phenomenology of  spirit (1977) 104-109 cited in S Fredman ‘Redistribution and 
recognition: Reconciling inequalities’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 
215.
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3.2.2 Addressing the objections to ubuntu
Before turning to the principles of  ubuntu, I first evaluate some of  the 
most prominent objections to ubuntu as a constitutional value. I will 
compartmentalise these objections into three themes, namely, normative, 
redundancy and constitutionality objections.53 While I will offer an 
evaluation of  these objections, the main responses to counter or navigate 
the more meritorious arguments are embedded in the forthcoming analysis 
of  ubuntu principles.
Normative objections
As far as normative objections are concerned, English is among those 
scholars who indict ubuntu’s usefulness as a jurisprudential tool. She 
questions whether it ‘simply means all things to all men’ and claims that 
it serves only as a marketing device to give an ‘African imprimatur’ on 
Cartesian Western rights conceptions.54 Another ubuntu sceptic, Kroeze, 
further finds that ubuntu is both a ‘bloated’ concept that tries to do too 
much but collapses under the weight of  expectation while at the same time 
being ‘empty’.55 Curiously, others lament ubuntu’s apparent density and 
susceptibility to abuse.56 
In my assessment, these criticisms fail to meaningfully engage with 
and appreciate the jurisprudential wealth that ubuntu offers. At the least, 
it is no emptier than any other (Western) philosophical and values-based 
legal concept including dignity,57 freedom, liberty and equality. The 
difficulty of  explaining abstract concepts alone does not render them 
empty.58 Indeed, a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from ubuntu’s 
abstract and amorphous nature is that this suggests its under-elaboration 
53 A concise summary is offered by Rautenbach (n 12) 306–307.
54 R English ‘Ubuntu: The quest for an indigenous jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 641–648.
55 I Kroeze ‘Doing things with values II: The case of  ubuntu’ (2002) 13 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 385.
56 J Hailey Ubuntu: A literature review (2008); W Binsbergen ‘Ubuntu and the globalisation 
of  Southern African thought and society’ (2001) 15 Quest - An African Journal of  
Philosophy. See the rebuttal to V Bisbergen in J Bewaji & M Ramose ‘The Bewaji, Van 
Binsbergen and Ramose debate on ubuntu’ (2003) 22 South African Journal of  Philosophy 
378.
57 J Waldron ‘Is dignity the foundation of  human rights?’ in R Cruft et al (eds) Philosophical 
foundations of  human rights (2013) 121; M Bagaric & J Allan ‘The vacuous concept of  
dignity’ (2005) 5 Journal of  Human Rights 257.
58 Himonga et al (n 36) 384-385.
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and that it remains a work-in-progress.59 Generality, imprecision and 
malleability are the inherent characteristics of  constitutional values, yet 
this alone does not deprive such values of  significance or the ability to 
retain substantive content. As the literature reviewed evinces, there are 
various interpretative understandings of  ubuntu. Moreover, that ubuntu 
envelops various ‘mainstream’ legal values simultaneously ought not to 
disqualify its invocation. The principles of  ubuntu that will be assessed 
below also offer a fuller retort to these normative objections. 
Redundancy objections
It has been argued that ubuntu is redundant as it is not unique; it is simply 
glorified African communalism60 and an African marketing tool for what 
essentially are Western human rights.61 Further, ubuntu, the argument 
goes, is more easily lived out in smaller groups where people are not 
inevitably strangers to one another. This would cause difficulties in the 
operation of  ubuntu as regards the relationship of  individuals within the 
group or community.62 
It is inaccurate to merely equate ubuntu to communalism, which itself  
retains a panoply of  possible meanings. The two are not synonymous – as 
will be elaborated in the analysis of  the community principle of  ubuntu. A 
reading of  ubuntu in this manner arguably is tendentious as it overlooks the 
fact that ubuntu allows us to at least attempt a harmonisation of  African 
values with Western values that are deeply embedded in the prevailing legal 
culture using the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights as the forum.63 Reducing 
ubuntu’s worth to the small group setting is unimaginative and would be 
blind to the ‘living’ nature of  African customary law that allows for the 
dynamic application of  ubuntu.
Endogenous, autochthonous and pluralistic reasons are to be 
embraced to pursue the Africanisation of  the legal culture imperative 
defended in my re-invigorative constitutionalism conceptualisation in 
chapter 2. Additionally, as Himonga observes, ‘there is something very 
powerful about having one’s judicial reasoning reinforced by two separate 
value systems’,64 particularly where one value system has systematically 
encroached upon the other, thereby providing force to the expression 
59 Waldron (n 57) 122. 
60 Himonga et al (n 36) 387. 
61 English (n 54) 48.
62 Himonga (n 5) 171.
63 Himonga et al (n 36) 389.
64 As above.
74   Chapter 3
of  universal human rights. That ubuntu’s Africanness finds no Western 
inheritance and is areligious is also significant. Perhaps most importantly, 
ubuntu’s human-centredness, inclusiveness, accessibility, sense of  socio-
economic justice and aspirational nature make it an important concept to 
draw upon in normatively grounding human rights.65
Constitutionality objections
A further set of  objections are those related to ubuntu’s compatibility with 
constitutional touchstones. Like various African customary laws, values 
and norms, ubuntu can indeed retain interpretations that potentially 
counter other values that are pronounced by the Constitution. Patriarchal 
inequality is an illustrative exemplar with Kenyan theologian John Mbiti’s 
account of  ubuntu bringing this to bear: 
Only in terms of  other people does the individual become conscious of  his 
being, his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards himself  and 
towards other people. When he suffers, he does not suffer alone but with the 
corporate group; when he rejoices, he rejoices not alone but with his kinsmen, 
his neighbours and his relatives whether dead or living. When he gets married, 
he is not alone, neither does the wife ‘belong’ to him alone, so also the children belong to 
the corporate body of  kinsmen, even if  they bear only their father’s name.66 
Mbiti’s account of  ubuntu indeed exposes its potential patriarchal 
underbelly. The language used demonstrates that ubuntu’s manifestation 
may run counter to the Constitution’s ethos and provisions on sex equality, 
for instance. Indeed, the conservativism in some highly-stratified African 
structures and patriarchal practices,67 such as male primogeniture and 
women’s limited land ownership and inheritance rights and, by extension, 
the exercise of  water rights, in customary settings that may be in tension 
with the Constitution, remain embedded in society. Nevertheless, this 
should not justify the absolute rejection of  ubuntu’s re-invigoration so as 
to throw the proverbial baby out with the bath water. Rather, we should 
pursue a richer and more inclusive notion of  ubuntu’s meaning that 
develops its positive aspects.68 The Mokoena decision from Lesotho, cited 
earlier in the context of  household dispossession of  widows, affirms how 
ubuntu can be invoked to counter problematic conceptions of  customary 
65 As above.
66 J Mbiti African religions and philosophy (1969) 108-110 (my emphasis).
67 Mokgoro & Woolman (n 7) 404.
68 In ruling that male primogeniture was unconstitutional, Langa DCJ in Bhe referred to 
ubuntu while elaborating on ‘positive aspects of  customary law [which] have been long 
neglected’. Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) para 45.
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law. Indeed, a similarly moderate and incremental approach has been 
adopted in response to those problematic aspects of  English and Roman-
Dutch common law.69
Re-invigorative constitutionalism calls for building upon the positive 
in African values while confronting the negative. Fortunately, as a concept 
derived from customary law, ubuntu can be developed within the scope 
of  the ‘living law’ nature of  custom, thus being capable of  evolution 
and adaptation to changing social conditions.70 The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) in article 29(7) is candid as 
to the drawbacks inherent in certain African cultural values when it enjoins 
a duty on the individual to specifically ‘preserve and strengthen positive 
African cultural values’, as discussed in chapter 2. As Mokgoro argued, 
ubuntu’s lack of  specificity is a strength; the more open and flexible the 
concept, the greater its potential as a tool for aligning customary practices 
and conduct with human rights.71 
I will thus develop a conceptual understanding of  ubuntu that coheres 
with Namibian constitutional touchstones, particularly those within the 
Bill of  Rights. 
3.2.3 Principles encompassed by ubuntu
The preceding analysis demonstrates that ubuntu does indeed resist easy 
definition and attracts various objections. It may be argued that ubuntu’s 
lack of  precise meaning and abstractness makes it potentially consistent 
with the very nature of  values in the Constitution.72 As such, it is argued 
that we can best understand and apply ubuntu through identifying its 
central interrelated principles.73 
Here, I depart from Himonga’s characterisation of  ‘attributes’ to 
‘principles’ of  ubuntu. I will thus unpack four central principles, namely, 
community, interdependence, dignity and solidarity.74 This constellation 
69 E Zitzke ‘A decolonial critique of  private law and human rights’ (2018) South African 
Journal on Human Rights 1.
70 Himonga (n 5) 174. 
71 Cited in Himonga (n 5) 171.
72 Himonga (n 5) 173. Important to highlight is the fact that Himonga’s work on ubuntu 
is retrospective, looking at the right to health in South Africa and how ubuntu has 
impacted upon its interpretation.
73 As above.
74 Cf  Himonga (n 5) 176, who identifies six interrelated attributes: community, 
interdependence, dignity, solidarity, responsibility and ideal.
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of  principles will be employed as tools in interpreting the normative 
basis for implying a right to water from the right to life in article 6 of  the 
Constitution. 
Community 
Ubuntu includes the central idea of  community whereby a relationship 
exists between the community and the individual. As Langa J describes 
ubuntu’s communitarianism, ‘we [Africans] are not islands unto 
ourselves’.75 Here, I adopt Gyekye’s concept of  ‘community’ as a ‘cultural 
community’ which means ‘a group of  people with shared values and 
practices and a shared notion of  common good, whether or not it has 
a shared language’.76 Gyekye’s definition of  community allows us to 
conceptualise ubuntu communitarianism notwithstanding the differences 
in its linguistic formulation, focusing more on the shared ‘habits, outlooks, 
practices, institutions, and cultural values’ in these communities.77 Thus, 
the idea of  community as an element of  ubuntu can apply to groups 
beyond the extended family.78 As such, I argue that the ubuntu community 
would extend to the clan, village, tribe, neighbourhood, city and the 
nation-state, all as different kinds of  ‘communities’.79 The construction of  
‘community’ as including the nation-state – in this context the Namibian 
state – is coherent with the living law80 nature of  ubuntu as an African 
customary law value. This nation-state construction of  community 
becomes particularly pertinent in ascribing correlative duties that accrue 
out of  a right to water that arise in the context of  the book.
Ubuntu communitarianism inevitably reveals tensions in the 
relationship between the individual and the community or the collective. 
75 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) (Langa CJ) para 53, 
pointing out that the importance of  community is not unique to African thought as 
community also cuts across Western philosophy, and points to various authorities in 
support in fn 30 of  the opinion. 
76 K Gyekye Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience (1997) 
43; Himonga (n 5) 174;
77 Himonga (n 5) 173.
78 As above.
79 Gyekye (n 76) 43.
80 The character of  African customary law as ‘living law’ acknowledges its fluidity and 
adaptability to fit in with changed circumstances and that law emerges from the people. 
Customary law also emphasises oral traditions as sources which, as Himonga observes, 
‘this living customary law represents the unwritten practices observed, and vested 
with binding authority, by the people whose customary law is under consideration’. C 
Himonga ‘The living customary law in African legal systems’ in J Fenrich et al (eds) 
The future of  African customary law (2011) 35. On living customary law, see also Bhe (n 
68) para 87; M Hinz Customary law ascertained (2010).
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In the context of  rights, this requires a reconciliation of  the rights of  the 
individual in relation to those of  the collective. There are generally two 
approaches to community: radical and moderate.81 The radical view of  
community would require that the individual’s rights and interests be 
sacrificed at the altar of  those of  the group. This approach to African 
communitarianism is embraced in the ideological perspectives of  Kwame 
Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. The individual can only say ‘I am, because 
we are; and since we are, therefore I am’.82 
In contrast, moderate communitarianism, which I endorse in light 
of  my justification of  moderate cultural relativism in chapter 2, rejects 
the approach that African communitarianism represents the idea that the 
traditional African social order was absolutely communal and blind to the 
‘status and relevance of  individual rights’.83 Gyekye, who cites the ideology 
of  Senegalese founding President Leopold Senghor84 and proverbs from 
the Akan people of  Ghana, argues that the status of  individuality and 
community are relative in the sense that ‘no human society is absolutely 
individualistic, and that it is all a matter of  emphasis or priority or basic 
concern with one or the other’. The gendered language notwithstanding, 
Steve Biko highlights the individual emphasis within the community by 
stating that ‘the corner-stone of  [African] society is man himself  – not 
just his welfare, not his material well-being but just man with all his 
ramifications’.85
Moderate communitarianism would (arguably) assert the importance 
of  both individual and collective rights. Where an irreconcilable tension 
between the two exists, it would place a greater, but not exclusive, emphasis 
on communal rights and interests rather than those of  the individual.86 
Interpreting ubuntu communitarianism in its radical mould runs the 
risk of  rendering ubuntu as unconstitutional; the Constitution retains a 
81 Gyekye (n 76) 43.
82 J Mbiti African religions and philosophy (1969) 108-110 cited in Himonga (n 5) 175; 
Gyekye (n 76) 37. 
83 Himonga (n 5) 175; Gyekye (n 76) 38.
84 It is worth noting that President Leopold Senghor was a driving force behind the 
adoption of  the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and had set the 
communitarian parameters for economic, social and cultural rights when he requested 
the drafting experts to ‘keep constantly in mind our values of  civilisation and the real 
needs of  Africa’. Address of  President Leopold Senghor to the Dakar Meeting of  
Experts Preparing the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU 
Doc CAB/LEG/67/X, reprinted in P Kunig et al (eds) Regional protection of  human 
rights by international law: The emerging African systems (1985) 121.
85 S Biko I write what I like (1978) 46.
86 Himonga (n 5) 176.
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sturdy individual rights outlook. Asserting a moderate communitarian 
interpretation would thus avoid transgressing the touchstone of  
constitutional supremacy over the customary law value that is ubuntu. 
Moreover, radical communitarianism may counterintuitively imply that 
African values would be apotheosised whenever value conflict arises. 
The prioritisation of  collective rights over individual ones may also result 
in approaches that summarily exclude non-conforming individuals and 
minority groups.87
Here, it is worth reflecting on the central ethos of  the African Charter to 
reveal the primordiality of  community in Africa. While I comprehensively 
consider the African Charter in the chapter 4 analysis of  a right to water 
under international law, it is material that the African Charter is distinctive 
from other human rights instruments (both national and supranational) 
as it incorporates all three traditional rights categories of  civil-political, 
socio-economic, and group/solidarity rights as well as both individual 
and collective rights and duties, all of  which are rendered justiciable.88 
This concept of  rights indeed is informed by African communitarianism,89 
as summed up by Gyekye as ‘a person is only partly constituted by the 
community’.90
Interdependence
The principle of  interdependence can be seen in the various derivative 
phrases of  ubuntu. Take, for example, the Oshindonga rendition uunhu 
wuunhu or ‘personhood in people’ or its isiZulu equivalent umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu or ‘persons depend on persons to be persons’.91 This 
emphasis upon interdependency between human beings is a tenet that 
Mbiti sums up appositely:92 
87 O Oyowe ‘An African conception of  human rights? Comments on the challenges of  
relativism’ (2014) 15 Human Rights Review 329 334.
88 M Ssenyonjo ‘The influence of  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Africa’ (2017) 64 Netherlands International Law Review 259 262; C 
Odinkalu ‘Analysis of  paralysis or paralysis by analysis – Implementing economic, 
social, and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 327.
89 Himonga (n 5) 170-171; O Okere ‘The protection of  human rights in Africa and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Comparative analysis with the 
European and American systems’ (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 141 148; R Howard 
‘Evaluating human rights in Africa: Some problems of  implicit comparisons’ (1984) 6 
Human Rights Quarterly 160.
90 Gyekye (n 76) 59.
91 Himonga (n 5) 177.
92 MEC for Education (n 75) (Langa CJ) para 53; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37; Makwanyane (n 40) para 308.
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What happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and 
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. This 
demonstrates the strength of  reciprocal duty between the individual and 
the group. The interdependence principle of  ubuntu is also asserted in 
various decisions by South African courts. 
Again, adopting a moderate form of  communitarianism, I argue 
that ‘interdependence should be understood to recognise the status of  
the individual as equal in moral terms to that of  the community while 
emphasizing communal interests and rights’.93 The crux nevertheless is 
that there is a shared responsibility to one another.
Solidarity
Ubuntu’s solidarity requires that people should be able to count on those 
around them for support and thus they are obligated to assist society’s 
needy in augmenting social solidarity.94 It rejects selfish individual 
pursuits. Solidarity thereby sets down notions of  what ties people together 
as mutual bonds of  loyalty and protection. This is consistent with an 
outlook that does not hold a person as an isolated, abstract individual, but 
as ‘an integral member of  a group animated by a spirit of  solidarity’.95 This 
outlook informs the strong features of  solidarity in African indigenous 
laws and African institutions.96 The solidarity principle comes out strongly 
in the water management regimes operative in Namibian rural/communal 
areas, which have historically and presently been inhabited by people of  
African indigeneity. In this vein, Mapaure’s quantitative and qualitative 
study on water provision in Namibian communities in the communal 
areas where customary law has asserted solidarity in that water rights and 
use could not be decoupled from land rights and use.97 
93 Himonga (n 5) 178.
94 Himonga (n 5) 177; R Makgato ‘Dignity and ubuntu: Epitome of  South Africa’s socio-
economic transformation’ (2016) 5 Scientific Journal for Theory and Practice of  Socio-
economic Development 68.
95 S Fredman Human rights transformed (2008) 18; Okere (n 89) 148.
96 Cf  art 2(1)(a) Charter of  the Organisation of  African Unity of  1963; art 3(a) 
Constitutive Act of  the African Union of  2000: ‘The objectives of  the Union shall be to 
(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples 
of  Africa.’
97 C Mapaure ‘“Water wars”: Legal pluralism and hydropolitics in Namibian water law’ 
unpublished LLM dissertation, University of  Namibia, 2010, http://repository.unam.
na/bitstream/handle/11070/499/mapaure2009.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
(accessed 18 February 2019) 40.
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Dignity 
The dignity principle of  ubuntu requires the recognition of  the worth of  
each individual in the community. This is captured through the notion of  
dignity that ubuntu advances as it requires human beings to be ‘valued 
and respected for their own sake’ without regard to their gender, ethnicity, 
race, intellectual, or mental capacities, and (an oft-neglected category that 
is critical to the water context) their socio-economic status.98 
Defining ubuntu through the dignity principle inevitably leads 
to challenges related to contestations over the meaning of  dignity in 
philosophical theory and as a constitutional value. Dignity, scholars 
observe, is often known to be a broad category that is overstretched, 
devoid of  content, and vague.99 It thus is of  little surprise that leading 
ubuntu scholars such as Himonga and Metz have materially differed 
on the substance of  dignity in the context of  ubuntu.100 Nevertheless, 
what ubuntu can facilitate are conceptions of  dignity that are authentic, 
localised, de-colonial yet principled. 
In my view, positive duties that arise out of  rights can best be justified 
through an understanding of  ubuntu as dignity. Where persons are in need 
of  certain socio-economic goods for their subsistence, they would retain 
a positive right claim,101 which gives rise to positive duties. Dignity in the 
ubuntu sense thus requires a concern for livelihood and socio-economic 
well-being, which is to be contrasted with dignity in the Western sense 
which has been found to emphasise negative liberty and individual 
personality issues generally.102 
The Namibian Constitution variously mentions dignity, perhaps most 
prominently as an inviolable human right in article 8 and the inherent 
dignity of  all members of  the human family recognised in the opening 
clause of  the Preamble. The substantive meaning of  dignity has further 
been developed in Namibian jurisprudence.103 I do not propose displacing 
98 Himonga (n 5) 179.
99 C McCrudden ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of  human rights’ (2008) 19 
European Journal of  International Law 655.
100 Himonga (n 5) 182.
101 Himonga 183.
102 S Liebenberg ‘The value of  human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 9. 
103 In Re Ex parte Attorney-General: Corporal Punishment by Organs of  State 1991 NR 178 
(SC); Trustco International v Shikongo 2010 (2) NR 377 (SC). Cf  Dawood & Another v 
Minister of  Home Affairs & Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 35 (O’Regan J).
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these conceptions of  dignity. Nevertheless, I hold that the novelty and 
utility in considering dignity through the value of  ubuntu allow us to adopt 
purposive, transformative and re-invigorative interpretative approaches 
that are anchored in concrete and localised values. Some scholars such 
as Cornell have advocated an interpretation ‘that would ground the 
constitutional grundnorm of  dignity, and not dignity that calls for the 
recognition of  African humanist principles such as ubuntu’.104 However, 
it is not necessary to strictly reconcile ubuntu with dignity. The viewpoint 
taken by Mokogoro and Woolman thus is compelling:105 
No one has suggested that we need to square ubuntu with equality or freedom, 
or reduce it entirely to community rights. We might do well to consider 
allowing these values to occupy their own separate spaces – closely aligned 
and overlapping, but with different roles to play when we apply our minds to 
constitutional conflicts … ubuntu and dignity do not map directly on to one 
another, but they do rhyme.
What follows is an application of  ubuntu to article 6 of  the Constitution. 
3.3 Purposively interpreting article 6 through ubuntu to imply 
a right to water 
In this part I will move to establish the normative basis for interpreting 
the right to life to imply a right to water using ubuntu – or, as some 
have characterised it, ‘legal ubuntu’.106 I earlier argued for a purposive 
interpretation method that is informed by value judgments. I have also 
advanced re-invigorative and transformative constitutionalism approaches. 
Therefore, I will consolidate these methods and apply them to interpret 
article 6 broadly, liberally, and purposively. In the process I prioritise 
ubuntu as a value of  African extraction in the pursuit of  socio-economic 
justice to advance normative justifications for asserting the existence of  a 
right to water implied from the right to life.
In summary, when conceptualised as transformative, the Constitution 
enjoins an interpretation of  its provisions in a manner that would be able to 
transform, among others, the gross socio-economic inequality prevailing 
in society. Drawing on Langa, transformative constitutionalism envisages 
the Constitution as a revolutionary instrument to address the prevailing 
chronic socio-economic deprivation. In asserting a normative basis for 
104 D Cornell Law and revolution in South Africa: ubuntu, dignity, and the struggle for 
constitutional transformation (2014) 151. 
105 Mokgoro & Woolman (n 7) 407.
106 Zitzke (n 69) 17.
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this premise, I endeavour to invoke the value of  ubuntu. As ubuntu is the 
antithesis of  human suffering and deprivation, it can be deployed as a 
normative basis upon which the Constitution can ‘create dependable [and 
durable] socio-economic transformation which safeguards human well-
being’.107 I argue that, taken collectively, ubuntu’s principles of  community, 
interdependence, solidarity and dignity affirm that all human beings have 
access to not only all the means necessary for their survival but also those 
goods necessary for a dignified existence. This would include their right 
to water. 
In my view, ubuntu aids us in overcoming the three principal 
challenges facing the affirmative argument that water can be implied from 
the right to life. The first argument is that the right to life in article 6 should 
only be understood in the civil rights sense – the state is prohibited from 
taking a life through capital punishment, the unjustified use of  force, or 
other extra-judicial means of  killing. I will argue that ubuntu allows us to 
normatively justify a socio-economic dimension to article 6, in this case 
a right to water. Second, ubuntu in part allows us to justify the assertion 
of  positive duties upon the primary duty bearer to realise a right to water 
under article 6. Third, ubuntu aids us in affirmatively identifying the state 
as the primary duty bearer for a right to water.
While I normatively ground these arguments in ubuntu, I will also rely 
on conceptions of  rights that draw from the work of  Shue and Fredman, 
as well as international human rights law that can aid us in making a right 
to water claim. 
3.3.1 The socio-economic dimension of  a right to water under article 6
Water is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights 
provisions. A reading of  article 6 of  the Constitution may invite the 
suggestion that the provision was aimed at only including the civil rights 
dimensions at the exclusion of  the socio-economic dimensions that would 
largely characterise a right such as water. This challenge is rooted in the 
familiar rights categorisation of  a dichotomy between civil-political rights 
and socio-economic rights and even a trichotomy of  solidarity/collective/
peoples’ rights. This is commonly expressed as first, second and third 
generation rights respectively. Accepting this, the categorisation leads to 
a dividing line of  judicially enforceable first-generation civil-political rights 
as compared to judicially unenforceable second-generation socio-economic 
rights and even third-generation solidarity rights. 
107 Makgato (n 94) 68.
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In my view, ubuntu aids us to reject what Scott calls the ‘legalistic 
“rigidification”’108 of  rights categories, or, more broadly, an interpretation 
that Mahomed AJA cautioned as being vulnerable to ‘the austerity of  
tabulated legalism’.109 This thereby embraces the co-permeation of  rights 
categories. An ubuntu-inspired understanding of  the right to life would 
imply that there is little or no distinction drawn between civil-political and 
socio-economic dimensions (although some ubuntu scholars do assert 
that the latter category should take prominence over the former).110 Thus, 
the right to life expressed in article 6 can and should also accommodate 
a right to water claim that retains strong social and economic dimensions 
that are judicially enforceable. 
I argue for an understanding of  the right to life that is normatively 
grounded in the value of  ubuntu. When grounded in ubuntu, without the 
necessaries to sustain human survival, life would be meaningless. Further, 
the right to life should not be understood as only the right of  a person 
to exist in the purely biological sense of  breathing etc. Rather, the right 
to life, when reflected upon with ubuntu, requires all the necessaries of  
life, which is understood through the prism of  the dignity principle that 
compels that we value and respect the individual and their socio-economic 
status.111 The nature of  these ‘necessaries of  life’ in the water context – 
whether an existential minimum core or more – is explored further in 
chapter 6. As such, principles of  ubuntu, taken together, demand the 
recognition of  the individual’s worth qua a member of  the community 
and that the right to life be constructed to require a material concern for 
the livelihood and socio-economic well-being of  all members of  society, 
which crucially includes their water needs. 
Given that water provision in a water-poor context such as Namibia 
is predominantly procured through communal means, it is particularly 
apposite to embrace re-invigorative constitutionalism and apply the 
communitarian principles that inform ubuntu. As I have argued, this 
would be a moderate form of  communitarianism, one that does not 
obscure the rights and interests of  the individual to their personal water 
needs. This invites the recognition that the correlative duties attaching to 
a right to water are owed to both the community and to the individuals 
within them. This is also revealed in the solidarity principle accruing from 
ubuntu. 
108 C Scott ‘Reaching beyond (without abandoning) the category of  “economic, social and 
cultural rights”’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 633 635.
109 Minister of  Defence v Mwandinghi 1993 NR 63 (SC) 71. 
110 Oyowe (n 87) 333.
111 Himonga (n 5) 179.
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This construction of  ubuntu allows the individual-versus-community 
rights tensions that may arise to be carefully navigated by understanding 
that, while the individual is communal in nature, they simultaneously 
retain individual free will and the vision of  life that they wish and choose 
to live. This construal would thus prioritise the recognition of  the intrinsic 
value of  every and all individuals that constitute the community.112 In line 
with Metz’s application of  ubuntu to socio-economic aspects, the principle 
of  respecting the communal nature of  many African societies would 
require that we take heed of  ‘positive’ human rights to socio-economic 
assistance.113
International law is also resourceful in overcoming the civil-political-
versus-socio-economic rights divide that treats the right to life as falling 
squarely within the latter category. I will elaborately argue in chapter 4 
that international law can be applied in Namibia directly and invoked in 
constitutional Bill of  Rights interpretation. On this interpretative basis, 
ICCPR is instructive here as I have relied upon the UN HRC’s General 
Comment 36 to advance a broad interpretation of  ‘life’ in article 6 of  
ICCPR to include socio-economic dimensions. 
The HRC’s approach is reflected in the African regional jurisprudence, 
principally SERAC,114 considered in chapter 4. International law thus offers 
us interpretative support for the construction of  life in article 6 of  the 
African Charter as inclusive of  socio-economic entitlements such as water, 
in addition to its civil-political rights dimensions. The related arguments 
that advance the transitivity principle will receive closer treatment in the 
chapter 5 consideration of  the justiciability objections arising out of  the 
assertion of  an implied right to water. 
Therefore, a reading of  article 6 of  the Constitution through ubuntu, 
with the aid of  international law sources cited, normatively justifies and 
grounds the right to water as an implied socio-economic dimension of  the 
right to life. 
Following the determination that a right to water can be implied from 
the right to life, attention should be given to the nature of  the duties that 
arise from a right to water. I will argue that there are three correlative 
duties, duties that include both negative and positive dimensions and 
112 D Bilchitz ‘What is a just distribution of  resources?’ in D Bilchitz et al (eds) Jurisprudence 
in an African context (2017) 131 159. 
113 T Metz ‘Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa’ (2011) 11 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 532 550.
114 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR).
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attract duties to respect, protect and fulfil. The respect and protect duties, 
generally viewed as negative duties, can be asserted on the basis of  the 
express wording of  article 6: A right to water must be protected and 
respected. However, the fulfil duty, which requires positive action by the 
duty bearer, needs further elaboration in light of  its textual omission from 
article 6 to which I turn next.
3.3.2 Article 6 and the textual absence of  ‘fulfil’ positive duties 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that the Namibian Supreme Court’s interpretative 
approach is one that is grounded in purposive interpretation and thus 
rejects the strict, narrow, and precise construal of  constitutional words 
and phrases; a generous, broad and purposive approach is to be preferred. 
Yet, I have asserted that the Supreme Court has not discounted the 
relevance of  the language that is employed by the Constitution’s text. 
Thus, an attentiveness to the precise constitutional language is necessary 
to ascertain the underlying scope of, in this case, article 6. This responds 
to the imperative to respect the language of  the Constitution, even in 
circumstances where generous rights interpretations are adopted.115 
In this light, one text-based argument that may be put forward to 
undermine an ubuntu-inspired interpretation of  article 6 as implying a 
right to water that includes positive duties upon the duty bearer can be 
identified: Article 6 explicitly mentions the duties to respect and protect but 
omits the fulfil duty. Indeed, the respect and protect duties may gesture 
towards negative duties of  restraint while the fulfil duty suggests positive 
duties of  action on the part of  the duty bearer. Be that as it may, the 
forthcoming analysis will demonstrate that these arguments do not hold 
water. 
While the focus is on the text of  article 6, the interpretative analysis 
must not lose sight of  the relevance of  other provisions in the Bill of  Rights 
to holistically and harmoniously interpret the Constitution. I, therefore, 
advance the view that the state’s positive duties can be drawn from a holistic 
reading of  article 6 together with article 5. Article 5 generally manifests 
both the vertical and horizontal obligations that attach to the Bill of  Rights 
in chapter 3, which includes the right to life. These are to be ‘respected and 
upheld’ by the three branches of  the state and all organs of  government.116 
115 S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 18: ‘We must heed Lord Wilberforce’s reminder 
that even a constitution is a legal instrument, the language of  which must be respected. 
If  the language used by the law giver is ignored in favour of  a general resort to “values”, 
the result is not interpretation but divination.’
116 Taking into consideration the vertical and horizontal application of  rights per art 5, 
Constitution. See S v Myburgh 2008 (2) NR 592 (SC) 618 (concerning the Court’s duties 
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To meaningfully uphold a right to water, the correlative duties that accrue 
thereto ought to include the positive duty to fulfil, notwithstanding that fulfil 
is not explicitly mentioned. The Namibian Supreme Court is yet to fully 
engage with the nature of  article 5 duties in a majority decision. However, 
the dissenting opinion of  O’Linn AJA in Mwilima117 offers support for the 
view that the state bears positive obligations to provide or fulfil in light 
of  the general obligation contained in article 5, even though the specific 
provision being interpreted – the article 12 right to a fair trial in Mwilima 
and the article 6 implied right to water for purposes of  my argument – may 
not include language that expressly identifies positive duties.
Further, in justifying the cogency of  the normative approach that the 
fulfil dimension of  a right to water is to be read into article 6,118 I rely 
on Shue and Fredman’s conception of  specifically positive duties.119 The 
article 6 right to life should be understood as invoking both positive and 
negative duties.120 It is impossible to respect and protect the right to life 
without taking a wide range of  positive actions that include the active 
provision of  water to persons. As such, borrowing from Shue, every basic 
right including the right to life attracts three types of  correlative duties: to 
avoid depriving (akin to respect); to protect from deprivation; and to aid the 
deprived (akin to fulfil).121 
While the correlative duty to aid or fulfil in this typology is not 
explicated in article 6, I argue that it ought to be read into the provision 
on the basis of  a broad, generous, and purposive interpretation. On 
the contrary, a narrow, mechanical and restrictive interpretation would 
assume that article 6-derived rights only retain the two correlative duties 
to respect and uphold ch 3 through enforcement mechanisms); N Horn ‘Human 
rights in the private sphere’ (2014) 6 Namibia Law Journal 30 43-44. Comparatively, see 
also Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para 45, where Kentridge AJ 
compares the construction of  the South African 1993 Constitution equivalent to the 
Namibian Constitution’s art 5 on the horizontal application of  rights.
117 Mwilima v Government of  the Republic of  Namibia 2002 NR 253 (SC) 256 270 (O’Linn 
AJA dissenting).
118 To the extent that the original intention is relevant, there is no evidence in the 
Constituent Assembly Debates that the drafters had sought to exclude the state’s 
positive duties under art 6. Namibia Constituent Assembly Debates 21 November 1989 
– 21 January 1990 Volume 1 and 2 (Namibia National Archives 1990).
119 H Shue Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence and US foreign policy (1980) 51; Fredman (n 95) 
69. 
120 Per Shue, positive rights require that people act positively, that is, people are required 
to actively do something, while negative rights require that people refrain from acting 
in certain ways that would violate the right. Shue (n 119) 36. 
121 Shue (n 119) 52–53.
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that are constitutionally specified, a claim that Fredman and Shue have 
both thoroughly disproved as artificial. 
As stated above, Shue’s122 seminal work has established the three 
correlative duties that every right attracts: respect, protect and fulfil. 
The cogency of  this understanding of  rights becomes apparent when 
we consider other more ‘established’ rights such as the right to a fair 
trial123 and the right to vote.124 While no fulfil dimension is referenced in 
the relevant constitutional provisions, it is accepted that the state has an 
obligation to take positive action such as establishing an effective criminal 
justice system with courts and providing the facilities for elections to be 
conducted. 
The three correlative duties approach, by and large, is now well-
entrenched in the contemporary understanding of  human rights 
internationally. We have seen an embrace for the positive duties that accrue 
from article 6(1) of  ICCPR, which duties enjoin the state to ‘ensure’ the 
right to life. This entails positive steps that are to be taken by the state as 
necessary for individuals to realise their rights. Further, the tripartite nature 
of  duties has been endorsed in international soft law (a source assessed in 
chapter 4) such as the Maastricht Guidelines. Guideline 6 states that ‘[l]ike 
civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three 
different types of  obligations on States: the obligations to respect, protect 
and fulfil. Failure to perform any one of  these three obligations constitutes 
a violation of  such rights.’125 
In relation to this, the Maastricht Guidelines maintain that 
the obligation to fulfil requires states to take appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full 
realisation of  the socio-economic dimensions of  a right to water.126 
122 Shue (n 119) 51; Fredman (n 95) 69. 
123 The Constitution, art 12. 
124 The Constitution, art 17(2). 
125 My emphasis. ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of  Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights of  1997’ which are reprinted in (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691. While 
the Maastricht Guidelines are not binding, they remain highly persuasive as the 
guidelines reflect an international consensus and have been ‘widely accepted as an 
interpretive tool, utilised in discerning the duties incumbent upon states’. V Dankwa 
et al ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on violations of  economic, social and 
cultural rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 705 731.
126 Dankwa (n 125); Fredman (n 95) 6.
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Concerning the positive duties accruing to the state, the Mwilima127 
majority also provides us with authoritative support. In this case the 
Supreme Court affirmed the positive duties arising out of  the right to a 
fair trial to provide indigent accused with legal aid at the state’s expense. 
The Mwilima majority, in relation to the positive and negative nature of  
duties arising from article 12, stated:128 
It seems to me that this argument is based on the wrong premise that the 
duty to uphold the rights and freedoms are all of  a negative nature, i.e. that 
as long as those who must uphold the rights and freedoms refrain from doing 
anything, their obligation is fulfilled. That may be so in regard to some of  the 
rights and freedoms but there are also rights where positive action is required such 
as [in article 16(2) requiring just compensation for expropriated property]. If  
this were not so it would mean that the right becomes illusory and affords no 
protection to the aggrieved person. In my opinion there is also a positive duty 
on [government] to ensure the right to a fair trial and where this means that 
an indigent accused must be provided with legal representation in order to 
achieve that object, that duty cannot be shirked by [government].
While the Mwilima majority’s understanding of  positive duties is 
commendable, it still falls short insofar as it takes the view that only some 
rights and freedoms require positive action on the part of  the state. As I 
have argued above, all rights require positive action and thus establish all 
three correlative duties to fulfil, respect, and protect. 
Building on this, Fredman observes that ‘focusing on the different 
types of  duties rather than the different types of  rights gives one a more 
sophisticated tool for analysis and implementation’ of  a right.129 Fredman 
adds that the value of  the respect-protect-fulfil trichotomy lies in that it 
provides an opportunity to go beyond debates as to whether positive duties 
arise from a given right. Instead, we can begin to understand the nature 
of  the positive duties that the right gives rise to.130 This will indeed be the 
focus of  chapter 6.131
127 Mwilima (n 117).
128 Mwilima (n 117) 256 (my emphasis). 
129 Fredman (n 95) 69-70. 
130 As above.
131 Worth noting is the quadripartite typology of  duties that adds a fourth dimension, to 
recognise. This is prominently put forward by Normand as imposing obligations on 
states to not only ratify human rights treaties but also, for non-state actors, to accept 
human rights responsibilities. However, as Ssenyonjo argues, a duty to recognise is 
problematic as it undermines the fundamental principle that state consent to be bound 
by treaties through ratification is a purely voluntary measure to be decided through 
the exercise of  the state’s free will and sovereignty. M Ssenyonjo Economic, social and 
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It is worth noting that the argument has been made for a move away 
from a trilogy (or tetralogy) of  duties in favour of  the ‘waves of  duties’ 
understanding of  human rights obligations that Waldron propounded.132 
For Waldron, human rights duties should not be rigidly aligned with a 
Shueian trilogy of  duties approach. They should rather take an enhanced 
understanding through presenting duties as waves. Waldron points out 
that ‘[e]ven a particular duty, thought of  as associated with a right, itself  
generates waves of  duties that back it up and root it firmly in the complex, 
messy reality of  political life’.133 Waldron asserts that the waves of  duties 
means that these rights come with multiple successive duties that require 
commission, omission, and other forms of  action.134 Thus, the duties 
that a right to water, in the context of  this book, would generate, the 
argument goes, cannot be neatly compartmentalised into separate and 
independent duties as the trilogy of  duties may speciously imply. It is 
noted that Waldron’s waves of  duties approach is not intended to stultify 
the value in Shue’s trilogy of  duties approach but rather offers a critique 
that ‘enhances’ the duties understanding.
Koch has taken a firmer critique of  the trilogy of  duties approach and 
cites various disadvantages as the reason for her abstaining from employing 
it in favour of  the waves of  duties approach.135 Koch’s scholarship cannot, 
however, be approached with a broad-brush, universal lens as it is 
analytically constrained to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) context and the corollary jurisprudence of  the European Court 
of  Human Rights (European Court), in addition to the HRC and ESCR 
Committee. Koch does not offer an assessment of  other regional human 
rights systems such as Africa or Inter-America. Certainly, in the African 
system, there is a strong treaty basis for a trilogy of  duties approach, and 
one which is countenanced in various African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) decisions and instruments, as 
assessed particularly in chapter 4 of  this book. I will thus follow a trilogy of  
duties approach in delineating a right to water obligations of  the Namibian 
state in this book. However, mindful of  the merits in Waldron and Koch’s 
critique of  the trilogy of  duties approach, I will invoke the trilogy as an 
organising typology for the various duties that are generated by a right to 
cultural rights in international law (2016) 36.
132 J Waldron ‘Rights in conflict’ (1989) 99 Ethics 503 509. 
133 As above. 
134 J Waldron ‘Liberal rights: Two sides of  the same coin’ in J Waldron (ed) Liberal rights: 
Collected papers 1981-1991 (1993) 1 25. 
135 I Koch Human rights as indivisible rights: The protection of  socio-economic demands under the 
European Convention of  Human Rights (2009) 25; I Koch ‘Dichotomies, trichotomies or 
waves of  duties’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 8.
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water to offer conceptual clarity and ensure systematic organisation in my 
analysis of  the various duties that water retains, to which I will turn in 
chapter 6.
3.3.3 Identifying the state as the primary duty bearer for a right to 
water
Affirming an ubuntu conception of  the right to life that implies a right to 
water gives rise to the question of  the identity of  the primary duty bearer 
for the right’s realisation. Indeed, a right to water would only be worth 
normative development and effective for the right holder if  there is an 
identified duty bearer in the first place, who is obligated to, and capable 
of, shouldering the weight of  duties.136 As I have argued, the duties are 
threefold: to respect, to protect and to fulfil. Here, I focus on developing 
an argument for the state – acting through the executive and legislative 
branches principally – to be the primary duty bearer to realise a right to 
water. 
I recognise that there may plausibly be other duty bearers beyond the 
state. This may include domestic or international non-state actors such as 
corporations,137 international financial institutions,138 and even third states 
owing to their extra-territorial international law obligations.139 This is a 
reality that is of  heightened importance in the age of  globalisation and 
where non-state actors may retain culpability for human rights violations 
or capability in human rights realisation. However, my focus here remains 
exclusively upon the Namibian state as the primary duty bearer.
The community and interdependence principles of  ubuntu aid us here 
as these require that individuals are not seen as isolated beings. Rather, 
there is a shared responsibility upon all members of  society to ensure that 
individuals do not suffer deprivations of  those socio-economic goods that 
136 J Waldron ‘Duty-bearers for positive rights’ (2014) New York University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Papers Paper 497 1 2. 
137 See J Hazenberg ‘Transnational corporations and human rights duties: Perfect and 
imperfect’ (2016) 17 Human Rights Review 479. For an argument on private mining 
companies’ liability for right to water violations in South Africa, see O Fuo ‘The right 
of  access to sufficient water in South Africa: Comments on Federation for Sustainable 
Environment & Others v Minister of  Water Affairs [2012] ZAG PPHC 128’ (2013) 20 
Murdoch University Law Review 21.
138 See M Salomon et al (eds) Casting the net wider: Human rights, development and new duty 
bearers (2007).
139 See T Bulto The extraterritorial application of  the human right to water in Africa (2014); 
M Ssenyonjo ‘Reflections on state obligations with respect to economic, social and 
cultural rights in international human rights law’ (2011) 15 International Journal of  
Human Rights 969 986-989.
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are necessary to realise a dignified life. Water no doubt is among those 
indispensable socio-economic goods to which they must have access. 
Thus, ubuntu dignity requires a concern for the livelihood and socio-
economic well-being of  the individual, while ubuntu interdependence 
requires a recognition of  the individual’s status as equal in moral terms 
to that of  the community, although communal interests and rights remain 
relevant in any distributive assessment. 
I have earlier argued for Gyekye’s version of  ubuntu communitarianism 
of  the moderate variety to be applied to the nation-state context. To 
realise every individual’s ubuntu requires not only sympathy with 
those who suffer socio-economic deprivations but also active provision 
on the part of  the state as the primary duty bearer of  a right to water. 
Further, through ubuntu’s principle of  solidarity, as Metz advances, 
communal relationships would be honoured by requiring that the state 
must do what it can to improve the quality of  life for individuals. Metz’s 
philosophical interpretation of  ubuntu thus constructs it as a moral theory 
that conceptualises human beings as retaining dignity owing to their 
capacity for community, which Metz understands to be a combination of  
identity with others and exhibiting solidarity with them, whereas human 
rights violations result in egregious degradations of  their capacity for 
community.140
A more textual basis for this argument can also be advanced when we 
read a right to water together with article 5 of  the Constitution, which is 
the general scope of  application clause for Bill of  Rights provisions in the 
Constitution. Article 5 positively identifies the primary duty bearer as the 
state (understood as the executive, legislature and judiciary) in relation 
to the obligations that are owed to the individual in the enjoyment of  
their fundamental rights contained in chapter 3. As I have argued earlier, 
this provides that the rights and freedoms must be respected and upheld, 
importing both negative and positive duties.
Materially, the article 6 right to life, in addition to being entrenched141 
as a fundamental right in chapter 3 of  the Constitution, is listed as one of  
the non-derogable fundamental rights in those exceptional cases where 
derogation would be permissible in state of  emergency circumstances.142 
140 I engage Metz’s theory advisedly while fully aware of  Oyowe’s meritorious critique 
of  his ubuntu moral theory. O Oyowe ‘Strange bedfellows: Rethinking ubuntu and 
human rights in South Africa’ (2013) 13 African Human Rights Law Journal 103; Oyowe 
(n 87) 333.
141 The Constitution, art 131. 
142 The Constitution, art 24(3). 
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There remain critical questions on article 22’s justifiable limitations upon 
chapter 3 fundamental rights that arise.143 These will receive attention in 
the chapter 6 discussion of  the content of  a right to water. 
In this light, the normative basis for a right to water from the right 
to life in article 6 of  the Constitution can be grounded in ubuntu. This 
does not conclude the analysis, however, as the substantive content of  the 
state’s obligations concerning water will be developed in chapter 6. 
Having applied a purposive approach to article 6 to imply a right to water 
using the tools of  transformative and re-invigorative constitutionalism, I 
now consider potential original intent objections. 
3.3.4 Original intent concerns in implying a right to water from article 6
In this part I will argue that applying an original intent approach to article 
6 paints an opaque picture as to the inclusion, or otherwise, of  water within 
the scope of  the right to life. I have argued in the preceding chapter that 
applying original intent as the determinative constitutional interpretative 
approach would be ill-advised. I will nevertheless argue that, even if  an 
original intent approach is applied, as the Supreme Court has on various 
occasions, there is a dearth of  evidence to support a claim that a right 
to water is excluded from article 6. I demonstrate below that there is no 
evidence that the Constitution’s founders manifested an intention to have 
‘life’ construed in the strictly negative sense, or that ‘life’ is confined to a 
civil right, or as prohibiting only the deprivation of  life through capital 
punishment or other deprivations of  life emanating from state conduct. 
I build this argument by considering historical sources that reflect the 
Constitution’s drafting. 
The original intention of  the founders can be principally deduced from 
two sources: the drafting history of  the Constitution and the minutes of  the 
Constituent Assembly Debates.144 UNSC Resolution 435145 had initially 
outlined Namibia’s independence and peace plan, thus paving the way 
for the Constitution’s drafting and adoption. For a synthesis of  political, 
military and geopolitical reasons that are outside the scope of  this book, 
the implementation of  Resolution 435 was delayed by over ten years. The 
first Namibian elections with universal and equal suffrage took place in 
143 The Constitution, art 22.
144 The drafting history of  the Constitution does not reveal a single founding figure 
such as George Washington for the US Constitution or BR Ambedkar for the Indian 
Constitution.
145 UNSC Resolution 435 (29 September 1978) UN Doc S/RES/435 (1978). 
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1989 under the control and supervision of  the UN Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG). These resulted in the election of  the Constituent 
Assembly of  which the primary mandate was to draft a constitution based 
on what came to be known as ‘the 1982 Constitutional Principles’. 
I will thus consider the 1982 Constitutional Principles as a key source 
to illuminate the drafting history and intention behind the provisions of  
the Constitution, specifically the article 6 right to life. Further, owing to the 
chapter 3 Bill of  Rights provisions in the Constitution being fundamentally 
a progeny of  the Universal Declaration, the Universal Declaration would 
be at the heart of  any analysis of  the 1982 Constitutional Principles and, 
therefore, by necessary implication, an understanding of  the intention 
behind the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights provisions themselves.
3.3.5 The Universal Declaration and the 1982 Constitutional Principles as 
original intent sources
History records that in 1982 a letter was circulated to the erstwhile 
member states of  the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with an 
annexure that set out eight ‘Principles for a Constituent Assembly for 
the Constitution of  an Independent Namibia’.146 The genesis of  the 1982 
Constitutional Principles is that these were drawn up pursuant to UNSC 
Resolution 435 and unanimously agreed upon by the Western Contact 
Group,147 together with the ‘parties concerned’ – the frontline states,148 the 
South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), and various other 
Namibian political actors, as well as apartheid South Africa.149 The 1982 
Constitutional Principles enjoined the Constituent Assembly to formulate 
a constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the eight 
principles that were adumbrated therein.150 These Principles are patently 
146 UNSC Resolution 435 Annexure. Principles for a Constituent Assembly and for 
the Constitution of  an independent Namibia; M Wiechers ‘Namibia: The 1982 
constitutional principles and their legal significance’ (1989/1990) 5 South African 
Yearbook of  International Law 1.
147 Britain, USA, Canada, West Germany and France.
148 Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
149 Wiechers (n 146) 2.
150 The eight principles may be adumbrated as follows: a unitary, sovereign and 
democratic state; constitutional supremacy; three government branches including 
an elected legislature, an executive, and an independent judiciary responsible for 
constitutional interpretation; a multi-party, proportional representation electoral 
system; a declaration of  enforceable fundamental rights consistent with the UDHR; 
non-retrospectivity of  criminal offences; a balanced public service, police service and 
defence services structure with equal access; and the establishment of  elected councils 
for local and/or regional administration.
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predisposed to liberal democratic values. For our purposes, the most 
material is Principle Five as reproduced here:151 
There will be a declaration of  fundamental rights, which will include the 
rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of  movement, to freedom of  
conscience; to freedom of  expression, including freedom of  speech and a free 
press; to freedom of  assembly and association, including political parties and 
trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from 
arbitrary deprivation of  private property or deprivation of  private property 
without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or 
sexual discrimination. The declaration of  rights will be consistent with the provisions 
of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled 
to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
The italicised text of  Principle Five directs us to the Universal Declaration. 
As such, two provisions of  the Universal Declaration are most relevant 
for our purposes. First, the Universal Declaration’s right to life provision 
states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to life’.152 
Second, the right to an adequate standard of  living in article 25(1) of  the 
Universal Declaration states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to a standard of  
living adequate for the health and well-being of  himself  and of  his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services’.153 
Adopting an original intent approach leads us to consider Principle Five 
of  the 1982 Constitutional Principles and its requirement that the Bill of  
Rights in the Constitution to be consistent with the Universal Declaration. 
The Universal Declaration does not specify the scope of  ‘life’ in article 2 
and is silent on whether life is restricted to the civil sense or whether it can 
also accommodate socio-economic dimensions. 
Article 25 of  the Universal Declaration recognises the various socio-
economic goods mentioned therein as ‘rights’. These rights retain the 
ability to be vindicated in law as enforceable rights, a conclusion drawn 
from the final sentence of  Principle Five that entitles aggrieved individuals 
‘to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights’. Those rights 
mentioned are tied to the right to an adequate standard of  living as the 
level to which their realisation should aspire. Although not explicated, 
this would include water given the non-exhaustive listing of  rights 
relevant to the right to an adequate standard of  living. The cogency of  
151 My emphasis.
152 Universal Declaration, art 3.
153 My emphasis.
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this interpretation is developed further in the international law context 
considered in chapter 4.
Moreover, when considering article 25(1) of  the Universal 
Declaration’s inclusion of  socio-economic rights on par with civil-political 
rights, a strong inference can be made that the Constitution’s founders also 
intended to protect the status of  human rights to these socio-economic 
entitlements. This inference is particularly attractive if  one accepts that the 
founders were either (a) bound by the 1982 Constitutional Principles as a 
matter of  international law; or (b) bound on the basis that the Constituent 
Assembly adopted the 1982 Constitutional Principles as the constitutional 
drafting framework. I will elaborate upon these arguments in the analysis 
of  the legal status of  the 1982 Constitutional Principles below. Therefore, 
the argument follows that while the Bill of  Rights in the Constitution does 
not explicitly mention a right to water – or even the other socio-economic 
rights that are explicitly mentioned in the Universal Declaration such as 
food, clothing, housing, and medical care – these were not intended to be 
excluded from the corpus of  human rights by the drafters. 
I also draw attention to the reality that there is no direct record from 
the Constituent Assembly Debates to suggest any consideration of, or 
controversy around, the constitutional recognition of  socio-economic 
entitlements such as water as enforceable human rights.154 While the 
argument can be made that the founders of  the Constitution’s inclusion 
of  constitutional Principles of  State Policy (PSPs) that reference socio-
economic entitlements related to an adequate standard of  living as 
non-enforceable, I will more appropriately address this argument in the 
analysis of  the potential textual justiciability objections that will arise 
from an implied right to water in chapter 5. At this stage, the conclusion 
is that the original intent approach has left the door open for the argument 
to be made that an enforceable right to water can be interpreted as a part 
of  the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights, specifically the article 6 right to life. 
3.3.6 Legal status of  the 1982 Constitutional Principles
In light of  my reliance upon the 1982 Constitutional Principles in evaluating 
the ‘negative’ argument that an original intent approach does not exclude 
an interpretation of  enforceable socio-economic rights such as water from 
being interpreted as part of  the right to life, I will consider the legal status of  
the 1982 Constitutional Principles and their continued legal effect in post-
154 This arguably is not surprising as the Constitution’s drafting context (1989-1990) 
was such that there were limited comparative human rights precedents that 
constitutionalised socio-economic rights in the bills of  rights of  national constitutions.
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Constituent Assembly Namibia. These issues have been raised in Namibian 
courts but remain without definitive judicial determination.155 The issues 
have also been the subject of  debate among Namibian constitutional 
scholars.156 Even at the time of  adopting the Constitution, divergent views 
were being expressed by Constituent Assembly members as to whether the 
Constituent Assembly was legally bound to follow the 1982 Constitutional 
Principles in their drafting of  the Constitution.157 However, this issue 
became moot when the Constituent Assembly unanimously resolved to 
adopt the 1982 Constitutional Principles as a framework to draw up the 
Constitution.158 It is not insignificant that no detailed and robust process 
of  legal certification to ensure the Constitution’s compliance with the 
1982 Constitutional Principles was adopted, such as the certification of  
the 1996 South African Constitution by the South African Constitutional 
Court.159 
I first consider the views of  Wiechers, who has asserted that the 
legal status of  the 1982 Constitutional Principles is such that they 
were, and remain, binding upon Namibia. In Wiechers’s view, the 1982 
Constitutional Principles formed part of  a binding UNSC resolution 
through their incorporation into Resolution 435’s Peace Plan.160 This 
Peace Plan (and thus the 1982 Constitutional Principles which the Peace 
Plan included) was approved in UNSC Resolution 632.161 Resolution 632 
expressly references and approves the UN Secretary-General’s Report162 
155 S v Heita 1992 NR 403 (HC) 406; Kauesa v Minister of  Home Affairs 1994 NR 102 (HC) 
137; Chairperson of  the Tender Board v Pamo Trading & Another 2017 (1) NR 1 (SC) 
para 37. All these cases reference the 1982 Constitutional Principles but reach no 
determination as to their status and continued legal effect.
156 Wiechers (n 146); N Horn ‘Forerunners of  the Namibian Constitution’ in A Bösl et al 
(eds) Constitutional democracy in Namibia (2010) 63.
157 Constituent Assembly Debates (n 118) 10-17.
158 ‘Mr T-B Gurirab: I want to make a formal proposal, indeed a formal motion, that the 
Constituent Assembly in this sitting adopt the 1982 constitutional principles as the 
framework for the constitution that we are going to draft. That is my formal motion.’ 
Constituent Assembly Debates (n 118) 16.
159 In re Certification of  the Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).
160 Wiechers (n 146) 2.
161 UNSC Resolution 632 (1989) of  16 February 1989 UN Doc S/RES/632. The relevant 
provisions state: ‘Having considered the report of  23 January 1989 submitted by the 
Secretary-General and his explanatory statement of  9 February 1989 … Approves 
the report of  the Secretary-General and his explanatory statement concerning the 
implementation of  the United Nations plan for Namibia’ (emphasis in original).
162 Further ‘Report of  the Secretary-General Concerning the Implementation of  Security 
Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) Concerning the Question of  Namibia’ 
(S/20412) 23 January 1989, http://undocs.org/S/20412 (accessed 14 July 2017) para 35 
states: ‘The United Nations plan for Namibia includes agreements and understandings 
reached by the parties since the adoption of  Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and 
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and the explanatory statement concerning the implementation of  the 
UN Plan for Namibia.163 Wiechers observes that the approval of  the 
1982 Constitutional Principles ‘gives irrefutable support to the view that 
these Principles became part and parcel of  the overall peace plan’.164 This 
made the 1982 Constitutional Principles an ‘internationally validated 
framework’ for Namibian independence and the future Constitution.165 
Wiechers thus accords the 1982 Constitutional Principles the status 
of  a binding UNSC resolution. Their binding nature emanates from the 
premise that UNSC resolutions are binding upon all UN member states, 
including Namibia, by virtue of  article 25 of  the UN Charter under which 
UN members ‘agree to accept and carry out the decisions of  the Security 
Council’. 
While I concur with Wiechers’s view that the 1982 Constitutional 
Principles were binding at the time of  drafting the Constitution, his view that 
they are of  continued legal force and effect after the Constitution’s adoption is 
difficult to accept. Two prominent views on the continued legal force of  
the 1982 Constitutional Principles have been expressed. On the one hand, 
Wiechers argues that the 1982 Constitutional Principles remain a binding 
international obligation on the Namibian government. Thus, should the 
Constitution be amended (or discarded) to abrogate or violate the 1982 
Constitutional Principles, Wiechers argues, this would constitute a breach 
of  both UNSC Resolution 632166 and the obligations arising out of  article 
25 of  the UN Charter.167 
Horn, on the other hand, asserts that Wiechers’s evaluation ‘goes too 
far’. Horn argues that even though the 1982 Constitutional Principles 
became a binding UNSC Resolution, ‘they were never intended to have 
a life of  their own’.168 Horn concludes that once the Constitution had 
confirmed as such to the Secretary-General. These agreements and understandings remain 
binding on the parties. In this connection, I wish to draw attention to the following ... 
(c) The text of  the Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution 
of  an independent Namibia, which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on 
12 July 1982 (S/15287) …’ (my emphasis)
163 UNSC ‘Explanatory statement concerning his further report (S/20412) concerning the 
implementation of  Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning 
the question of  Namibia / by the Secretary-General’ http://undocs.org/S/20457 
(accessed 14 July 2017). 
164 Wiechers (n 146) 8.
165 As above.
166 UNSC Resolution 632 (n 161).
167 Wiechers (n 146) 19.
168 Horn (n 156) 66. 
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been drafted in compliance with the 1982 Constitutional Principles and 
accepted by the Constituent Assembly, the 1982 Constitutional Principles 
became obsolete. 
In my view, both Wiechers and Horn err in their analysis. In particular, 
Wiechers’s position that embraces the de facto primacy of  international 
law, in the form of  the UNSC resolutions, over the dictates of  Namibia’s 
sovereign Constitution is problematic. The answer to determining the 
continued binding legal effect of  the 1982 Constitutional Principles can 
be revealed by scrutinising the actual text of  the 1982 Constitutional 
Principles, an aspect that both Wiechers and Horn appear to have 
overlooked in their analyses. The 1982 Constitutional Principles provided 
that ‘[t]he Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an 
independent Namibia in accordance with the principles’ as outlined. It 
follows that the 1982 Constitutional Principles were only legally binding 
upon the Constituent Assembly and insofar as it related to the Constitution’s 
drafting. Self-evidently, the Constituent Assembly, being a functional 
institution, has ceased to exist with the completion of  the Constitution’s 
drafting. Indeed, the Namibian legislature is now constituted of  the lower 
chamber National Assembly and the upper chamber National Council. 
These chambers have succeeded the Constituent Assembly and are thus 
vested with the constitutional power, together with the President, to 
amend the Constitution.169 
Although I agree that the 1982 Constitutional Principles were not 
intended to have a life of  their own, the Principles were not rendered obsolete 
when the Constitution was adopted, as Horn suggests.170 My view is that 
they continue to serve as a significant interpretative source, analogous to 
travaux préparatoires. As such, the 1982 Constitutional Principles should 
carry attenuated weight and can be considered in determining the original 
intention of  the drafters. However, the Principles cannot alone be binding 
so as to be conclusive in interpreting a given constitutional provision. 
Therefore, even if  an original intent approach is applied through recourse 
to the Constituent Assembly Debates and the 1982 Constitutional 
Principles, the door remains open for the interpretative inclusion of  an 
enforceable socio-economic right to water implied from article 6, as I have 
argued. 
169 The Constitution, art 123. 
170 Horn (n 156) 66.
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At this juncture, it is appropriate to transition into considering 
comparative perspectives on a constitutional human right to water. I thus 
turn to examine the Indian and Motswana experiences.
3.4 Comparative perspectives on an implied right to water
The approach advanced of  implying a right to water from life and the 
interpretation of  the state’s correlative obligations, including positive 
duties, finds support in comparative jurisprudence from both India 
and Botswana. In my comparative analysis, I deliberately avoid those 
jurisdictions with an express provision of  an enforceable right to water in 
the Bill of  Rights of  their constitutions, such as Kenya, the Democratic 
Republic of  the Congo (DRC), South Africa and Zimbabwe,171 although 
tangential reference may be made to aspects of  their jurisprudence where 
relevant and justified. It is through this critical approach to comparative 
material that I apply principled comparativism for deliberative purposes, 
as argued in chapter 1. 
3.4.1 India
The Indian experience is apposite because of  the textual similarities between 
the Indian and Namibian constitutional right to life provisions.172 Further, 
the constitutional inclusion of  PSP or DPSPs173 in both. Nonetheless, 
it will be seen below that the Indian experience is limited by the scant 
articulation of  a normative foundation in the Indian constitutional right 
to water jurisprudence. 
While India’s 1950 Constitution does not include an explicit right to 
water, the Indian Supreme Court and High Courts have read that right 
into the right to life. Article 21 of  the Indian Constitution entrenches the 
right to life and does so in language similar to that seen in article 6 of  the 
Namibian Constitution: ‘No person shall be deprived of  his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law.’ Like article 6, 
this provision appears to assert the protection of  life in the civil sense. 
Distinctively, however, India’s article 21 is couched in negative language 
171 For a breakdown of  African constitutions with an express right to water, see F Higuet 
& E Secours ‘The right to water and African constitutions’, http://www.rampedre.
net/implementation/territories/national/africa/constitutions (accessed 17 February 
2019).
172 Cf  the Irish experience where McIntyre discusses the (unenumerated) constitutional 
right to water under the Irish Constitution sourced from the right to bodily integrity. 
See O McIntyre ‘The human right to water and reform of  the Irish water sector’ (2014) 
5 Journal for Human Rights and the Environment 74 94. 
173 An analysis of  the principles of  state policy is engaged in ch 5. 
100   Chapter 3
– ‘no person shall be deprived’ – compared to the positive language of  
Namibia’s article 6 – ‘shall be protected and respected’. 
Notwithstanding what appears to be a civil right construction of  life 
and the negative conception of  the right as prohibiting deprivation, the 
Indian Supreme Court has interpreted article 21 expansively to include the 
right to water, among many other socio-economic rights such as education, 
housing and food. The fundamental right to water was pioneered in the 
1991 decision of  Subhash Kumar v State of  Bihar,174 where a writ petition was 
brought under India’s PIL mechanism before the Indian Supreme Court. 
The writ was brought based on pollution caused by a private company 
through mining activities that discharged slurry from mining washeries 
into a river, causing the water to be unfit for drinking and irrigation 
purposes. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ after the petitioner 
had been found not to be acting in the public interest as required by law 
but in their personal interest. Nevertheless, the Court did assert that the 
‘[r]ight to live is a fundamental right under Art 21 of  the Constitution, and 
it includes the right of  enjoyment of  pollution free water and air for full 
enjoyment of  life’.175
The article 21-derived right to water was again affirmed in the 2000 
decision of  the Indian Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v 
Union of  India.176 The case concerned the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project 
that constructed dams for irrigation and electricity generation, and where 
the right to water came up against rights relating to the environment and 
those of  displaced and indigenous peoples. The project resulted in the 
displacement of  large communities because of  the dam’s surface area.177
Subhash Kumar was again endorsed by the Indian High Court decision 
of  Hamid Khan v State of  MP.178 where the state was found to have failed 
in its duty to provide pure drinking water and for not taking the proper 
precautions to ensure proper drinking water to citizens.179 Here, the state 
government was sued for failing to take appropriate precautions to ensure 
174 Subhash Kumar v State of  Bihar AIR 1991 SC 420 (Supreme Court of  India). See also 
Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardichan & Others 1980 SCC (4) 162 (Supreme Court of  
India), where the Court found statutory duties to provide water and sanitation to 
protect the right to sanitation and public health. 
175 As above. 
176 Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of  India AIR 2000 SC 3751 (Supreme Court of  India).
177 See the critique by P Cullet ‘Human rights and displacement: The Indian Supreme 
Court decision on Sardar Sarovar in international perspective’ (2001) 50 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 973.
178 Hamid Khan v State of  MP AIR 1997 MP 191 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, India). 
179 Hamid Khan (n 178) para 6.
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that the drinking water that it had supplied through hand pumps was free 
from excessive fluoride. The fluoride had adversely affected the health of  
those who consumed the water. As such, Hamid Khan can be said to assert 
a duty to provide or fulfil the right to water, one that implicitly requires the 
state to take positive steps in realising the right. 
The decision of  the courts in India are illuminating insofar as they 
justify the approach of  reading a right to water into the right to life. 
However, the challenge with relying on this jurisprudence is that it 
scantily articulates the normative basis for reading in water. An attempt at 
normative developments is at best deduced from two decisions. The first 
decision is by the Indian Supreme Court in Virender Gaur v Haryana stating 
that the ‘[e]njoyment of  life and its attainment including their right to life 
[sic] with human dignity encompasses within its ambit the protection and 
preservation of  environment, ecological balance free from pollution of  air 
and water, sanitation without which life cannot be enjoyed’.180 
The second decision is the Indian High Court of  Kerala in Vishala 
Kochi Kudivella Samarkshana Samithi v State of  Kerala. Here, there was a 
violation of  the right to water for the people of  West Kochi who had been 
without a supply of  potable drinking water for more than three decades. 
The Court thus affirmed the right to water as: 
one of  the primary needs of  man, second only to air. Water is in fact the 
elixir of  life. Any Government whether proletarian or bourgeois and certainly 
a Welfare State committed to the cause of  the common man, is bound to 
provide drinking water to the public which should be the foremost duty of  
any Government.181 
In so stating, the Court directed that within six months, the state of  Kerala 
should take and complete all steps necessary for the supply of  potable 
drinking water to the people of  West Kochi in sufficient quantities through 
an efficient water supply system without fail.182 Although the normative 
basis of  water is scantily articulated, the broader article 21 jurisprudence 
of  the Indian Supreme Court reveals a dignity imperative within the right 
to life which ‘includes the right to live with human dignity and all that 
goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries of  life’.183 
180 Virender Gaur v Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577 580 (Supreme Court of  India).
181 Vishala Kochi Kudivella Samarkshana Samithi v State of  Kerala 2006 (1) KLT 919 (High 
Court of  Kerala, India) para 3.
182 Vishala (n 181) para 4.
183 Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of  Delhi 1981 (2) SCR 516 
(Supreme Court of  India); Mohini Jain v State of  Karnataka AIR (1992) SC 1858 
102   Chapter 3
Notably, Indian jurisprudence has asserted that the right to water 
implies a state duty to ‘provide’ rather than simply to ‘facilitate access’ to 
water.184 As such, Cullet argues in the context of  an Indian constitutional 
right to water that ‘[t]he duty to provide also implies that water supply 
cannot be disconnected. Indeed, disconnections of  water supply or 
withdrawal of  access should be prohibited as a matter of  principle under 
the right to water.’185 This argument augments the earlier analysis that 
the Namibian Constitution’s article 6, which is read as implying a right 
to water, also includes an obligation on the state to provide or to fulfil, 
notwithstanding the duty’s textual absence from the article 6 provision. 
While the basis for comparativism in Namibia has been asserted 
in chapter 1, merely adopting the Indian approach of  constitutionally 
reading a right to water into the right to life without being sufficiently 
sensitive to the Constitution’s text or disregarding the Namibian approach 
to constitutional interpretation would constitute a wanting recourse to 
comparativism. A cautious approach to the Indian jurisprudence would 
ensure that my argument is not left vulnerable to accusations of  being 
unprincipled and outcome-oriented and, consequently, advancing an 
unjustifiable form of  judicial activism with the purpose of  rights creation 
and expansion. 
Grounding the implied right to water in ubuntu thus allows us to 
avoid some of  the challenges that India has seen in adjudicating right to 
water cases. Through ubuntu, we can develop the meaning and scope of  
a right to water and identify the appropriate correlative duties by applying 
a concrete value-premise. The principles of  ubuntu discussed can thus 
be invoked in the enforcement of  a right to water, thereby allowing 
interpreters, including judges, to normatively ground such right. This will 
be the focus of  chapter 6 which develops the normative content of  a right 
to water. 
3.4.2 Botswana
Botswana is also a suitable comparator for Namibia. On a practical basis, 
they share geographic proximity and similar climatic environments that 
are largely desert and arid with water being a premium resource. On the 
legal front, the 1966 Botswana Constitution also does not include the 
full spectrum of  socio-economic rights. Distinctively, however, unlike 
(Supreme Court of  India).
184 P Cullet ‘Right to water in India: Plugging conceptual and practical gaps’ (2013) 17 
International Journal of  Human Rights 56 67.
185 As above.
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the Namibian Constitution, the Constitution of  Botswana does not 
incorporate PSPs.186 The right to life is protected under section 4 of  the 
Botswana Constitution. The courts in Botswana, however, have upheld a 
right to water derived from the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment in section 7 of  Botswana’s Constitution, as will 
be assessed below. Nevertheless, the analysis will reveal the limitations 
that are presented by a lack of  a normative exposition upon which to 
ground the right to water: a wanting approach to the explication of  both 
the positive and negative duties of  the state to realise its right to water 
obligations. 
In Sesana187 the High Court of  Botswana was faced with an application 
for an order declaring that the termination by the government of  Botswana 
of  the provision of  certain basic and essential services to the Basarwa 
tribe of  the San peoples in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) 
was unlawful and unconstitutional based on the legitimate expectation 
doctrine. The government of  Botswana had relocated the community 
to new settlements and informed those who refused relocation that the 
provision of  services would be terminated at the old settlements within 
six months. The basic and essential services that formed the crux of  the 
request for the order were, for our purposes, the provision of  drinking 
water on a daily basis and the maintenance of  the supply borehole water. 
Relying on the administrative law principles of  legitimate expectation, 
Dibotelo J, writing for the majority, held that the termination of  services 
by Botswana’s government was neither unlawful nor unconstitutional and, 
thus, the government retained no obligation to restore the provision of  
the services.188 Commenting on Sesana, Dinokopila critiques the decision 
as having ‘missed an opportunity to establish a precedent regarding the 
judicial enforcement of  socio-economic rights in Botswana’ given the 
‘failure to adopt a purposive interpretation of  the Constitution in the wake 
of  globalisation and an era of  human rights culture’.189
186 For a comprehensive analysis of  socio-economic rights in Botswana, see B Dinokopila 
‘The justiciability of  socio-economic rights in Botswana’ (2013) 57 Journal of  African 
Law 108.
187 Sesana & Others v Attorney-General 2006 (2) BLR 633 (HC) (Botswana High Court). 
188 The dissenting opinion of  Justice Dow is noteworthy. However, as it takes a rights-
based approach (in contrast to the legitimate expectation analysis of  the other two 
justices) to determine a violation of  the constitutional right to life as a result of  the 
withdrawal of  essential services, including water, by the government. Sesana (n 187) 
723.
189 Dinokopila (n 186) 118, adding: ‘Sesana also indicates the problems associated with 
the enforcement of  socio-economic rights through the administrative law principles of  
legitimate expectation. Such problems include the undeniable fact that, even though 
the government might have consulted on the termination of  essential services, this does 
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The issues in Sesana once again arose in Mosetlhanyane,190 this time 
focusing specifically on the right to water before the Supreme Court of  
Botswana. The facts are similar to those of  Sesana which presented, in the 
court’s own words, a ‘harrowing story of  human suffering and despair 
caused by a shortage of  water in the harsh climatic conditions of  the 
Kalahari Desert where the appellants and their Basarwa community 
live’.191 The Basarwa community was relocated to new settlements in line 
with the government’s then new policy of  wildlife conservation areas 
without human settlements. During the relocations, a pump engine and 
water tank that had been installed by the government for purposes of  using 
a particular borehole were dismantled and removed. It was turned into 
‘a white elephant whilst the Basarwa communities in the area continue 
to suffer on a daily basis from lack of  water’.192 The appellants had thus 
sought a court order permitting them to use the existing borehole that 
the Botswana government had sealed or an alternative borehole within 
the CKGR, all at their own, not the government’s, expense.193 Applying a 
derivative right approach, the Court found that the Botswana government’s 
actions violated the right of  the appellants not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment under section 7 of  the Botswana 
Constitution.194
Read in the context of  limited socio-economic rights claims in 
Botswana, Mosetlhanyane is commendable in that the Court compelled the 
Botswana government to allow the appellants to have access to water as 
a right. The decision has been celebrated as a ‘victory for the … judicial 
enforcement of  socio-economic rights in Botswana within a legal framework 
that does not adequately provide for the protection of  such rights’.195 
An analysis suggests that the appellants were cautious, and presumably 
not remove the unjust nature of  such an act. This would be particularly true in the case 
where it is eventually held, in the light of  extensive consultations, that the government 
is under no obligation to restore such services.’
190 Mosetlhanyane & Another v Attorney-General 2011 (1) BLR 152 (CA) (Botswana Court of  
Appeal).
191 Mosetlhanyane (n 190) 154.
192 Mosetlhanyane 155. The borehole was previously sunk in 1986 by a private mining 
company. When the company no longer needed the borehole, it was agreed to be used 
to provide water for the residents of  the CKGR, to which the Botswana government 
did not object. Between 1986 and 2002 the Ghanzi District Council maintained the 
engine of  the borehole pump. It provided fuel for it and regularly took water from the 
borehole to the Basarwa communities in other parts of  the CKGR.
193 Mosetlhanyane (n 190) 155-158.
194 Mosetlhanyane 159-160.
195 B Dinokopila ‘The right to water in Botswana: A review of  the Matsipane Mosetlhanyane 
case’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 282.
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strategic, in framing their claim as a negative right and obligation (that 
the government allow them to extract water from boreholes for domestic 
use) rather than as positive duties (that the government provide them with 
boreholes, which would include the care and maintenance thereof). This is 
the challenge with the judgment as the Court then determines the issue as 
a negative obligation upon the Botswana government not to interfere with 
the appellants’ right to water, rather than the positive obligation to provide 
water and to protect citizens from inhuman conditions. 
The plight of  the communities living in the CKGR would be a classic 
case of  peoples who cannot themselves provide for their essential services 
and needs, which places an arguably stronger set of  positive obligations 
upon the government of  Botswana to make water provision available. This 
avoids the problematic and counter-intuitive conclusion that a government 
would be prohibited from inflicting suffering through deprivations of  
self-financed access to water, yet it need not take the initiative to prevent 
suffering from a lack of  water through positive action.196
What these two cases in Botswana add to the books’ right to water 
analysis under the Namibian Constitution is that a robust theoretical 
foundation upon which to ground an implied right is imperative in order 
to determine not only the nature of  a right to water, but also the various 
correlative obligations – negative and positive – that are imposed. Indeed, 
the interpretation that I have advanced achieves this through the purposive 
approach which is infused by the transformative constitutionalism 
underpinnings and ubuntu as an overarching value-premise. This would 
avoid the risk of  manifestly absurd conclusions, such as the lack of  a state 
duty to provide water at the state’s expense for deprived communities such 
as those in Mosetlhanyane.
3.5 Conclusion 
In applying a purposive approach to the interpretation of  the right to 
life, this chapter has argued for an implied right to water. The normative 
foundation of  the argument is rooted in the value of  ubuntu, which 
is legally understood through its four interconnected principles of  
community, solidarity, interdependence and dignity. Ubuntu allows our 
interpretation of  the right to life to be concordant with the re-invigorative 
and transformative aims of  the Constitution, as I had argued in chapter 2. 
There are positive duties upon the state that accrue from the right to 
life, notwithstanding the textual absence of  the fulfil duty. Further, my 
196 K Snell ‘Can water be a human right?’ (2014) 19 Appeal 131.
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examination of  the Constitution’s drafting documents reveals that there is 
no support for the position that socio-economic entitlements were intended 
to be excluded from the Constitution as enforceable rights. The Universal 
Declaration supports this interpretative approach, which has assumed the 
utility of  the original intent approach to Constitutional interpretation. I 
have also made reference to the Indian jurisprudence on a right to water 
derived from the right to life given the textual similarities between the 
Constitutions of  Namibia and India. Nevertheless, while the comparative 
implied rights approach offers support for implying a right to water, the 
lack of  a normative foundation in India’s right to water jurisprudence has 
left it vulnerable to difficulties in balancing rights and resolving conflicts 
where they arise, such as those seen in Narmada Bachao Andolan. This 
approach of  grounding water in ubuntu also potentially avoids some of  
the challenges seen in Mosetlhanyane in Botswana of, at best, asserting 
only weak positive duties upon the state. In the final analysis, the three 
correlative duties approach, infused with an ubuntu understanding, will 
equip us with the tools to develop the content of  a justiciable right to water 
and more meaningfully chisel out the concrete obligations of  the state in 
the forthcoming chapters. The next chapter will turn to a right to water 
drawn from the well of  international law.
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a righT To waTer under 
inTernaTional law4
4.1 Introduction
As presented in chapter 3, this book thus far has invoked ubuntu to argue 
for a right to water that is anchored in the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights 
provisions, specifically the article 6 right to life. This chapter now turns 
to a right to water under international law. I will engage both binding 
international law and soft law sources to interpretatively invoke these in 
developing the normative and substantive content of  a right to water in 
chapter 6. This chapter primarily examines the Constitution’s international 
law provision – article 144. The chapter first assesses the application of  
international law in Namibia before considering a right to water under 
treaties that bind Namibia as well as customary international law (CIL) 
and general principles of  law. 
The chapter commences by analysing theoretical and practical 
concerns qua the domestic application of  international law. While the 
inter-relationship between international law and municipal law has 
received some attention among international law scholars, and as it 
pertains to Namibia specifically, this chapter identifies material gaps in 
the existing jurisprudence and commentary on Namibia’s international 
law – the municipal law ‘model’.1
Through a Namibian jurisprudential and doctrinal analysis that 
draws on comparative perspectives and scholarship, I will argue for an 
understanding of  international law that forms part of  Namibian law 
as including both international agreements and general rules of  public 
international law, with the latter being constituted of  both customary 
international law and general principles of  law. I will defend an 
understanding of  international agreements as both retaining direct 
application in Namibian law and serving as an aid to interpret Bill of  
1 I have undertaken a comprehensive analysis in N Ndeunyema ‘The Namibian 
Constitution, international law and the courts: A critique’ (2020) 9 Global Journal of  
Comparative Law 271.
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Rights provisions in the Constitution. In so doing, the assessment will 
reveal the limited attention by domestic courts as to the application of  
international law municipally and, where it has been applied, the analysis 
in part is inadequate and at times inaccurate. 
As to the interpretation of  international agreements that bind Namibia, 
the analysis will assert that the appropriate interpretative methodologies 
are those reflected in articles 31 and 32 of  the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of  Treaties (VCLT).2 These provisions reflect customary international 
law. The chapter also examines the authoritative status of  soft law sources 
such as the General Comments of  various treaty bodies before Namibian 
courts.
The second part of  the chapter turns to source a right to water from 
international law. An examination of  various treaties binding Namibia 
is offered with an analytical distinction made between those treaties that 
assert either an express or an implied right to water. I will pay attention 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter), all of  which I argue support an implied right to water. I will 
then critically engage with the international and regional jurisprudence 
developed thereunder as well as the soft law guidance offered by the 
respective treaty bodies. These sources will be relied upon in the argument 
in chapter 6 regarding a right to water’s content and the state’s correlative 
obligations flowing therefrom. 
Finally, turning to customary international law and general principles 
of  law, the chapter finds that these international law sources binding 
Namibia do not firmly lend themselves as the legal basis for a right to 
water domestically. Nevertheless, these are utile in developing the 
substantive content of  a right to water that I have implied from article 6 
of  the Constitution.
4.2 The application of international law in Namibia3
4.2.1 Theorising the international law-municipal law relationship
At the heart of  debates concerning the international law-municipal law 
relationship is the issue of  supremacy and the independence or (extent of) 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS Vol 1155.
3 For the principal literature on international law in Namibia, see G Erasmus ‘The 
Namibian Constitution and the application of  international law’ (1989/1990) 
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separation between the two legal orders. The soundness of  this analysis 
is germane because the question of  the nature of  the relationship arises 
in applying international law in a domestic context.4 Four overarching 
theories have been developed to describe a given jurisdiction’s municipal 
law-international law relationship.5 These are the two prominent theories 
of  monism and dualism, as well as inverse monism and harmonisation.6 
The historical analysis is stressed given the reality that these theories are 
impure, inadequate, and perhaps antiquated paradigms for understanding 
the municipal law-international law relationship, not least because of  the 
globalised nature of  the contemporary world legal order.
Monism captures unitary conceptions of  law whereby international 
law and municipal law are viewed as a single and unified system.7 A 
monist approach gives international law primacy over municipal law in 
both international and municipal decisions. International law has direct 
application and automatically forms part of  the municipal legal order 
without the further need for incorporation or transformation within the 
state, for example, through domesticating legislation. Therefore, once 
a state has bound itself  to an international agreement in line with its 
domestic provisions, or where a given rule is established as customary 
international law or as a general principle of  law, then such international 
law would bind that state, including its courts. Domestic application 
would follow without the need for further legislative affirmation. 
Under a dualist model, international law retains primacy over 
municipal law in international decisions, while municipal law has primacy 
over international law in municipal decisions. Sometimes referred to 
15 South African Yearbook of  International Law 84; T Maluwa ‘The incorporation of  
international law and its interpretational role in municipal legal systems in Africa: 
An explanatory survey’ (1998) 23 South African Yearbook of  International Law 45; 
O Tshosa ‘The status of  international law in Namibian national law’ (2010) 2 Namibia 
Law Journal 5; Y Dausab ‘International law vis-à-vis municipal law: An appraisal of  
article 144 of  the Namibian Constitution from a human rights perspective’ in A Bösl et 
al (eds) Constitutional democracy in Namibia: A critical analysis after two decades (2010) 261; 
D Zongwe International law in Namibia (2019).
4 D O’Connell ‘The relationship between international law and municipal law’ (1960) 48 
Georgetown Law Journal 444.
5 D O’Connell International law (1970) 39; D Harris Cases and materials on international 
law (2010) 61. For a historical evolution of  the theories, see T Finegan ‘Holism and 
the relationship between municipal and international human rights law’ (2011) 2 
Transnational Legal Theory 480. 
6 For an introduction to the historical debate on the theories, see J Nijman & 
A Nollkaemper ‘Introduction’ in J Nijman & A Nollkaemper (eds) New perspectives on 
the divide between National and International Law (2007).
7 O’Connell (n 5) 39; Finegan (n 5) 478.
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as pluralism, dualism starts from the proposition that law is an act of  
sovereign will. Municipal law is distinguished from international law 
in that it is a manifestation of  the will internally directed, as distinct 
from participation in a collective act of  sovereigns.8 Dualism holds that 
international law and municipal law are separate and dichotomous legal 
authorities with insignificant overlap, relationship and interplay between 
them.9 A classic dualist assertion is that the two legal systems are to be 
differentiated based on the particular relations that they govern: Whereas 
a state’s municipal law deals with social relations between individuals, 
international law regulates social relations between states, which alone 
are subject to it.10 Dualism further asserts the precedence of  the sovereign 
state and its municipal law. Thus, for international law to be applicable in 
municipal courts, the doctrines of  transformation (or incorporation) and 
adoption must be given effect.11
At this stage it is important to heed Tshosa’s three points of  caution 
when considering these theories in the Namibian context. First, as a 
matter of  practicality, the applicable theory is not to be purely determined 
theoretically and in the abstract.12 Determining the domestic application 
of  international law and treaties, in particular, would be conditioned 
by a rule of  municipal law. A basic principle reflected in most legal 
systems with constitutions as the overarching normative framework is 
that constitutional law governs the internal application of  treaties.13 This 
principle applies to Namibia, as argued below. Second, Tshosa observes 
that the practical approach of  national courts, including Namibia, reveal 
that even in monist states, courts frequently fail to effectuate binding 
treaties.14 Third, Tshosa concludes that for Namibia, these theories ‘are 
relevant only in the specific context of  customary, but not conventional, 
international law’.15 Tshosa observes that the real concern relates to ‘how 
international law standards can be infused or, rather, incorporated’ into 
municipal law to reinforce the effectiveness of  the national legal system 
8 O’Connell (n 5) 42; H Triepel International law and state law (1899).
9 Finegan (n 5) 478. 
10 Tshosa (n 3) 5.
11 R O’Keefe ‘The doctrine of  incorporation revisited’ (2009) 79 British Yearbook of  
International Law 8 10; Ndeunyema (n 1).
12 Tshosa (n 3) 6.
13 A Nollkaemper ‘The effect of  treaties in domestic law’ in C Tams et al (eds) Research 
handbook on the Law of  Treaties (2014) 123 130; Tshosa (n 3) 6.
14 Tshosa (n 3) 6; Dausab (n 3) 261.
15 Tshosa (n 3) 6.
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given that national legal rules at times are not well-defined and inadequate 
to address practical legal questions.16 
Nevertheless, Tshosa’s points of  caution do not make the theories of  
international law-municipal law redundant. Rather, they allow for the 
continued illumination of  that relationship. Indeed, there is an observed 
‘symbiotic’ relationship between international law and municipal law: 
Domestic law can be a material source of  international law, while 
international law can simultaneously influence domestic law,17 as I 
will argue with the consistent interpretation approach in this chapter. 
Therefore, in considering the relationship, one ought to closely consider 
the constitutional position. As such, the next part turns to examine the 
prescriptions of  the Namibian Constitution. 
4.2.2 International law prior to the Constitution 
While the Constitution is ultimately dispositive of  the application of  
international law in Namibia, it remains indispensable to foreground 
the analysis by revisiting the Namibian pre-independence position on 
international law’s municipal application. What necessitates this is to 
not only properly contextualise the Constitution’s ‘newly’-established 
international law position but also, more pertinently, owing to the legal 
continuity as reflected in article 66(1) which recognises the continued 
force and validity of  the common law as at independence, exception 
where it conflicts with the Constitution or legislation. It follows that the 
pre-constitutional common law position on international law’s application 
would apply unless the contrary is gleaned from either the Constitution or 
legislation. 
The legal system of  South West Africa was effectively an extension of  
that of  South Africa and applied a Westminster parliamentary sovereignty 
model that was imposed during British colonial rule.18 The then unwritten 
and composite constitutions of  South Africa contained no provisions on 
the application of  international law. Concerning international agreements, 
the pre-Constitution position was that signature, ratification or accession 
to international agreements constituted an executive act. To form part of  
municipal law, domestic incorporation of  international agreements by way 
16 As above.
17 O Elias & C Lim ‘General principles of  law, “soft” law and the identification of  
international law’ (1997) 28 Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law 22.
18 Erasmus (n 3) 85. See also A Sanders ‘The applicability of  customary international 
law in South African law – the Appeal Court has spoken’ (1978) 11 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of  Southern Africa 198.
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of  a legislative act was required,19 a position confirmed in Binga.20 Strydom 
J – in distinguishing customary international law from international 
agreements in the form of  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions revoking South 
Africa’s League of  Nations mandate over South West Africa – stated:21 
Obligations incurred by international treaty and resolutions by international 
organisations such as the United Nations stand on a different footing from 
international customary law and generally speaking a South African Court, 
and for that matter a Court of  this territory, will only give effect thereto if  such 
treaty or resolution was incorporated by legislative act into the laws of  the land. 
Binga thus confirms the domestic incorporation requirement for 
international agreements through legislation before their application. 
However, an unstated caveat to this position was that unincorporated 
treaties could be taken into account when interpreting ambiguous 
legislation.22
Concerning customary international law, common law principles 
and judicial decisions had determined its domestic application.23 After a 
prolonged period of  uncertainty and controversy, the Nduli decision by the 
South African Supreme Court of  Appeal for the first time affirmed that 
customary international law did form part of  South African law.24 Owing 
to the vassal nature of  the legal system before independence, Nduli was 
applied in South West Africa/Namibia.25 
However, there were caveats to Nduli drawn from the English law at 
the time. First, customary international law would not apply where it was 
19 Erasmus (n 3) 91, citing Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident 
Insurance Co Ltd 1965 (3) SA 150 (A) 161.
20 Binga v Administrator-General, South West Africa & Others 1984 (3) SA 949 (SWA) 968–
969; Pan American (n 19).
21 Binga (n 20) 968 (my emphasis).
22 Salomon v Commissioners of  Customs and Excise 1967 (2) QB 116.
23 RP Schaffer ‘The inter-relationship between public international law and the law of  
South Africa: An overview’ (1983) 32 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 283; J 
Dugard ‘International human rights norms in domestic courts: Can South Africa learn 
from Britain and the United States?’ in E Kahn (ed) Essays in memory of  Oliver Schreiner 
(1980) 221 232.
24 Nduli v Minister of  Justice 1978 (1) SA 893 (A) 906: ‘According to our law only such 
rules of  customary international law are to be regarded as part of  our law as are either 
universally recognised or have received the assent of  [South Africa]’. See Ndeunyema 
(n 1).
25 Erasmus (n 3) 87.
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inconsistent with an Act of  the South African Parliament, in line with 
the doctrine of  legislative sovereignty.26 Second, under the stare decisis 
doctrine, the courts would be bound to follow an established judicial 
precedent even though such precedent were discordant with a customary 
international law rule.27 Third, the prerogative power of  the executive 
through the act of  state doctrine could override customary international 
law.28 Pertinently, there appears to be pre-constitutional judicial paucity on 
the domestic application of  general principles of  law as a binding source 
of  international law.
In summary, the general approach to international law in pre-
Constitution Namibia was that a monist position applied to customary 
international law, thereby mandating its automatic application within 
the municipal order, whereas a dualist position applied for international 
agreements that required legislative incorporation into the municipal 
order. 
4.2.3 International law under the Constitution
With the advent of  independence, the Constitution jettisoned the 
previous international law-averse disposition by adopting legal features 
that can be described as ‘international law-friendly’29 or ‘international 
law-positive’.30 Although the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights framework 
has patently drawn from international human rights law, the minutes of  
the Constituent Assembly31 that drafted the Constitution are silent on 
the precise motivations for this embrace of  international law. However, a 
contemporaneous reading of  the Constitution would suggest that it probably 
was in response to Namibia’s history of  colonialism and apartheid rule, 
which are systems that flagrantly disregarded and ubiquitously violated 
international law, including international humanitarian law norms 
26 However, it was required that legislation ‘should be interpreted to accord with 
international law wherever possible’ per Nduli (n 24) 898, in light of  the presumption 
that the legislature did not intend to derogate from CIL. Cf  Rev v Lionda 1944 AD 348 
352-355; S v Penrose 1966 (1) SA 5 (N) 11.
27 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of  Nigeria (1977) QB 529 (CA); cf  S v 
Mushwena 2004 NR 276 (SC) 369; Erasmus (n 3) 89; Sanders (n 18) 200.
28 Erasmus (n 3) 90; Sanders (n 18) 200. For a judicial critique of  the act of  state doctrine 
and its continued application in Namibia, see Mushwena (n 27).
29 Erasmus (n 3) 91; D Dermont ‘The relationship between international law and 
municipal law in light of  the interim South African Constitution 1993’ (1995) 44 
International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly 1.
30 Tshosa (n 3) 9. 
31 Namibia Constituent Assembly Debates 21 November 1989-21 January 1990 Vol 1 
and 2 (Namibia National Archives 1990).
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that were ostensibly applicable during the armed conflict that preceded 
Namibia’s independence. The claim is often made that ‘Namibia is a child 
of  international solidarity’,32 a legal and political truism that aptly reflects 
the United Nations (UN) and the international community’s role on the 
‘Question of  Namibia’.33 
The Constitution’s favourable predisposition to international law is 
evident in a plurality of  provisions, including the Preamble and other 
explicit international law-related provisions.34 Of  these, the central 
provision is article 144: ‘Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution 
or Act of  Parliament, the general rules of  public international law and 
international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution 
shall form part of  the law of  Namibia.’
Though laconic, article 144 invites the conclusion that it ‘sought to 
give expression to the intention of  the Constitution to make Namibia part 
of  the international community’35 and chimes well with principles of  state 
sovereignty and state consent that are among the overarching premises 
of  international law. To commence the article 144 analysis, the meaning 
of  ‘general rules of  public international law’ and of  ‘international 
agreements’ is deconstructed. 
Deconstructing ‘general rules of  public international law’ and ‘international 
agreements’
It is well accepted that article 144’s reference to international agreements36 
is to be understood as a generic term that encapsulates all forms of  written 
agreements that have been concluded between Namibia and other states 
(or international organisations) to demonstrate Namibia’s consent to be 
bound by the content thereof. For an international agreement37 to form 
part of  Namibian law, the procedural requirements are derived from 
32 See eg ‘Statement by His Excellency Hage G Geingob, President of  the Republic 
of  Namibia at the General Debate of  the UN General Assembly’ 29 September 
2015, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_NA_en.pdf  
(accessed 17 September 2019).
33 UNGA ‘Question of  Namibia’ 13 December 1985, A/RES/40/97.
34 See arts 1(4), 32(3(e), 95(d), 96(d), 99 and 140 of  the Constitution, which are analysed 
in Tshosa (n 3) 9 and Erasmus (n 3) 93-94.
35 Government of  the Republic of  Namibia & Another v Cultura 2000 1993 NR 328 (SC) 333.
36 ‘Commentary on Article 2(1)(a), Draft Articles on the Law of  Treaties with 
commentaries’ in Yearbook of  the International Law Commission 1996.
37 The Namibian Constitution does not distinguish between the classes of  international 
agreements such as political, technical, administrative or executive. Compare 
Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, 1996 sec 231(3).
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various provisions of  the Constitution. First, acting with the powers 
conferred by article 32(3)(e), the President (or delegate) would negotiate 
an international agreement and then sign it. These powers are exercised 
with the assistance of  cabinet ministers under article 40(i). Second, upon 
presidential signature, the National Assembly is vested by article 63(2)(e) 
with the power and function ‘to agree to the ratification of  or accession to 
international agreements which have been negotiated and signed in terms 
of  Article 32(3)(e)’. Constitutionally, therefore, the President must act 
with the approval of  the National Assembly. 
The meaning and ambit of  the phrase ‘general rules of  public 
international law’ in article 144 are more controversial. Namibia-
centric scholars, including Tshosa and Erasmus, take the restrictive 
approach that the phrase is synonymous with customary international 
law.38 However, if  the reality that the identification of  the sources of  
international law remains one of  the most vexing issues is anything to 
go by, this determination is not as straightforward. Further, a recourse 
to comparative constitutionalism reveals the reference to ‘general rules 
of  public international law’ in constitutions such as that of  Germany39 
and Kenya.40 Other constitutions (those of  Malawi41 and South Africa42) 
specifically engage the term ‘customary international law’ to distinguish 
international law that is not sourced from international agreements. 
In my view, taking a generous, broad, and purposive approach43 to the 
interpretation of  the Constitution, the reference to ‘general rules of  public 
international law’ is to be correctly understood expansively as including 
38 Erasmus (n 3) 98; Tshosa (n 3) 11. Tshosa takes an even more restrictive approach 
by asserting that ‘[the] term general in this context means rules widely supported and 
accepted by the representatively large number of  states’. Tshosa (n 3) 11 (my emphasis).
39 Art 25 of  1949 German Constitution; H Rupp ‘International law as part of  the law of  
the land: Some aspects of  the operation of  article 25 of  the Basic Law of  the Federal 
Republic of  Germany’ (1976) 11 Texas International Law Journal 541; R Wolfrum et al 
‘The reception of  international law in the German legal order: An introduction’ in E de 
Wet et al (eds) The implementation of  international law in Germany and South Africa (2015) 
17.
40 Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 Others v Attorney General [2013] eKLR para 70. See also M 
Wabwile ‘The emerging juridical status of  international law in Kenya’ (2013) 13 Oxford 
University Commonwealth Law Journal 167.
41 Cf  Malawian Constitution sec 211.
42 Sec 322 South African Constitution: ‘Customary international law is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of  Parliament’. See 
Kaunda & Others v President of  the Republic of  South Africa 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC); D 
Shelton ‘Introduction’ in D Shelton (ed) International law and domestic legal systems: 
Incorporation, transformation, and persuasion (2011) 14.
43 Minister of  Defence v Mwandinghi 1993 NR 63 (SC) 69; Cultura 2000 (n 35).
116   Chapter 4
both customary international law and general principles of  law.44 This 
understanding is one that principally leans on the text of  articles 38(1)(a) 
to (c) of  the ICJ Statute which, in addition to international conventions, 
specifies ‘international custom, as evidence of  a general practice accepted 
as law’, and ‘the general principles of  law of  civilised nations’. Article 
38(1) is widely accepted as reflecting customary international law on 
the formal sources of  international law. Moreover, there is no a priori 
hierarchy in the three sources.45 Some commentators, however, claim that 
general principles of  law constitute a ‘secondary’ source with the central 
function of  ‘filling gaps’46 in the absence of  a treaty or customary norm.47 
Accordingly, it is submitted that both customary international law and 
general principles of  law are part of  binding Namibian law.48 
Concerning customary international law, the textbook method 
for establishing it is described in article 38(1)(b) of  the ICJ Statute as 
‘evidence of  a general practice accepted as law’.49 This traditionally 
consists of  two elements. The first is the objective element of  state practice 
(constuendo), which is a general practice that is sufficiently widespread and 
representative; the practice need not be uniform.50 The second is opinio 
juris, the subjective element that requires the practice of  states to arise 
from a belief  that a legal obligation exists,51 thereby distinguishing custom 
from mere usage or habit. The precise meaning and application of  these 
elements in establishing custom remain uncertain. Some scholars have 
poured cold water on the claim that domestic courts systematically follow 
44 While the specific reference to ‘general rules of  public international law’ may be 
argued as excluding general principles of  law, this is untenable as it would constitute a 
narrow interpretation of  art 144. 
45 J Crawford Brownlie’s principles of  public international law (2012) 35; S Yee ‘Article 38 of  
the ICJ Statute and applicable law: Selected issues in recent cases’ (2016) 7 Journal of  
International Dispute Settlement 472 488.
46 J Pauwelyn Conflict of  norms in public international law: How WTO law relates to other rules 
of  international law (2003) 127-129. 
47 R Yotovana ‘Challenges in the identification of  “the general principles of  law 
recognized by civilized nations”: The approach of  the international court’ (2017) 3 
Canadian Journal of  Comparative and Contemporary Law 269 279.
48 Mushwena (n 27) 320. 
49 See generally International Law Commission ‘Identification of  international 
customary law: Analytical guide to the work of  the International Law Commission’ 
(International Law Commission 2013), http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml 
(accessed 23 September 2019); M Wood First report on the formation and evidence of  
customary international law A/CN.4/663 (accessed 23 September 2019); M Wood 
Second report on identification of  customary international law A/CN.4/672. (2013).
50 As above.
51 North Sea Continental Shelf  Cases (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands) 1969 ICJ 
Rep 3, 44; Crawford (n 45) 25-32. 
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this textbook method in their determination of  custom.52 Others maintain 
that, when determining rules of  custom, the ICJ, in particular, has not 
used a single methodology but a mixture: induction, deduction and (the 
primary method) assertion.53 Nevertheless, the central assumptions and 
many critiques of  customary international law are outside the remit of  the 
chapter. Rather, the chapter will align with the settled approach that the 
two elements remain established and are indispensable in determining the 
existence of  a rule of  customary international law.
While customary international law is settled as part of  binding 
Namibian law, general principles of  law are not as established. These 
have received scant attention or mention in Namibian courts, as will be 
observed in the case studies below. As it has now been resolved that article 
144 incorporates the triad of  international law sources of  international 
agreements, customary international law, and general principles of  law 
as part of  binding Namibian law, the next part considers the scope of  
application of  article 144. 
Scope of  article 144
Article 144 introduces the automatic and mandatory application of  both 
general rules of  public international law and international agreements 
duly agreed to under the Constitution as binding Namibian law. For good 
measure, this is evinced by the drafters of  the Constitution’s choice of  
peremptory language in article 144: ‘shall form part of  the law of  Namibia’. 
No (further) legislative action, such as incorporation or transformation, is 
required. This thus mandates the direct application of  both general rules 
of  public international law and international agreements by Namibian 
52 C Ryngaert & D Siccama ‘Ascertaining customary international law: An inquiry into 
the methods used by domestic courts’ (2018) 65 Netherlands International Law Review 
1. This study concludes that, from domestic court cases on matters of  customary 
international law between 2000-2014, domestic courts (similar to the ICJ) do not 
normally identify norms of  customary international law on the basis of  the textbook 
method of  ascertaining a general practice accepted as law. Instead, it finds that 
domestic courts tend to outsource the determination of  custom to treaties, non-binding 
documents, doctrine or international judicial practice. Courts sometimes assert a 
customary international law norm without citing persuasive practice authority.
53 S Talmon ‘Determining customary international law: The ICJ’s methodology between 
induction, deduction and assertion’ (2015) 26 European Journal of  International Law 417. 
Concisely put, induction is a method of  inferring the customary norm from an iterative 
process of  state practice and opinio juris. Deduction infers a specific customary norm 
from a more general principle. Assertion means that the ICJ uses neither inductive nor 
deductive reasoning, but simply asserts CIL.
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courts.54 This manifests the so-called direct-effect doctrine.55 In some 
instances, an international agreement would enjoin Namibia to undertake 
legislative and other measures to ensure the domestic effectiveness of  
international law.
From the language of  article 144, however, there are two exceptions 
to the direct application of  international law.56 The first is the constitutional 
supremacy exception: International law will not apply where it is ‘otherwise 
provided’ for by the Constitution, that is, where it is incompatible with 
the Constitution itself. The exception aligns with the Constitutions’ 
self-proclaimed supremacy in article 1(6). The test to determine the 
incompatibility of  an international law position with the Constitution 
has not received significant judicial consideration. Only the High Court 
in Kauesa has arguably offered some guidance: ‘The specific provisions 
of  the Constitution of  Namibia, where specific and unequivocal, override 
provisions of  international agreements which have become part of  
Namibian law.’57 Thus, to override international law,58 a constitutional 
provision must specifically and unequivocally contradict international law.59
The second qualification is the legislative exception: International law will 
not apply where it conflicts with an Act of  Parliament.60 As the Supreme 
Court stated in Thudinyane v Edward,61 in the context of  the ‘best interests 
of  the child’ doctrine of  the Convention on the Rights of  the Child (CRC): 
‘[I]n Namibia, international agreements … appear to have similar force of  
law as accorded to legislation, in the absence of  any constitutional provision 
or Act of  Parliament contradicting the law or agreement in question.’62 
54 Tshosa (n 3).
55 The doctrine of  vertical or horizontal direct effect (to be distinguished from direct 
application) is subject to whether an international agreement, in particular, is self-
executing or non-self-executing. See J Jackson ‘Status of  treaties in domestic legal 
systems: A policy analysis’ (1992) 86 American Journal of  International Law 310.
56 A third qualification (which both Erasmus and Tshosa appear to overlook) can also be 
added: Norms jus cogens bind Namibia, irrespective of  whether they are (theoretically) 
in conformity with the Constitution or Acts of  Parliament. 
57 Kauesa v Minister of  Home Affairs 1994 NR 102 (HC) 141 (my emphasis).
58 The test applies to international law, understood as also including general rules of  
public international law, not only international agreements as in Kauesa.
59 Cf  NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration (1963) ECR 1 on the requirements for direct effect of  European 
Union law that is unconditional, clear and precise; Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen (C14/83) (1984) 1891 ECR on indirect effect of  European Union law. 
60 The Constitution art 63(2)(e).
61 Thudinyane v Edward (SA 17/2005) (2012) NASC 22 (unreported) para 18.
62 As above (my emphasis). 
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The Supreme Court’s approach, albeit in the somewhat ambivalent 
language of  ‘appear to have’, suggests that legislation and international 
agreements are on par. However, this would present practical interpretative 
difficulties where the provisions of  legislation and international agreements 
are in direct conflict. The common law, which remains applicable in 
light of  article 66(1) discussed earlier, offers a solution in the doctrine 
of  consistent interpretation.63 The doctrine requires legislation to be 
interpreted in harmony with international obligations wherever possible.64 
Article 144, it may be argued, thus obliges the Namibian courts to take 
judicial notice of  international law and are enjoined to have recourse to it 
as a source of  national law.65 
An essential qualification to the common law’s application is necessary: 
Customary law is placed on par with common law by article 66(1). I have 
argued in chapter 2 against the subservience of  customary law in the 
Namibian legal milieu. Thus, what this would ordinarily necessitate is a 
determination of  the position that customary law takes on the application 
of  international law in Namibia, in addition to that of  the common law. 
The common law is not to be regarded as the default or hegemonic regime. 
It remains an open question whether a single and coherent customary law 
principle on a given issue (such as resolving conflicts between treaties 
and the Constitution or legislation) can be extracted from Namibia’s 
heterogeneity of  communities with divergent customary laws.66
The determination is often made that Namibian law adopts a monist 
approach vis-à-vis the relationship between international law and Namibian 
municipal law.67 However, in light of  the preceding analysis in this chapter, 
the precise position would be that Namibia adopts a ‘weak’68 monism or 
‘qualified’ monism approach, given that international law is subject to its 
consistency with the Constitution and Acts of  Parliament. 
63 Nduli (n 24) 898; see also Nollkaemper (n 13) 146. Cf  sec 233 of  the 1996 South African 
Constitution.
64 Dausab (n 3) 267.
65 Tshosa (n 3) 12. Tshosa does not cite authority for his contention that Namibian 
courts take judicial notice of  binding international law, while Erasmus concludes that 
this ‘flows logically from the content of  Article 144’ as this was the pre-constitution 
position under common law. Erasmus (n 3) 100.
66 R Anderson ‘Redressing colonial genocide under international law: The Hereros’ 
cause of  action against Germany’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 1155 1159.
67 Tshosa (n 3) 12.
68 M Killander ‘The impact of  transjudicialism on constitutional adjudication’ in 
C Fombad (ed) The effects of  international law norms on constitutional adjudication in Africa 
(2017) 216. 
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The next part moves away from theoretical constructs to examine the 
practical application of  international law by Namibian courts.
Application of  international law by Namibian courts 
It is settled that international agreements, customary international law, and 
general principles of  law binding upon Namibia would apply automatically 
unless they contradict the Constitution or legislation. Article 78 of  the 
Constitution enjoins the judiciary to uphold the law,69 an obligation that 
includes international law in light of  article 144. Through the decisions 
of  the Supreme Court principally, it will be demonstrated that courts have 
only – either at the invitation of  the parties to a specific case or as a matter 
of  judicial notice – superficially analysed the Constitution’s international 
law clause. Further, courts have applied international agreements binding 
upon Namibia with limited reference to customary international law. 
Moreover, no substantive engagement with general principles of  law is 
traceable in Namibian decisions.70 
Consider first the courts’ approach to international agreements. 
Namibian courts have favourably and directly relied upon international 
agreements in domestic decision making. In Mushwena71 the Supreme 
Court considered the legality of  the extradition of  13 accused respondents 
from Zambia after they had been apprehended and abducted by Namibian 
agents. The Court considered ICCPR and the UN Convention Relating to 
the Status of  Refugees, which bound Namibia through accession. O’Linn 
AJA, commenting on the application of  the ICCPR, states:72 
Not only has it become part of  Namibian domestic law by virtue of  the Namibian 
Constitution, but some of  its basic principles have been incorporated into the 
Namibian, Botswana and Zambian laws relating to extradition, deportation 
and repatriation. The Convention is also part of  international law and 
69 See also arts 79(2) and 80(2) of  the Constitution. 
70 Cf  R Oppong ‘Re-imagining international law: An examination of  recent trends in the 
reception of  international law into national legal systems of  Africa’ (2006) 30 Fordham 
International Law Journal 300-305.
71 Mushwena (n 27).
72 Mushwena (n 27) 320 (my emphasis). Similarly, the Supreme Court in Shaanika & Others 
v The Windhoek City Police & Others 2013 (4) NR 1106 (SC) considered art 14 of  ICCPR 
on fair trial rights but does not consider the application of  this international instrument 
in terms of  art 144. In Namunjepo & Others v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison & 
Another 1999 NR 271 (SC) 281 the Court interpreted torture, cruel, inhumane and 
degrading treatment in light of  ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture but does 
not reference art 144. Cf  Chairperson of  the Tender Board of  Namibia v Pamo Trading 
Enterprises CC & Another 2017 (1) NR 1 (SC) para 40.
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breaches of  it are not only breaches of  the domestic law of  these countries, 
but breaches of  international law.
Mushwena thus affirms the direct and automatic application of  international 
agreements by Namibian courts. Mushwena is similar to the Kauesa73 
decision of  the High Court to the extent that the latter case invokes and 
applies an international agreement. 
Kauesa is to be distinguished, however, as it does not directly consider 
the application of  an international agreement, but rather invokes it in the 
interpretation of  the Constitution. In Kauesa the applicant challenged the 
Regulations to the Police Act that made it an offence for a member of  
the Namibian police force to publicly comment unfavourably upon the 
administration of  the force or any other government department. In 
considering whether the provisions of  the Regulations fell foul of  the 
freedom of  expression protected under article 21(1)(a) of  the Constitution, 
the Court considered the provision of  the African Charter on free speech 
and equality. The Court established that Namibia had acceded to the 
African Charter, thus making it part of  binding Namibian law through 
articles 143 and 144 of  the Constitution. The Court then clarified that: 
[t]he specific provisions of  the Constitution of  Namibia, where specific and 
unequivocal, override provisions of  international agreements which have 
become part of  Namibian law. However, in all situations where such law is 
not in conflict with the provisions of  the Namibian Constitution, such law 
will have to be given effect to in Namibia. In cases where the provisions of  
the Namibian Constitution are equivocal or uncertain as to the scope of  their 
application, such provisions of  the international agreements must at least be 
given considerable weight in interpreting and defining the scope of  the provisions 
contained in the Namibian Constitution.74 
Two central principles can be derived from Kauesa: First, the requirement 
that the Constitution’s provisions can only override international 
agreements where the former is ‘specific and unequivocal’ is in line with 
the common law doctrine of  consistent interpretation outlined earlier. 
Second, Kauesa also affirms the value of  international law beyond 
its direct domestic application: in the interpretation and scoping of  
73 Kauesa v Minister of  Home Affairs 1994 NR 102 (HC). Although the High Court’s 
Kausea decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, the latter considered neither the 
African Charter nor other rules of  international law as a matter of  direct application 
or interpretation, thus making the High Court’s decision good authority. See Kauesa 
v Minister of  Home Affairs 1995 NR 175 (SC). Cf  S v Martinez 1993 NR 1 (HC) on the 
perpetuation of  existing international law under the Constitution.
74 Kauesa (n 140) (my emphasis).
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Constitutional provisions. Notably, this embrace of  international law as 
an interpretative resource is not textually asserted in the Constitution, as 
in other jurisdictions.75
However, there has been a lack of  consistency in the direct application 
of  international law by Namibian courts insofar as the Constitution and 
legislation are to take precedence. This is illustrated in Mwilima76 where the 
Supreme Court had to consider a contradiction between an international 
agreement and domestic legislation. Article 14(3)(d) of  ICCPR obligates 
the state to provide legal representation in criminal matters to indigent 
accused persons in the interest of  justice. On the contrary, the Legal 
Aid Act had subjected the provision of  legal aid in criminal matters to 
the availability of  resources and funding from the state.77 The majority 
refused to apply the Legal Aid Act as it took the view that it did not 
give full effect to the rights of  an accused as provided for in article 14(3)
(d) of  ICCPR.78 This rendered superior provisions of  the international 
agreement over those of  legislation, implying that the validity of  the latter 
is to be tested against the former. Article 144 is unambiguous in that both 
the Constitution and legislation supersede international law including 
international agreements.79 At the least, the Mwilima majority ought to 
have grappled with interpretatively reconciling the conflicting legislative 
and treaty provisions in accordance with the consistent interpretation 
principle under common law. 
A further inconsistency in the (non-)application of  international 
agreements is revealed in the Supreme Court’s Müller80 decision. There, 
the appellant, Mr Müller, relied on international agreements, including 
the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), in claiming that he is permitted to adopt his 
wife’s surname and to not be discriminated against on the basis of  his sex. 
Sex is a protected category under articles 10 and 14 of  the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court, after accepting that Namibia had acceded to and was 
bound by CEDAW, perplexingly stated: ‘Such Conventions are of  course 
subject to the Constitution and cannot change the situation’81 before 
75 Cf  sec 39(1)(b) of  the South African Constitution.
76 Government of  the Republic of  Namibia v Mwilima 2002 NR (SC) 235.
77 Mwilima (n 76) 260. 
78 As above.
79 Cf  Thudinyane (n 61).
80 Müller v President of  the Republic of  Namibia & Another 1999 NR 190 (SC) . 
81 Müller (n 80) 205. Further Namibian decisions that consider international agreements 
include Namunjepo & Others v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison & Another 1999 NR 
271 (SC); Ex Parte Attorney-General: In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of  State 1991 
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summarily dismissing the reliance on CEDAW without any attempt at 
reconciling the Constitution with CEDAW provisions as required by 
article 144.82 
Concerning the domestic application of  customary international 
law, there is limited jurisprudence citing or relying on this as a source of  
law. Although reference is made to ‘international law’ by courts, rarely 
have courts positively identified a rule as one specifically of  customary 
international law. Indicatively, in S v Likanyi83 the Supreme Court was 
called upon to decide whether the arrest of  the accused, Mr Likanyi, 
by Namibian agents – while Mr Likanyi was on Botswanan territory – 
violated the state’s sovereign act of  arrest.84 The majority determined 
that there was a breach of  ‘international law’ through the carrying out 
of  the act of  extra-territorial arrest by Namibian agents, whose action 
constituted a prohibited internationally wrongful act. The majority 
relied upon the Permanent Court of  International Justice’s decision in 
SS Lotus.85 Although the majority considered and relied on ‘international 
law’ to the extent of  determining that Namibia engaged in an internationally 
delinquent act, it did not substantively engage article 144 to positively 
identify whether the prohibition stems from international agreements or 
customary international law or, for that matter, general principles of  law. 
Further, the majority erred in its failure to take note of  another potential 
customary international law rule: State consent would preclude the 
wrongfulness of  an internationally delinquent act.86 This rule is reflected 
in the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of  
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,87 which are widely regarded as 
reflecting customary international law.88 This reveals that Namibian courts 
NR 178 (SC); see also Dausab (n 3) 261.
82 Similarly, The Chairperson of  the Immigration Selection Board v Frank & Another 2001 NR 
107 (SC). See also N Horn ‘International human rights norms and standards’ in N 
Horn & A Bösl (eds) Human rights and the rule of  law in Namibia (2008) 144.
83 S v Likanyi 2017 (3) NR 771 (SC).
84 Likanyi (n 83) paras 68-69. 
85 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ (Ser A) No 10, 28 (7 September); Likanyi (n 83) 
para 110.
86 See N Ndeunyema ‘Extra-territorial arrests by states: Did the Namibian Supreme 
Court get it wrong?’ OxHRH Blog 31 August 2017, http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/extra-
territorial-arrests-by-states-did-the-namibian-supreme-court-get-it-wrong/ (accessed 
18 July 2021).
87 International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, 
GAOR 56th session Supp 10, 43 (specifically arts 2-4). 
88 S Talmon ‘The responsibility of  outside powers for the acts of  secessionist entities’ 
(2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495.
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rarely explicitly identify and apply customary international law rules as 
part of  Namibian law.89 
These cases reveal the inconsistencies, inaccuracies and divergences in 
the application of  international law domestically. This book will rely on 
the correct approach to international law in Namibia as advanced in this 
chapter in the assessment of  a right to water.
4.2.4 Interpretative methodology and soft law resources 
Given this chapter’s determination that international agreements are 
directly binding on Namibian law subject to the stated exceptions, this 
necessitates an analysis of  the appropriate methodology to be applied 
in the interpretation of  international agreements within Namibia and 
particularly by Namibian courts. 
From a practical perspective, the determination of  a legally-coherent 
and legitimate interpretative methodology is critical. Not least because 
they are negotiated by a variety of  states with divergent interests, 
treaty provisions are often framed generally, vaguely and inevitably 
attract ambiguity as to their meaning. From a doctrinal and normative 
perspective, determining an acceptable interpretative methodology avoids 
claims that norms such as human rights are premised upon questionable 
interpretative principles and as such are outcome-oriented. Norms such 
as a right to water that relies upon the implied rights doctrine, as argued 
for throughout this book, are acutely vulnerable to this critique. This 
heightens the necessity of  articulating and relying upon irreproachable 
legal methods in interpreting international law.90
Moreover, in interpreting and applying a right to water that is asserted 
under international law within Namibia domestically, this chapter and 
chapter 6 will place particular reliance upon sources that are a step away 
from being legally binding law, that is, soft law sources. It thus is necessary 
to determine the authoritative status and relevance of  soft law sources in 
claiming a right to water before Namibian courts.
89 In the early jurisprudence of  Corporal Punishment (n 81) the Supreme Court could 
have expressed but did not express a position on whether the prohibition of  corporal 
punishment had matured into CIL. As Tshosa holds, this failure by the Court was a 
missed opportunity to determine the domestic status of  customary international law in 
early Namibian constitutional development. Tshosa (n 3). Cf  Cultura 2000 (n 35).
90 T Meron Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (1989) 81.
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Interpreting international agreements in Namibian courts
In this part we turn to consider the how of  interpreting the international 
agreements that are relied upon in this book. The issues are germane 
because, while international agreements may have direct application in 
Namibia, the meaning of  international agreement provisions are often 
disputed. As I have argued earlier, Kausea affirms the parallel interpretative 
function of  international agreements in relation to the Constitution. 
In determining the appropriate method and techniques for interpreting 
international agreements by Namibian courts, two possibilities are 
offered: the rules of  interpretation developed through judicial decisions for 
interpreting the Constitution and domestic legislation; alternatively, the 
rules of  interpretation developed under international law to specifically 
interpret international agreements. The latter proposition will be defended. 
The customary international law rules that apply to the interpretation of  
international agreements – as reflected in articles 31 and 32 of  VCLT – are 
applicable. 
Whether a municipal court would be legally bound to apply the 
VCLT’s interpretative rules is a matter determined by domestic law. On 
this premise, customary international law is part of  binding Namibian 
law. There need not be two or more state parties to a dispute inviting 
the interpretation of  an international agreement for the methodology of  
articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT to be applicable. 
Namibia is not a contracting state party to the VCLT. 91 Nevertheless, 
articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT are a binding part of  Namibian law by 
virtue of  article 144 of  the Constitution as there is little dispute that 
articles 31 and 32 of  VCLT reflect norms of  customary international law. 
This proposition finds abundant support, including the decision of  the 
International Court of  Justice (ICJ) in Kasikili/Sedudu Island concerning 
the Namibia/Botswana boundary where Namibia’s agents asserted – 
and the ICJ accepted – that articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT form part of  
customary international law.92
91 In Martinez (n 73) the High Court, in determining the binding effect of  the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of  the Sea on Namibia, considered whether the UN Council 
for Namibia had signed the VCLT on Namibia’s behalf, but was unable to establish the 
question conclusively. 
92 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia) Merits [1999] ICJ Reports 1045 para 18. 
See also Memorial Submitted by the Namibian Government para 46, http://www.icj-cij.
org/files/case-related/98/8574.pdf  (accessed 22 September 2019); Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of  Iran v United States of  America) Preliminary Objections, Judgment 
(1996) ICJ Report (II) para 23; R Gardiner Treaty interpretation (2008) 12; M Villiger 
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Namibian courts are yet to expressly rely on the VCLT’s interpretive 
framework as a matter of  custom. Seldom have Namibian courts 
meaningfully considered, let alone referenced, the VCLT’s interpretive 
rules in their interpretation of  international agreements. Nonetheless, 
there exists a legal obligation, I argue, upon Namibian courts to apply 
articles 31 and 32 as a matter of  binding customary international law.93 
To augment this argument, the Namibian Supreme Court has laudably 
affirmed a strict approach to respect for international law in the municipal 
setting through fidelity to the rule of  law as a founding constitutional 
principle. Concurring in Likanyi, Shivute CJ has asserted:94 
The rule of  law requires that even people accused of  committing heinous 
crimes must be dealt with according to law. Where a person is brought before 
court in violation of  international law, the rule of  law – a foundational principle 
of  the Constitution – requires that a court critically examine the conduct of  
the law enforcement agency in securing the presence of  the accused within the 
territorial jurisdiction of  the court.
While Shivute CJ’s emphasis upon the centrality of  international law 
to respect for the rule of  law is in the context of  substantive rules of  
international law, this also extends to quasi-procedural rules, such as the 
interpretative methodology in articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT interpreting 
international agreements. 
Beyond legal justifications for applying articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT 
as custom, further normative and policy-based reasons exist on why 
municipal (Namibian) courts ought to apply the VCLT domestically. First 
is harmonisation, since divergent approaches remain between states and 
among international law judges and scholars as to the element(s) that ought 
to be relevant in treaty interpretation. Waibel captures this divergence in 
approaches.95 Some emphasise the subjective intentions of  the parties 
(including through liberal recourse to travaux préparatoires); others ascribe 
a significant premium to a treaty’s object and purpose, while others stress 
the primacy of  the text with limited scope for adducing extrinsic evidence 
about the intentions of  the parties and a treaty’s object and purpose.96 The 
Customary international law and treaties (1985) 484-506.
93 A Nollkaemper ‘Grounds for the application of  international rules of  interpretation in 
national courts’ in H Aust & G Nolte The interpretation of  international law by domestic 
courts: Uniformity, diversity, convergence (2013) 37. 
94 Likanyi (n 83) para 8.
95 M Waibel ‘Principles of  treaty interpretation: developed for and applied by national 
courts?’ in Aust & Nolte (n 93) 10-11.
96 As above.
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utility of  articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT lies in that it offers a common 
approach – or in the least a common starting point – to interpreting 
international agreements. ‘Common’ in this context, however, is not to be 
understood as singular, as articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT indeed reflects 
an eclectic mix of  interpretative approaches.97 
Second is legitimacy. Particularly where the legitimacy of  a municipal 
court to determine certain legal issues is tenuous, it may be tempting to 
turn to the VCLT’s interpretative methodology. This allows municipal 
courts to avoid potential minefields and criticisms that their formulated 
interpretations may usurp the executive and legislative roles. For example, 
interpretative legitimacy concerns would be of  potentially heightened 
relevance in the context of  positive rights and duties of  a socio-economic 
nature, such as a right to water in context of  this book, because institutional 
justiciability objections as to the legitimacy of  judges in adjudicating 
matters laden with policy, resource and budgetary considerations are 
likely to arise. Waibel moreover advances the use of  the VCLT approach 
as particularly appealing to judges in countries in transition. Arguably, 
Namibia remains ‘transitional’ considering the sparse reliance upon 
international law in domestic decisions.98
The third is practicality. While articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT may be 
deemed as being primarily addressed to state parties in light of  the language 
employed, it has also been claimed that the VCLT drafters had municipal 
courts in mind as addressees. Waibel cites the normative desirability 
of  legal certainty and the need for convergence in treaty interpretation 
which were discussed by the International Law Commission and Vienna 
Conference that drafted the VCLT.99 Waibel points out that national courts 
were implicitly a central audience for the VCLT’s interpretive rules as the 
International Law Commission had discussed the issue based on reports 
that summarised interpretive practices that included many decisions of  
national courts.100 Many early writings also examine treaty interpretation, 
as well as the law of  treaties more broadly, from the perspective of  national 
practice, including the practice of  national courts. Moreover, even in the 
absence of  explicit consideration of  national courts as one important 
audience, the VCLT’s drafters were seemingly aware that the audience was 
broad and that a diverse range of  treaty interpreters would apply articles 
31 and 32 of  the VCLT.101
97 J Tobin The right to health in international law (2012) 79. 
98 Waibel (n 95) 16.
99 Waibel 13.
100 As above.
101 As above; Nollkaemper (n 93) 37.
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Status and application of  soft law sources in domestic interpretation
In interpreting and applying binding law in Namibia – whether derived 
from the Constitution or legislation or international law – reference may 
be made to those interpretations within various sources that are a step 
away from being legally binding: soft law.102 Soft law may take forms that 
include General Comments, general recommendations or resolutions, and 
are often issued by quasi-judicial or non-judicial bodies such as the ESCR 
Committee, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission), the HRC or the CEDAW Committee. Soft law 
sources are to be distinguished from comparative law sourced from foreign 
decisions (including foreign regional decisions such as the Inter-American 
and European systems) and which may hold persuasive authority within 
Namibian judicial reasoning.103 These soft law sources are relied upon 
heavily in the substantive content of  water analysis in chapter 6 of  the 
book.
The significance of  soft law lies in potentially aiding interpretation, 
particularly where legal provisions are vague, contestable, ambiguous 
or open-ended.104 While it is settled that soft law sources are not legally 
binding of  and by themselves, their persuasiveness and authoritative 
weight require attention. These concerns are not entirely new. The nature, 
drafting technique and legitimacy of  soft law sources have been the subject 
of  scholarly analysis, perhaps more prominently by Keller and Grover in 
the context of  General Comments of  the HRC. The issues Keller and 
Grover raise in their analysis mirror those arising from soft law issued by 
other bodies such as the ESCR Committee and African Commission that 
are at the disposal of  domestic courts. 
Reactions to General Comments lie at different levels of  the authority 
spectrum. At the two opposite ends of  this spectrum are those that 
concord their use as ‘authoritative interpretations’ of  treaty norms, while 
others reject their use entirely as ‘broad, unsystematic, statements which 
are not always well-founded, and are not deserving of  being accorded any 
particular weight in legal settings’.105 Some states have also been recorded 
in objecting to specific General Comments, asserting that their content 
102 See A Boyle & C Chinkin The making of  international law (2007) 211. 
103 See ch 1.
104 P Alston ‘The historical origins of  the concept of  “General Comments”’ in L Boisson 
de Chazournes & V Gowlland-Debbas (eds) The international legal system in quest of  
equity and universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (2001) 763.
105 H Keller & L Grover ‘General Comments of  the Human Rights Committee and 
their legitimacy’ in H Keller & G Ulfstein (eds) UN human rights treaty bodies: law and 
legitimacy (2012) 118.
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is an ‘unacceptable attempt to attribute treaty provisions a meaning 
which they do not have’.106 Similar criticism is exemplified by those who 
admonished the ESCR Committee’s General Comment 15 which implied 
the right to water, which I will address in this chapter. Nevertheless, the 
normative legitimacy of  General Comments ought to be assessed through 
their quality of  reasoning, language and process for drafting General 
Comments, all of  which would impact their interpretative and deliberative 
resourcefulness and persuasive authority. 
Two principal theories can thus be advanced in justifying recourse to 
General Comments of  treaties. The first is the subsequent practice theory. 
This theory views General Comments as constituting subsequent practice 
for purposes of  article 31(3)(b) of  the VCLT and can thus be taken into 
account in interpreting an international agreement (less so where a state has 
contested the General Comment’s content). Relatedly, the acquiescence 
of  state parties to General Comments may serve as a justification for 
treaty interpretation. The argument is that, per article 31(1) of  the VCLT, 
a good faith interpretation of  an instrument obliges state parties to duly 
consider the content of  General Comments, as they are the product of  a 
body established to interpret such an instrument, as well as to monitor and 
promote compliance with it. The proposition is thus for article 31(1)(c) of  
the VCLT to be interpreted more broadly to include the practice of  treaty-
monitoring bodies and not only states themselves as has been the tradition 
in interpreting international law.107 
Second is the authoritative interpretation theory, where General 
Comments are asserted as ‘authoritative’ interpretations or statements 
of  a treaty. Their authoritativeness refers to the fact that treaty body 
committee members are elected to perform duties specified and to do so 
implies that they need to adopt General Comments.108 Authoritativeness 
may also derive from the expertise of  committee members, drawn from 
the ESCR Committee’s Concluding Observations of  state parties over the 
years. The soft law character of  General Comments does not mean they 
are devoid of  any legal significance. They are particularly useful in both 
domestic and supra-national settings where there are attempts to resolve 
‘hard cases’ by setting out important background principles against which 
a law may be analysed.109 Indeed, what is unassailable from General 
106 Keller & Grover (n 105) 119. 
107 M Langford ‘Ambition that overleaps itself: A response to Stephen Tully’s critique of  
the General Comment on the right to water’ (2006) 24 Netherlands Quarterly of  Human 
Rights 433 435; Keller & Grover (n 105) 132.
108 Keller and Grover (n 105) 132. 
109 Keller and Grover 129.
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Comments is that they often reflect a robust legal analytical function that 
advances a common international understanding of  treaties and serves to 
prevent state parties from claiming that a treaty obligation is limited to this 
or that area of  its experience.110
Therefore, on the combined strength of  the subsequent practice and 
authoritative interpretation theories, soft law sources such as General 
Comments can legitimately be relied upon in legal interpretation by 
Namibian courts. While aware of  their legally non-binding nature, courts 
ought to consider soft law as resources that offer deliberative, interpretative 
and potentially persuasive value. This aligns with the international law-
friendly disposition that pervades the Constitution. 
In summary, it has thus far been argued that, subject to constitutional 
and legislative superiority, article 144 directly incorporates international 
agreements and general rules of  public international law as part of  binding 
Namibian law, the latter being constituted of  both customary international 
law and general principles of  law. Further, when interpreting international 
agreements, the rules of  interpretation established under custom, as 
reflected in articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT, apply. These rules will be 
applied in interpreting a right to water-related international agreements 
in this chapter. Finally, as Namibian courts can also legitimately, yet 
judiciously, rely upon soft law sources in interpreting potentially persuasive 
authorities, the book will also critically rely on soft law sources throughout. 
In this light, the forthcoming parts of  the chapter will consider the three 
sources of  international law in the context of  the legal basis of  a right to 
water in Namibia. 
4.3 A right to water under international agreements binding 
Namibia
In the following parts the chapter turns to analyse a right to water by 
interrogating international law sources that are found to be binding upon 
Namibia. The focus of  this chapter thus is an analysis of  the existence of  
a legally-binding right to water by drawing on the three principal sources 
of  international law that are binding upon Namibia under article 144 of  
the Constitution: treaties to which Namibia is a contracting state party, 
customary international law and the general principles of  law. 
As a matter of  human rights treaty law that binds Namibia, I argue that 
this question has largely been affirmatively answered with the adoption of  
110 Keller and Grover 124.
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the ESCR Committee in its 2002 General Comment 15.111 The Committee 
interpretatively implied the right to water into the provisions of  ICESCR, 
although with some scholarly demur as to its normative suitability. I 
will also consider other treaties that contain the express right to water 
provisions, although such treaties are of  limited applicability ratione 
personae as they only extend to specially-protected categories of  people. 
Asserting a right to water as a norm of  customary international law is 
an appealing approach as it would bind all states, including Namibia, even 
where no treaty law basis can be asserted. Elsewhere, I have extensively 
examined a right to water under treaty law, customary international law 
and general principles of  law.112
4.3.1 An express right to water under treaty law
Various international and regional treaties that bind Namibia expressly 
recognise a right to water as part of  a range of  human rights guarantees. 
However, no independent, issue-specific treaty exists that proclaims 
a right to water from a strictly anthropocentric perspective, outlines a 
right’s normative content and determines the obligations of  state parties. 
However, international civil society and intergovernmental organisations 
have advocated a universal convention specifically dedicated to a right to 
clean water.113 For our purposes, an express right to water is to be understood 
as one that is textually specified in a treaty instrument that binds Namibia. 
This is in contrast with an implied or derivative right to water under treaty 
law, which will be addressed in subsequent parts of  this chapter.
A treaty-based right to water for children, persons with disabilities, women, 
and in armed conflicts
The international regional agreements that Namibia has ratified or acceded 
to that recognise the right to water expressly are the Convention on the 
111 ESCR Committee ‘General Comment 15: The Right to Water’ (Articles 11 and 
12 of  the Covenant) (2002) UN Doc E/C 12/2002/11. See also HRC Report of  the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the scope and content of  the relevant 
human rights obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation under 
international human rights instruments 16 August 2007 A/HRC/6/3; UN HRC Report of  
the independent expert on the issue of  human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque 29 June 2010 A/HRC/15/31.
112 See N Ndeunyema ‘Unmudding the waters: Evaluating the legal basis of  the human 
right to water under treaty law, customary international law and the general principles 
of  law’ (2020) 41 Michigan Journal of  International Law 455.
113 See UN Sustainable Development Platform Statement by Green Cross International, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=255&nr 
=2158&menu=35 (accessed 30 March 2019). 
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Rights of  the Child (CRC);114 the Convention on the Rights of  Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD);115 CEDAW;116 and the Geneva Conventions. 
Regional treaties include the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of  
the Child117 (African Children’s Charter) and the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of  Women in Africa 
(African Women’s Protocol).118 It is argued that all these instruments are 
limited in scope as they apply only to specific categories of  individuals or 
groups. Those who do not fall within one of  the protected categories would 
not be able to claim rights guaranteed under the relevant treaty. These 
group-based treaties nevertheless are salient for, among others, developing 
the substantive content of  a right to water and are thus examined here. 
Beginning with CRC, article 24(1) enjoins state parties to recognise 
the child’s right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of  health and 
facilities for the treatment of  illness and rehabilitation of  health, requiring 
state parties to ‘strive to ensure that no child is deprived of  his or her 
right of  access to such health care services’. Article 24(2) proceeds 
to list the appropriate measures that state parties ‘shall pursue’ for the 
full implementation of  article 24(1). Among the measures listed under 
article 24(2) is ‘[t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including within 
the framework of  primary health care through, inter alia, the application 
of  readily available technology and through the provision of  adequate 
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water’.119 While article 24(2) explicitly 
refers to clean drinking water as among the appropriate measures that 
states are to take, this is only in relation to the child’s right to the enjoyment 
114 Convention on the Rights of  a Child opened for signature 20 November 1989 1577 
UNTS 3, entered into force 2 September 1990. Namibia acceded in 1990. See United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Status of  Ratification’, http://
indicators.ohchr.org/ (accessed 25 May 2018).
115 Convention of  the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) opened for signature 
13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 May 2008. Namibia ratified 
in 2007. See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en (accessed 2 August 2018).
116 Convention of  the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, entered into force 
3 September 1981.
117 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of  the Child, 11 July 1990, CAB/
LEG/24.9/49 (1990). Namibia ratified in 2004. See African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table: African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of  the Child. See http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ratification/ (accessed 26 
May 2018).
118 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of  
Women in Africa, adopted July 11, 2003. Namibia ratified in 2004. See http://www.
achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/ (accessed 2 August 2018).
119 My emphasis. 
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of  health.120 Given the scope of  CRC, the right to water is only claimable 
to the extent that it relates to a child – a human being below the age of  18 
years.121
While it is obvious that water is indispensable to the basic health of  
a child (or any person), water is also important for non-health-related 
reasons. Arguably, a right to water is only obligatory under CRC insofar 
as water is the nexus to realise the health of  the child. This is a proposition 
that finds the interpretive support of  the CRC Committee, which points to 
the essentiality to life and other human rights of  water and the prevention 
of  water-related diseases.122 Those scholars who have analysed CRC’s 
travaux préparatoires affirm this interpretation by pointing out that it was 
India that had proposed the introduction of  the expression ‘clean drinking 
water’ during the revision of  the draft of  what later became article 24. This 
inclusion was to recognise the importance of  providing clean drinking 
water to avoid the risk of  serious disease and even the death of  children.123 
A similar approach to that adopted by CRC in recognising water 
as a derivative of  health finds regional expression in article 14 (2)(c) of  
the African Children’s Charter.124 The Children’s Charter adopts similar 
language and structure as CRC, although the African Children’s Charter 
refers to safe drinking water as opposed to the CRC’s clean drinking water. 
As a regional treaty binding Namibia, the African Children’s Charter also 
applies to children under 18 years in Namibia.
120 CRC art 24(1). The child’s right to water can also be implied for the child’s right to an 
adequate standard of  living in CRC art 27. 
121 CRC art 1.
122 UN Committee on the Rights of  the Child, General Comment 15 (2013) on the right 
of  the child to the enjoyment of  the highest attainable standard of  health (art 24), 17 
April 2013, CRC/C/GC/15 para 48: ‘Safe and clean drinking water and sanitation are 
essential for the full enjoyment of  life and all other human rights. Government departments 
and local authorities responsible for water and sanitation should recognise their 
obligation to help realise children’s right to health, and actively consider child 
indicators on malnutrition, diarrhoea and other water related diseases and household 
size when planning and carrying out infrastructure expansion and the maintenance of  
water services, and when making decisions on amounts for free minimum allocation 
and service disconnections. States are not exempted from their obligations, even when 
they have privatised water and sanitation’ (my emphasis).
123 J Chávarro The human right to water: A legal comparative perspective at the international, 
regional and domestic level (2015) 59; S Detrick A Commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of  the Child (1992) 353.
124 African Children’s Charter art 14: ‘(1) Every child shall have the right to enjoy the 
best attainable state of  physical, mental and spiritual health. (2) States Parties to the 
present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full implementation of  this right and in 
particular shall take measures … (c) to ensure the provision of  adequate nutrition and 
safe drinking water …’ (my emphasis). 
134   Chapter 4
Treaties addressing women’s rights also expressly affirm the existence 
of  the right to water. CEDAW provides for a right to water in the specific 
circumstances of rural women’s right to participate in and benefit from 
rural development.125 Article 14(1) and (2) of  CEDAW thus addresses 
the unique challenges that rural women – who represent a quarter of  the 
world’s population126 – face in the context of  the need for the economic 
survival of  their families and the non-monetised work that they contribute. 
In responding to these challenges, CEDAW requires state parties to 
take appropriate measures that include ensuring the elimination of  
discrimination against rural women through rights that include enjoying 
‘adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, 
electricity and water supply, transport and communications’.127 Article 14 
of  CEDAW thus ‘engenders’ the right to water as an intersectionality128 
concern by coupling gender with socio-economic class, given its specific 
application to women who are rurally located.129 
Rural women are explicitly protected under article 14 since rural 
women fare worse than rural men, and urban women and men on 
every socio-economic indicator.130 Article 14 thus seeks to ensure that 
rural women benefit directly from social security programmes and have 
adequate living conditions, including water supply.131 This is a particularly 
pertinent concern in the sub-Saharan African context where 40 billion 
hours are spent collecting water every year, with women bearing two-
thirds of  this burden.132 A ‘holistic approach’ to article 14 has also 
125 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation 34 on rural women’ (2016) 
CEDAW/C/GC/34 para 35.
126 CEDAW Committee (n 125) para 3.
127 CEDAW art 14(2)(h) (my emphasis). 
128 On intersectionality, see K Crenshaw ‘Demarginalizing the intersection of  race and sex: 
A black feminist critique of  anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist 
politics’ (1989) University of  Chicago Legal Forum 139; S Fredman ‘Engendering socio-
economic rights’ in A Hellum & H Sinding Aasen (eds) Women’s human rights: CEDAW 
in international, regional and national law (2013) 218.
129 For an intersectional perspective, anchored in Southern and Eastern African case 
studies, on a women’s right to water discussion ‘intersecting and overlapping 
marginalizations on the basis of  gender, race, ethnicity, political exclusion, and social 
economic class’, see A Hellum et al (eds) Water is life: Women’s human rights in national 
and local water government in Southern and Eastern Africa (2015).
130 CEDAW Committee (n 125) para 5. 
131 M Campbell Women, poverty, equality: The role of  CEDAW (2017). CEDAW stated: 
‘Rural women’s and girls’ rights to water and sanitation are not only essential rights in 
themselves, but also are key to the realization of  a wide range of  other rights, including 
health, food, education and participation.’ CEDAW Committee (n 125) para 81.
132 UNICEF Water, sanitation and hygiene, http://www.unicef.org/media/media_45481.
html (accessed 19 July 2018). See also UN Economic and Social Council, Sub-
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been advanced133 and is reflected in the CEDAW Committee’s General 
Recommendation 34 which asserts that ‘[r]ural women’s and girls’ rights 
to water and sanitation are not only essential rights in themselves, but also 
are key to the realization of  a wide range of  other rights, including health, 
food, education and participation’.134 
Similarly, the African Women’s Protocol recognises the rights of  
African women to food security, with the duty upon state parties to ensure 
that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food. Among the 
listed measures that the state is to take is providing women with access to 
clean drinking water per article 15(a). Like CEDAW, the African Women’s 
Protocol’s scope of  application is limited to (African) women – which 
includes girls.135
CRPD expressly provides for the right to water. Through article 28(2) 
of  CPRD, state parties recognise the rights of  persons with disabilities 
to social protection. This has been interpreted as including their right to 
clean water services as affirmed by the UN Committee on the Rights of  
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee).136 The scope of  application 
for CPRD is also limited to the protected group of  persons with disabilities 
in Namibia. 
A right to water under international humanitarian law, the body of  
international law that applies during international or non-international 
armed conflicts,137 also merits some analysis. While a right to water can 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of  Human Rights, Final Report of  the 
Special Rapporteur Mr El Hadji Guissi, Relationship between the Enjoyment of  Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights and the Promotion of  the Realization of  the Right to Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation paras 18–19 UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/20 14 July 
2004, https://www.cetim.ch/legacy/en/documents/rap-2004-20-ang.pdf  (accessed 2 
August 2018).
133 A Hellum ‘Engendering the right to water’ in M Langford & A Russell (eds) The human 
right to water: Theory, practice and prospects (2017) 316-317.
134 CEDAW Committee (n 125) para 18. 
135 Art 1 African Women’s Protocol. 
136 UN Committee on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities ‘Guidelines on treaty-
specific document to be submitted by states parties under article 35 paragraph 1, 
of  the Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities’, 18 November 2009, 
CRPD/C/2/3, 16. The Committee was established under art 34 of  CPRD with the 
purpose of  the monitoring the implementation of  CPRD.
137 D Akande ‘Classification of  conflicts: Relevant legal concepts’ in E Wilmshurst 
(ed) International law and the classification of  conflicts (2012); D Fleck ‘The law of  non-
international armed conflicts’ in D Fleck (ed) The handbook of  international humanitarian 
law (2013); C Byron ‘Armed conflicts: International or non-international?’ (2001) 6 
Journal of  Conflict and Security Law 63.
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be impacted upon at the level of  both jus ad bellum (water as a source of  
armed conflict and water-related conflict situations) and jus in bello (the 
law on the provision of  water during armed conflicts), it is through the 
latter that international humanitarian law offers potential as a source of  
water-related rights and obligations upon states. As such, the Third138 and 
Fourth139 Geneva Conventions, which arguably also reflect customary 
humanitarian law by and large,140 contain provisions that protect access 
to water in armed conflict-related situations. These protections extend to 
persons such as prisoners of  war, internees and civilians, thereby creating 
water-related rights and obligations that bind parties participating in 
hostilities.141 This has been considered by various scholars.142 
138 Geneva Convention (No III) Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS.
139 Geneva Convention (No IV) Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  
War, 12 August 1949 (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. See also the 
analysis in L Boisson de Chazournes Fresh water in international law (2013) 169-173.
140 International Committee of  the Red Cross Customary humanitarian law https://www.
icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/customary-law-q-and-a-150805.htm#a3 
(accessed 19 September 2019).
141 Arts 20, 26, 29 and 46 of  GC-III guarantees sufficient water for drinking purposes 
and other human needs; arts 85, 89 and 127 of  GC-IV mentions water and protects 
civilian persons in times of  war; art 54 of  the First Additional Protocol of  1977 
(Protocol [No I] Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3) prohibits the attack on, destruction, removal or rendering useless of  
objects indispensable to the survival of  the civilian population including drinking 
water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of  
denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse 
party; cf  arts 5 and 14 of  the Protocol [No II] Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of  12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of  Victims of  Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 
609. Namibia has ratified or acceded to all of  the above Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols. See International Committee of  the Red Cross Treaties, States 
Parties and Commentaries – Namibia, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=NA (accessed 2 August 
2018).
142 For scholarship on an international humanitarian law right to water, see I Winkler The 
human right to water: Significance, legal status and implications for water allocation (2012) 
62-64; M Tigino Water during and after armed conflicts (2016); A Hardberger ‘Whose job 
is it anyway? Governmental obligations created by the human right to water’ (2006) 
41 Texas International Law Journal 533 549-568. For a comprehensive analysis of  four 
basic water prohibitions relating to international humanitarian law insofar as they 
relate to the use of  poison as a means of  warfare, the destruction of  enemy property, 
attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of  the civilian population, and attacks 
on installations containing dangerous forces, see Z Ameur ‘The Protection of  water in 
times of  armed conflicts’ (1995) 308 International Review of  the Red Cross 550.
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Analysing the express right to water under treaty law
The treaties assessed above that expressly provide for a right to water are 
of  limited scope ratione personae as they only protect specific categories 
of  groups or individuals in Namibia. These treaties thus do not offer an 
independent, general and free-standing right to water. Rather, we see that 
the right is often formulated as the derivative right of  another ‘principal’ or 
‘core’ right, be it the right to health (CRC) or the right to social protection 
(CRPD). This ‘ill-defined status’ of  water, as Cahill frames it, has a 
pertinent drawback as it ‘causes confusion as to the scope and core content 
of  the right to water’.143 This thus raises problems concerning water’s 
justiciability and implementation given that questions as to the normative 
content present the challenge of  establishing ‘whether violations are of  
the right to water itself  or, first and foremost, violations of  other related 
rights’.144 Cahill thus illuminates the challenge of  cogently asserting that a 
right to water has, as a matter of  law, been violated where we accept that 
water is not an independent right, but is derived from another related or 
dependent right.145
Concerning a right to water under international humanitarian law, 
Winkler has argued that if  these water-related guarantees exist in the 
strenuous context of  armed conflicts where significant derogations from 
various human rights protections are not prohibited, then they must be 
even more valid in times of  peace as there would ordinarily be no military 
necessity justifications to restrict human rights. While Winkler’s deductive 
reasoning may be attractive, given the ratione materiae (armed conflict) and 
ratione personae (prisoners of  war, internees and civilians) limitations of  the 
international humanitarian law sources that bind Namibia, international 
humanitarian law is of  marginal relevance in the peacetime context that 
this book assumes. I thus refrain from further evaluating international 
humanitarian law sources.
All of  the treaties that reference an express right to water assessed 
thus far are alone insufficient to establish a human right to water as well 
as to determine a right’s content and the correlative duties upon states. A 
human right to water denotes a right that is of  general application to all 
human beings by virtue of  the biological status of  their humanity alone. 
However, the assessed treaties require more than the basic biological 
143 A Cahill “‘The human right to water – a right of  unique status”: The legal status and 
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status of  a human being. They would apply only to rural women, children 
or persons with disabilities, as the case may be, although the application 
of  water-related rights and obligations may sometimes also extend to 
the dependants and families of  persons falling within those protected 
categories. While this ‘vulnerability-based’ approach to a right to water146 
is laudable, this chapter focuses on evaluating the existence of  a general 
human right to water. Nevertheless, these treaties retain the potential to 
serve as evaluative and deliberative resources in determining the normative 
scope and substantive content of  a right to water considered in chapter 6.
What follows, therefore, is a consideration of  treaty law sources 
binding Namibia that may assert the existence of  an implied right to 
water and one that is not limited through ratione materiae or ratione personae 
considerations. 
4.3.2 An implied right to water under treaty law
Turning to the implied right to water, three treaties are offered to 
potentially support a right’s legal basis: ICESCR,147 ICCPR148 and the 
African Charter.149 I argue that these treaties150 support an implied right 
to water that is of  general application. I will also rely on judicial, quasi-
judicial and soft law sources that are developed under these treaties as 
interpretative aids in this chapter and throughout this book. 
146 Similarly, Target 6.2 UN SDG: ‘By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable 
sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the 
needs of  women and girls and those in vulnerable situations.’
147 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976. Namibia acceded 
28 November 1994.
148 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. Namibia acceded in 1994.
149 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 
217, entered into force 21 October 1986. Namibia in acceded 1994. 
150 Cf  art 10(2), Convention on the Law of  the Non-Navigational Uses of  International 
Watercourses UN Doc A/RES/51/229 (1997), which requires special regard to be 
given to ‘the requirements of  vital human needs’ in the event of  a conflict between users 
of  an international watercourse. Namibia ratified the Watercourses Convention on 29 
August 2001, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en (accessed 18 September 2019). See also the 
analysis of  ‘vital human needs’ in S McCaffrey The law of  international watercourses 
(2007) 369.
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Implying water under ICESCR
Support for a right to water under ICESCR finds textual anchorage in two 
provisions: articles 11(1) and 12.151 Article 11(1) of  ICESCR reads:152 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of  everyone to an 
adequate standard of  living for himself  and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of  living conditions. 
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of  this 
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of  international co-
operation based on free consent.
While article 11(1) does not explicitly refer to water, the provision has 
been interpreted as ‘including’ a right to water as part of  a right to an 
adequate standard of  living for the individual and their family.153 The term 
‘including’ is to be interpreted as implying that a rights therein are not 
an exhaustive numerus clausus and reflects the legal drafting tradition that 
is frequently adopted by domestic and international law-making organs. 
The interpretative inclusion of  a right to water in article 11(1) is anchored 
in a teleological approach to interpretation as the primary rule of  treaty 
interpretation under article 31(1) of  the VCLT.154 Further, the phrase 
‘adequate/acceptable standard of  living’ is a legal formulation seen in 
article 25(1) of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration)155 and in the Namibian Constitution’s article 95(j) Principle 
of  State Policy.156 Both the Constitution and the Universal Declaration 
omit an explicit reference to water.
151 Note also art 1(2) ICESCR providing that ‘in no case may a people be deprived of  its 
own means of  subsistence’. Means of  subsistence, it has been argued, must include 
water. See Cahill (n 143) 391. 
152 My emphasis.
153 Although the right is gendered given the reference ‘himself  and his family’, it applies 
to everyone and does not imply any limitation upon the applicability of  this right to 
individuals or to femaleheaded households as stated in the ESCR Committee ‘General 
Comment 12: The right to adequate food’ (Article 11 of  the Covenant) (1999) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1999/5 para 1.
154 ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of  the treaty in their context and in the light of  its object and 
purpose’. See also T Bulto ‘The emergence of  the human right to water in international 
human rights law: Invention or discovery?’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of  International 
Law 298.
155 Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 
A(III).
156 The Constitution art 95(j).
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The interpretation of  article 11(1) to include a right to water was first 
– at least insofar as an ‘authoritative’ source is concerned – put forward 
by the ESCR Committee157 in its 2002 General Comment 15.158 General 
Comment 15 sets out the legal bases of  a right to water, its normative 
content, the state’s obligations159 and corollary violations thereof,160 a 
right’s implementation at a national level161 and the obligations of  non-
state actors.162 The analysis here will be restricted to the legal bases of  
a right to water and I will return to the substantive aspects of  General 
Comment 15 in chapter 6. Notably, the ESCR Committee’s discussion 
of  General Comment 15 extends only to water for personal and domestic 
use and thus excludes considerations borne out of  commercialisation or 
transboundary concerns around water.163
Four principal justifications are relied upon by the ESCR Committee 
in asserting the legal bases of  a right to water. The first is rooted in the 
original intent of  the ICESCR drafters. The ESCR Committee states that 
the use of  the word ‘including’ in article 11(1) of  ICESCR indicated that 
the catalogue of  rights mentioned – food, clothing and housing – was not 
intended to be understood as an exhaustive list but rather as exemplary.164 
The right to an adequate standard of  living thus is the ‘source right’ for 
a right to water.165 The ESCR Committee utilised article 11(1) to carve 
157 The Committee is tasked with monitoring ICESCR’s implementation by state parties 
as well as with developing general interpretations through General Comments. See 
Part IV, ICESCR; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/
cescrindex.aspx (accessed 25 May 2018).
158 See GC15 (n 111) para 1. The ESCR Committee’s GC4 also specifies a right to have 
sustainable access to safe drinking water for all beneficiaries of  the right to adequate 
housing, but only mentions water without elaborating upon its legal source or 
normative content. GC15 was thus pioneering in offering a full exposition of  the right 
to water under ICESCR. See ESCR Committee ‘General Comment 4: The right to 
adequate housing’ (Article 11 (1) of  the Covenant), 13 December 1991, E/1992/23. 
159 GC15 (n 111) paras 17-38. 
160 GC15 paras 10-16. 
161 GC15 paras 45-59.
162 GC15 para 60. 
163 GC15 para 2. On the commercialisation and privatisation of  water, see C de 
Albuquerque & I Winkler ‘Neither friend nor foe – Why the commercialization of  
water and sanitation services is not the main issue for the realization of  human rights’ 
(2010) 17 Brown Journal of  World Affairs 167; M Langford ‘Privatisation and the right 
to water’ in Langford & Russell (n 133) 463; A Lang ‘Privatisation and regulatory 
autonomy: The right to water and international economic law’ in Langford & Russell 
(n 133) 531.
164 GC15 (n 111) para 3.
165 P Thielbörger ‘Re-conceptualizing the human right to water: A pledge for a hybrid 
approach’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 225.
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out a free-standing right to water given that water would be among the 
prerequisites for an adequate standard of  living.166 On this premise, a 
right to water was a discovery of, rather than an invention by, the ESCR 
Committee.167
The second justification is water as a multiplier right. Water is of  
overarching salience in the realisation of  other rights as without water, 
other rights cannot be fulfilled. As the ESCR Committee frames it, water 
‘clearly falls within the category of  guarantees essential for securing 
an adequate standard of  living, particularly since it is one of  the most 
fundamental conditions for survival’.168 The ESCR Committee continues 
that water thus is necessary ‘to realise many of  the [ICESCR] rights’ such 
as adequate food, ensuring environmental hygiene through a right to 
health,169 securing livelihoods through the right to gain a living by work, 
and to enjoy certain cultural practices as part of  the right to cultural life.170 
The third justification relates to water as a derivative right,171 derived 
from the rights to life, dignity and health.172 The ESCR Committee points 
out that water ‘should also be seen in conjunction with other rights 
enshrined in the International Bill of  Human Rights, foremost among 
166 Bulto (n 154) 299.
167 Bulto 303.
168 GC15 (n 111) para 3. In a philosophical discussion of  water as part of  the right to 
an adequate standard of  living, Copp, commenting on the phrase in the Universal 
Declaration, concludes: ‘Any credible analysis of  the concept of  a basic need would 
imply … basic needs [such as] clean water’. D Copp ‘The right to an adequate standard 
of  living: Justice, autonomy, and the basic needs’ (1992) 9 Social Philosophy and Policy 
231 252. Winkler also highlights the challenge of  determining what forms part of  
the right to an adequate standard of  living in art 11(1) of  ICESCR and advances 
Engbruch’s assumption that an adequate standard of  living is met ‘when individuals 
live in an environment and under conditions that allow them to participate in social life 
while maintaining their dignity and to realise their rights by their own means’. Winkler 
(n 142) 62.
169 See also ESCR Committee General Comment 14 ‘The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of  Health (Art 12) Adopted at the 22nd session of  the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ on 11 August 2000 E/C.12/2000/4.
170 GC15 (n 111) para 6.
171 Interestingly, Cahill maintains that because water is a crucial element of  art 11 of  
ICESCR rights (food, clothing, housing), it may be argued that ‘the right to water 
still exists in international human rights law with a ‘unique status’ – somewhere 
between that of  a derivative right and an independent right’; see Cahill (n 143) 391. 
Similarly, CEDAW has been interpreted by its treaty body, the CEDAW Committee, as 
recognising the right to water as a component of  both the right to health and the right 
to housing. 
172 See: Chávarro (n 123) 48; E Bluemel ‘The implications of  formulating a human right 
to water’ (2004) 3 Ecology Law Quarterly 970.
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them the right to life and human dignity’.173 Water as a human right can 
thus be seen as being of  intrinsic value, of  which the worth derives from 
its ‘inherent qualities, powers, and potentialities’ and not through social 
conventions or subjective preferences.174 
The fourth justification is rooted in the right to health in article 12 
of  ICESCR from which the ESCR Committee argued that the right to 
water can be derived.175 This argument was elaborately advanced in the 
ESCR Committee’s General Comment 14 which immediately preceded 
General Comment 15.176 The ESCR Committee states that the article 
12(1) right to health is ‘an inclusive right extending not only to timely 
and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of  
health, such as access to safe and potable water’.177 The Committee also 
interpreted adequate supply of  safe and potable water178 as being covered 
by article 12(2)(b) of  ICESCR, which outlined the steps to be taken by 
state parties to achieve the full realisation of  the right to health.179 
To recapitulate, the ESCR Committee has established the legal 
foundations of  the right to water on the basis of  various ICESCR articles 
relating to dignity, life, health and an adequate standard of  living. In my 
view, these arguments are most appropriately considered as mutually 
reinforcing and inter-related rather than as separate and independent. For 
purposes of  this book and as seen in chapter 6, I will, however, restrict 
the analysis to life, dignity and an adequate standard of  living. This is 
in light of  the unexplored status of  the right to health as an enforceable 
right under the Namibian Constitution and under international law180 that 
binds Namibia.
The ESCR Committee’s justifications for the legal foundations of  
the right to water have not been without scholarly demur and criticism. 
The principal objector has been Tully who has taken issue with General 
173 GC15 (n 111) para 3. The Committee does not cite the specific provisions, but these 
are presumably referring to the rights to life and dignity provisions in the Universal 
Declaration, ICESCR, ICCPR and the Optional Protocols.
174 M Penn & A Malik ‘The protection and development of  the human spirit: An expanded 
focus for human rights discourse’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 665 667.
175 On the distinction between an implied right and derivative right, see Thielbörger (n 165) 
228.
176 The Committee also touches on the right to water from the perspective of  the right to 
health in GC15 (n 111) paras 3, 8, 11–13, 44.
177 GC14 (n 169) para 11. 
178 Potable water is water ‘fit or suitable for drinking’; Oxford English dictionary (2017). 
179 GC14 (n 169) para 15.
180 Tobin (n 97).
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Comment 15 specifically.181 While Tully objects to the legal basis of  the 
right to water on numerous grounds, this chapter is restricted to legal and 
normative concerns182 and refrains from engaging with his policy-based 
considerations.183 
First, Tully disputes the expansive reading of  the word ‘including’ in 
article 11(1) of  ICESCR. Tully argues that the word is a ‘self-evidently 
imprecise term’ that leads one to ‘speculate on the number and nature of  
other characteristics essential to an adequate standard of  living but not 
explicitly guaranteed by the [ICESCR]’184. Effectively, Tully faults the 
ESCR Committee for engaging in a form of  ‘rights proliferation’.185 For 
him, the word ‘including’ could also mean the interpretative inclusion 
of  rights such as electricity, the internet or other essential civic services, 
something that would ‘open up the floodgates of  other less important 
rights’.186 Tully criticises General Comment 15 as ‘revisionist’ and 
admonishes what he sees as the invention of  a novel right to water.187 
Tully, nevertheless, does accept an implied right to access water but only 
insofar as it is necessary to grow food or satisfy housing needs.188 
In responding to these critiques, it must first be observed that given 
that Tully’s views were rendered in the early 2000s, much of  the wind 
has been taken out of  his ESCR Committee revisionist objections by the 
effluxion of  time. The post-2002 developments, most notably the global 
consensus – or at least the absence of  express objection – to the recognition 
of  water as a human right is today epitomised in the 2010 UN General 
Assembly Resolution 64/292.189 While UNGA resolutions, unlike UNSC 
181 S Tully ‘A human right to access water? A critique of  General Comment No 15’ (2005) 
23 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 45-48.
182 For a series of  interesting debates between Tully and Langford on GC15, see Langford 
(n 107) 433; S Tully ‘Flighty purposes and deeds: A rejoinder to Malcolm Langford’ 
(2006) 24 Netherlands Quarterly of  Human Rights 461; M Langford ‘Expectation of  
plenty: Response to Stephen Tully’ (2006) 24 Netherlands Quarterly of  Human Rights 
473.
183 Tully (n 181) 45-48.
184 Tully (n 181) 36-37; cf  Langford (n 107) 435.
185 See P Alston ‘Conjuring up new human rights: A proposal for quality control’ (1984) 
78 American Journal of International Law 607.
186 Tully (n 181) 37; S Tully ‘A human right to access the internet? Problems and prospects’ 
(2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 175.
187 Bulto (n 154) 292.
188 Tully (n 181) 36-37.
189 UNGA ‘The human right to water and sanitation’ Resolution adopted 3 August 
2010, A/RES/64/292. No vote of  Namibia is recorded as Namibia was presumably 
absent when the vote was taken. See also the Preamble to the UNGA Resolution 
62/292 wherein the UNGA recalled its various previous resolutions on the right to 
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resolutions, do not attract the binding force of  law, they may retain 
normative value in establishing the existence of  a rule or the emergence 
of  opinio juris.190 The 2010 UNGA Resolution was promptly followed by 
a further UNGA resolution in 2013191 and another in 2015,192 both of  
which recalled and effectively reaffirmed the 2010 UNGA Resolution.193 
Further, the HRC adopted two resolutions in 2010194 and 2011195 which 
also reaffirmed UNGA Resolution 64/292.196
While Tully is not incorrect in observing that the meaning of  the phrase 
‘adequate standard of  living’ in article 11(1) of  ICESCR is imprecise, 
this is not surprising given the inherently vague nature of  treaty texts. 
Nevertheless, one must accept that, at a minimum, ‘adequate standard of  
living’ requires an environment under conditions that allow individuals 
to participate in social life while maintaining their dignity.197 Without 
access to water, realising this minimum condition would be impossible. 
As for Tully’s floodgates of  rights concern, this is more hypothetical than 
real. Granwall observes that the Committee’s approach of  water as a pre-
requisite for other rights means that ‘[t]here will hardly be any flood of  
new rights only because of  the special status of  water is recognised’.198 
development, the decade of  water action, the habitat agenda, among others, that have 
affirmed a human right to water. 
190 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of  the Separation of  the Chagos Archipelago from 
Mauritius in 1965 (25 February 2019) (2019) ICJ Reports 155; Legality of  the Use or 
Threat of  Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (8 July 1996) [1996] ICJ Report 226 
70. For a comprehensive discussion of  UNGA resolutions and their legal effects, see 
M Öberg ‘The legal effects of  resolutions of  the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly in the jurisprudence of  the ICJ’ (2005) 16 European Journal of  International 
Law 879-906; Ryngaert & Siccama (n 52) 10, who note that although the ICJ has the 
habit of  regarding non-binding instruments such as UNGA resolutions as, under some 
circumstances, reflecting customary international law without much analysis of  its 
own.
191 UNGA Res 68/157 ‘The Human Right to Water and Sanitation’, 18 December 2013, 
A/RES/68/157 (adopted without a vote).
192 UNGA Res 70/169 ‘The Human Right to Water and Sanitation’, 17 December 2015, 
A/RES/70/169 (adopted by consensus).
193 See analysis in P Thielbörger The right(s) to water: The multi-level governance of  a unique 
human right (2014).
194 HRC Resolution ‘The human right to safe drinking water and sanitation’ Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/15/9 adopted 30 September 2010 para 3 (adopted without a vote).
195 HRC Resolution ‘The human right to safe drinking water and sanitation’ Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/16/2 adopted 24 March 2011 para 1 (adopted without a vote). 
196 For a fuller analysis of  the HRC’s resolutions, see Ndeunyema (n 112); Thielbörger 
(n 165) 241. 
197 Winkler (n 142) 43. 
198 J Granwall ‘Access to water: Rights, obligations and the Bangalore situation’ 
unpublished PhD thesis, Linköping University, 2008 215. 
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Tully’s second critique is one of  over-inclusive interpretation. He 
argued that the ESCR Committee’s inclusion of  water in its interpretation 
of  article 11 was outside its competence as an interpretative, non-legislative 
body. Tully points to the ICESCR’s travaux préparatoires as revealing the 
deliberate omission of  water by states at the drafting stage.199 Tully suggests 
that the Committee’s recognition of  water as a human right, in effect, was 
an indefensible amendment of  ICESCR. Since amending ICESCR to add 
new rights is only possible through the amendment procedure outlined 
in article 29,200 Tully’s argument implies that the Committee ‘invented’ 
rather than ‘discovered’ the right to water.201 
The weight of  Tully’s second critique can be neutralised through 
an examination of  the travaux préparatoires to ICESCR.202 Thielbörger 
compellingly argues that ICESCR’s textual silence on water ought not 
to be interpreted as a consensus that there is no such thing as a right to 
water. A plausible alternative interpretation is that the textual omission 
constitutes a ‘negligent silence’ as water was simply forgotten at the time of  
drafting ICESCR.203 An examination of  the ICESCR travaux préparatoires 
would thus reveal an ambivalence on this question at best, particularly 
having regard to the global food crisis that was contemporaneous to the 
ICESCR’s drafting and when drinking water was considered a plentiful 
and renewable natural resource.204 The absence of  water from the list thus 
is neither an exclusionary or inclusionary absence, as Bulto argues, but 
results simply from a lack of  ‘cognition’ or ‘recognition’.205 
Moreover, assuming that the travaux préparatoires did establish 
the exclusion of  water as a human right, this would be of  secondary 
significance in article 11(1) of  ICESCR’s interpretation in light of  the 
supplementary nature of  the travaux préparatoires as informed by article 
32 of  the VCLT. Nevertheless, it is evident that various comparative 
regional bodies have accepted General Comment 15’s implying of  the 
199 Tully (n 181) 37.
200 As above.
201 Cf  Bulto (n 154) 298, arguing that the water was more of  a ‘discovery’ than an 
‘invention’. 
202 Scholars, as secondary sources that have consulted the travaux préparatoires of  ICESCR, 
are relied upon here. Recourse to the travaux préparatoires is secondary in light of  art 32 
of  VCLT providing that interpretative recourse to the preparatory works would only 
follow where the primary methods in art 31 of  VCLT are ambiguous, obscure, or lead 
to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
203 Thielbörger (n 165) 227.
204 As above.
205 Bulto (n 154) 303 citing M Craven ‘Some thoughts on the emergent right to water’ in 
E Ridel & P Rothen (eds) The human right to water (2006) 37 38.
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right to water. Prominently, the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights 
relied on General Comment 15, among others. For example, in Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay206 it was held that the supply 
of  2,17 litres per person per day distributed by the government to the 
indigenous community of  Xákmok Kásek was not a sufficient quantity 
and of  adequate quality, and had exposed them to risks and disease.207 The 
African human rights system’s embrace of  General Comment 15 will be 
assessed below. 
Implying water under ICCPR
ICCPR also offers the potential to support a right to water through its 
article 6(1) guarantee of  the right to life expressed thus: ‘Every human 
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of  his life.’ ‘Life’ in article 6(1) can 
arguably be understood in two senses. The first is in a strict and narrow 
sense that would impose exclusively negative obligations of  restraint or 
non-interference upon the state, that is not to deprive a person of  their life. 
The second is in a broad sense that would obligate the state to, in addition 
to negative obligations, also take positive steps to safeguard life. 
Adherents of  the narrow approach point to both the text and context 
of  ICCPR. From the text of  article 6 of  ICCPR, Dinstein has argued that 
‘[t]he human right to life per se is a civil right and does not guarantee any 
person against death from famine or cold or lack of  medical attention’.208 
What is within the ambit of  protection of  article 6 of  ICCPR, the argument 
goes, is confined to the deprivation of  life through means of  homicide, 
not the freedom to live as one wishes or to an appropriate standard of  
living.209 This restrictive interpretation may further be buttressed when 
considering that the right to life is contained in ICCPR which enumerates 
civil-political rights and not ICESCR with its socio-economic rights focus. 
206 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay Inter-American Court of  Human Rights 
(Merits, Reparations, Costs) Judgment of  24 August 2010 Series C No 214 para 195. 
See also discussion in Chazournes (n 139) 158; J Chávarro ‘The right to water in the 
case-law of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights’ (2014) 7 Annuario Colombiano 
De Derecho Internacional 39-68.
207 Similarly, see also Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v Paraguay Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights (Merits, Reparations, Costs) (17 June 2005) Series C No 142; Indigenous 
Community Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay Inter-American Court of  Human Rights (Merits, 
Reparations, Costs) (29 March 2006) Series C No 146. For an analysis of  these cases, 
see C Macchi ‘Right to water and the threat of  business: corporate accountability and 
the state’s duty to protect’ (2017) 35 Nordic Journal of  Human Rights 186 199. 
208 Y Dinstein ‘The right to life, physical integrity and liberty’ in L Henkin (ed) The 
international bill of  rights – the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) 115.
209 Dinstein (n 208) 115.
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It implies that article 6(1) of  ICCPR is to be understood only in the civil 
rights sense and at the exclusion of  its socio-economic connotations such 
as the right to water.210 
A textual argument that narrowly constructs ‘life’ in article 6(1) 
as imposing only a negative duty of  restraint on the state has been 
disputed. The year 1982 saw the HRC, the ICCPR’s treaty body, adopt 
General Comment 6 on the Right to Life.211 The HRC lamented the 
narrow and restrictive interpretation of  article 6212 to eschew a vacuous 
interpretation.213 A ‘modern and proper’ construction of  ‘life’ should not 
only protect against any arbitrary deprivation of  life, but also place states 
under a duty to ‘pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the 
means of  survival for all individuals and all peoples’.214 While the HRC’s 
General Comment 6 does not specify water, it states that the protection of  
the right ‘requires that States adopt positive measures’.215 The argument 
for water’s inclusion is relatively elementary yet potent in its forcefulness: 
Water is a non-substitutable resource that is essential at the most basic 
level to ensure the survival and sustenance of  human life. 
More recently, in its 2018 General Comment 36 on the Right to Life, 
the HRC has also embraced a wider construction of  life and expressly 
includes access to water.216 General Comment 36 replaced General 
Comment 6.217 I have also defended this approach in chapter 3 of  the book. 
This construction avoids an interpretive peril that is aptly laid bare by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in stating that a lack 
of  access to water ‘is a polite euphemism for a form of  deprivation that 
threatens life, destroys opportunity and undermines human dignity’.218 As 
210 The travaux préparatoires to ICCPR reveal that the comments on right to life as it 
relates to state deprivation of  an individual’s life. See M Bossuyt Guide to the “travaux 
préparatoires” of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1987) 115. 
211 HRC General Comment 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 30 April 1982.
212 General Comment 6 (n 211) para 5. 
213 Cahill (n 143) 397.
214 A Trindade The parallel evolutions of  international human rights protections and of  
environmental protection and the absence of  restrictions on the exercise of  recognized human 
rights (1991) 35 51. Further, the HRC stated that ICCPR ‘should be interpreted as a 
living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in 
the light of  present-day conditions’. Judge v Canada Communication 829/1988, HRC, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/829/1998 (2003) para 10.3.
215 HRC General Comment 6 (n 211) para 5. 
216 HRC ‘General Comment 36 (2018) on article 6 of  ICCPR, on the right to life’ 
30 October 2018 CCPR/C/GC/36 para 26.
217 HRC General Comment 36 (n 216) para 1.
218 UNDP Human development report 2006: Beyond scarcity: power, poverty and the global water 
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I have argued in chapter 3, the expansive understanding of  the right to life 
should be informed by ubuntu to include a right to water. 
Implying water under the African Charter 
I argue that the African Charter supports an implied right to water. Unlike 
other regional instruments of  the African Women’s Protocol and the 
African Children’s Charter discussed earlier, the African Charter, by virtue 
of  article 2, applies to all individuals in Namibia without limitation rationae 
personae.219 Pertinently, the African Charter has been widely celebrated as 
the pioneering international human rights law instrument to protect and 
render justiciable all three ‘generations’ of  human rights – civil-political, 
socio-economic and group (solidarity or peoples’) rights.220 
Nevertheless, the African Charter does not explicitly mention a right 
to water. However, the right has been developed in the jurisprudence of  
the African Commission. The African Commission is a quasi-judicial 
body with a promotional mandate empowered to determine standards and 
formulate principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to 
African Charter rights and freedoms.221 As will be seen below, the African 
Commission’s decisions evince an ‘innovative’222 purposive approach to the 
rights to life,223 to health224 and to a generally satisfactory environment225 
in the African Charter to accommodate water’s interpretive inclusion as 
a right. 
crisis (UNDP 2006) 5. 
219 African Charter, art 2: ‘Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of  the rights 
and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction 
of  any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any 
other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status.’
220 See M Ssenyonjo (ed) The African regional human rights system (2012).
221 See generally R Murray The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
international law (2000). 
222 T Bulto ‘The human right to water in the corpus and jurisprudence of  the African 
human rights system’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 342. 
223 African Charter, art 4: ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be 
entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of  his person. No one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of  this right.’
224 African Charter art 16: ‘(1) Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of  physical and mental health. (2.) States Parties to the present Charter 
shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of  their people and to ensure 
that they receive medical attention when they are sick.’
225 African Charter art 24: ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.’
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The African Commission’s water jurisprudence covers both positive 
and negative duties.226 In Legal Assistance Group v Zaire227 it was held that 
the failure of  the Zairean government to provide basic services, including 
safe drinking water, constituted a violation of  the African Charter’s article 
16 right to the best attainable state of  physical and mental health. The 
Commission interpreted the provision as requiring that state parties ‘should 
take the necessary measures to protect the health of  their people’.228 The 
Commission thus found a violation based on Zaire’s failure to comply 
with its positive duties to provide water. Similarly, in Sudan Human Rights 
Organisation v Sudan229 the African Commission found the Sudanese 
government to be complicit in destroying wells and poisoning water sources 
in the Darfur region. Citing Legal Assistance Group v Zaire, the Commission 
in Sudan Human Rights Organisation also found a violation of  article 16 of  
the African Charter through the poisoning of  water sources that exposed 
the victims to serious health risks. It was considered a violation of  the 
negative obligation to refrain from interfering with the right to water. 230 
Further, while the SERAC231 decision does not establish a right 
to water, it merits analysis for its approach to implicit rights. Here, the 
African Commission considered a communication alleging that the 
military government of  Nigeria’s oil production activities with various 
multi-national corporations violated the Ogoni people’s African Charter 
rights. The Commission established an implied right to food, which 
was violated through a breach of  articles 4 (life), 16 (health) and 22 
(development).232 Although the complainant claimed a violation of  the 
right to water through the contamination of  water sources of  the Ogoni 
population,233 the African Commission did not pronounce on this claim.234 
Nevertheless, the African Commission’s approach to the right to life here 
226 See M Ssenyonjo ‘The protection of  economic, social and cultural rights under the 
African Charter’ in D Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The protection of  economic, social and 
cultural rights in Africa: International, regional and national perspectives (2016) 91. 
227 Legal Assistance Group v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 74 (ACHPR 1995). 
228 Legal Assistance Group (n 227) para 47. 
229 Sudan Legal Assistance Organisation v Sudan (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999).
230 As above. 
231 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001).
232 The Commission determined that the government’s destruction of  food sources, along 
with its failure to prevent oil companies from doing so, amounted to a breach of  a 
right to food as it is ‘inseparably linked to human dignity’ and is implicit in the African 
Charter’s rights to life, health, and economic, social and cultural development. SERAC 
(n 231) para 65.
233 SERAC (n 231) para 50.
234 See Bulto (n 222) 345-346.
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was expansive as it did not only consider the deprivation of  life in the civil 
right sense. Rather, it implicitly recognised the right to a certain quality of  
life in holding that ‘the pollution and environmental degradation to a level 
humanly unacceptable has made living in the Ogoni land a nightmare’.235 
This rejection of  the narrow interpretation of  life is further seen in the 
African Commission’s General Comment 3 that asserts the right to a 
dignified life which includes social and economic dimensions.236 The 
Nairobi Principles embrace a similar approach.237
However, the African Commission has not been consistent in asserting 
the existence of  a right to water. For example, the African Commission’s 
General Comment 3 only mentions water insofar as it pertains to the 
state’s article 4 positive obligations to persons held in custody. Likewise, 
in Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola238 before 
the African Commission, the complainants alleged, among other claims, 
the violation of  detainee’s rights to dignity under article 5 of  the African 
Charter as a result of  the failure to provide adequate water where 500 
detainees had only two buckets of  water for bathing between them. 
However, the Commission did not address the alleged violation of  their 
right to water.239 No reasoning for this silence is apparent in the decision. 
235 SERAC (n 231) para 67. 
236 ‘General Comment No 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
Right to Life (Article 4)’, adopted during the 57th ordinary session of  the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held from 4 to 18 November 2015 in 
Banjul, The Gambia, 2016 paras 6, 43. 
237 ‘African Commission Principles and Guidelines on Social and Economic Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (Nairobi Principles), adopted at the 
47th ordinary session, Banjul, The Gambia, 12 to 26 May 2010, formally launched 
at the Commission’s 50th ordinary session in Banjul, The Gambia, from 24 October 
to 7 November 2011 para 87, https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=30 
(accessed 17 September 2019): ‘While the African Charter does not directly protect 
the right to water and sanitation, it is implied in the protections of  a number of  
rights, including but not, [sic] limited to the rights to life, dignity, work, food, health, 
economic, social and cultural development and to a satisfactory environment.’ For a 
drafting history of  the Nairobi Principles, see International Justice Resource Centre 
‘Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, http://www.ijrcenter.org/
regional/african/working-group-on-economic-social-and-cultural-rights/ (accessed 19 
September 2019); for a critique of  the Nairobi Principles, see D Olowu ‘A critique 
of  the African Commission’s draft principles and guidelines on economic, social and 
cultural rights in the African Charter’ (2010) 11 Economic and Social Rights Review 7.
238 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola (AHRLR) 43 (ACHPR 
2008).
239 Bulto (n 222) 346. For a comparative perspective from the European Court of  Human 
Rights, where the failure to provide water was held to be a violation of  ECHR art 3, 
prohibition of  cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, see Riad and Idiab v Belgium 
ECHR (24 January 2008) App 29787/03 (French Text) where asylum seekers were 
held to be detained without adequate water for consumption and hygiene; Tadevosyan 
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While a derivative approach is a plausible avenue for asserting a right 
to water, it also invites us to assess – or at the least be aware of  – the 
limitations in a lack of  an autonomous existence of  a human right to 
water under the African Charter. Water rights cannot be claimed unless 
a ‘parent right’ is jeopardised due to a lack of  an adequate quantity or 
quality of  water. Water’s subservience to other rights under the African 
Charter arguably has the consequence of  being dependent on the ‘main’ 
right in the interest of  which the right to water is protected.240 Bulto laments 
that this lack of  comprehensive legal protection of  water in the African 
Charter, as the main regional241 instrument, ‘creates a hierarchy within a 
hierarchy, as it sits on the lowest rung of  the already-marginalised socio-
economic rights’.242 It means that a right to water cannot be demanded per 
se and is thus susceptible to lying in the ‘shadow’ of  other rights.243 
In this context, what is unique about the African Charter and the African 
human rights system, more broadly, is that the system is not self-contained 
or insulated given the explicit permissibility of  interpretive inspiration from 
external human rights systems.244 The African Commission has thus had 
recourse to material from other sources such as the ESCR Committee’s 
General Comments, including General Comment 15, as discussed earlier. 
While the Commission’s jurisprudence has established a violation of  
predominately negative obligations and only a few positive obligations of  
state parties in relation to water rights as derived from various ‘parent’ 
rights, it has also failed to articulate the normative content of  such water 
rights. However, other regional soft law sources can be relied upon for 
this purpose, principally the Nairobi Principles, which will be considered 
more critically in the chapter 6 discussion of  the normative content of  a 
right to water. 
We have seen that the African Charter’s article 4 right to life – as well 
as ICCPR’s article 6(1) right to life elucidated earlier – has been interpreted 
expansively to accommodate not only the civil dimension of  life but also 
v Armenia ECHR 2 (2 December 2008) App 41698/04, where a detainee was not 
provided with adequate access to water and sanitation. 
240 Bulto (n 222) 347.
241 The SADC Treaty, which Namibia ratified, can also be a potential source of  law but it 
does not explicitly give a right to water and only references human rights as one of  the 
principles of  the member states (art 4(c)). It thus offers little that is worthy of  further 
consideration in this book. See G Matchaya et al ‘Justiciability of  the right to water in 
the SADC Region: A critical appraisal’ (2018) 7 Laws 18 25.
242 Bulto (n 222) 342.
243 Bulto 348.
244 Art 60 of  the African Charter allows the Commission to draw inspiration from human 
rights sources beyond the African Charter.
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social and economic dimensions. This understanding of  the right to life 
is reconcilable with the interdependence of  rights theory, as developed by 
Scott. Scott sees the concept as attempting to capture the idea that ‘values 
seen as directly related to the full development of  personhood cannot be 
protected and nurtured in isolation’.245 This promotes the notion that rights 
are ‘developed not for the sake of  rights but for the sake of  persons’.246 
Scott describes interdependence in two senses: organic interdependence 
and related interdependence. Organic interdependence is where one 
right forms part of  another right and may be incorporated into that latter 
right. Scott argues that these rights are inseparable or indissoluble in the 
sense that one right, termed the core right, justifies the other, termed the 
derivative right.247 On the other hand, related interdependence treats rights 
as equally important and complementary, yet separate.248 
The African Charter indeed embodies the interdependency of  rights. 
At the time of  the African Charter’s drafting, socio-economic rights 
as enforceable rights were vigorously questioned internationally. The 
division was firmly between so-called ‘first generation’ rights that were 
civil-political and ‘second generation’ rights that were socio-economic.249 
However, the African Charter expressly rejects this strict dichotomy as 
demonstrated in the eighth indent of  its Preamble: ‘[C]ivil and political 
rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their 
conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of  economic, 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of  civil and 
political rights.’250 
This text reflects the non-recognition by the founders of  the African 
Charter of  conflict between civil-political rights in the then ‘Western’ 
world, and economic, social and cultural rights in the then ‘Communist’ 
world – a dichotomy that has a strong genesis in Cold War rhetoric – 
resulting in the denigration of  socio-economic rights as secondary and 
245 C Scott ‘Interdependence and permeability of  human rights norms: Towards a partial 
fusion of  the international covenants on human rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 769 786.
246 As above.
247 Scott (n 245) 779-780.
248 Scott 783. 
249 Ssenyonjo (n 220); C Odinkalu ‘Analysis of  paralysis or paralysis by analysis: 
Implementing economic, social, and cultural rights under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 327 336; S Fredman 
Human rights transformed (2007) 66.
250 My emphasis. See further F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and sustainable, democracy in Africa (2003) 
57.
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unenforceable.251 Ouguergouz’s study of  the travaux préparatoires and 
context of  the African Charter also reveals a deliberate intention on the 
part of  the drafters to stress that it ‘was not merely a carbon copy of  existing 
international conventions but should be flexible and pragmatic and reflect 
Africa’s peculiar economic problems, of  which under-development was 
the most important’.252 This was also intended to assert the ethos of  
African philosophy within the African Charter.253
In the same vein, Chenwi helpfully reminds us that while the African 
Charter presupposes a ‘normative unity’ of  rights, it does not mean that one 
category of  rights takes priority over another. Rather, these are to be read 
as implying that rights are mutually dependent.254 This conceptualisation 
of  the right to life in the African Charter thus allows for the interpretive 
inclusion of  a right to water.
I conclude this part by emphasising the importance of  regional 
systems, generally, and Africa’s, specifically, as being particularly salient 
in reflecting local values that cannot effectively been reflected under the 
international system. Hansungule has argued that the ‘preoccupation with 
universal values, though important, can lead to a de-emphasis of  certain 
peculiarities that are nonetheless basic to some societies’, allowing for 
the opportunity of  recalling their values for inclusion in the system, in 
addition to what can be borrowed from other systems.255 As Shelton states, 
regional systems ‘have the necessary ability and flexibility to change as 
conditions around them change, yet are applied in response to regionally-
specific problems; they achieve equilibrium between uniform enforcement 
of  global norms and regional diversity’.256
251 Ouguergouz (n 250) 57.
252 Ouguergouz 31; cf  M Mutua ‘The African human rights system in a comparative 
perspective’ (1993) 3 Review of  the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 5 11, 
expressing pessimism in the African Charter as a ‘facade, a yoke African leaders have 
put around our necks’.
253 Ouguergouz (n 250) 31.
254 C Lilian ‘Permeability of  rights in the jurisprudence of  the African Commission’ 
(2014) 39 Supplement South African Yearbook of  International Law 98. 
255 M Hansungule ‘Protection of  human rights under the Inter-American system: An 
outsider’s reflection’ in A Gudmudur & J Möller (eds) International human rights 
monitoring mechanisms essays in honour of  Jakob Th Möller (2001) 679 684. 
256 D Shelton ‘The promise of  regional human rights systems’ in B Weston & S Marks 
(eds) The future of  international human rights (1999) 351.
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Justifying implied rights
I have argued above that an implied right to water exists under treaty 
law that binds Namibia. The legal basis for a right to water varies. The 
ICCPR and African Charter provisions, I have posited, accommodate 
water through implied rights. Further, the right to health provisions in the 
African Charter and ICESCR are suitable textual sources for the right to 
water, although the limitation of  asserting the right to water on this basis 
is that it would need to be violated in relation to the principal right – the 
right to health. I have comprehensively engaged with a right to water as 
being included among those rights that constitute an adequate standard of  
living in article 11(1) of  ICESCR. I have also addressed the interpretative 
concerns attendant with deriving a human right to water from article 11(1) 
of  ICESCR. Having relied on the implied rights doctrine to establish a 
human right to water, it is necessary to note that this approach is not 
without normative and doctrinal controversy. I will thus engage the main 
critiques here, also bearing in mind the rebuttal to Tully’s objection above. 
Implying rights has resulted in accusations of  ‘free-wheeling judicial 
review’257 or ‘promiscuous rights manufacture’258 through the judicial 
broadening of  rights. Nevertheless, implying rights where they are 
inexpress or un-enumerated is nothing new to either the interpretation 
of  international human rights law as demonstrated above or within 
Namibian constitutional jurisprudence, including in Mwilima as discussed 
in chapter 5. In the same way that Mwilima implies the provision of  free 
legal aid as an enforceable right from the article 12 right to a fair trial, 
I have advocated implying a right to water from various express rights 
under the international instruments considered here. Jurisprudence from 
the African Commission has also imported the implied rights doctrine, a 
jurisprudential development that has been described by Viljoen as among 
the Commission’s ‘boldest moves’,259 with Ssenyonjo asserting that the 
‘major consequence of  … interpreting the African Charter is that most 
of  the rights that are not expressly recognised by the Charter may be 
enforced’.260
257 R George ‘The natural law due process philosophy’ (2001) 69 Fordham Law Review 
2312. 
258 D Luban ‘The Warren court and the concept of  a right’ (1999) 34 Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 14.
259 F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2012) 346. See also SERAC (n 231) 
para 60.
260 Ssenyonjo (n 226) 118. 
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Viljoen has traced the implied rights doctrine’s origins to the US Supreme 
Court’s Griswold261 decision, which considered the un-enumerated right to 
privacy as being part of  the ‘penumbra’ of  the US Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment. Justice Douglas in Griswold reasoned that constitutionally 
guaranteed rights have ‘penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance’.262 Recognising the 
penumbra of  rights thus allows the implying of  inexpress rights. Notably, 
Griswold was decided in the context of  the permissibility of  contraception 
restrictions under the US Constitution, where there is no express mention 
of  a right to privacy. It is the legal technique of  implying rights that is what 
is proposed to be drawn upon in this book, not necessarily the divergent 
rights and values in given constitutions. 
What the exact limits to implying rights are is informed by factors 
that include the structure and the nature of  the right in question.263 A 
central principle to bear in mind is fidelity to the interpretative rules for 
international treaties as seen in articles 31 and 32 of  the VCLT, which 
I have earlier established as part of  customary international law that 
is binding upon Namibia. The primary principle is that of  good faith 
interpretation, according to the ordinary meaning of  the text, and in light 
of  the object and purpose of  rights.264 This allows us to avoid the risks of  
the illegitimate creation of  a new right in opposition to the intention of  
state parties to a treaty.265 If  we are cavalier with our approach to implying 
rights, it opens up the concern of  an unjustified ‘conjuring up’ of  a right 
as Alston argued, thereby undermining the right’s general acceptance as 
being authoritative and states’ compliance, and undercutting the existing 
body of  rights.266 Consistent with the constitutional argument advanced 
in chapter 3, this book thus relies on the implied right to water as an 
approach that is endorsed by the HRC, the ESCR Committee and the 
African Commission.
4.4 A right to water under customary international law and 
general principles of law?
I have argued above that article 144 of  the Constitution also renders 
customary international law and general principles of  law, in addition to 
international agreements, part of  binding Namibian law. Elsewhere, I have 
261 Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
262 Griswold (n 261) 484.
263 A Barak Human dignity as a constitutional value (2009) 78.
264 VCLT art 31(1). 
265 Thielbörger (n 165) 231.
266 Alston (n 185) 620-621. 
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extensively assessed the issue of  a right to water from an international 
law perspective267 and concluded that no such right can be established 
under customary international law and general principles of  law. Given 
that this book does not rely on a right to water sourced from customary 
international law or general principles of  law, I only provide an analytical 
summation of  the key arguments. 
4.4.1 Customary international law 
A treaty-based right to water, whether express or implied, presupposes that 
a state such as Namibia must be a party to a treaty (such as ICESCR) to be 
bound by it. There is value in seeking to assert a right to water as a matter 
of  customary international law268 given that customary international 
law is one of  the three principal sources of  law under article 38(1)(b) of  
the ICJ Statute: ‘international custom, as evidence of  a general practice 
accepted as law’.269 
I have argued that establishing the crystallisation of  a right to water 
as a customary international law norm remains challenging. This is even 
after UN bodies had ‘recognised’ the right to water, particularly through 
UNGA Resolution 64/292. Various commentators have looked into the 
existence of  a customary international law right to water. What follows is 
an indicative summation of  some of  the most meritorious recent scholarly 
perspectives on the question. 
Misiedjan argues that the right to water ‘is still materialising in 
customary law as it currently has a weak status, which is mostly fuelled 
by state practice in combination with states’ statements’.270 Arden271 only 
tangentially mentions the possibility of  a customary international law 
267 See Ndeunyema (n 112).
268 I will not consider water as an African regional customary international law human 
right. For an analysis of  a regional customary international law right across five regional 
human rights systems, see Chávarro (n 123) 190-198, who does not make a definitive 
conclusion on whether or not such a right exists under customary international law in 
the African system.
269 Further, the ICJ in Nicaragua asserted the principle that even where a treaty norm and a 
customary international law norm have exactly the same content, neither the treaty or 
the customary international law norm can deprive the other of  separate applicability. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of  
America) Merits, Judgment (1986) ICJ Report 14 para 175. 
270 D Misiedjan Towards a sustainable human right to water: Supporting vulnerable people and 
protecting water resources (2019) 73.
271 RH Justice Arden ‘Water for all? Developing a human right to water in national and 
international law’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 771 786.
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right to water. McCaffrey272 finds that despite the sufficiency of opinio juris 
in support, no right to water has emerged since the right has not been 
recognised ‘by an authoritative and generally recognized source, such as 
the [ICJ], or by states generally’, and given that ‘some states that play 
important roles in the international system have yet to accept the existence 
of  the right’.273 Chávarro274 finds sufficient evidence of  state practice and 
opinio juris to conclude that the right to water amounts to an independent 
customary international law right. Bates275 has argued that the ‘right 
to water is a principle capable of  being recognized as a principle of  
customary international law’. Larson,276 after considering the evolution of  
state practice, national and international jurisprudence, and the activities 
of  several international bodies, finds that ‘it is possible to affirm that at 
least the core content of  the human right to water … that is, the right of  
everyone to access to water necessary to respond to his/her basic needs 
… has achieved the status of  a customary international norm’.277 Finally, 
Thielbörger’s study, which applies a reflective equilibrium approach to 
customary international law, has also found that the right to water has 
now achieved the status of  a norm of  custom.278 
272 S McCaffrey ‘The human right to water: A false promise?’ (2016) 47 University of  the 
Pacific Law Review 231-232.
273 McCaffrey’s centralisation of  ‘some states’ as more important in international law is 
problematic as it risks what Rajagopal terms the hegemonic nature of  human rights 
discourse in international law; see B Rajagopal ‘Counter-hegemonic international law: 
Rethinking human rights and development as a third world strategy’ (2006) 27 Third 
World Quarterly 767. 
274 Chávarro (n 123) 115-124.
275 R Bates ‘The road to the well: An evaluation of  the customary right to water’ (2015) 19 
Review of  European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 282.
276 RB Larson ‘The new right in water’ (2013) 70 Washington and Lee Law Review 2181 
2208, citing SD Vido ‘The right to water as an international custom: The implications 
in climate change adaptation measures’ (2012) 6 Carbon and Climate Law Review 22 224-
225.
277 The pre-2010 scholarship (preceding to UNGA Res 64/292) largely reflects the view 
that no customary international law right to water had yet evolved: A Hardberger ‘Life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of  water: Evaluating water as a human right and the duties and 
obligations it creates’ (2005) 4 Northwestern University Journal of  International Human 
Rights 331 340 345 finds: ‘Although global recognition of  this need is increasing, it has 
not reached the level of  customary international law as a separate right.’ M Williams 
‘Privatization and the human right to water: Challenges for the new century’ (2007) 28 
Michigan Journal of  International Law 469 502. Williams cites D Bederman International 
law frameworks (2001), in which Bederman had argued that while there may be 
increasing state recognition of  the right, one indication that the right to water is not yet 
customary international law is the very problem that makes the right so pressing: Many 
governments fail to ensure access to all citizens, and because generalised state practice 
is a necessary element of  CIL, the failure of  state practice impedes the development of  
CIL.
278 Thielbörger (n 165) 239.
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I have found that, while there is strong evidence of  opinio juris, state 
practice in support of  a right to water is inadequate. I argued that the 
principal contention thus turned to the appropriate methodology in 
determining the constituent elements of  a customary international law 
norm. Two customary international law methodological approaches were 
critiqued in the context of  a right to water. The first is the ‘sliding scale 
approach’ which views the elements of  customary international law as 
falling on a ‘sliding scale’ between state practice and opinio juris. Kirgis has 
argued that the two customary international law elements can be placed 
on a sliding scale whereby one element of  custom can compensate for 
the other weaker element or, in the extreme case, an element can become 
entirely dispensable if  the other element is of  sufficient strength.279 
The second is the ‘reflective equilibrium approach’ that allows the 
existence of  strong opinio juris to compensate for inconclusive state practice. 
Thielbörger invokes the approach in his examination of  a customary 
international law right to water, finding the state practice element wanting 
while opinio juris is sufficient. To overcome the insufficiency in state 
practice, Thielbörger has endeavoured to innovatively adopt a ‘modern’ 
approach in establishing customary international law. Thielbörger’s 
approach draws on Roberts’s original distinction between traditional and 
modern approaches to customary international law.280 
In examining both the sliding scale and reflective equilibrium 
approaches, I have determined that asserting a customary international 
law right to water based on either of  these theories is problematic for two 
principal reasons. First, this would propose a customary international law 
methodology that has the effect of  fundamentally re-shaping the elements 
of  customary international law in a manner that disregards its intrinsic 
limitations with the view to accommodate the desired policy outcome.281
The second is effectively a Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL) critique.282 A major drawback in adopting an approach that 
is lopsided to opinio juris is that it opens up the normative challenge of  
279 F Kirgis ‘Custom on a sliding scale’ (1987) 81 American Journal of  International Law 146 
149.
280 A Roberts ‘Traditional and modern approaches to customary international law: A 
reconciliation’ (2001) 95 American Journal of  International Law 757.
281 B Simma & P Alston ‘The sources of  human rights law: Custom, jus cogens and general 
principles’ (1988/1989) 12 Australian Yearbook of  International Law 82 96.
282 JC Okubuiro ‘Application of  hegemony to customary international law: An African 
perspective’ 2018 7 Global Journal of  Comparative Law 232; BS Chimni ‘Third World 
approaches to international law: A manifesto’ (2006) 8 International Community Law 
Review 3.
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allowing the practice of  some states to determine what is or is not customary 
international law. Framed differently, the concern is a manifestation of  
hegemony and biases based on geographic, economic and political power. 
This would risk regressing to forms of  international law making that were 
seen during the colonial period, during which the formation of  customary 
international law rules was replete with recourse to the practices of  only 
a handful of  (Western) states.283 The latent problems that would arise by 
reinforcing the role of  opinio juris while downgrading the state practice are 
laid bare by Galindo and Yip:284 
Making customary international law exclusively an expression of  a certain 
opinio juris is dangerous in many respects, especially because the practice of  
states can effectively play a role of  protecting the interests of  Third World 
states against the will of  Great Powers. But the tendency of  international 
courts to emphasize the role of  opinio juris is even more dangerous when it 
represents the opinion of  a single set of  judges under the disguise of  states’ 
opinio juris.
In this light, my analysis has thus determined that there is no customary 
international law right to water.285 It remains an idea of  which the time 
has not (yet) come. At best, the rule can be regarded as statu nascendi, an 
emerging rule of  custom that is yet to crystalise fully into a customary 
international law norm. 286
Nevertheless, the overwhelming state consensus of  a right to water as 
a matter of  opinio juris is not insignificant. This can serve as a meaningful 
resource in interpreting and determining the normative content of  a treaty-
based right to water. I will thus invoke and rely upon various sources that 
may be regarded as opinio juris in the chapter 6 assessment of  the content 
of  a right to water in this book.
283 G Galindo & C Yip ‘Customary international law and the Third World: Do not step 
on the grass’ (2017) 16 Chinese Journal of  International Law 251 254; Rajagopal (n 273) 
767.
284 Galindo & Yip (n 283) 261.
285 I have also rejected the claim of  a customary international law right to water based on 
the entire Universal Declaration as a reflection of  customary international law norms. 
See Ndeunyema (n 112).
286 Winkler (n 142) 97. Another potential argument for establishing a right to water under 
customary international law is to establish the customary international law nature of  
the right to life from which a right to water can be derived. However, this argument is 
unlikely to hold as there is limited state practice or opinio juris to support the proposition 
of  life as a CIL norm. 
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4.4.2 General principles of  law 
Turning to ‘the general principles of  law recognised by civilised nations’287 
as a source of  binding law in Namibia, I have argued288 that while general 
principles of  law do not offer an independent legal basis for a right to water 
under international law, the significance – contrary to their relative neglect 
in the right to water literature – lies in their interpretative resourcefulness 
in legally constructing the substantive content and correlative obligations 
that accrue from a binding right to water that would retain its legal basis 
under treaty law, customary international law, or even domestic law.289 This 
source arguably may be of  relevance to water’s status as a legally binding 
human right – in addition to treaty law and customary international law.290
General principles of  law can function as a direct source of  rights 
and obligations.291 While general principles of  law are listed third, there 
is no indication of  any a priori hierarchy in the three formal sources in 
article 38(1) of  the ICJ Statute.292 Some commentators, however, claim 
that general principles of  law constitute a ‘secondary’ source with the 
main function of  ‘filling gaps’293 in the absence of  a treaty or customary 
international law norm.294 
Partly because of  their unwritten character, the determination of  
general principles of  law remains controversial under international 
287 The phrase ‘civilised nation’ can today be argued to be obsolete, an argument that is 
concisely captured in North Sea Continental Shelf (n 51) (Separate Opinion of  Judge 
Fouad Ammoun) thus: ‘[R]eferring to “the general principles of  law recognized by 
civilized nations”, is inapplicable in the form in which it is set down, since the term 
“civilized nations” is incompatible with the relevant provisions of  the United Nations 
Charter, and the consequence thereof  is an ill-advised limitation of  the notion of  the 
general principles of  law. The discrimination between civilized nations and uncivilized 
nations, which was unknown to the founding fathers of  international law … is the 
legacy of  the period, now passed away, of  colonialism.’
288 Ndeunyema (n 112). See also Simma & Alston (n 281) 105, who advocate a firmer 
grounding of  the legality of  human rights norms in general principles of  law as these 
would ensure a strong grounding in the consensualist conception of  international law.
289 For a comprehensive assessment and characterisation of  the key controversies around 
general principles of  law as a source of  international law, see M Vásquez-Bermúdez 
‘General principles of  law’ in Report of  the International Law Commission (2017) 224.
290 F Ekardt & A Hyla ‘Human rights, the right to food, legal philosophy, and general 
principles of  international law’ (2017) 103 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 221 
227.
291 Yee (n 45) 488.
292 Crawford (n 45) 35; Yee (n 45) 488.
293 Pauwelyn (n 46) 127-129. 
294 See M Jackson ‘State instigation in international law: A general principle transposed’ 
(2019) 30 European Journal of  International Law 391; Yotovana (n 47) 279.
A right to water under international law   161
law. Among the pertinent doctrinal issues is the contestation over their 
determinative methodology295 and whether these are general principles of  
municipal law, of  international law or of  global legal systems.296 As these 
issues are not the focus of  this book, the position adopted here aligns with 
the widely-accepted view advanced by Redgwell that general principles in 
the article 38(1)(c) of  the ICJ Statute sense may be derived and percolate 
from both municipal law and international law.297 
I have argued that, while several states have constitutionalised a right 
to water in their national constitutions,298 the number of  states is not 
sufficiently widespread and recognised or common to the representative 
legal systems of  the world299 to constitute a general principle of  law that 
affirms a right to water.300
Nevertheless, the absence of  a general principle of  law supporting 
a right to water does not necessarily mean that general principles are 
irrelevant to the debate, which brings us to the second possible role. 
General principles could be of  potential relevance in defining the content 
and determining the obligations that attach to a right to water that is 
established as a matter of  domestic law, treaty law, or – assuming such 
is meritoriously established – customary international law. A reliance 
upon their character as general principles may well be acknowledged and 
reflected in treaties such as ICESCR and ICCPR. However, in addition to 
being binding upon all states beyond only treaty state parties, their most 
complete legal forms arguably would be found outside these instruments, 
295 C Redgwell ‘General principles in international law’ in S Weatherill & S Vogenauer 
(eds) General principles in European and comparative law (2017) 5 15.
296 Redgwell (n 295) 10.
297 As above. See also Pauwelyn (n 46) 125-126. 
298 National constitutional provisions that have an explicit enforceable right to water – as 
opposed to water as an unenforceable principle of  state policy – include sec 27(1)(b) 1996 
South African Constitution; art 43(1)(d) 2010 Kenyan Constitution; sec 77(a) 2013 
Zimbabwean Constitution; art 12 2008 Ecuador Constitution. In 2004 the Republic 
of  Uruguay held a referendum that saw an approval of  the constitutionalisation of  
access to potable water as a human right: see art 47 1966 Uruguayan Constitution, 
as amended in 2004. Most recently, Slovenia has taken the step of  amending its 
Constitution to include a right to drinking water in art 70(a). See Constitutional Act 
Amending Chapter III, 2016 Slovenian Constitution. For a discussion of  the European 
position on the right to water, see Thielbörger (n 193) 9.
299 Redgwell (n 295) 15.
300 Winkler (n 142) 93; K Bourquain Freshwater access from a human rights perspective: A 
challenge to international water law and human rights law (2008) 191; Thielbörger (n 193) 
86-87.
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thereby creating value in asserting and claiming them as general principles 
of  law.301 
This is particularly pertinent in light of  the reality that it is a soft 
law instrument – General Comment 15 – that principally enunciates the 
substance of  what a right to water would entail, including the normative 
content,302 principles such as non-discrimination and equality,303 and the 
correlative general and core obligations of  state parties.304
The soft law nature of  General Comment 15 may potentially receive 
limited acceptance when relied upon owing to its non-binding nature and 
questionable legitimacy. General principles of  law thus may be utilised 
to offer universally-binding law that would define those minimum social 
standards, particularly in terms of  the positive and negative obligations of  
states qua access and provision of  water as a right. Moreover, the general 
principles of  law found in international environmental law may be of  
potential application given that water access, provision and security would 
give rise to issues concerned with the environment. For instance, the 
precautionary principle, in the water context, would impose obligations 
of  diligent prevention and control of  foreseeable risks to the pollution 
of  water sources.305 Similarly, the polluter-pays principle would impose 
obligations on polluters, whether state or non-state actors.306 I will thus 
return to rely on general principles of  law in chapter 6. 
4.5 Conclusion
International law can apply domestically in Namibia to ground a right to 
water’s legal basis. The purpose of  this book is to root a right to water in the 
Constitution’s Bill of  Rights provisions, which gives the right entrenchment 
beyond the limitations of  international law. Nevertheless, this analysis 
concludes that a right to water under international law can be variously 
invoked to develop the content of  a right to water. Most importantly, I will 
include resources from international law to interpretatively develop the 
normative and substantive content of  a right to water implied from article 
301 G McGraw ‘Defining and defending the right to water and its minimum core: Legal 
construction and the role of  national jurisprudence’ (2011) 8 Loyola University Chicago 
International Law Review 127 150-152.
302 GC15 (n 111) paras 10-12.
303 GC15 paras 13-16.
304 GC15 paras 17-29.
305 P Birnie International law and the environment (2009) 153. 
306 P Sands & J Peel Principles of  international environmental law (2018) 240.
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6 of  the Constitution. These resources will include, in particular, General 





Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of  this book were collectively dedicated to constructing 
constitutional and doctrinal arguments for water as a human right of  
a justiciable character. In this chapter I seek to evaluate justiciability 
arguments in terms of  normative and practical desirability. In essence, I 
enquire into how we defend the recognition of  an implied constitutional 
right to water, a right that is concomitantly justiciable. This analysis will 
consider a variety of  arguments advanced around socio-economic rights 
justiciability generally, a debate that has attracted both justiciability-phobes 
and justiciability-philes, and apply them in the context of  a right to water 
in Namibia. 
In proving that the various justiciability objections are answerable, the 
assessment will be principally typologised into three justiciability concerns: 
normative, institutional, and textual. The chapter commences by framing 
water issues in Namibia as not inevitably about water scarcity in the 
traditional, first-order sense of  factual limitations in light of  the Namibian 
arid climate, but of  scarcity, as understood in the second-order sense 
of  social resources advanced by Ohlsson. I will then address normative 
reasons why water, as a socio-economic right, ought to be regarded as 
justiciable. In so doing and in building upon the normative grounding of  
a right to water in ubuntu advanced in chapter 3, I will emphasise various 
normative imperatives for augmenting legal accountability and facilitating 
democratic inclusion. Two forms of  institutional justiciability concerns 
are then examined: the legitimacy of  courts to adjudicate water in light of  
the various policy, programmatic and resource issues that arise; and the 
capacity and competence of  courts which are evaluated through the prism 
of  polycentricity. In responding to institutional justiciability concerns, I 
will introduce and advance the model of  bounded deliberative democracy, 
which model is applied elaborately in chapter 6. Finally, the chapter 
examines textual justiciability concerns that converge on the question of  
the court unenforceable Principles of  State Policy (PSPs) in articles 95 
and 101, with a critique of  the Supreme Court’s interpretation of  PSPs in 
Mwilima. 
5
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All of  the above related to substantive justiciability, which is 
distinguished from procedural justiciability. Procedural justiciability 
concerns, which would implicate doctrinal issues such as legal standing 
and court procedures for bringing rights claims, will only receive limited 
attention in this chapter when I endeavour to avoid the ‘mirage’ of  a right 
to water’s justiciability. While it is acknowledged that the boundaries 
between the typologies are not rigid, it is argued that these be kept separate 
for analytical clarity in this book.
5.2 Framing justiciability in a water-scarce context
I commence by framing water’s justiciability. A potential concern can be 
factually grounded: In a context where many parts of  Namibia on average 
receive low or no rainfall, the courts simply cannot ‘let it rain’ – lex non 
cogit ad impossibilia.1 However, I argue that justiciability is not a question of  
courts adjudicating access to water as a factually absent resource. Rather, 
justiciability arguments ought to be appropriately understood through the 
theoretical framework of  second-order scarcity that Ohlsson has advanced 
in the context of  human geography.2 Ohlsson distinguishes between the 
‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ scarcity of  a resource – in our context, 
water. 
First-order (or natural resource) scarcity arises where a resource 
such as water is of  limited availability. Second-order (or social resource) 
scarcity refers to the adaptive capacity to manage first-order scarcity 
through the adoption of  improved means, ways and methods.3 As such, 
a social entity might not cope with the scarcity of  water in the first-order, 
but this could be ascribed to the reality of  second-order scarcity of  social 
resources. Accordingly, Ohlsson observes that the adaptive capacity of  a 
society facing scarcities of  natural resources is contained in its ability to 
build institutions and facilitate institutional change as appropriate to the 
scarcity at hand.4 
1 The law does not require the impossible.
2 L Ohlsson Environment scarcity and conflict: A study of  Malthusian concerns (1999) 22-23. 
The Malthusian theory of  population, within which Ohlsson’s approach is rooted, is 
not necessarily endorsed herein. 
3 Ohlsson (n 2) 147. 
4 Ohlsson 158. See also Skogly’s argument for an understanding of  resources in the 
fulfilment of  the state’s socio-economic rights obligations as not only financial but also 
natural, human, regulatory and educational resources. S Skogly ‘The requirement of  
using the “maximum of  available resources” for human rights realisation: A question 
of  quality as well as quantity?’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 393.
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Ohlsson’s conception of  second-order scarcity is largely directed at 
adaptation through capacity building and societal tools that mobilise 
an appropriate amount of  social efforts to accomplish the often large 
structural change that is required for adapting to first-order scarcity.5 
The relevant social resources would include ‘institutions’ in a wide 
sense.6 Consequently, it is apposite that the focus of  this book is upon 
an institution in the narrow sense of  courts, of  which the adjudicative 
capacity allows them to hold other institutions to account for how they 
are managing second-order scarcity or, more accurately, second-order 
difficulty, where access to and distribution of  water are impacted.7 Indeed, 
this understanding of  scarcity draws on the work of  Sen’s assertion in 
the famine context: ‘Starvation is the characteristic of  some people not 
having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of  there being not 
enough food to eat. While the latter can be a cause of  the former, it is 
but one of  many possible causes.’8 In the context of  water, scarcity is the 
characteristic of  some people not having enough water for their personal 
and domestic use. It is not the characteristic of  there not being enough 
water for their personal and domestic use. While the latter can be a cause 
of  the former, it is but one of  many possible causes. 
Second-order scarcity of  water will thus be demonstrated in chapter 6 
when elaborating upon the various state duties. Suffice to state here that 
examples may include the distribution of  water in a discriminatory manner 
to benefit politically-favoured groups at the expense of  others (duty to 
refrain from discrimination); the state’s failure to prevent private entities 
such as corporations from interfering with existing water supplies (duty 
to protect); or the state’s failure to provide, repair or otherwise maintain 
infrastructure that could optimise the availability of  water that is scarce in 
the first-order sense (duty to respect).
The added value of  asserting water’s justiciability lies in the danger 
that water scarcity, of  both the first and second order, risks the festering of  
conflict – whether within or between communities.9 This is as a result of  
5 Ohlsson (n 2) 165-167.
6 Ohlsson 161.
7 K Bakker ‘The “commons” versus the “commodity”: Alter-globalization, anti-
privatization and the human right to water in the Global South’ (2007) 39 Antipode 431 
441-442, in which Bakker positively identifies socially-produced scarcity in the global 
context as from which ‘the real “water crisis” arises … in which a short-term logic of  
economic growth, twinned with the rise of  corporate power (and in particular water 
multi-nationals) has “converted abundance into scarcity”’.
8 A Sen Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation (1981) 1. 
9 Ohlsson (n 2) 188.
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contestations over water as a resource of  limited availability.10 The claim 
here certainly is not that the intervention of  courts through adjudicating 
a right to water would nullify the risk of  water-induced conflict. Rather, 
courts can, at least, play a critical role in attenuating the risk of  conflict 
arising. Where disputes do arise, courts stand to significantly contribute 
to the sustainable resolution of  disputes, in the process limiting the risk 
that such would morph into destabilising and violent acts.11 As will be 
argued below, the court’s role would not only be testing legislation or 
reviewing policies, in this case on water provision. Rather, courts would 
also evaluate the state’s conduct in relation to its compliance with the 
relevant constitutional demands. I will return to calibrate the judicial role 
when advancing a bounded deliberation conception in this chapter and in 
chapter 6. 
5.3 Normative justiciability concerns
This part turns to normative theory to argue for a justiciable right to water. 
Normativity is to ‘prescribe, on the basis of  values and principles, ideal 
or desirable states of  affairs, or how things ought to be’.12 Normativity 
proclaims ‘what arrangements are attractive and, comparatively, better than 
others. It equips one with critical lenses from which to assess a concrete 
object or process.’13 In the constitutional contexts of  jurisdictions such as 
those of  South Africa, Kenya and Ecuador, the normative justiciability 
question is settled or rendered redundant by the textual justiciability of  
a right to water in these constitutions. However, in Namibia, given the 
absence of  a textually-explicit right to water, pertinent normative concerns 
remain to be overcome, in addition to establishing the legal basis of  a right 
to water anchored in article 6 of  the Constitution in the chapter 3 analysis.
The normative case against water’s justiciability ought to be placed 
in its proper historical context. Until the early 1990s, the distinction 
between court-enforceable first generation civil-political rights and court-
10 Ohlsson offers various case studies in support of  the hypothesis that water scarcity 
contributes to societal conflict. In the Rwandese genocide, it is claimed that owing to 
high population density, the country suffered from environmental scarcity of  water 
and agricultural land. Further, Gaza’s water scarcity was analysed as a factor that had 
worsened socio-economic conditions and heightened grievances within Gaza. Ohlsson 
(n 2) 41-42. 
11 See Shaanika & Others v The Windhoek City Police & Others 2013 (4) NR 1106 (SC) para 
50, where O’Regan J affirmed that the decision whether a home or dwelling should be 
demolished or removed ‘not only raises a question of  intense importance to the people 
whose home it is, but also may give rise to divisive social conflict’ (my emphasis). 
12 C Mendes Constitutional courts and deliberative democracy (2013) 5.
13 As above.
168   Chapter 5
unenforceable second generation socio-economic rights was a popular 
dichotomy in human rights discourse.14 As debate grew for enforceable 
socio-economic rights, arguments for and against took shape. The period 
during the Namibian Constitution’s drafting also saw the dying days of  
the Cold War and the dissolution of  the Soviet Union with ‘new’ Eastern 
European constitutions expressly including justiciable socio-economic 
rights with positive duties. These rights were viewed with scholarly disdain 
as ‘a large mistake, possibly a disaster’.15 
Reasons advanced against socio-economic rights included concerns 
that governments should not be compelled to interfere with free markets 
to avoid perverting ongoing attempts at creating market economies;16 
that courts lacked the institutional tools that were at the disposal of  a 
bureaucracy in creating government programmes that were necessary 
to enforce and realise positive rights;17 and the risk that positive rights 
would create a culture of  dependency that could work against attempts at 
diminishing the sense of  entitlement to state protection and to encourage 
individual initiative.18 These affirmations are now ripe for challenge.
Socio-economic rights arguments from normatively moral, political 
and philosophical perspectives have received significant treatment in the 
literature and need not be rehashed here.19 I have earlier constructed the 
normative case for a right to water under article 6 of  the Constitution in 
chapter 3 of  the book by primarily relying on the value of  ubuntu. Here, I 
largely draw on the work of  Fredman and King to identify key democratic 
values that represent rationales of  importance to the justiciability debate: 
(a) moving beyond ‘hydro-politics’ through legal accountability; and (b) 
pursuing the deliberate inclusion of  the excluded through participation, 
equality and representation.
5.3.1 Beyond ‘hydro-politics’: Achieving legal accountability 
Political discourse on water access in the physical and economic sense, 
and at the basic level of  personal, domestic and communal use is common 
14 See E Riedel ‘Core obligations in social rights and human dignity’ in M Geis et al (eds) 
Festschrift für Friedhelm Hufen (2015) 79.
15 C Sunstein ‘Against positive rights: Why social and economic rights don’t belong in 
the new constitutions of  post-communist Europe’ (1993) 2 East European Constitutional 
Review 35-38.
16 Sunstein (n 15) 36. 
17 Sunstein 37. 
18 As above.
19 J King Judging social rights (2012); S Fredman Human rights transformed (2008). 
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place in Namibian society. However, I argue that the justiciability of  a 
right to water would augment – rather than displace – the existing socio-
political accountability that is exercised through electoral processes that 
allow people to directly hold their elected representatives to account. 
Asserting legal accountability by accepting water’s justiciability 
would serve to shift the debate on water-related issues away from being 
exclusively within the political realm. Problematically, water too often is 
politically framed as concerning the charity, benevolence or goodwill of  
political actors due to its apparent aspirational or ‘manifesto’ character.20 
As seen in the Nairobi Principles that are relied upon in chapter 6, 
the use of  water as a political tool has been identified as particularly 
problematic by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission). Rather, the legal realm, where judicially claimable 
obligations for which the state as the duty bearer can be held to account 
using the strength of  the rule of  law, would find prominence in water-
related discourse. This would thus allow the judiciary to serve as a forum 
of  deliberative reason, rational argumentation, and neutrality.21 
Further, legal accountability for the realisation of  one’s socio-
economic right to water would not merely mean justiciability that is aimed 
at formally obtaining an explanation from the state as the duty bearer. On 
the contrary, it would require the state to account as to compliance with 
its duties – positive and negative – and within the respect-protect-fulfil 
framework. Where the state has not complied, it is required to justify why 
not.22 I will elaborate on this in advancing deliberative democracy later in 
this chapter and in chapter 6. 
Relatedly, the legal accountability that stands to be enhanced by 
asserting a right to water as justiciable resonates with the doctrine of  
‘public trust’, with specific reference to water and natural resources 
generically. The public trust doctrine in Namibia holds that the state is the 
trustee of  water resource titles – save where water is not lawfully owned 
20 See Riedel (n 14) 79; King (n 19) 21, drawing on Kant’s distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties, the former attracting correlative rights while the latter are without. 
21 The emphasis upon judicial legal accountability does not discount the relevance of  other 
institutions created for checks and balances beyond the traditional tripartite branches, 
including hybrid institutions such as the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission. These are outside the book’s remit. See C Fombad 
‘The role of  emerging hybrid institutions of  accountability in the separation of  powers 
scheme in Africa’ in C Fombad (ed) Separation of  powers in African constitutionalism 
(2016) 325. 
22 Fredman (n 19) 103; King (n 19) 60-62.
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as private property23 – for the benefit of  citizens. The corollary obligation 
is water management for the welfare of  the general public. Although 
originally derived from common law,24 the public trust doctrine has now 
found expression in article 100 of  the Constitution25 and in national 
legislation.26 The public trust doctrine’s significance lies in the fact that 
it could be invoked, as a matter of  law, including constitutional law, to 
challenge government policies or action that do not facilitate the use of  
water resources vested in the state for public benefit. Nevertheless, this 
book does not consider the public trust doctrine further, given its extra-
constitutional Bill of  Rights roots.
It is worth emphasising the importance of  water’s justiciability as 
augmenting rather than displacing other socio-political and non-judicial 
accountability mechanisms that would be available to individuals and 
communities faced with challenges rooted in right to water deprivations. 
This is in light of  the potential risks attendant to pursuing legal accountability 
for a right to water through the courts. Drawing on comparative cases, 
Clark27 has articulated some of  these risks using the Critical Legal Studies 
theory that caution against rights discourse in the pursuit of  water 
justice by social justice movements globally.28 The concern here is one 
23 The Constitution art 16(1).
24 For the common law roots of  the public trust doctrine in the water context, see L 
Feris ‘The public trust doctrine and liability for historic water pollution in South 
Africa’ (2012) 8 Law, Environment and Development Journal 1 11; RHLJ Arden ‘Water 
for all? Developing a human right to water in national and international law’ (2016) 
65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 771 776. The doctrine remains relevant 
in common law jurisdictions; eg, in MC Mehta v Kamal Nath & Others (1997) (1) SCC 
388 the Indian Supreme Court affirmed that under the public trust doctrine ‘[t]he State 
is the trustee of  all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and 
enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of  the sea-shore, running waters, airs, 
forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to 
protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted 
into private ownership.’ 
25 The Constitution art 100: ‘Land, water and natural resources below and above the 
surface of  the land and in the continental shelf  and within the territorial waters and the 
exclusive economic zone of  Namibia shall belong to the State if  they are not otherwise 
lawfully owned.’
26 Water Resources Management Act 11 of  2013 sec 4: ‘The State, in its capacity as 
owner of  the water resources of  Namibia by virtue of  Article 100 of  the Namibian 
Constitution[,] has the responsibility to ensure that water resources are managed and 
used to the benefit of  all people in furtherance of  the objects of  this Act.’
27 C Clark ‘Of  what use is a deradicalized human right to water?’ (2017) 17 Human Rights 
Law Review 231.
28 Clark captures the potentially chilling effect of  water rights litigation in two case 
studies: In the debates post-Mazibuko decision, which ‘triggered both critique for its 
narrow interpretation of  the right to water and calls for water justice activists to eschew 
rights-based litigation’; Clark (n 27) 233; Mazibuko v City of  Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 
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of  ‘deradicalisation’ and ‘institutional capture’ whereby the invocation 
of  the language of  ‘rights’ risks placating the more radical demands of  
social justice movements and ‘watering down’ their claims to make them 
more palatable to courts.29 Further, because litigation is fraught with the 
risk of  a lack of  success, the adjudication of  socio-economic rights can 
potentially reduce community activism as courts would seemingly render 
final determination on the subject, resulting in the ‘chilling effect’ of  
shutting down future debate on water claims.30 
In my view, the appropriate response to Clark’s critique lies in 
recognising that courts at times are not the only or the most suitable forum 
in a specific context for pursuing socio-economic claims such as water. As 
such, activists in this area would need to strategically consider whether, 
what, and how to litigate, rather than entirely foreclosing the possibility 
of  litigation through the blanket normative delegitimisation of  water as 
a justiciable right. The effectiveness of  justiciability would inevitably be 
influenced by various factors and is jurisdiction-specific. This approach 
acknowledges that courts need not be presumed as silver bullets (or fire 
blanks) in remedying all right to water concerns in Namibia. Thus, the 
cynical contentions that characterise courts as merely delivering ‘hollow 
hope’31 in bringing about social change are overreaching arguments at 
best.32 
5.3.2 Beyond exclusion: Enhancing participation, equality and 
representation
Affirming a right to water as justiciable will enhance inclusivity by 
broadening participation within Namibia’s democracy. Participation33 is 
one of  the key imperatives in the deliberative model examined in later 
sections of  this chapter. Societal exclusion in participation is a challenge 
(CC); in the Lyda decision in Detroit City, USA, where residents had challenged their 
water disconnections in Detroit bankruptcy proceedings, the Court stated that ‘there 
is no constitutional or fundamental right either to affordable water service or to an 
affordable payment plan for account arrearages’. Lyda & Others v City of  Detroit (In Re 
City of  Detroit) Bankr 13-53846 (Chapter 9) (ED Mich Sep 16, 2015). 
29 Clark (n 27) 242. 
30 Clark 254-255. 
31 G Rosenberg The hollow hope: Can courts bring about social change? (2008). For a South 
African perspective on societal transformation, see A Kok ‘Is law able to transform 
society?’ (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 59; J Modiri ‘Law’s poverty’ (2015) 18 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 223.
32 See also ch 2. 
33 For Waldron, participation is the ‘the right of  rights’. J Waldron Law and disagreement 
(1999) 233.
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aptly summed up by Roy as follows: ‘There’s really no such thing as the 
“voiceless”. There are only the deliberately silenced, or the preferably 
unheard.’34 Therefore, facilitating inclusion in democratic participation 
requires what Said framed as a contrapuntal approach, one which goes 
against the grain and ‘gives emphasis and voice to what is silent or 
marginally present’.35
Bringing socio-economic rights issues such as water within the 
judicial realm facilitates the move away from the interest-bargaining 
nature of  politics and negotiations, a form of  engagement that is largely 
individualised, bipolar and partisan. Rather, courts can be fora of  wider 
public participation that serve as an alternative to transcend inequalities 
in bargaining power based on economic, social, political or collective 
considerations.36 In an adjudicative context, the parties would be expected 
to engage with the advanced reasons, offering the potential for movement 
from their position and convincing the other party. 
Courts, as independent and impartial institutions, have the potential 
to enhance democratic participation by moving away from partisan, 
power-prone interest bargaining to value-oriented deliberation, thereby 
augmenting deliberative democracy.37 Judges would evaluate and 
deliberate upon arguments advanced. A further ‘knock-on effect’ is 
that decision makers would be more likely to reach their decisions in a 
deliberative, participative manner given the possibility of  accountability 
through adjudication that considers both the reasons that informed the 
decision and the process adopted in decision making.38
A justiciable right to water also has the potential to narrow the existing 
chasm of  inequalities in voice, power and influence within the (imperfect) 
Namibian democratic framework by embracing a substantive understanding 
of  equality.39 This argument is developed by Fredman40 who critically 
applies Ely’s41 representation-reinforcing theory. The justiciability of  
34 A Roy ‘Peace and the new corporate liberation theology’ (City of  Sydney Peace Prize 
Lecture 2004), http://sydneypeacefoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
02/2004-SPP_Arundhati-Roy.pdf  (accessed 5 April 2019). 
35 E Said Culture and imperialism (1994) 78-79.
36 Fredman (n 19) 105.
37 Fredman (n 19) 106. 
38 R Larson ‘The new right in water’ (2013) 70 Washington and Lee Law Review 2181.
39 S Fredman ‘Substantive equality revisited’ (2016) 14 International Journal of  
Constitutional Law 712; S Fredman Discrimination law (2011) 25.
40 Fredman (n 19) 109-113.
41 J Ely Democracy and distrust: A theory of  judicial review (1980) 103. 
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positive duties through judicial review allows courts to be harnessed in 
buttressing democracy without overstepping their legitimacy bounds. 
The inequality concern in the context of  access to water is revealed in the 
reality that predominantly commercial water claims have thus far been 
brought before Namibian courts,42 although a lack of  access to water has 
been and remains a chronic issue for the majority of  Namibians who are 
already largely economically and politically marginalised. This manifests 
in interest bargaining that ‘favours the powerful, with some groups being 
permanently excluded from the possibility of  sharing power’, thereby 
distorting the proper functioning of  democracy.43 
In this context, I concur with Fredman who critiques and rejects 
Ely’s account of  the function of  judicial review as only legitimate where 
it is value-neutral or impartial and procedural, rather than requiring 
substantive engagement with the issues.44 The centrality and role of  
values in adjudicating rights have received elaborate attention in chapters 
2 and 3 of  this book. Equality as a Namibian constitutional value, and 
one that Fredman invokes to critique Ely’s approach to representative 
reinforcement as only procedural, is central to this analysis of  water where 
inaccessibility is a major challenge. This approach thus offers justiciability 
as a mechanism to mitigate water poverty among – to borrow from Fanon 
– ‘the wretched of  the earth’ in Namibia.45
One must concede that this model of  participation is significantly 
predicated upon addressing unequal access to justice, the predominance 
of  elite-dominated private interest rights litigation, financial barriers, 
the protracted nature of  judicial processes, and the at times counter-
productive adversarial set-up of  the courts. Thus, water’s justiciability 
risks aggravating rather than correcting societal inequality.46 This peril 
may be characterised as a ‘sharpest elbows problem’ that may result in a 
right to water’s justiciability being of  disproportionate benefit to already 
privileged sections of  society. The problem indeed is typified in right to 
health litigation in jurisdictions such as that of  Brazil, where litigation has 
42 Cf  Namib Plains Farming and Tourism CC v Valencia Uranium (Pty) Ltd & Others 2011 
(2) NR 469 (SC); Namibia Water Corporation Ltd v Aussenkehr Farms (Pty) Ltd [2009] 
NAHC 1 (9 January 2009) (unreported); Vilho Elifas Sheetheni Kamanja v Willem Andries 
Stephanus Smith [2009] NAHC (26 November 2009) (unreported).
43 Fredman (n 19) 109.
44 Fredman 110. 
45 F Fanon The wretched of  the earth (1961).
46 Fredman (n 19) 107.
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been found to disproportionately benefit individuals ‘in the middle of  the 
social spectrum’.47 
The assumptions made in this model of  participation no doubt present 
obstacles in ensuring that rights pervade to all intersections of  a Namibian 
society which remains plagued by deep systemic and structural inequalities. 
However, they are not insurmountable. Innovative interventions that 
embrace transformative approaches to both the interpretation and 
application of  procedural and substantive rules can precipitate legal 
reforms that stand to ameliorate the structural and institutional difficulties 
that the broader and less privileged majority would face in judicially 
vindicating their rights. While the how of  instituting wider access to justice 
presents mammoth questions that are not within the primary remit of  
this book, some possible measures will be assessed in this chapter when I 
endeavour to avoid the mirage of  a right to water’s justiciability.
5.4 Institutional justiciability concerns
The second set of  justiciability concerns relates to the role of  courts 
as ‘institutions’. Institutional justiciability evaluates ‘the aptness of  a 
question for judicial solution’.48 In the words of  the Israeli Supreme Court 
in Targeted Killings, these enquire into ‘whether the law and the Court 
are the appropriate framework for deciding in the dispute’.49 Two forms 
of  institutional justiciability concerns are further distinguished: first, 
institutional legitimacy, followed by institutional competence and capacity. I 
address these in turn. 
5.4.1 Institutional legitimacy objections
The legitimacy of  courts to adjudicate upon matters that are (perceived 
to be) within the domain of  the legislature and executive branches remain 
significant domestic contestations in the context of  courts’ powers of  
judicial review. Legitimacy concerns are of  arguably greater relevance 
when considering positive rights and positive duties flowing from 
socio-economic rights given their inevitable implications upon policy 
determination, programme design, and resource allocation. 
47 O Ferraz ‘The right to health in the courts of  Brazil: Worsening health inequities?’ 
(2009) 11 Health and Human Rights: An International Journal 33.
48 King (n 19) 30, in which King coins the term ‘prescriptive justiciability’.
49 Public Committee against Torture in Israel and Palestinian Society for the Protection of  Human 
Rights and the Environment v Israel & Others ILDC 597 (IL 2006) para 49 (‘Targeted 
Killings’).
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As a comparator, it is of  interest that Ireland – with significant 
constitutional similarities to Namibia as discussed in the PSPs analysis 
below – has largely adopted an approach of  absolute deference to the 
legislature in policy determination. In Sinnott v Minister of  Education, 
where the Irish Supreme Court considered the right to basic education of  
an autistic child, it was stated that ‘[if] judges were to become involved in 
such an enterprise, designing the details of  policy in individual cases or in 
general, and ranking some areas of  policy in priority to others, they would 
step beyond their appointed role’.50
Where a constitution expressly provides for socio-economic rights 
such as water in its Bill of  Rights, the forcefulness of  the objection of  
courts as usurpative of  executive or legislative functions and lacking 
legitimacy to adjudicate the issues arising out of  this area of  law would 
be less potent. It is only less potent because the legitimacy question would 
still arise when framing the extent to which the court can legitimately 
exercise its powers and prescribe action over the other organs of  the state. 
This is vividly revealed in South Africa where there are express socio-
economic rights provisions. Yet, when determining these questions, the 
courts are frequently taxed by the proper calibration of  their adjudicative 
role. In Minister of  Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 
(Treatment Action Campaign)51 the Constitutional Court of  South Africa, 
in a case concerning the right to basic healthcare services that the state 
was constitutionally duty-bound to progressively realise through taking 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources,52 
recognised the limits of  the Court’s legitimacy in adjudicating upon socio-
economic issues. The Court affirmed:53 
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could 
have multiple social and economic consequences for the community. The 
Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, 
namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of  these measures to evaluation. 
Such determinations of  reasonableness may in fact have budgetary 
implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In 
50 Sinnott v Minster of  Education (2001) IRSC 545 711 (Sinnott) (Hardiman J). Sinnott relies 
on an earlier precedent of  O’Reilly v Limerick Corporation [1989] ILRM 18, stating that 
the distribution of  the nation’s wealth was a decision to be taken by the legislature and 
executive.
51 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
52 Constitution of  South Africa, secs 27(1) and (2).
53 Treatment Action Campaign (n 51) para 38.
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this way the judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate 
constitutional balance.
At the heart of  the legitimacy concern in Treatment Action Campaign (and 
Mazibuko analysed in chapter 6) is the separation of  powers between 
the three organs – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The 
conceptual origins of  the separation of  powers doctrine are historically 
attributed to Montesquieu54 and is enshrined as a foundational principle 
in the Constitution.55 Courts, the argument goes, would intrude into the 
territory of  the legislature and executive were they to adjudicate upon 
socio-economic matters such as water. Only the legislature and executive 
should retain a legitimate mandate to decide upon these matters, compared 
to judges who are unelected and thus unaccountable to the public.56 The 
argument goes that judicial intervention in the social and economic space 
would give rise to what Bickel terms the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’.57 
The legitimacy concern, when framed in its ‘pure’ form, would 
support the absolute and strict separation between the judiciary and the 
other two organs at least.58 This framing indeed is not alien to Namibian 
jurisprudence. The Namibian Supreme Court has at times expressed 
sympathy for a strict and absolute construal of  the separation of  powers 
doctrine. In Mwilima it was stated that ‘[a]ny attempt by a court of  law to 
force the government to, for instance, increase the amount allocated for 
statutory legal aid, might be an intrusion into the exclusive domain of  the 
government as to its expenditure and allocation of  state funds, which …]
was not permissible’.59
Interestingly, this strict construal of  the separation of  powers doctrine 
is relaxed in those contexts where the Supreme Court has been called 
to adjudicate the negative dimensions manifesting the restraint duties of  
54 B de Montesquieu The spirit of  laws: Book XI (2001); for a modern African analysis of  
the separation of  powers doctrine, see C Fombad ‘An overview of  the separation of  
powers under modern African constitutions’ in C Fombad (ed) Separation of  powers in 
African constitutionalism (2016) 58.
55 The Constitution art 1(3): ‘The main organs of  the State shall be the Executive, the 
Legislature and the Judiciary’, read with arts 27(2), 44 and 78.
56 S Yeshanew The justiciability of  economic, social and cultural rights in the African regional 
rights system (2011) 77-79. 
57 A Bickel The least dangerous branch (1962) 16. 
58 For a case study of  the application of  the separation of  powers doctrine particularly 
between the judiciary and executive, see N Horn ‘An overview of  the diverse approaches 
to judicial and executive relations: A Namibian study of  four cases’ in C Fombad (ed) 
Separation of  powers in African constitutionalism (2016) 300.
59 Mwilima v Government of  the Republic of  Namibia 2002 NR 235 (SC) 251 (Mwilima).
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fundamental rights with socio-economic implications. This is apparent 
in Shaanika60 concerning the eviction of  unlawful occupiers on municipal 
land. Here, the Supreme Court was less reticent in adjudicating and 
asserting the state’s predominantly negative obligations flowing from the 
duty to refrain from housing deprivations through evictions. Shaanika held 
that a court order must be obtained prior to the state (acting through the 
municipality) demolishes structures or evicting occupiers, irrespective of  
the lawfulness of  construction or occupation. This was part of  the right to 
access courts that Shaanika implied from the article 12 right to a fair trial. 
I will return to negative duties when examining the duties of  restraint that 
arise from a right to water in chapter 6.
5.4.2 Institutional incapacity and incompetence concerns
The second subset of  concerns relate to the institutional incapacity 
or incompetence of  courts to adjudicate socio-economic rights such as 
water. The argument is that concisely framed, judges are ill-suited to 
substantively determine the competing concerns and apply themselves to 
issues that require technical expertise in adjudicative circumstances such 
as water provision. Moreover, in adjudicating socio-economic rights, the 
courts would necessarily adjudicate upon positive duties – duties that are 
inherently characterised by their indeterminacy. This renders positive 
duties more suitable for political actors rather than the judicial process. 
Institutional capacity and competence concerns arguably are best 
captured by the notion of  ‘polycentricity’, which is the prism of  evaluation 
here. In essence, the polycentric61 – or many (poly) centred – nature of  
socio-economic matters such as a right to water results in the incompetence 
of  Namibian courts as institutions to adjudicate this area of  law. The most 
prominent polycentricism-phile arguably is Fuller. In a famous 1978 essay, 
‘The forms and limits of  adjudication’,62 Fuller creatively invokes the 
image of  a spider web to visualise the problem of  adjudicating polycentric 
tasks:63 
A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern 
throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all 
60 Shaanika (n 11).
61 Polycentricity is not to be misunderstood as policy-centrism which would denote 
concerns of  judicial policy making, an evaluation of  which is best addressed as the 
institutional legitimacy concern. 
62 L Fuller ‘The forms and limits of  adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353 394. 
King (n 19) 189. Fuller attributes the term polycentricity to M Polanyi The logic of  
liberty (1951). 
63 Fuller (n 62) 395. 
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likelihood, not simply double each of  the resulting tensions but will rather 
create a different complicated pattern of  tensions. This would certainly occur, 
for example, if  the doubled pull caused one or more of  the weaker strands 
to snap. This is a ‘polycentric’ situation because it is ‘many centered’ – each 
crossing of  strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions.
Indeed, Fuller argues for certain tasks to be left to either the legislature or 
‘the market’ given that polycentric issues do not lend themselves well to 
adjudication for four principal reasons. Courts typically involve only two 
parties; the respective interests in the outcome of  the case are diametrically 
opposed; courts can ultimately only satisfy one interest by ruling in favour 
of  one or the other party; and while third parties would be affected by a 
ruling, they are incapable of  influencing the outcome of  a case. 
Fuller proceeds to argue that these deficiencies lead to three principal 
undesirable consequences: Judges produce unintended results through 
their decisions; judges selectively involve parties who are not represented in 
the proceedings; and judges make assumptions as to the facts and attempt 
to recast the problem before them to better suit established patterns of  
judicial decision making.64 Fuller thereby contrasts the ‘bipolar’ nature 
of  adjudication with the ‘multipolar’ nature of  polycentric issues.65 
Pertinently, Fuller observes the existence of  ‘polycentric elements in almost 
all problems submitted to adjudication’, thereby rendering polycentricity 
as a challenge that ‘is often a matter of  degree’.66
When applied to the realm of  socio-economic rights such as water, what 
renders these matters susceptible to arguments rooted in polycentricism 
is that they are heavily laden with polycentric questions that have strong 
implications for resource allocation, budgeting and policy making, issues 
that are best left in the domain of  the executive and legislature. The 
essence of  polycentricity as a concern is that the process of  adjudication 
is innately bipolar, reactive and dispute-based, resulting in judges being 
unable to achieve the wide lens necessary to make polycentric decisions.67 
Fredman frames the polycentricity concern as arising because ‘the number 
and complexity of  competing principles is often greater in the context 
of  positive duties’.68 More than with duties of  restraint, positive duties 
require action to be taken in a contexts where there are several available 
choices, whereby action in one direction would potentially foreclose 
64 Fuller (n 62) 401; King (n 19) 191-192. 
65 Fuller (n 62) 401.
66 Fuller 397.
67 Fredman (n 19) 96.
68 Fredman 103.
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other policy choices.69 Distributive decisions concerning resources may 
also be necessary. The futuristic nature of  the action further requires 
decisions to be based on prognosis or the ability to judge the future, a 
reality that is particularly true with positive duties that require progressive 
programming.70 
Applied to the specific context of  water, the positive measures that 
a state must take to realise the right are undoubtedly multifarious. The 
implications range from tangible considerations such as infrastructure 
development and economic modelling to intangible interests, including 
health concerns and contextual, socio-cultural awareness and sensitivity. 
For example, the state must decide upon a variety of  key issues that 
may include determining whether to source water through damming, 
subterranean reserves, desalination or piping from rivers; whether and 
where to construct a dam with land designated for flooding as a catchment 
area, with significant anthropocentric and ecological implications to be 
balanced;71 the funding model for infrastructure development – whether 
through public-private partnerships or loans from domestic or international 
financial institutions, with potentially wider structural conditionalities; 
and the costing model for delivery and output to the consumer, be it full 
cost-recovery, subsidised provision, fixed charges, or volumetric charges 
based on usage.72
The essence of  polycentricity as a concern is a well-known objection 
in judicial review generally, and one habitually raised in the context 
of  resource allocation and policy-laden disputes involving the state.73 
Namibian courts have also cited polycentric arguments when asserting 
judicial deference in disputes involving the ‘complex task of  balancing 
competing interests’.74 While Fuller does not originally address socio-
economic rights or, indeed, a right to water, the concerns raised in 
69 As above.
70 As above.
71 The flooding of  OvaHimba ancestral lands has been cited for not pursuing the Epupa 
Falls Dam project, eg. BBC ‘Angola and Namibia plan huge dam’ 25 October 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7062544.stm (accessed 9 April 2019). 
72 See generally Bakker (n 7). 
73 J King ‘The pervasiveness of  polycentricity’ (2008) Public Law 101.
74 Waterberg Big Game Hunting Lodge Otjahewita (Pty) Ltd v Minister of  Environment and 
Tourism 2010 (1) NR 1 (SC) 32-33 (Shivute CJ concurring), which approvingly cites 
the following passage by A Cockrell ‘Can you paradigm? Another perspective on 
the public law/private law divide’ (1993) Acta Juridica 227: ‘a judicial willingness to 
appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of  administrative 
agencies; to admit the expertise of  those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues’. 
See also Nakanyala v Inspector-General Namibia & Others 2012 (1) NR 200 (HC) para 58.
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his analysis are readily transferable to this setting. Indeed, Fuller’s 
polycentricity concern has also been expressly invoked at the macro-level 
in making the case against constitutionalising justiciable socio-economic 
rights, for example, in the scholarly debates during the drafting of  the 1993 
South African Interim Constitution.75 
Nevertheless, polycentricity as an objection to water’s justiciability is 
surmountable. First, Fuller’s deferential attitude to the legislature and ‘the 
market’ is problematic. I have already addressed the deficient assumptions 
that are made about the legislature in the earlier analysis engaging 
participation and interest bargaining. As for the market, the context of  
Fuller’s postulations is significant. He originally writes from the perspective 
of  the United States, a jurisdiction where the economic and social 
configuration is brute capitalism with a heavily market-dependent regime. 
This is in stark contrast with Namibia, where the market (domestically 
certainly) plays a lesser role. Beyond context, a reliance upon the market 
would serve to ignore the grave imbalances in bargaining power therein: 
At best, the market is indifferent to inequality, suffering and oppression. 
In the worst, the market is at the core of  creating and maintaining this 
state of  affairs.76 The well-documented water privatisation controversies 
in developing country contexts such as Tanzania, Bolivia and Argentina, 
where the provision of  water through commercial contracts located 
in international investment law provide vivid case studies of  failures in 
realising the human right to water.77 A market-centred approach stands in 
tension with the values of  a transformative and re-invigorative constitution 
such as that of  Namibia, as defended in chapter 2 of  the book, one where 
the social and economic justice is a cardinal aspiration, and where the 
courts retain a legitimate role in addressing or ameliorating the prevailing 
socio-economic inequalities and deprivation. This is in addition to the 
reality that the market cannot resort to the claim that it is democratically 
accountable in the same way the state is. The forces that direct and restrain 
the market and the state are not equivalent. 
75 D Davis ‘The case against the inclusion of  socio-economic demands in a bill of  rights 
except as directive principles’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 475 477-
79; N Haysom ‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic rights’ 
(1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 451; Cf  M Pieterse ‘Possibilities and 
pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of  social rights: Contemplating the South African 
experience’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 882. 
76 Fredman (n 19) 43.
77 Eg, T Meshel ‘Human rights in investor-state arbitration: The human right to water 
and beyond’ (2015) 6 Journal of  International Dispute Settlement 277; E Truswell ‘Thirst 
for profit: Water privatization, investment law and a human right to water’ in C Brown 
& K Miles (eds) Evolution in investment treaty law and arbitration (2011) 570. See the 
analysis in ch 4. 
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Second, a series of  compelling responses can be offered as to the 
diminished importance of  polycentricity objections. King’s work on the 
subject, written primarily from the perspective of  English public law, 
generally,78 and on the area of  social rights, specifically,79 is insightful. 
King evinces the pervasiveness of  court adjudication of  polycentric 
issues80 and illuminates his book through the example of  tax law. King 
argues for the refinement of  polycentricity as a concept, given that ‘we 
ought to regard polycentricity as a property of  issues or problems and 
not “areas” of  decision making such as resource allocation or planning’.81 
King claims that whether a legal issue is polycentric is an evaluation to be 
made only after the particular facts of  a given case are measured against 
the legally-applicable framework.82 
Therefore, as a result of  the limited strength of  the polycentricity 
objection, King advances two possible responses to polycentricity. The first 
is that the concept would fade into obsolescence as a justiciability concern 
in favour of  more sophisticated analyses of  judicial competence.83 The 
second is for the refinement of  the concept to render it more consistent 
with the role of  courts in contemporary society.84 Therefore, it is argued 
that while courts should recognise polycentricity concerns, these ought 
not to be fatal to the adjudication of  socio-economic rights, generally, 
and water, specifically. In partially departing from King’s proposition, it 
is advanced that, in giving due regard to the polycentricity concern, the 
appropriate response lies in devising the suitable legal tests to be applied 
in adjudicating positive duties such as a right to water, as advanced by 
various scholars.85 
Before assessing models to address justiciability concerns, it is 
appropriate to preface this analysis with the so-called transitivity principle 
of  rights that Shue has advanced: If  everyone has a right to Y, and 
enjoyment of  X is necessary for the enjoyment of  Y, then everyone also has 
78 King (n 73) 101. 
79 As above. 
80 King (n 19) 199.
81 King 193.
82 King 194. King’s main thesis is that a legal issue is polycentric ‘when the court 
is required to make, or should make, a legal binding as to the substantial and 
heterogeneous interests of  a large number of  non-represented persons’.
83 King (n 73) 104-105 112. King traces polycentricism’s withering in the USA after Broad 
v Board for Legal Education 347 US 483 (1954).
84 King (n 73) 112. 
85 M Langford ‘Justiciability of  social rights: From practice to theory’ in M Langford (ed) 
Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative law (2008) 37.
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a right to X.86 The transitivity principle, in the context of  a right to water, 
can be formulated as follows: The characteristics identified in arguing 
against the justiciability of  water as a socio-economic right – imprecision, 
programmatic and resource dependence, for example – are also shared by 
civil-political rights. This category of  rights has justiciability features that 
are taken for granted. This exposes the logical fallacy in distinguishing socio-
economic rights as non-justiciable compared to civil-political rights. While 
transitivity arguments are valuable, they stand to supplement arguments 
on a right to water’s intrinsic justiciability. Deliberative democracy thus is 
advanced below to best underpin the normative assessment.
5.4.3 Responding through deliberative democracy 
This analysis of  institutional justiciability turns to offer a workable 
model that would inform the approach to adjudicating a right to water 
by Namibian courts. The question is how to fashion a role for justiciable 
human rights, which reinforces Namibia’s democracy rather than detracts 
from it in light of  the institutional justiciability concerns identified. The 
importance of  a model or theory of  justiciability aids us in resolving what 
Young has termed ‘contestable rights-issues’ where contestability may 
arise in situations where there is reasonable disagreement on a specific 
question about rights.87 
This analysis invariably assumes that a right to water is established 
from the right to life in the Constitution’s article 6, as I have argued in 
chapter 3 of  the book. Relatedly, the analysis recognises the constitutional 
role of  courts in adjudicating and enforcing fundamental rights and 
freedoms based on the combined reading of  the Bill of  Rights enforcement 
clauses, articles 5 and 25. The argument is that the model of  bounded 
deliberative democracy should be adopted to best navigate around 
court’s democratic legitimacy, institutional competence, and capacity 
concerns, and can best give meaning to the values identified for normative 
justiciability as advanced earlier. The analysis, however, will commence 
with an evaluation of  the alternative dialogical model,88 pointing out its 
86 H Shue Basic rights (1980) 32.
87 A Young Democratic dialogue and the constitution (2017) 112; A Young ‘In defence of  due 
deference’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 554.
88 A third approach of  representation-reinforcing theories, which is not considered here, 
draws on the notion that adjudication reinforces representation of  systematically 
silenced and under-represented groups in a representative democracy. See S Fredman 
Comparative human rights (2019) 87.
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attractiveness but ultimately rejecting it as an inappropriate model in the 
constitutional context. 
The dialogic model has been developed to principally respond to the 
problem of  the democratic deficit to which judges are vulnerable when 
they exercise judicial review over legislation. As a model, it rejects the idea 
that either the judges or the legislators are infallible, which is a concern 
prompted by the reality that legislators may ignore fundamental long-term 
values or ‘gang up’ on the unpopular in the absence of  independent courts 
having the ability to apply a Bill of  Rights.89 
The dialogical model is, in the adjudicative setting, perhaps best 
characterised by Hogg and Bushell90 in their influential article that sought 
to describe the interpretation of  the Canadian Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights through 66 Canadian decisions wherein legislation was impugned. 
Their findings demonstrated that, in most cases, judges did not have the 
last word on rights issues but that the legislature generally was able to 
respond to judicial invalidation of  legislation in ways that preserved the 
basic legislative objective.91 Hogg and Bushell’s analysis determined that 
a judicial decision that struck down a law on Canadian Charter grounds 
was followed by some action by the competent legislative body.92 This 
thus exposed an inter-institutional ‘dialogue’ between the courts and the 
legislature, which revealed that unelected judges were not given a veto 
over the democratic will expressed through competent legislative bodies. 
Hogg and Bushell also observed that dialogue might continue outside the 
courts. A dialogue between courts and the legislature exists even when the 
courts hold that there is no Canadian Charter issue that is given rise to by 
impugned legislation.93
The potential suitability of  a dialogical model to the adjudication 
of  rights in Namibia would be anchored in the Constitution’s article 
25 enforcement of  rights provision, which shares similarities with the 
89 K Roach ‘Dialogic judicial review and its critics’ (2004) 23 Supreme Court Law Review 
49.
90 P Hogg & A Bushell ‘The charter dialogue between the courts and legislatures (or 
perhaps the Charter of  Rights isn’t such a bad thing after all)’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 75.
91 Fredman (n 88) 90. 
92 Hogg & Bushell (n 90) 82. See also R Dixon ‘Creating dialogue about socio-economic 
rights: Strong-form versus weak-form judicial review revisited’ (2007) 5 International 
Journal of  Constitutional Law 391, exploring the role of  strong-form judicial review in 
the socio-economic rights experience of  South Africa. 
93 Hogg & Bushell (n 90) 105, citing Thibaudeau v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 627.
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Canadian Charter’s section 33.94 Based on the text of  article 25(1)(a) 
of  the Namibian Constitution, it may be argued that the provision, like 
the Canadian Charter,95 envisages inter-institutional dialogue among the 
courts, the legislature and the executive by granting courts the power and 
discretion to allow the legislature or the executive a specified period within 
which to correct any defect in an impugned law or action.96 A similar 
approach is indeed embraced by section 33(1) of  the Canadian Charter 
in allowing a Canadian legislature to declare the operation of  a law for a 
period of  up to five years notwithstanding that the possibility – or certainty 
– that the legislation might be understood by some, including the courts, 
as inconsistent with one of  the Charter rights.97 
However, various reasons render the dialogic model inapt for our 
purposes. First, Hogg and Bushell’s article that originates and unpacks 
the model is not normative; it is a descriptive-cum-empirical98 account 
that is drawn from observed patterns of  decision making by Canadian 
courts applying the Canadian Charter.99 This renders the model peculiar 
94 This is in addition to the justification and equality clauses in secs 1 and 15 Canadian 
Charter, respectively. 
95 The key distinction is that the locus of  power under the Constitution’s art 25 lies with 
the court, whereas in Canada the legislature is vested with declaratory power. 
96 See the Constitution art 25(1)(a): ‘Save in so far as it may be authorised to do so by this 
Constitution, Parliament or any subordinate legislative authority shall not make any 
law, and the Executive and the agencies of  Government shall not take any action which 
abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by this Chapter, 
and any law or action in contravention thereof  shall to the extent of  the contravention 
be invalid: provided that: (a) a competent Court, instead of  declaring such law or action to be 
invalid, shall have the power and the discretion in an appropriate case to allow Parliament, any 
subordinate legislative authority, or the Executive and the agencies of  Government, as 
the case may be, to correct any defect in the impugned law or action within a specified 
period, subject to such conditions as may be specified by it. In such event and until 
such correction, or until the expiry of  the time limit set by the Court, whichever be the 
shorter, such impugned law or action shall be deemed to be valid’ (my emphasis).
97 Canadian Charter sec 33(1): Parliament or the legislature of  a province may expressly 
declare in an Act of  Parliament or of  the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act 
or a provision thereof  shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in sec 2 or 
secs 7-15 of  this Charter.
98 Fredman observes that the dialogic model also been used as the basis for normative 
arguments on the mutual accountability between the legislature and judiciary. In the 
decision of  Alberta Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 para 138, Iacobucci J, after citing 
Hogg and Bushell’s article, stated: ‘To my mind, a great value of  judicial review and 
this dialogue among the branches is that each of  the branches is made somewhat 
accountable to the other. The work of  the legislature is reviewed by the courts and the 
work of  the court in its decisions can be reacted to by the legislature in the passing of  
new legislation … This dialogue between and accountability of  each of  the branches 
have the effect of  enhancing the democratic process, not denying it.’
99 Young (n 87) 6; Fredman (n 88) 90.
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to the Canadian Charter experience, thereby limiting the propriety 
of  transplantation into the Namibian milieu. The second drawback 
in applying the dialogical model is that, in its predominant form, it 
focuses upon the inter-institutional dialogue between the courts and the 
legislature, and consequently upon laws enacted and impugned. This 
neglects the centrality of  the inter-institutional dialogue between courts 
and the executive, or even the trialogue that would exist between the 
courts, legislature and executive. The importance of  the latter forms of  
inter-institutional engagement is worth stressing in light of  the fact that, 
while socio-economic rights such as water may be grounded in legislation, 
a significant dispute as to the realisation of  such rights may arise as a result 
of  the action taken by the executive as a public organ. The third limitation 
is well captured by Fredman who points out that the dialogical model 
reveals ‘a deep ambiguity as to the role of  the judiciary’, given that it is 
unclear whether a judge can ultimately make authoritative decisions on 
the meaning of  human rights or whether they should defer authoritative 
decisions to the legislature.100 
I argue that to overcome the institutional justiciability concerns 
raised above and to render effective the normative values that have been 
advanced to affirm justiciability, a deliberative democracy model should 
be adopted in the constitutional adjudication of  positive duties arising out 
of  socio-economic rights, specifically a right to water. The model retains a 
conceptual genesis in the deliberative democracy literature, particularly in 
the work of  Habermas and Cohen101 in the broader context of  democracies 
and political decision making.102 
While deliberative democracy has a panoply of  potential applications 
in resolving social, political and cultural issues through democratic 
institutions such as legislatures, civil society organisations and political 
organisations, Fredman has sought to relate the model to human rights 
adjudication, that is, with courts as the forum for inter-institutional 
deliberation and particularly in the context of  the challenge of  positive 
duties that arise from socio-economic rights. Fredman puts forward not 
a pure form of  deliberative democracy, but what she terms ‘bounded 
100 Fredman (n 88) 90.
101 J Habermas Between facts and norms (1997); J Cohen ‘Deliberation and democratic 
legitimacy’ in A Hamlin & P Pettit (eds) The good polity (1989); A Bächtiger et al (eds) 
The Oxford handbook of  deliberative democracy (2017).
102 For a concise exposition of  Habermas and Cohen’s arguments, among others, see 
S Fredman ‘Adjudication as accountability: A deliberative approach’ in N Bamforth & 
P Leyland (eds) Accountability in the contemporary constitution (2013) 114-116.
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deliberation’103 with the constraint being human rights which arise as a 
product of  prior deliberative consensus. 
Given that the Constitution, particularly article 25 read with article 
5, affirmatively pre-determines an express constitutional basis for the 
adjudication of  fundamental rights disputes, the real challenge is how 
to formulate a democratically-justifiable role for the courts.104 The 
overarching premise of  a deliberative democracy model as to concerns 
related to the institutional legitimacy of  courts is that, by augmenting the 
power of  the electorate to hold the executive and legislature to account, 
judges can enhance rather than undermine democracy.105
Fredman’s account of  inter-institutional interactions focuses on the 
need for the court to scrutinise the reasons provided by the legislature 
for their policy choices, in the process ensuring that any restriction of  a 
right is sufficiently justified. Fredman identifies the centrality of  courts in 
adjudicating upon human rights as concerns that are not to be addressed 
based on interest bargaining. The undesirable consequence would be that 
interests of  individuals and minorities may always be trumped by those with 
superior power, whether numerical, political or financial.106 Deliberative 
democracy is value-oriented, thus moving away from a bargaining model 
of  interest-governed action. It aids in disciplining political representatives 
by requiring that they ‘justify decisions by reference to the public interest, 
not to preferences (whether their own or voters) which could be distorted 
or self-seeking’.107 
In responding to the institutional legitimacy limitations of  courts 
relative to the legislature, the fact that the judges are called to adjudicate 
rights within the confines of  chapter 3 Bill of  Rights would enhance 
judicial accountability given that judges would also have to justify their 
own decisions as against a background of  values that have been reached 
by a prior process of  consensus. In this way, the Bill of  Rights also acts as a 
mechanism for accountability for both the legislature and the judiciary.108
103 Fredman (n 102) 106; S Fredman ‘From dialogue to deliberation: Human rights 
adjudication and prisoners’ rights to vote’ (2013) Public Law 292; Fredman (n 19); 
Fredman (n 88) 90. See also Mendes (n 12). 
104 Fredman (n 102) 106. 
105 As above.
106 Fredman (n 102) 117. 
107 Fredman (n 102) 115. 
108 Fredman (n 102) 114.
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In arguing for deliberativism, Fredman contrasts the model by 
directly drawing attention to the limitations inherent in a dialogical 
model.109 First, a dialogic approach is concerned only with the court and 
the legislature, whereas the ideal process of  human rights interpretation 
and application ought to be open to a much wider range of  participants. 
Second, dialogicalism focuses only on the ‘output’ or the judicial decision 
itself, whereas the deliberative model, Fredman posits, ‘looks behind 
the decision to the process of  decision-making in the course of  human 
rights litigation’.110 The expectation under deliberativism is that judges 
do not simply articulate ‘principles’ that are identified abstractly. Instead, 
‘in recognition of  the fact that the interpretation of  a human right need 
not necessarily have a single right answer, the court itself  should be 
required to justify itself  in deliberative terms’.111 Third, while the dialogic 
model assumes that courts are to render alternative solutions to human 
rights questions to that offered by the legislature, the deliberative model 
focuses instead on the quality of  deliberation. Thus, the model places 
significant importance upon the process of  deliberation before a court, 
not least because it regards the judicial output as itself  part of  a process 
of  deliberation.112 
In respecting the separation of  powers doctrine, Fredman correctly 
asserts that the primary deliberative role lies with the legislature. Human 
rights decisions ought to be deliberative, not interest-based, thus 
rendering the legislature best placed for this purpose. The role performed 
by the courts is supervisory, to ‘ensure that such decisions are indeed taken 
deliberatively within the constraints set by the human rights themselves’. 
They assume a supervisory role that should be directed at enhancing, 
rather than eroding, the deliberative dimension to modern democracy.113 
Decision makers must be in a position to persuade the court that they 
have fulfilled their human rights obligations while recognising that there 
is room for reasonable disagreement in the interpretation, delivery and 
acceptable limits of  such rights.114 Indeed, ‘[d]isagreement about rights is 
not unreasonable, and people can disagree about rights while still taking 
rights seriously’.115
109 Fredman (n 102) 106.
110 Fredman (n 102) 113.
111 As above.
112 As above.
113 Fredman (n 102) 118.
114 As above.
115 Fredman (n 102) 106. 
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Courts thus stand to ensure that ‘the state explain and justify to the 
court, and therefore to the litigants and the public more generally, the 
grounds of  its decisions and the reason for the selection of  particular 
means’.116 In other words, the provision of  reasons is itself  insufficient as 
the decision makers must account for the reasonableness of  their decisions. 
This thereby rejuvenates the deliberative process while ensuring that the 
court does not overstep the grounds of  legitimation by substituting for 
the democratic process.117 Thus, Fredman notes, the deliberative approach 
is one that is ‘bounded’ given that it operates within the constraints of  
human rights.118 Fredman describes the role of  the court as ‘not to exercise 
a conclusive veto or to prescribe an authoritative interpretation, but nor is 
justification measured against an open-ended standard of  rationality or 
reasonableness, as in administrative law’. Rather, the expectation is that 
decision makers are to persuade the court that they have fulfilled their 
human rights obligations, with the courts taking into account both the pre-
existing deliberative consensus as reflected in the Bill of  Rights and of  the 
fact that there is margin for reasonable disagreement.119
A prominent example of  the deliberative model in action when 
courts adjudicate positive duties arising from socio-economic rights is 
offered in the Treatment Action Campaign120 decision by the South African 
Constitutional Court. Here, a challenge was brought to compel the South 
African government to provide HIV/AIDS treatment on the basis of  the 
right to access healthcare services under section 27(1)(a) of  the South 
African Constitution, with a corresponding duty on the state to ‘take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of  this right’.121 The Court compelled 
the government to account for its decision to refuse to permit the use of  
the drug Nevirapine to reduce mother-to-child transmission of  HIV/
AIDS despite the drug’s proven efficacy and the availability of  resources 
for procurement. Commenting on the decision, Fredman notes that 
[b]y requiring the government to prove that its concerns over the safety of  
Nevirapine were based in evidence, the court introduced a strong requirement 
of  accountability and transparency. It was not enough simply to produce reasons; 
they were also required to be reasonable. In this light, it was clear that the reasons 
put forward were lightweight relative to the enormous cost in human lives 
116 Fredman (n 102) 118.
117 As above.
118 Fredman (n 102) 119.
119 Fredman (n 103) 298. 
120 Treatment Action Campaign (n 51).
121 Constitution of  South Africa sec 27(2). 
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that the refusal entailed. But the judgment goes further than accountability, 
introducing a deliberative element into decision-making. This is because the 
government was required to explain its policies in a way which could convince 
others of  their reasonableness, and on terms which were free of  ideological 
or self-interested perspectives. Those who had previously had no voice in 
democratic decision-making were able to introduce their own perspectives, so 
that the court could create a synthesis of  both.122
Indeed, the attractiveness of  the deliberative democracy model is that 
it enhances key constitutional and democratic values, principles, and 
objectives that were advanced earlier in this chapter and chapter 2. In 
particular, it was argued that the Namibian Constitution represents 
a move from a ‘culture of  authority’ to one where rights are exercised 
and protected within a ‘culture of  justification’. Such an obligation of  
justification requires that the organs of  the state account for their actions, 
decisions and choices. Informed by a legal accountability approach, courts 
would require the government as the decision maker on socio-economic 
matters to offer a justificatory explanation of  their decision. Fredman’s123 
approach is helpful here in fashioning a model that affirms the value of  
accountability in adjudicating positive duties as ‘although courts might 
regard such decisions as too polycentric for judges to handle, in fact, in the 
context of  human rights, their very complexity might make it even more 
important to reinforce the duty of  explanation’.124 In these circumstances, 
the court’s role is ‘not to make the decision in the place of  the decision 
maker, but to require the decision maker to give an open account of  why 
a duty has not been fulfilled or has been fulfilled in one way rather than 
another’.125
The model thus stands to augment the court’s deliberative role in 
rights adjudication. Outcomes, therefore, are not determined on the basis 
of  factual power or authority but on the basis of  reasons.126 The values-
oriented nature of  the deliberative model also allows the overarching 
approach to the constitutional interpretation of  purposivism infused with 
values drawn from transformative and re-invigorative constitutionalism 
imperatives – including equality and ubuntu – to be given expression. 
As to the limits in the competence and expertise of  courts in dealing 
with polycentric issues related to resource allocation, policy formulation 
122 Fredman (n 102) 121-122 (my emphasis). 
123 Fredman (n 19) 103. 
124 As above (my emphasis).
125 As above.
126 Fredman (n 102) 114.
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and planning, the deliberative model offers an excellent avenue to ensure 
that there exists accountability on the part of  the state for its actions. As the 
court does not substitute its views with those of  the decision maker, the risk 
of  distorting the admittedly delicate balance of  policy, fiscal and resources 
that the state is to strike is mitigated. Bounded deliberation thereby moves 
us away from a rudimentary understanding of  the institutional functions 
and responsibilities of  courts to a more nuanced transformative and re-
invigorative paradigm. 
5.4.4 Avoiding the mirage of  water’s justiciability
In advancing the argument for water as a justiciable human right to be 
appropriately adjudicated through a deliberative democracy model, I have 
pointed to various structural and procedural difficulties that would need 
be overcome so that a right to water is not merely ‘theoretical or illusory 
but … practical and effective’.127 The structural and procedural difficulties 
risk creating a mirage of  a right to water, metaphorically drawing on the 
scientific optical illusion of  water. Without a transformative approach to 
legal procedure, the claim to water’s justiciability in Namibia would be 
stymied and stillborn.128 Therefore, deliberate efforts ought to be made 
to ensure that the existing procedural hurdles and structural barriers 
that frustrate the ability of  rights holders to claim their human right to 
water are overcome.129 The challenges posed by effective justiciability are 
numerous and cross-cutting. 
The intention here is not to exhaustively consider this but to offer 
a normative framework that can be employed by adjudicators when 
presented with rights claims. Indeed, as Damaseb DCJ captures in Kashela, 
‘[i]t could not have been the intention of  the framers of  the Constitution 
to grant a right which was unenforceable by the courts; for where there is 
a right, there must be a remedy to be fashioned by the court seized with 
the matter’.130 In taking the crux of  Kashela further, where there is a right, 
there must exist procedural mechanisms that are adopted and adapted to 
feasibly facilitate the vindication of  such right. 
127 Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305 para 24.
128 On procedural justiciability, see L Sossin Boundaries of  judicial review: The law of  
justiciability in Canada (2012).
129 Z Hinson & D Hubbard ‘Access to justice in Namibia: Proposals for improving access 
to courts – locus standi: Standing to bring a legal action: Paper 2’ (2012). 
130 Kashela v Katima Mulilo Town Council 2018 (4) NR 1160 (SC) para 70. Here the Supreme 
Court appears to adopt an inductive method of  inferring the intention of  the founders 
without offering support for its proposition. This inductive approach to the founders’ 
intention is frequent in the literature.
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In so doing, I will briefly assess how transformative and re-invigorative 
constitutionalism imperatives can find meaning through the question of  
locus standi, the legal requirement that a person must meet in order to have 
the standing to bring a constitutional claim before the Namibian courts.131 
Succinctly, article 25 of  the Constitution requires that a person be regarded 
as ‘aggrieved’ in order to vindicate their substantive or procedural rights. 
Who qualifies as ‘aggrieved’ is not constitutionally defined but has been 
understood by the Namibian courts as a person who retains a ‘direct and 
substantial interest’ in a given issue, in line with the common law approach 
to standing.132 In recent decisions the Namibian courts, however, have 
shown a willingness to move away from the strict construal of  aggrieved 
persons as advanced under the common law in favour of  a more expansive 
understanding.133 
To overcome a restrictive and narrow interpretation of  standing as 
reflected in the contemporary common law rules, it is argued that a re-
invigorative constitutionalism approach to the meaning of  aggrieved 
person in article 25 ought to be embraced. As argued in chapter 3, the 
value of  ubuntu is drawn from the constitutionally-ordained customary 
law. Ubuntu requires mutual concern, interdependence and solidarity. A 
restrictive construal of  aggrieved persons to only individuals and those with 
a pecuniary interest in a matter, therefore, should be rejected in favour of  
an expansive understanding under which third parties can legitimately seek 
to affirm the rights of  others as part of  their communal duty, particularly 
those who are less privileged and relegated to socio-economic margins. 
Moreover, in light of  the communitarian underpinnings of  ubuntu, the 
collective vindication of  rights, through class actions and public interest 
mechanisms, ought to be embraced to avoid a case of  ‘Hobson’s choice’ in 
rights vindication, as positively manifested in constitutional settings such 
as those of  South African134 and Kenya.135 
As a comparative perspective, India offers a prime case study on how 
courts have developed the standing requirements in order to increase 
access to justice and ensure that rights, particularly those of  a socio-
131 Namibia Law Reform and Development Commission ‘Locus standi discussion paper’ 
(LRDC 27, March 2014).
132 Kerry McNamara Architects Inc & Others v Minister of  Works, Transpstuort and Communication 
& Others 2000 NR 1 (HC). 
133 Lameck & Another v President of  Republic of  Namibia & Others 2012 (1) NR 255 (HC) para 
11; Trustco Insurance t/a Legal Shield Namibia & Another v Deed Registries Regulation Board 
& Others 2011 (2) NR 726 (SC) para 18.
134 Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, 1996 sec 38.
135 2010 Kenyan Constitution sec 22.
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economic nature, are more easily accessible. In the 1980s India introduced 
institutional innovation of  public interest litigation (PIL)136 to overcome 
its then restrictive rules on standing so as to facilitate a voice for the 
poor and disadvantaged in society, thus rendering courts as vehicles for 
social conversation between co-equal citizens.137 While PIL is not without 
practical limitations and challenges,138 it offers Namibian courts a tested 
reference point on how to radically transform legal rules of  procedure 
to realise substantive human rights such as a right to water. Although 
traditional concerns rooted in floodgates arguments against liberalised 
rules of  standing are often raised, these have largely lost their currency. 
As the Namibian High Court in Frans v Paschke affirmed this through 
the apt water metaphor, ‘[f]loodgate-litigation arguments cannot cause 
an unconstitutional rule to survive. Sometimes … it is indeed necessary 
to open the floodgates to give constitutional water to the arid land of  
prejudice upon which the common-law rule has survived for so many 
years in practice.’139
While the transformation and re-invigoration of  procedural law will 
require significant attention, the analysis in this part is but an introduction 
and will not be carried forward further in the book. 
5.5 Textual justiciability concerns 
In this part I turn to the Principles of  State Policy (PSPs) as potentially 
manifesting textual justiciability concerns. In chapter 3 I made the 
argument for a constitutional right to water that is implied from the 
article 6 right to life that is interpreted through the prism of  ubuntu. I now 
examine whether a justiciable right to water is compatible with the PSPs. 
The analysis draws on the Constitution’s text, structure and history, which 
is enriched by domestic and foreign judicial perspectives. 
136 A Bhuwania Courting the people: Public interest litigation in post-emergency India (2017).
137 Fredman (n 19) 125. 
138 For a critique of  PIL in India, see G Bhatia The transformative constitution (2019) 17. 
While not taking issue with PIL’s original commitment of  ensuring that those who 
were unable to approach the Court would not therefore lack a voice, Bhatia excoriates 
what he holds to be the substantive expansion of  art 21 (right to life), and the removal 
of  procedural constraints in order to enable ‘justice’, a practice that has seen the Court 
playing an active role in governance, and taking both quasi-legislative and executive 
actions. For a special issue critiquing PIL in South Africa, see J Klaaren et al ‘Public 
interest litigation in South Africa: Special issue’ (2011) 27 South African Journal on 
Human Rights.
139 Frans v Paschke & Others 2007 (2) NR 520 (HC) para 18.
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Functionally, PSPs can generally be described as expressing 
constitutional directives that are primarily addressed to the state’s 
political organs (the executive and the legislature) to programmatically 
secure specified goals of  a certain social, political and economic nature, 
presenting duties of  a ‘transformative’ character, duties that are not 
judicially enforceable.140 The key PSP provisions for purposes of  a right 
to water argument are articles 95(j) and 101. After article 95, entitled 
‘Promotion of  the Welfare of  the People’, the chapeau states: ‘The State 
shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of  the people by adopting, 
inter alia,141 policies aimed at’142 12 PSPs. These PSPs include women’s 
equality; workers’ and children’s rights; trade unions; labour standards; 
access to public facilities and services; protections for senior citizens; 
social benefits; legal aid; living wages for workers; civic participation; 
and environmental protection. For our purposes, the most material PSP 
is contained in article 95(j), which requires ‘consistent planning to raise 
and maintain an acceptable level of  nutrition and standard of  living of  the 
Namibian people and to improve public health’. I have argued in earlier 
chapters (in the context of  the right to an adequate standard of  living 
in article 25 of  the Universal Declaration and article 11(1) of  ICESCR) 
that socio-economic matters can, and indeed should, be interpreted as 
including the provision of  a right to water as a socio-economic dimension.
The PSPs in article 95, like all other provisions in chapter 11, are 
further qualified by the non-enforceability clause article 101. It provides 
that the PSPs in chapter 11 ‘shall not of  and by themselves be legally enforceable 
by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide the government in making and 
applying laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of  the said 
principles. The Courts are entitled to have regard to the said principles in 
interpreting any laws based on them.’143 
The principal question is: Do the PSPs restrict the court enforceability 
of  a right to water? My argument is the following: A right to water is 
derived from the article 6 right to life, which is a fundamental right 
provision contained in chapter 3 of  the Constitution. Chapter 3 contains 
provisions that are explicitly judicially enforceable, with a significant – 
but not exclusive – focus on civil-political matters. It would constitute a 
140 T Khaitan ‘Directive principles and the expressive accommodation of  ideological 
dissenters’ (2018) 16 International Journal of  Constitutional Law 389 391; L Weis 
‘Constitutional directive principles’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 4; 
BA Gebeye ‘The potential role of  directive principles of  state policies for transformative 
constitutionalism in Africa’ (2017) 1 Africa Journal of  Comparative Constitutional Law 1. 
141 This indicates that the list of  PSPs is non-exhaustive. 
142 My emphasis. 
143 My emphasis.
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constitutionally repugnant interpretation to invoke PSPs as extra-chapter 3 
provisions to prohibit or limit the enforcement of  a right to water implied 
from the right to life, which is a chapter 3 fundamental right. 
In so doing, I also assess and reject the argument by some scholars 
that the Constitution’s adoption of  a PSPs framework that incorporates 
socio-economic matters reflects the drafters’ intention to exclude such 
matters from court enforceability.144 Nevertheless, I will argue that the 
PSPs are not rendered redundant or ‘constitutional dead wood’ through 
my argument. PSPs can be invoked in interpreting fundamental rights 
including a right to water.
In my view, the non-enforceability of  socio-economic entitlements 
such as water addressed in the PSPs argument can be pursued through 
at least two senses: that water entitlements cannot (feasibly) be enforced 
by the courts or that they should not be. In this part of  the chapter my 
assessment of  the implications of  PSPs centralises the should not argument 
and thus turns to interpret the relevant provisions of  the Constitution. 
On the other hand, the cannot argument is one that invites normative and 
institutional questions relating to objections that include the inherent or 
practical non-justiciability of  a right to water, which objections I have 
already addressed earlier in this chapter.
5.5.1 The constitutional PSPs and their history
In order to isolate the precise impact of  PSPs upon a right to water, a 
historic and comparative appreciation of  PSPs is apposite. The legal 
effect of  article 101 – which invokes language that is similar to the 
‘contrajudicative’145 clauses contained in comparative constitutions with 
PSPs or DPSPs – has been foremost considered by the Supreme Court in 
Mwilima.146 Mwilima arguably also is the leading authority on the scant 
cases claiming the enforcement of  socio-economic rights in the context 
of  PSPs.147 
144 For purposes of  this part, I assume a material separation between certain civil-political 
and socio-economic rights.
145 Weis (n 140) 8, who employs the term ‘contrajudicative’ to aptly distinguish the 
concept from the overlapping and familiar concepts of  ‘non-justiciability’ and 
‘unenforceability’.
146 Mwilima (n 59).
147 The Supreme Court also considered the PSPs in Metropolitan Bank of  Zimbabwe Ltd 
& World Eagle Properties Ltd v Bank of  Namibia 2018 (4) NR 1115 (SC) paras 32-33, 
determining that art 101 was not applicable as the banking legislation in question was 
not based on the PSPs in arts 95 and 98. 
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The dearth of  socio-economic rights claims before Namibian 
courts can, at least in part, be attributed to the widely-held view that 
the Constitution’s adoption of  a PSP framework has the legal effect of  
prohibiting the judicial enforcement of  socio-economic rights claims such 
as water, housing, health care and food. This is a view that can be traced 
to early commentary on PSPs. Carpenter, writing in 1990, took the view 
that ‘[t]he rights enumerated in the [Bill of  Rights] are confined to the so-
called first-generation or traditional human rights. The second and third 
generation rights do not feature in the Constitution, but only as principles 
of  state policy (in chapter 11) and not as judicially enforceable rights.’148
Carpenter solely relies on the Constitution’s PSPs to make the 
blanket claim that socio-economic rights, as second generation rights (in 
addition to third generation rights) are entirely outside the parameters of  
judicial enforcement. This ‘perception’149 of  the unenforceability of  socio-
economic rights owing to PSPs is further perpetuated by Fourie: ‘The 
authors of  the Constitution chose to handle economic [and social] matters 
outside the rights context and specifically as policy goals.’150 
This perception continues to attract support even in more recent PSPs 
scholarship.151 I argue that these conclusions are predicated on a flawed 
interpretation of  the PSPs concerning socio-economic entitlements and an 
erroneous understanding of  the history of  PSPs. Concerning the historical 
context, the Constituent Assembly Debates are silent on how the PSPs 
framework was imported into the Constitution and the precise rationale 
behind them.152 In fact, no substantive commentary is recorded in the 
Constituent Assembly Debates when the PSPs were considered, except 
148 G Carpenter ‘The Namibian Constitution – ex Africa aliquid novi after all?’ in 
DH van Wyk et al (eds) Namibia: Constitutional and international law issues (1991) 32 
(my emphasis).
149 J Nakuta ‘The justiciability of  social, economic and cultural rights in Namibia and 
the role of  non-governmental organisations’ in N Horn & A Bösl (eds) Human rights 
and the rule of  law in Namibia (2008) 96, referring to the ‘perception of  ESC rights 
as unenforceable principles of  state policy cannot be left unchallenged ... Such an 
attitude is defeatist and contrary to the principle that all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are indivisible and interdependent.’
150 F Fourie ‘The Namibian Constitution and economic rights’ (1990) 6 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 363 365 (emphasis in original). See also G Naldi Constitutional 
rights in Namibia (1995) 96; J Cottrell ‘Constitution of  Namibia’ (1991) 35 Journal of  
African Law 56 73.
151 J Mubangizi ‘The constitutional protection of  socio-economic rights in selected 
African countries: A comparative evaluation’ (2006) 2 African Journal of  Legal Studies 1 
8.
152 Namibia National Archives, Namibia Constituent Assembly Debates 21 November 
1989 – 21 January 1990 Volume 1 and 2 (1990) 324.
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that the Constituent Assembly members ‘agreed to’ them.153 Further, 
there is no requirement for, or reference to, PSPs in the 1982 Principles, as 
critiqued in chapter 3 of  the book. 
A contemporaneous reading of  the Constitution may nonetheless 
be helpful here. At the time of  the Constitution’s adoption, the use of  
PSPs as drafting techniques was not novel. PSPs had a long pedigree of  
inclusion within various earlier national constitutions. The 1937 Irish 
Constitution is said to be the archetype for DPSPs.154 Ireland is claimed to 
have ‘invented’ DPSPs with the raison d’être of  serving as an alternative to 
judicially-enforceable socio-economic rights.155 Ireland was later followed 
by India in 1947.156 Globally, approximately 30 national constitutions have 
since invoked this drafting formula, many of  them in Africa.157 The text 
of  article 95 offers strong evidence that the drafters specifically consulted 
the language in the Indian and Irish DPSPs that was patently transplanted 
into Namibian PSPs.158 
However, there are key distinctions between the underlying raison 
d’être behind DPSPs or PSPs in the Namibian and Indian constitutions 
at least. Some Indian Constitution commentators state that the reason 
for the dichotomy between unenforceable DPSPs and enforceable 
fundamental rights was a brainchild of  BR Ambedkar, the Chairperson 
153 Namibia National Archives (n 152) 322. 
154 1937 Constitution of  Ireland art 45. 
155 For an analysis of  the constitutional origins of  DPSPs, see Gebeye (n 140) 5-8. Gebeye 
argues that a prominent reason for DPSPs in Ireland arose from the comparative 
concerns that were drawn from an era where the SCOTUS was aggressively striking 
down legislation aimed at social and economic protections for reasons based on 
laissez-faire, free market capitalism principles rooted in the freedom to contract. This is 
characterised as ‘Lochner era constitutionalism’, drawing on SCOTUS jurisprudence 
epitomised by Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905), where the US Supreme Court 
struck down a state law aimed at protecting the health and well-being of  bakers in 
New York as the law was found to violate the ‘liberty to contract’ as part of  the 14th 
Amendment. Gebeye finds that Ireland thus adopted social-oriented constitutional 
DPSPs that were unenforceable in courts as an alternative to the contra-Lochner era 
approach adopted by other European states that had explicitly constitutionalised social 
and economic rights. 
156 1947 Constitution of  India Part IV. 
157 Gebeye (n 140) 8; Khaitan (n 140) 391; Weis (n 140) 8. 
158 An example is PSP art 95(b) that obligates the state to ‘enactment of  legislation to 
ensure that the health and strength of  the workers, men and women, and the tender 
age of  children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity 
to enter vocations unsuited to their age and strength’. The spelling of  ‘vocations’ in the 
Namibia Constitution as opposed to ‘avocations’ in the Indian and Irish constitution is 
the only (material) difference.
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of  the Indian Constitution’s Drafting Committee.159 Ambedkar took the 
view that ‘the infant [Indian] State shall not be immediately called upon 
to account for not fulfilling the new obligations laid down upon it’.160 
Other reasons identified from the elaborate Indian Constituent Assembly 
debates included that DPSPs were to serve as temporary deference to 
India’s status as a newly-independent state still suffering under the weight 
of  colonialism;161 served as a consensus-building rationale as a means to 
secure consent of  ideological dissenters;162 and were ‘deferral’ mechanisms 
to specified social values that the state is obligated to pursue but which 
were unrealistic ideals at the time of  constitutional enactment and thus 
were ill-suited for immediate enforcement.163 
As to the intention behind the PSPs in the Namibian Constitution, 
while I have noted the silence of  both the 1982 Principles and Constituent 
Assembly debates, secondary sources offer some clues. Academic 
commentary by Fourie that was contemporaneous to the Constitution’s 
adoption attributes the inclusion of  PSPs and the neglect of  social and 
economic matters qua fundamental rights in the Constitution to the 
political opinions and influences of  the liberal Western democracies that 
were heavily involved in Namibia’s independence and constitutional 
process; the perceived difficulty in giving legal effect to socio-economic 
rights; and the compromise and negotiated nature of  the Constitution’s 
drafting leading to the prioritisation of  the ‘all important’ issue of  political 
freedom.164 
Assuming the accuracy of  Fourie’s rationale behind PSPs, the 
underlying ‘political’ motivations for Namibian PSPs can be clearly 
distinguished from Indian DPSPs. These distinctions in the underlying 
rationale are material as the analysis below will reveal. I will now turn to 
consider the PSPs in the context of  Mwilima.
159 G Bhatia ‘Directive principles of  state policy’ in S Choudhry et al (eds) The Oxford 
handbook of  the Indian Constitution (2016) 648; Khaitan (n 140) 416.
160 P Jaswal Human rights and the law (1996) 115; G Bhatia ‘Directive principles of  state 
policy’ in Choudhry et al (n 159) 648; W Osiatyński Human rights and their limits (2009) 
135. 
161 N Chandhoke ‘The antecedents of  social rights in India’ in U Bhatia (ed) The Indian 
Constituent Assembly: Deliberations on democracy (2016) 90.
162 Khaitan (n 140) 392. 
163 As above.
164 Fourie (n 150) 367-369.
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5.5.2 Critiquing Mwilima’s approach to PSPs
The factual background to Mwilima is set out here as the decision will be 
referred to throughout the analysis of  the scope, application and effect of  
PSPs upon the assertion of  a judicially enforceable right to water. Mwilima 
saw 128 respondents (applicants a quo) seek an order to compel the Legal 
Aid Directorate of  the Ministry of  Justice to provide them with legal 
representation at the state’s expense. The facts arose out of  criminal trials 
on charges including murder and high treason stemming from a thwarted 
armed attempt to secede from the then Caprivi region on 2 August 1999. 
The government sought to overturn the High Court decision declaring 
certain sections of  the legislation on legal aid unconstitutional. The thrust 
of  the government’s argument was that those fair trial rights in article 12 
must be interpreted in light of  the PSPs, specifically article 95(h) of  PSP 
to provide free legal aid, and article 101 on PSP court unenforceability, 
which was to be done with due regard to state resources.165 
The government argued that it had neither the financial nor personnel 
resources to meet all the respondents’ requests for legal aid under the 
relevant legal aid legislation, which the government claimed to have 
enacted in effectuating the article 95(h) while avoiding the problem of  
uncontrolled spending.166 The respondents countered the government by 
arguing that if  the circumstances were such that an accused person would 
not have a fair trial without legal representation and that an accused was 
not able to afford legal representation, then article 12 placed a duty on the 
government to provide assistance to such accused.167 
The Supreme Court en banc decided the order with a majority of  four 
to one, while the reasons were a majority of  three to two. The (erstwhile) 
Chief  Justice Strydom penned the majority opinion with Mtambanengwe 
AJA and Manyarara AJA concurring. O’Linn AJA dissented on the 
‘form of  the order, the reasons and motivations for such an order’, while 
Chomba AJA agreed with the majority’s order but wrote separately as he 
differed with part of  their reasoning. 
Following the stare decisis principle, the majority decision by Strydom 
CJ is the binding authority. Nevertheless, given their deliberative value, 
the dissenting and separate opinions are also critically considered to 
illuminate salient positions concerning PSPs and their relationship with 
165 Mwilima (n 59) 242.
166 Mwilima 241.
167 Mwilima 243. 
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fundamental rights in chapter 3. Mwilima makes various assertions on the 
nature and application of  PSPs, which I critique next.
The obligatory character of  PSPs
The first relates to the nature of  the obligation(s) imposed by article 95 of  
the PSPs read with article 101. The majority in Mwilima held that article 
101 was a ‘disclaimer for legal liability’ and took the view that the provision 
of  free legal aid to indigents accused persons was the ‘self-imposed duty’ 
of  the state which cannot by any means be held as limitless.168 
This understanding is flawed. First, the Mwilima characterisation of  
article 101 as a ‘disclaimer for legal liability’ is untenable as it is inconsistent 
with the actual text: The PSPs in chapter 11 shall ‘not of  and by themselves 
be legally enforceable by any Court’,169 subject to the qualification that 
courts are entitled to have regard to them in interpreting laws based on 
them. Article 101 thus envisages situations when the PSPs can be relevant 
to an interpretative enquiry. Therefore, article 101 is more accurately to 
be characterised as a limitation upon legal liability rather than as the more 
wide-reaching ‘disclaimer for legal liability’. While the PSPs alone cannot 
be invoked to compel the state to act, if  it does act pursuant to the PSP 
obligations by enacting legislation, for example, such legislation is to be 
interpreted consistent with the PSPs. 
Second, the Mwilima majority determines that the free legal aid PSP in 
article 95(h) is the ‘self-imposed duty’ of  the state. However, interpreting 
article 95 of  the PSPs as self-imposed would imply that the state can 
effectively opt in or opt out of  those PSPs. As the majority acknowledged, 
free legal aid in the criminal context is part of  the right to a fair trial in 
article 12, in addition to its stipulation as an article 95(h) PSP. The majority 
(erroneously in my view) distinguished between constitutional legal aid 
arising out of  the former provision and statutory legal aid arising out of  
the latter.170 The characterisation of  free legal aid as self-imposed because 
it emanates from legislation that the government claimed to have enacted 
in pursuit of  article 95(h) leaves room for a constitutional circumvention 
(inadvertent or otherwise) of  the state’s constitutional obligations arising 
out of  the fundamental rights in chapter 3, in this case the right to a fair 
trial which warrants court vindication. 
168 As above.
169 My emphasis. 
170 In dissent, O’Linn AJA (correctly, in my view) rebuts the majority’s distinction between 
statutory and constitutional legal aid is ‘unnecessary and unhelpful, if  not confusing’; 
Mwilima (n 59) 274.
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Moreover, the majority implies that the legal aid duty does not arise 
because the article 95(h) PSP is not court-enforceable. The challenge with 
this claim is that the test to determine the existence of  an obligation is not 
whether such an obligation is court-enforceable. Article 95 PSPs remain 
constitutional obligations.171 The drafter’s use of  the modal verb ‘shall’ in 
establishing PSPs in both the chapeau to article 95 and in article 101 to 
emphasise the government’s obligation notwithstanding their court non-
enforceability – ‘shall nevertheless guide the government in making and 
applying laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of  the said 
principles’172 – clearly marks out their obligatory character.173
While PSPs are not obligations in the sense of  per se providing the 
legal basis for direct enforcement in courts by dint of  article 101, they 
also are not reducible to mere ‘aspiration or symbolism’174 or ‘political 
exhortations’ to the legislature and executive, with the only remedial relief  
being the ballot box.175 Their constitutionally obligatory character means 
that the state must act in good faith to comply with PSPs. These obligatory 
PSPs can be ‘enforced’ through means other than the judiciary, such as the 
political and quasi-judicial state agencies.176 Possibilities for accountability 
on PSPs included Parliament, the Ombudsman and other oversight bodies 
that may be established under law. 
Further, PSPs are programmatic, as Khaitan accurately characterises, 
and thus require conduct on the part of  the state to realise a specific goal, 
conduct that may include – but crucially is not limited to – legislation.177 
The necessity of  conduct in pursuit of  PSPs is discernable from the verbs 
in the chapeau of  article 95: ‘actively promote and maintain’178 and the 
reference to ‘planning’ in article 95(j). 
Accordingly, the obligations that arise out of  PSPs cannot accurately 
be described as ‘self-imposed’, as the Mwilima majority found. Rather, the 
effect of  article 101 is that PSPs are constitutional obligations that are 
binding upon the state but cannot be enforced through courts in isolation. 
171 Bhatia (n 159) 648.
172 My emphasis. 
173 Weis (n 157) 14-15; A Harel Why law matters (2014) 153.
174 Weis (n 157) 15.
175 Bhatia (n 159) 647.
176 Khaitan (n 157) 391.
177 Khaitan 397.
178 My emphasis.
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Relationship between PSPs and chapter 3 fundamental rights
Another overarching concern that surfaces from Mwilima is the nature 
of  the relationship between PSPs and fundamental rights in chapter 3. 
The Mwilima majority has established the principle that PSPs in article 95 
cannot be interpreted to limit a chapter 3 right unless such an interpretation 
was ‘clearly and unambiguously spelled out’ in chapter 3 itself.179 The 
Mwilima context concerned the provision of  legal aid as arising from the 
fair trial guarantee in article 12, which the majority – under the banner of  
constitutional legal aid – found to stem from the obligations imposed by 
the combined effect of  articles 5 and 25, provisions that empower courts 
to, among others, enforce the state’s obligations such as those to provide 
legal aid.180 I concur with this approach and will apply it below to a right 
to water. 
PSPs in light of  budgetary and resource intensity 
A common argument against socio-economic rights as judicially 
enforceable is that they concern budgetary issues and are resource-
intensive. This argument finds sympathy with the Mwilima majority, albeit 
in its analysis of  statutory legal aid as opposed to constitutional legal aid. 
The Mwilima majority took the view that human and financial resource 
limitations made it impossible to provide free legal aid for all indigent 
and needy.181 The majority found that for a court to attempt ‘to force’ 
government to, for instance, increase the amount allocated for statutory 
legal aid was impermissible as it would constitute an ‘intrusion into the 
exclusive domain of  the government as to its expenditure and allocation 
of  state funds’.182 The flawed premises of  this line of  reasoning have been 
considered in this chapter when addressing the institutional objections to 
the justiciability of  a right to water.
Problematic PSP comparativism 
In chapter 1 of  the book I made a case for comparativism in constitutional 
interpretation, arguing for a methodologically cogent approach that is 
informed by the deliberative value of  foreign jurisprudence. It is notable 
that the Mwilima majority relies heavily on comparative perspectives of  
Indian DPSPs. However, the majority’s citation of  comparativism reveals 
a flawed understanding and application of  the Indian perspective. 
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The principal problem is that in drawing from Indian DPSPs, the 
Mwilima majority appears to pay less attention to the textual nuances of  
the DPSPs in the Indian Constitution or the abundance of  jurisprudence 
on DPSPs that has been handed down in the Indian courts between 1949 
and 2002, when Mwilima was decided. Rather, the majority quotes and 
relies upon a passage in a journal publication by De Villiers concerning 
‘Directive principles of  state policy and fundamental rights [in] the Indian 
experience’.183 De Villiers penned the article with the view to inform the 
DPSP debate that ensued in the run-up to the drafting of  the South African 
Constitution.184 Therein, De Villiers notes ‘two important characteristics’ 
of  DPSPs. The first characteristic is that DPSPs ‘are not enforceable in 
any court of  law and, therefore, should they be ignored or infringed the 
aggrieved have no legal remedy to compel positive action’. The second 
characteristic is that DPSPs
are fundamental to the governance of  the country and oblige the legislature 
to act in accordance with them. They consequently fulfil an important role 
in the interpretation of  statutes ... The unenforceability of  the directive 
principles from a judicial perspective, has led Seervai to describe them as 
‘rhetorical language, hopes, ideals and goals rather than the actual reality of  
government’.185
The Mwilima majority explicitly endorsed De Villiers’s characterisation 
of  Indian DPSPs by labelling them as ‘equally applicable’186 to Namibian 
PSPs. In my view, the majority’s endorsement and adoption of  De Villiers’s 
account of  PSPs are wanting on several accounts. First, the historical 
genesis and rationale behind the respective PSPs or DPSPs diverge, as 
my assessment of  the Namibian Constitution’s historical intention above 
reveals. This historical context is pivotal to understanding the intended 
effect of  PSPs and article 101. 
Second, the majority’s substantive reasoning fails to show sufficient 
sensitivity to the textual differences between the Namibian and Indian 
constitutions, in contrast to its purported awareness.187 Illustratively, a key 
183 B de Villiers ‘Directive principles of  state policy and fundamental rights: The Indian 
experience’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 33-34. See also B de Villiers 
‘The socio-economic consequences of  directive principles of  state policy: Limitations 
on fundamental rights’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 188.
184 Notably, the drafters of  the 1996 South African Constitution are said to have rejected 
DPSPs as they were deemed inadequate for their transformative agenda. Khaitan (n 
157) 390.
185 de Villiers (n 183 above).
186 Mwilima (n 59) 252.
187 Mwilima 257-58, where the majority asserts an awareness of  the ‘clear differences 
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distinction is textual-cum-structural: The Namibian equivalent of  PSPs, 
the DPSPs in Part IV of  the Indian Constitution, provide for a much more 
extensive list of  socio-economic provisions as separate, independent, 
substantive articles, whereas the Namibian PSPs constitute only sub-
provisions under article 95, most of  which, in fact, are not socio-economic 
in character. 
The Indian DPSP contrajudicative clause – article 37 – affirms that the 
DPSPs ‘shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein 
laid down are nevertheless fundamental in governance of  the country and 
shall be the duty of  the state to apply these principles in making laws’. 
Distinctively, Namibia’s article 101 provides that PSPs ‘shall not of  and 
by themselves be legally enforceable by any Court’, but the Namibian 
Constitution permits their use as interpretative aids for laws based on 
them. Consequently, the interpretation of  the limitation placed on PSPs 
enforcement under the Namibian Constitution is materially different from 
that operative in the Indian Constitution given these textual nuances. The 
Mwilima majority does not consider the text that entrenches the judicial 
enforcement of  fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution’s Bill of  
Rights. 
Third, the majority decision fails to engage with the wealth of  
Indian domestic jurisprudence on DPSPs to gain potentially persuasive 
insights into how these have been interpreted. Reliance upon a single 
author’s article alone for comparative insights is inadequate. Relatedly, 
and perhaps less a criticism than a temporal observation, the majority’s 
primary authority in characterising DPSPs in De Villiers’s contribution 
– a journal article published in 1992 and one that advances inaccurate 
and indeed sweeping generalisations on the operation of  DPSPs – could 
have been improved. This is not least because of  the vast and divergent 
academic DPSP scholarship that has been published between 1992 and 
2002 when Mwilima was decided.
5.5.3 The impact of  PSPs upon a right to water
I have now argued that PSPs are constitutional obligations which, alone, 
cannot be enforced through the courts. In line with my enhanced approach 
to the Mwilima principle, where a subject matter overlap exists between a 
PSP and a fundamental right, the fundamental right cannot be limited by 
PSPs. Rather, the fundamental right should take precedence over PSPs; 
PSPs may only be given limited weight, if  at all. 
among the various constitutional instruments’. 
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Applied to a right to water, I reiterate the argument advanced 
in chapter 3 of  the book that the right to life should be interpreted as 
inclusive of  an implied right to water as a socio-economic dimension and 
have relied on both the concept of  ubuntu and international agreements. 
Like my argument for a right to water that is implied from the right to life, 
the right to legal aid in Mwilima was implied as part of  the right to a fair 
trial. Both implied rights retain strong socio-economic dimensions that 
are programmatic and resource-intensive. It follows that because water 
as a socio-economic entitlement is the subject of  both an enforceable 
fundamental right in chapter 3 and of  unenforceable PSPs in article 95, 
water’s nature as a fundamental right should triumph over its nature as 
a PSP. This thus precludes the unenforceable policy statements in article 
95(h) from being invoked in a manner that curtails the enforcement of  a 
fundamental right in chapter 3.188 
Because a right to water is drawn from a constitutional fundamental 
right – life – in chapter 3, water as a right cannot be interpreted as being 
limited by an extra-chapter 3 provision, in this case the contrajudicative 
PSP in article 95(j) of  maintaining an acceptable level of  nutrition and 
standard of  living and public health. It bears emphasis that chapter 3 
retains its own pro-judicative clauses: Article 5 enshrines fundamental 
rights as enforceable in the courts while article 25(2) entitles aggrieved 
persons to enforce and protect constitutionally guaranteed fundamental 
rights through the courts. Articles 5 and 25 thus (ought to) take precedence 
over article 101. Chapter 3 rights cannot be diminished or detracted from, 
whether through legislative or executive action owing to the entrenchment 
of  chapter 3 by article 131 of  the Constitution.189 
Further, interpretative imperatives support this argument. In line 
with the transformative nature of  the Namibian Constitution, as has 
been argued in chapter 3 of  the book, the interpretative approach that has 
been advanced ensures that PSPs are not invoked to frustrate the socio-
economic transformative objectives of  the Constitution. 
5.4.4 PSPs as constitutional ‘dead wood’
Another potential counterpoise to the principle that PSPs cannot limit 
fundamental rights in chapter 3 of  the Constitution is reflected in the 
188 Mwilima 259. The Indian Supreme Court – in the context of  DPSP art 48 prohibiting 
cow slaughter and art 19(1)(g) right to practise and profess a trade – expressed this 
principle in the following terms: ‘The directive principles of  state policy have to 
conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights’; Mohd. Hanif  
Quareshi v The State of  Bihar [1959] SCR 629.
189 The Constitution art 131.
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‘dead wood’ problem. The concern is as follows: If  PSPs are interpreted 
as having no bearing upon the fundamental rights in chapter 3, specifically 
the article 6-derived right to water in the context of  the book (or the 
article 12-derived right to free legal aid in the context of  Mwilima), such 
an interpretation would be in direct tension with the principle against 
applying an interpretation that would render PSPs redundant. Indeed, this 
constitutional ‘dead wood’ concern is explicitly raised in Chomba AJA’s 
separate opinion in Mwilima.190 
I argue that the ‘dead wood’ problem does not arise if  an 
‘interpretation approach’191 is adopted. This problem would be the 
antithesis of  the doctrine of  harmonious construction known in statutory 
and constitutional interpretation192 as well as the principle of  systemic 
integration that is codified in international treaty law.193 To not render 
them entirely redundant, PSPs ought to retain some limited relevance and 
weight in the specific assessment of  fundamental rights. The interpretation 
approach propounds that we can consider PSPs in defining the content of  
a right to water by looking at, for example, the ‘due regard to the resources 
of  the state’ specification in various PSPs. 
Potentially persuasive perspectives on the interpretation approach 
to DPSPs can be derived from India in Re The Kerala Education Bill, a 
decision that concerned the rights of  Indian minorities to run educational 
institutions. Referring to the DPSP that had mandated the state to ensure 
the provision of  effective and adequate education, the Indian Supreme 
Court stated:194 
The directive principles of  State policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary 
to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights … nevertheless, in determining the 
scope and ambit of  the fundamental rights relied on by or on behalf  of  any 
person or body the court may not entirely ignore these directive principles of  
State policy laid down in Part IV of  the Constitution but should adopt the 
principle of  harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as 
much as possible.
190 Mwilima (n 59) 259 (Chomba AJA’s separate opinion).
191 Bhatia (n 159) 657; Weis (n 157) 16.
192 As above.
193 Pursuant to VCLT art 31(3)(c). See A Rachovitsa ‘The principle of  systemic integration 
in human rights law’ (2017) 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 557; 
C McLachlan ‘The principle of  systemic integration and article 31(3)(c) of  the Vienna 
Convention’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279.
194 Re The Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC 956 (my emphasis). I nevertheless recognise 
the ‘mixed’ Indian jurisprudence on harmonious construction. See Weis (n 157) 16; 
Bhatia (n 159) 645. 
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When applied to Namibia, by allowing PSPs to retain some scope of  
relevance – the exact degree of  relevance of  which would be determined on 
a case-by-case basis – in the interpretative enquiry of  a fundamental right, 
this approach preserves the superiority of  chapter 3 while maintaining an 
interpretation that does not render PSPs redundant in interpreting a right 
to water. 
Thus, while PSPs cannot be invoked to limit constitutional 
fundamental rights, they nevertheless should be used as an interpretive aid 
in determining the nature and scope of  a right to water implied from the 
right to life. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Having systematically assessed the various justiciability concerns, this 
chapter has advanced normative reasons as to why a right to water should 
be enforceable through the Namibian courts. A distinction between first 
and second-order scarcity is also advanced. Further, the institutional 
concerns are critiqued and countered through deliberativism. The 
Constitutional PSPs were equally identified as textual non-obstacles 
to water’s justiciability as a fundamental right under article 6 of  the 
Constitution. The next chapter now turns to develop a right to water’s 
normative and substantive content, as well as the Namibian state’s core 
and general obligations.
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waTer and The namibian 
sTaTe’s obligaTions 6
6.1 Introduction
The preceding analysis of  the book has ensconced the existence of  a 
human right to water and addressed the various justiciability objections 
that arise. This chapter is dedicated to examining the concrete claims that 
would accrue from a right to water to the right holders, with the state as 
primary duty bearer.1 The chapter endeavours to address the challenge 
of  identifying the content of  a right to water and the state obligations 
that flow from it, in terms of  article 6 of  the Constitution. These issues 
are critical in ensuring that the right holder can substantively exercise it, 
through a claim against the state as the primary duty bearer. Defining 
water’s substantive content also undermines any scepticism as to the right’s 
indeterminacy, a charge frequently levelled against social and economic 
rights more broadly. 
This chapter attempts to give content to a right to water and identifies 
various obligations that are placed upon the Namibian state. The 
legal basis of  a right to water I advance is one that is implied from the 
Constitution. Details of  its substantive content and the state’s obligations 
would thus need to be developed by courts with recourse to values and 
extraneous legal resources. The chapter thus once again invokes the re-
invigorative constitutionalism paradigm by deploying ubuntu as the 
anchoring principle in developing a right to water’s content and correlative 
obligations. Further, international law sources are particularly helpful 
resources here. As discussed in chapter 4, international agreements are not 
only directly binding in Namibian law but, where appropriate, can also be 
invoked in the interpretation of  Bill of  Rights provisions. Additionally, 
reliance is placed upon comparative perspectives.
In the context of  the challenge posed by determining the state’s 
obligations, the chapter addresses two of  the most demanding issues. 
The first is temporality, which considers the immediacy or otherwise 
1 The terms ‘obligation’ and ‘duty’ are employed interchangeably.
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of  realising the state’s obligations. The second is resource constraints. I 
will argue for a two-tiered approach to the state’s obligations, namely, 
the non-negatable essential content obligations and the general non-
core obligations. I will propose that the bounded deliberativism model 
should be invoked in adjudicating water’s essential content and the general 
obligations. In addition, the progressive realisation model is advanced 
specifically as regards the general obligations of  a right to water. Attention 
is drawn to the second-order difficulty of  water scarcity – that of  social 
resources – which is more nuanced than conceptions of  resource scarcity 
in the financial or material sense. 
6.2 Justifying the normative and substantive sources relied 
upon 
In developing a right to water’s content and the state’s obligations, 
ubuntu will once again be applied as the guiding principle in this 
chapter. Moreover, soft law sources will be critically invoked in light 
of  the interpretative resourcefulness of  international law in Namibia, 
thereby functioning as ‘normative gap fillers’. Most prominent is General 
Comment 15,2 which is the pioneering international instrument to have 
asserted the right to water’s normative content. General Comment 15 is 
of  heightened persuasiveness as it is developed by subject-matter experts 
on the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR 
Committee). Similarly, a right to water is also implied from the provisions 
of  the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter),3 
with water’s substantive content being articulated principally by the 
Nairobi Principles of  the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Commission).4 The Nairobi Principles draw generously 
2 General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of  the Covenant) ESCR 
Committee (20 January 2003) UN Doc E/C 12/2002/11 (2002). See also Report of  
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the scope and content 
of  the relevant human rights obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation under international human rights instruments HRC (16 August 
2007) UN Doc A/HRC/6/3 (2007); Report of  the Independent Expert on the Issue of  
Human Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, 
Catarina de Albuquerque HRC (29 June 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/31 (2010).
3 See ch 4.
4 African Commission Principles and Guidelines on Social and Economic Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi Principles) (adopted at the 
47th ordinary session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 12 to 26 May 2010 and formally 
launched at the Commission’s 50th ordinary session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 
24 October to 7 November 2011) para 87, https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/
detail?id=30 (accessed 17 September 2019). See also African Commission Guidelines 
on the Right to Water in Africa (adopted during the 26th extraordinary Session of  the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held from 16 to 30 July 2019, in 
Banjul, The Gambia).
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upon General Comment 15, albeit with nuanced differences that respond 
to the African context.5 
The normative position expressed in General Comment 15 will be 
assessed with the aid of  the publication of  the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) on Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality (Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines), the latest edition being published in 2017.6 It will be noted that 
while General Comment 15 and the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines 
do not completely overlap, both align with similar principles on water’s 
content and they refer to one another. While the Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines would constitute non-binding soft law, they represent the 
‘normative standards that are underpinned by science, ethics and human 
rights’.7 The Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines explicitly affirm that they 
do not promote the adoption of  an international standard, but instead 
advocate the use of  a risk-benefit approach that draws from qualitative 
and quantitative considerations in the establishment of  national standards 
and regulations.8 The Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines thus serve as 
a resource that facilitates adopting guideline values to locally relevant 
standards,9 an approach that takes into account national and regional 
variances that would render a single universal approach impossible.10 
Namibian courts would thus be able to assert context-specific approaches 
to the content of  a right to water using the Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines. 
Given that these soft law instruments are non-binding, at best offering 
only normative guidance, there is heightened importance in engaging 
with the substantive reasoning behind their various approaches and 
in determining their applicability in the specific context of  Namibia. 
Crucially, the intention is not to engage in a broad analysis of  a right to 
water’s content and the state’s obligations; an abundant body of  scholarly 
5 M Ssenyonjo ‘The protection of  economic, social and cultural rights under the African 
Charter’ in D Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The protection of  economic, social and cultural 
rights in Africa: International, regional and national perspectives (2016) 91 98.
6 WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality (2017), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream 
/handle/10665/254637/9789241549950-eng.pdf;jsessionid=A4304278A81F4F25 
7664C287DCAA423F?sequence=1 (accessed 10 July 2019). The WHO previously 
published four editions of  the Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality (in 1983-1984, 
1993-1997, 2004, 2011) as successors to the previous international standards for 
drinking-water in 1958, 1963, 1971.
7 L Gostin et al ‘The normative authority of  the World Health Organization’ (2015) 129 
Public Health 2. 
8 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 2. 
9 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 31.
10 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 2.
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literature to that effect already exists.11 The aim is to offer a focused 
examination that deliberately avoids an acontextual and uncritical 
regurgitation of  General Comment 15 and like sources. In this light, the 
chapter will be deliberate in pursuing this aim with an emphasis upon 
transformative and re-invigorative constitutionalism ideals.
I will thus invoke the values and legal resources developed in this 
chapter to scope out the content and obligations of  a right to water. It 
is important to emphasise that the General Comment 15 analysis leans 
towards the abstract – it does not endeavour to address a pre-determined 
right to water challenge or claim. Therefore, to focus and contextualise 
the analysis, the chapter will consider the water challenges identified in 
the Namibian milieu through the report published in 2012 after a country 
visit to Namibia in 201112 by Catarina de Albuquerque, the former Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation.13 
The chapter will also rely on comparative perspectives from jurisdictions 
that have adjudicated right to water claims domestically.
With respect to the Special Rapporteur’s report, there remains a 
paucity of  scholarly, non-journalistic literature on the Namibian water 
situation, literature that does not (directly) originate from governmental 
sources. Although now slightly dated, the Special Rapporteur’s report 
remains relevant and offers an arguably more reliable, objective, legally 
analytical yet practically informed assessment of  the water situation. 
This may be contrasted with access to water self-assessments of  the 2016 
ESCR Committee’s Periodic Report14 by the Namibian government and 
the attendant Concluding Observations by the Committee,15 both of  
which only tersely address the water situation in Namibia with scant legal 
analysis.
The Special Rapporteur’s report is reliable as it is offered by an 
independent expert body. Although not a judicial body, the Rapporteur 
11 See the critical analysis of  GC15 in I Winkler The human right to water: Significance, legal 
status and implications for water allocation (2012).
12 Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation, Addendum: Mission to Namibia, HRC (28 June 2012) UN Doc A/
HRC/21/42/Add.3 (Special Rapporteur’s Report). 
13 Special Rapporteur.
14 Consideration of  reports submitted by States Parties under arts 16 and 17 of  the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Initial Reports of  
States Parties Due in 1997 – Namibia, CESCR (13 February 2015) UN Doc E/C.12/
NAM/1.
15 Concluding Observations on the Initial Periodic Report of  Namibia, CESCR 
(23 March 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/NAM/CO/1.
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engages a compelling methodology that incorporates site visits and 
interviews with Namibian governmental and non-governmental 
organisations including ministries, legislators, the Ombudsman, civil 
society, international organisations represented in Namibia, local 
authorities, as well as private actors including private investors and rural, 
urban, and peri-urban communities.16 Further, the Special Rapporteur 
invaluably evaluates the water situation in Namibia from a human rights 
perspective, with significant reliance upon the normative standards 
contained in General Comment 15. 
6.3 Developing the AQuA content 
I argue for ubuntu to be invoked in developing a right to water’s normative 
and substantive content. In chapter 3 it was advanced that ubuntu 
communicates that all persons are entitled to have access to an amount of  
water that ensures a dignified life. This translates to adequate water that 
is more than just the bare minimum required for life. It follows that, when 
faced with a right to water claim, courts would be required to develop what 
the right would entail, including its content and correlative obligations. 
I will have recourse to General Comment 15, the Nairobi Principles, 
and the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines as the key normative 
frameworks in evaluating a right to water through ubuntu as a re-
invigorative constitutional value. These thus aid us in avoiding reinventing 
the wheel in determining water’s content and the corollary obligations 
of  the state. General Comment 15 has advanced the standard of  a right 
to water that is adequate for purposes of  human dignity, life and health. I 
will, however, principally focus on water for purposes of  ‘life’ as protected 
in article 6 of  the Constitution, ‘life’ that is understood and interpreted 
through the value of  ubuntu, while accepting that dignity and health are 
nevertheless intrinsic to the expansive conception of  ‘life’ I advance.
Under General Comment 15 the right to water entails both freedoms and 
entitlements for the right holder.17 On the one hand, General Comment 15 
demarcates freedoms as including the right to maintain access to existing 
water supplies necessary for the right to water, and the right to be free from 
interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary disconnections or 
the contamination of  water supplies.18 On the other hand, entitlements 
include the right to a system of  water supply and management that 
16 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 2.
17 GC15 (n 2) para 10.
18 As above.
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provides equality of  opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.19 
This dichotomy between freedoms and entitlements is one that mirrors the 
distinction between positive and negative duties of  rights that manifests 
throughout this book. 
General Comment 15 states that water ‘should be treated as a social 
and cultural good, and not primarily as an economic good’, to be used 
sustainably for present and future generations.20 General Comment 15 sets 
out the elements of  what constitutes adequate water, for which it cautions 
‘should not be interpreted narrowly, by mere reference to volumetric 
quantities and technologies’.21 
It is emphasised that General Comment 15 extends only to water that 
is adequate for two types of  uses: personal and domestic use.22 These uses 
would ordinarily include drinking to prevent death from dehydration; 
sanitation; washing of  clothes; food preparation; and personal and 
household hygiene.23 This prioritisation does not preclude the possibility 
of  claiming water that is needed for other purposes, particularly in the 
context of  realising other rights to health, food and cultural life.24 These 
rights dimensions, however, are not pursued in the book. 
Most pertinently, the ESCR Committee identifies three substantive 
dimensions that apply in all circumstances where adequate water is 
required: Availability – water that is available in sufficient quantity; Quality 
– water that is safe and acceptable; and Accessibility – water that can be 
feasibly accessed. For convenience, I collectively term these ‘AQuA’. To 
focus the analysis, the application of  the AQuA elements to a right to 
water, as a component of  the right to life in the Constitution, is examined 
by drawing on the Special Rapporteur’s report rooted in the Namibian 
context. 
19 As above.
20 GC15 (n 2) para 11.
21 As above.
22 GC15 (n 2) para 6. A similar approach of  prioritising water for personal and domestic 
uses is reflected in art 10(2) of  the UN Watercourses Convention 1997 (GA Res 51/229, 
annex (May 21, 1997), 36 ILM 700 (1997)), which binds Namibia, in stating that ‘[i]n 
the event of  conflict between uses of  an international watercourse, it shall be resolved 
with reference to Articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the requirements of  
vital human needs’ (my emphasis). The phrase ‘vital human needs’ is said to have been 
designed to protect and prioritise the water needed for sustaining human life, including 
both drinking water and water required for food to prevent starvation. See T Bulto The 
extraterritorial application of  the human right to water in Africa (2014) 61-62. 
23 GC15 (n 2) para 2.
24 Bulto (n 22) 60.
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6.3.1 Availability
The first substantive requirement of  a right to water, per General Comment 
15, is that water should be available in sufficient quantity. Concerning 
the normative standard for water’s availability, General Comment 15 
determines that water supply for each person must be sufficient and 
continuous for personal and domestic uses. While the ESCR Committee 
has pegged the quantity of  water per capita to the Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines, it has recognised that some individuals and groups may 
also require additional water depending on health, climate and work 
conditions.25 Indeed, the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines express the 
availability of  water in relation to quantity or service level primarily from 
the perspective of  health. Beyond the basic human physiological need for 
water to maintain adequate hydration and an additional requirement for 
food preparation, the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines observe that 
there is a basic requirement for water for health. The assumption is that 
the daily per capita consumption of  drinking water is approximately two 
litres for adults, although actual consumption varies according to climate, 
activity level and diet.26 
The Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines further assert that, from the 
available data, a minimum volume of  seven-and-a-half  litres per capita per 
day is required to provide sufficient water for hydration and incorporation 
into food for most people under most conditions.27 Additionally, the 
Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines state that adequate domestic water is 
needed for food preparation, laundry and personal and domestic hygiene, 
which are also important for health, as well as water for income generation 
and amenity uses.28
The Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines hold that the quantities of  
water collected and used by households are primarily a function of  the 
distance to the water supply source or total collection time required.29 This 
broadly equates to the level of  service received, with four levels of  service 
outlined in the WHO table given below. 
25 GC15 (n 2) para 12.
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Table 1: WHO table on the service level and quantity of  water collected30
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30 See also Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6); G Howard & J Bartram Domestic water 
quantity, service level and health (2003), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/67884 
(accessed 21 August 2019).
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Table 1 reveals that the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines consider 
service level as a useful and easily measured indicator that provides a valid 
substitute for the quantity of  water collected by households, serving as the 
preferred indicator for oversight. 
The Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines state that the available 
evidence indicates that health gains accrue from improving service level 
in two key stages: the delivery of  water within 1 kilometre or 30 minutes 
of  total collection time; and when supplied to a yard or household level of  
service.31 Further, health gains are likely to occur once water is supplied 
through multiple taps as this will increase water availability for diverse 
hygiene practices. The volume of  water collected may also depend on the 
reliability and cost of  water,32 to which I will return to when assessing 
affordability. The Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines, therefore, stress the 
importance of  data collection on various indicators.33
Another important dimension of  water’s adequacy is the issue of  
continuity. While General Comment 15 only mentions continuity in terms 
of  water supply that must be ‘sufficient and continuous for personal and 
domestic uses’34 for each person, the WHO’s Guidelines elaborate upon 
the substance of  this dimension. This is in the context of  interruptions to 
drinking water supply that are a result of  either intermittent sources or 
engineering inefficiencies.35 
While some of  these requirements are met in parts of  Namibia, the 
Special Rapporteur’s report reveals that there are clear shortfalls. Thus, 
as of  2011, 97 per cent of  the population in urban areas had access to 
improved water sources in Namibia, while in rural areas the figure stood 
at 80 per cent.36 This rural-urban gap reflects the socio-economic divide 
that generally prevails in Namibia and manifests in a form of  second-order 
scarcity. In terms of  the water supply systems in Namibia, the Special 
Rapporteur describes it as follows:37 
There are three main water supply systems in Namibia: (i) distribution by 
local authorities, although they reportedly face resource constraints; (ii) 
31 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 84. 
32 As above. 
33 As above. 
34 GC15 (n 2) para 12 (my emphasis).
35 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 86.
36 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 16. See also a wider analysis of  water 
availability in Winkler (n 11) 17-20.
37 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 16.
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Namibia Water Corporation (NAMWater), a publicly held company, 
which delivers bulk water; and (iii) the Directorate of  Water Supply and 
Sanitation within the Ministry of  Agriculture, Water and Forestry which 
develops water infrastructure, including pipelines and boreholes, in rural 
areas as well as delivers water to public buildings. Water supply in Namibia 
is highly decentralized and founded on the principle of  community-based 
management. With respect to boreholes, which are mostly located in rural 
areas, mechanisms such as water associations and water point committees 
aim to ensure community-involvement of  both women and men in these 
decision-making bodies. Members of  the committees are trained to make 
minor repairs, while the Directorate of  Water Supply and Sanitation is 
responsible for handling major breakdowns.
The Special Rapporteur also takes special note of  the adverse health 
impact of  lack of  access to water on children who suffer from diarrhoea 
and malnutrition as well as persons living with HIV.38 Access to water 
complications such as those caused by natural disasters, especially floods, 
were also recognised.39 
The availability of  water is additionally impacted directly by the 
distances that are travelled to water points. In rural areas, the distances 
travelled by rural dwellers to access water points received significant 
attention. The report emphasises the higher incidences of  poverty in rural 
areas as opposed to urban areas.40 The Special Rapporteur highlights the 
considerable time spent collecting water by some Namibians, specifically 
in rural areas, where 
more than seven per cent of  the population travel more than one kilometre 
to get water, and this percentage can reach as high as 15.4 per cent in the 
dry season. In some regions, there are considerably higher numbers of  
people travelling such distances: in Kavango, for instance, more than 18 per 
cent of  the population must travel more than one kilometre to get water in 
the rainy and in the dry season. More than 15 per cent of  the population 
in Kunene, Ohangwena, Omusati, and Oshikoto travel over a kilometre to 
collect water in the dry season. Poor households suffer disproportionately 
from these distances and face greater challenges transporting water back to 
their households because they are less likely to have access to a means of  
38 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) paras 19-20.
39 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 23. Access to water complications would 
indeed include drought-induced challenges, as has plagued Namibia between 2014 and 
2019, although the Special Rapporteur omits mention of  drought probably because 
Namibia experienced flooding at the time of  the Report’s compilation. 
40 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) paras 45-46.
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transport besides walking. In this context, poor households are likely to turn 
to unsafe water sources which are closer to their homes.41 
The Special Rapporteur finds that the situation was markedly worse for 
remote communities such as ovaHimba people who reported walking two 
hours to reach a water point; alternatively, ovaHimba relied on closer but 
dirty water sources that are also used by animals.42 The Special Rapporteur 
notes that while rural communities were tasked with making small repairs 
to their water sources, the availability of  spare parts was cited as a major 
challenge. The installation of  water infrastructure without ensuring that 
spare parts are available to the community to make repairs potentially 
leads to the use of  the facilities being discontinued.43 
6.3.2 Quality
The second substantive dimension is that the water required for personal 
or domestic use must reach the quality standard of  being safe. Safe 
water entails being free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and 
radiological hazards that, for example, threaten health. Furthermore, 
water should be of  an acceptable colour or appearance, odour, taste and 
flavour44 for personal or domestic use.45 Safe water requires the absence 
of  qualities objectionable to the majority of  consumers, including highly-
turbid or highly-coloured water.46 Again, recourse is to be had to the 
Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines in determining quality.
The 2012 Special Rapporteur’s report highlights the inadequacy and 
weaknesses in the existing regulatory framework in Namibia to ensure 
water quality and prevent water pollution. It specifically laments the lack 
of  periodic testing of  boreholes.47
Concerning the mining sector, the Special Rapporteur notes that 
a significant part of  the Namibian economy relies on mining activities 
but found that there was no proper oversight. Particularly concerning 
41 As above.
42 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 48.
43 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 49.
44 While the taste or flavour requirement may not necessarily undermine the safety of  
water from a health perspective, it is arguable that this preserves the dignity of  the 
individual consuming it. See A Kok & M Langford ‘The right to water’ in D Brand & 
C Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 191 199.
45 GC15 (n 2) para 12.
46 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 7-8 219.
47 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) paras 23-60.
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was the potential over-extraction of  groundwater as well as potential 
water pollution as a result of  mining activities.48 The Special Rapporteur 
expresses concern about the lack of  necessary regulations to ensure 
that mining does not endanger the availability and quality of  water for 
personal and domestic use as well as the risk of  irreparable harm to the 
environment.49 
6.3.3 Accessibility
The third substantive requirement for a right to water is accessibility. 
Accessibility requires water as well as water facilities and services to be 
accessible to everyone without discrimination in Namibia. Here, the 
ESCR Committee asserts four often overlapping dimensions: physical, 
economic, non-discrimination, and information accessibility. They are 
examined here in turn.
Physical accessibility requires that water, and adequate water facilities 
and services, must be within safe physical reach for all sections of  the 
population. Sufficient, safe and acceptable water must be accessible within, 
or in the immediate vicinity of, each household, educational institution 
and workplace. Thus, a strong overlap exists between water’s physical 
accessibility and availability as analysed above. In addition, all water 
facilities and services must be of  sufficient quality, culturally appropriate 
and sensitive to gender, life-cycle and privacy requirements. 
The ESCR Committee states that physical security should not be 
threatened when accessing water facilities and services. This is a concern 
that is particularly relevant in the Namibian context where deprived rural, 
urban and peri-urban communities often encounter human hazards such 
as the risk of  sexual violence against women and children,50 and natural 
hazards such as the risk of  encountering wild creatures such as river 
crocodiles51 while accessing water sources. 
Economic accessibility requires that water, and water facilities and 
services, must be affordable for all. The ESCR Committee observes that 
48 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 57.
49 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 59.
50 J Graham et al ‘An analysis of  water collection labour among women and children 
in 24 sub-Saharan African countries’ (PLoS One 2016), https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0155981 (accessed 10 July 2019). 
51 ‘Woman saves hubby from jaws of  crocodile’ New Era 26 February 2016, https://
neweralive.na/2016/02/29/woman-saves-hubby-jaws-crocodile/ (accessed 10 July 
2019); ‘Crocodile kills mother and child’ New Era 27 March 2018, https://neweralive.
na/posts/crocodile-kills-mother-and-child (accessed 10 July 2019).
Content of  a right to water and the Namibian state’s obligations   219
the direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water 
must be affordable, and must not compromise or threaten the realisation 
of  other International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) rights.52 The Special Rapporteur states that the ICESCR’s 
prohibition against retrogressive measures includes raising the price 
of  services disproportionately so that poor people can no longer afford 
water and allowing the deterioration of  infrastructure owing to a lack of  
investment in operation and maintenance.53 De Albuquerque cautions 
that ‘retrogressive measures are more common and their impacts often 
exacerbated by austerity measures’.54
The Special Rapporteur observes that Namibia followed a cost-
recovery model that seeks to recover only those costs related to supply, 
operation and maintenance for water provision. While she agreed with 
the cost recovery approach for the sustainability of  safe and regular water 
provisions, the Special Rapporteur expresses concern that households 
with poor and unemployed members could not afford water,55 with in-
kind contributions (such as crop produce or livestock) for water provision 
in rural areas being identified as a possibility for the impecunious.56 
The Special Rapporteur also finds that NAMWater, the state-owned 
bulk water supplier to municipalities, had engaged in the practice of  
disconnecting water supply to municipalities ‘so as to prevent those in 
charge from abusing power and keeping the water tariff  revenues for 
themselves rather than paying the municipality’s water bills’.57 The Special 
Rapporteur further reported complaints – especially in urban areas – about 
the cost of  water and the lack of  a subsidy scheme to assist people who 
could not afford to pay for water.58 The Special Rapporteur further notes 
that in the capital city, Windhoek, the water tariff  structure was such that 
the lifeline supply was calculated at 33 litres per person per day. This, De 
Albuquerque notes, was short of  the WHO’s estimate that ‘to live a life 
in dignity, people require more than the lifeline supply, for instance, at 
least 50 litres per day, for consumption and hygiene needs’.59 Alarmingly, 
the Special Rapporteur notes the struggles with water affordability for 
52 GC15 (n 2) para 12.
53 Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation, Addendum, HRC (11 July 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/44 paras 13-14.
54 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 53) paras 13-14.
55 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 42.
56 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 38.
57 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 39.
58 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 40.
59 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 41.
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many Windhoek households, pointing out that she was informed that ‘in 
Windhoek, water supply is disconnected from as many as 280 households 
per day’.60 
Concerning non-discrimination, this seeks to achieve formal and 
substantive equality in accessing water. To ensure non-discrimination, it 
is required that water and water facilities and services must be accessible 
to all, including the most vulnerable or marginalised sections of  the 
population, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of  the 
prohibited grounds in ICESCR.61 Given the Namibian context of  this 
analysis, the prohibited grounds would include those enumerated in the 
Constitution, including sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or 
social or economic status.62 
The significance of  the non-discrimination dimension of  water lies in 
the fact that the state’s correlative duties are not subject to concerns such 
as the availability of  resources to realise a right to water. The obligation 
of  non-discrimination is therefore immediate. Nevertheless, in contexts 
such as Namibia’s where discriminatory practices have been historically 
pervasive in society, it is to be recognised that redressing inequalities 
brought about by colonial and apartheid discrimination will require time 
to eradicate and dedicated resources to eliminate underlying structural 
barriers.63 Even in this context, the existence of  historically-rooted and de 
facto discrimination from accessing water due to temporal and resource 
limitations is not a justification in itself. The structures of  discrimination 
must be eliminated as promptly as possible through positive state action. 
This would require a focus upon the disadvantaged as a category of  people 
who are under greater constraints in their ability to enjoy access to water 
relative to others. This thereby embraces substantive equality that may 
include directing resources to the disadvantaged.64 The Special Rapporteur 
60 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 42. For a comparative assessment towards 
quantifying affordable water based on expenditure percentage of  disposable income 
in a household, see H Smets ‘Quantifying the affordability standard: A comparative 
approach’ in M Langford & A Russell (eds) The human right to water theory: Practice and 
prospects (2017) 276.
61 GC15 (n 2) para 12.
62 The Constitution art 10(2). 
63 Cf  City Council of  Pretoria v Walker 1999 (2) SA 363 (CC), where the South African 
Constitutional Court suggested that cross-subsidisation per se among consumers and 
differentiation in tariffs for services are not unconstitutional. The Court found that a 
policy of  charging flat rates in a predominantly black community and consumption-
based rates in a neighbouring community was necessary in order to ensure that 
disadvantaged communities enjoy access to basic services.
64 S Fredman Human rights transformed (2008) 77.
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found that, in Namibia, the principal responsibility for collecting water 
was performed mostly by women and girls. Water collection chores 
also had adverse effects on children’s ability to attend school, the risk of  
carrying heavy water containers to health, and adults’ ability to engage in 
other productive activities for the household.65
The ESCR Committee cautions that inappropriate resource allocation 
can lead to discrimination that may not be overt and cites the example of  
investments that disproportionately favour expensive water supply services 
and facilities that are often accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of  
the population, rather than investing in services and facilities that benefit a 
far larger part of  the population.66 
The ESCR Committee further asserts that where payment for water 
services is to be made, this is to be based on the principle of  equity to 
ensure that these services, whether privately or publicly provided, 
are affordable for all, including socially-disadvantaged groups. The 
Committee stresses that equity demands that poorer households should 
not be disproportionately burdened with water expenses as compared to 
richer households.67 This is reflected in the cost recovery model of  water 
supply to reduce financial exclusion in water access. 
The ESCR Committee emphasises the state’s ‘special obligation to 
prevent any discrimination on internationally prohibited grounds in the 
provision of  water and water services’68 as well as discrimination that 
‘has the intention or effect of  nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment 
or exercise of  the right to water’.69 The Nairobi Principles further oblige 
states to proscribe discrimination of  vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, 
including those with precarious land and property rights, informal settlers, 
rural and peri-urban areas, indigenous communities, and the imprisoned 
or detained.70 
Finally, information accessibility includes the right to seek, receive and 
impart information concerning water issues. Individuals should thus have 
access to information that will enable them to participate in decision 
making that involves access to drinking water.71 It is notable that the 
65 Special Rapporteur’s Report (n 12) para 47.
66 GC15 (n 2) para 14; Nairobi Principles (n 4) paras 31-38.
67 GC15 (n 2) para 27.
68 GC15 para 15.
69 GC15 para 13.
70 Nairobi Principles (n 4) paras 92(p)-(v).
71 J Chávarro The human right to water: A legal comparative perspective at the international, 
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dimension of  information accessibility gives rise to procedural obligations 
such as the obligations to ensure access to information concerning safe 
drinking water issues, and participation in decision-making processes 
related to safe drinking water.72
Having identified key aspects of  the normative content of  a right to 
water under the Constitution, we turn to define the various correlative 
obligations that bind the state. I will advocate a dual thresholds approach to 
the state’s water obligations: essential content/minimum core obligations, 
and general obligations that are progressively realisable.
6.4 Developing the state’s trilogy of obligations
I advance an understanding of  the Namibian state’s correlative obligations 
flowing from the AQuA elements of  a right to water that is informed by 
the trilogy of  duties approach: respect, protect and fulfil. This framework 
has been argued under article 6, specifically, and the Bill of  Rights 
provisions, generally, in chapter 3 of  the book. Indeed, the trilogy of  
duties approach is extensively endorsed by the ESCR Committee and the 
African Commission.73 This part argues that a right to water’s correlative 
obligations includes non-negatable essential content obligations and 
general non-core obligations. 
While the analysis in chapter 3 made the case for the nature of  duties 
that bind the state, this part builds upon that to analyse the content of  
those duties. It is stressed here that negative or restraint duties are often 
contrasted directly with positive duties such that the erroneous claim is 
made that positive duties are indeterminate, forward-looking, resource-
intensive, and programmatic, thus requiring only progressive realisation 
as resources become available while duties of  restraint are determinate, 
immediately realisable, and without resource implications.74 Suffice to 
mention that perspectives asserting this strict dichotomy are now largely 
antiquated, with scholars such as Riedel and Fredman offering compelling 
regional and domestic level (2015) 25.
72 Report of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the scope 
and content of  the relevant human rights obligations related to equitable access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation under international human rights instruments, HRC 
(16 August 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/6/3 para 42.
73 For a discussion of  the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil from the perspective of  
the right to water, see Chávarro (n 71) 29-38.
74 Fredman (n 64) 70.
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critiques of  how such characterisations are overdrawn and unhelpful, 
particularly in contexts of  socio-economic rights such as water.75 
The respect duty relates predominately to negative76 duties where the 
state is obligated to exercise restraint. The African Commission in SERAC 
classifies the duty to respect as a ‘primary level’ obligation of  the state, one 
that ‘entails that the State should refrain from interfering in the enjoyment 
of  all fundamental rights; it should respect right-holders, their freedoms, 
autonomy, resources, and liberty of  their action’.77 Ssenyonjo argues that 
the respect duty imposes an immediate obligation upon states under both 
the African Charter and ICESCR.78 Further, Butlo maintains that the 
respect duty should not only be approached as encapsulating inaction 
and non-interference by the state in the liberal political philosophy of  a 
minimalist state, one that interferes as little as possible with individual 
autonomy and freedom. Rather, Bulto argues for the state’s role to be one 
of  oversight (as opposed to interference) to ensure that the right holders 
enjoy their rights and freedoms in a manner akin to ‘the night watchman 
state’, a role that ensures that no danger ensues.79 Indeed, this conception 
of  the respect duty aligns with an ubuntu-inspired understanding of  
correlative duties defended in chapter 3. 
Throughout General Comment 15 the ESCR Committee identifies 
various obligations that the state must respect, with a particular focus 
on the state to refrain from engaging in practices or activities that deny 
or limit equal access to adequate water, and the arbitrary interference 
with customary or traditional arrangements for water allocation. These 
concerns firmly resonate with Namibia where the majority of  those with 
precarious access to water reside in rural areas.80 The ESCR Committee 
also mentions unlawfully diminishing or polluting water, for example, 
through waste from state-owned facilities or through use and testing 
75 Fredman (n 64) 70-84; E Riedel ‘Core obligations in social rights and human dignity’ 
in M Geis et al (eds) Festschrift für Friedhelm Hufen (2015) 79.
76 Cf  Koch’s critique as to whether there can in fact be such a thing as a ‘negative’ 
obligation given the difficulty in identifying an obligation of  non-interference that is 
devoid of  some sort of  positive measure. I Koch Human rights as indivisible rights: The 
protection of  socio-economic demands under the European Convention of  Human Rights (2009) 
17. 
77 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001) para 45.
78 M Ssenyonjo ‘Reflections on state obligations with respect to economic, social and 
cultural rights in international human rights law’ (2011) 15 International Journal of  
Human Rights 969 975. 
79 Bulto (n 22) 92.
80 GC15 (n 2) para 21.
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of  weapons; and limiting access to, or destroying, water services and 
infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example, during armed conflicts 
in violation of  international humanitarian law.81 
Bulto observes that the respect duty, relative to other duties, does not 
generally involve resource distribution or reallocation.82 The respect duty, 
therefore, does not readily aid in improving the situation of  those who do 
not have the conditions necessary for the enjoyment of  a given right. In 
the water context, it does not necessarily require the immediate allocation 
of  a safe and adequate quantity and quality of  water to those who did not 
previously enjoy the right.83 Rather, the respect duty would often preserve 
the status quo by ensuring that there is effectively no regression from a 
previously-enjoyed right to water.84
The protect duty relates to actions or omissions that interfere with 
water resources through conduct such as pollution, diversions and 
inequitable allocations. However, the protect duty is not only violated 
at the state’s hand; third parties, which may include states and non-state 
actors, can interfere with the right. As this analysis focuses on the state, 
it is the state that must take measures to prevent third parties – whether 
individuals, groups or corporations – from interfering in any way with 
the enjoyment of  the right to water.85 As Fredman asserts, the duty to 
protect ‘introduces a three-way relationship between the state, the right 
holder … and the perpetrator of  the breach’.86 Indeed, it is precisely this 
three-dimensional protect duty that Nigeria was found to have violated 
in SERAC by failing to protect the Ogoni peoples’ rights – including life, 
water, food and the environment – from private oil companies.87 
To comply with the duty to protect, the Namibian state is required to 
adopt necessary and effective legislation and other measures, as well as 
to ensure the existence of  effective remedies for the protection of  rights 
81 As above.
82 Cf  Holmes and Sunstein who argue that all rights are positive in the sense that they 
attract budgetary implications: S Holmes & C Sunstein The cost of  rights: Why liberty 
depends on taxes (1999) 1.
83 Bulto (n 22) 92.
84 As above.
85 GC15 (n 2) para 23.
86 Fredman (n 64) 73. 
87 Bulto (n 22) 94.
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holders.88 Other measures may be administrative, budgetary and judicial 
in nature.89 
According to the ESCR Committee, the state’s protect duty includes 
measures that restrain third parties from denying equal access to adequate 
water, and polluting or inequitably extracting from water resources, 
including natural sources, wells, and other water distribution systems.90 The 
protect duty applies where water services (such as piped water networks, 
water tankers, access to rivers and wells) are operated or controlled by 
third parties as the state must prevent them from compromising equal, 
affordable and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water.91 
To comply with the protect duty of  preventing and remedying right to 
water violations by third parties, the state is obliged to establish an effective 
regulatory system ‘which includes independent monitoring, genuine 
public participation and imposition of  penalties for non-compliance’.92 
On the persuasive authority of  the decision of  the African Commission 
in Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad 93 in the 
context of  the Chadian civil war, the protect duty arises even where the 
state was not actively involved in the violation of  the rights.
Finally, the fulfil duty turns to the obligations that the state must 
actively take to facilitate opportunities by which the rights can be enjoyed. 
This duty requires positive measures by the state to assist individuals and 
communities in enjoying the right to water. This obliges the state to take 
steps to ensure that there is education concerning hygienic water use, 
protection of  water sources, and methods to minimise water wastage.94 
Where individuals or groups are unable to realise their right to water 
themselves, the state is obliged to fulfil their right.95 The obligation to fulfil 
thus requires the state to adopt necessary measures directed towards the 
full realisation of  the right to water.96 The ESCR Committee states that this 
88 GC15 (n 2) para 23; SERAC (n 77) para 46.
89 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
adopted 22-26 January 1997 para 6, reprinted in ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 
691 (Maastricht Guidelines).
90 GC15 (n 2) para 23.
91 As above.
92 GC15 para 24.
93 (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995) paras 19-20.
94 GC15 (n 2) para 25.
95 As above.
96 GC15 para 27.
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includes obligations such as according sufficient recognition of  the right 
within the national political and legal systems, preferably by legislative 
implementation; adopting a national water strategy and plan of  action; 
ensuring affordability; and facilitating improved and sustainable access to 
water, particularly in rural and deprived urban areas.97
The ESCR Committee also specifies the obligation on the state to 
ensure that water is affordable. This speaks to the second-order scarcity 
of  the adaptive capacity of  the state to manage first-order scarcity by 
adopting measures to ensure access to water does not result from financial 
constraints. To meet its obligations, the state may adopt measures such as 
(i) the use of  a range of  appropriate low-cost techniques and technologies; 
(ii) appropriate pricing policies such as free or low-cost water; and 
(iii) income supplements.98 Among the positive steps that should be adopted 
are included comprehensive and integrated strategies and programmes to 
ensure that there is sufficient and safe water for not only the present but 
also future generations. The ESCR Committee further identifies strategies 
and programmes that may include:99 
(a) reducing depletion of  water resources through unsustainable extraction, 
diversion, and damming; 
(b) reducing and eliminating contamination of  watersheds and water-related 
ecosystems by substances such as radiation, harmful chemicals, and 
human excreta; 
(c) monitoring water reserves; 
(d) ensuring that proposed developments do not interfere with access to 
adequate water; 
(e) assessing the impacts of  actions that may impinge upon water 
availability and natural-ecosystems watersheds, such as climate changes, 
desertification and increased soil salinity, deforestation, and loss of  
biodiversity; 
(f) increasing the efficient use of  water by end-users; 
(g) reducing water wastage in its distribution; 
(h) response mechanisms for emergency situations; and
(i) establishing competent institutions and appropriate institutional 
arrangements to carry out the strategies and programmes.
It is important to stress the interdependence of  the state’s trilogy of  
duties here. Inasmuch as these three duties are largely assessed separately 
above, they seldom exist independently, as we see in decisions such as 
97 As above.
98 As above.
99 GC15 para 28.
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SERAC. Just as it is frequently affirmed that social and economic rights 
are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible,100 so too should the 
state’s duties attract the same characterisation and qualities. While the 
level of  emphasis in the application of  these duties varies depending on 
the context, the need to meaningfully enjoy some of  the rights demands 
concerted action from the state in terms of  more than one of  the three 
duties.101 For example, the state’s duty to protect the right to water, while 
ordinarily necessitating abstention, also requires that the state ensure 
judicial remedies where the right is breached.102 In the same vein, the 
duty to respect cannot be dissociated from the duty to protect as the 
non-interference by the state in the enjoyment of  the right would prove 
inadequate in the face of  a right to water violation by third parties.103 
This approach is consistent with the argument advanced in chapter 3 of  
using the trilogy of  duties approach for conceptual clarity and systematic 
analysis.104
In light of  the respect, protect, fulfil framework, what follows is an 
analysis of  what I advance as the two distinct tiers of  the obligations that 
flow from a right to water in Namibia. These are the core normative content 
obligations and general normative content obligations. The argument will 
be made for the former as attracting irreducibility, urgency and immediacy, 
while the latter is being subject to the temporal requirement of  progressive 
realisation. First, I will offer a defence of  the minimum core content 
obligations concept in the context of  water before addressing those general 
normative content obligations that are to be progressively realised. 
6.5 The core content of obligations flowing from a right to 
water 
In this part I make the case for a minimum essential/core content of  
obligations, flowing from a right to water, that Namibia must realise. The 
ESCR Committee affirms in General Comment 3105 that state parties 
retain various core obligations to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of  each of  the ICESCR rights. General 
100 Maastricht Guidelines (n 89).
101 SERAC (n 77) para 48.
102 Bulto (n 22) 98.
103 As above.
104 I Koch ‘Dichotomies, trichotomies or waves of  duties’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law 
Review 8. 
105 General Comment 3: The Nature of  States Parties’ Obligations (art 2.1, para 1, of  the 
Covenant), CESCR (14 December 1990) UN Doc E/1991/23.
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Comment 15 takes forward this principle by identifying nine non-
derogable,106 immediate, core content obligations:107
(a) to ensure access to the minimum essential amount of  water, that is 
sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease; 
(b) to ensure the right of  access to water and water facilities and services on 
a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalised 
groups; 
(c) to ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide 
sufficient, safe and regular water; that have a sufficient number of  water 
outlets to avoid prohibitive waiting times; and that are at a reasonable 
distance from the household; 
(d) to ensure personal security is not threatened when having to physically 
access water; 
(e) to ensure equitable distribution of  all available water facilities and 
services; 
(f) to adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of  action 
addressing the whole population; the strategy and plan of  action should 
be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of  a participatory and 
transparent process; it should include methods, such as right to water 
indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; 
the process by which the strategy and plan of  action are devised, as well 
as their content, shall give particular attention to all disadvantaged or 
marginalised groups; 
(g) to monitor the extent of  the realisation, or the non-realisation, of  the 
right to water;
(h) to adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect 
vulnerable and marginalised groups; and
(i) to take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in 
particular ensuring access to adequate sanitation.
These core obligations are not exhaustive. I propose that these core 
obligations would be engaged as starting points in determining the Namibian 
state’s specific core obligations as opposed to being prescriptive. In addition, 
a right to water’s minimum core obligations under General Comment 15 
are to be read with the Nairobi Principles,108 the latter explicitly specifying 
only three core obligations. Similar to General Comment 15, the Nairobi 
Principles mention access to a minimum essential amount of  water as well 
as the state’s obligation to ensure safe physical access to water facilities 
and services based on waiting times and distances travelled. Uniquely, 
106 GC15 (n 2) para 40.
107 GC15 para 37.
108 Nairobi Principles (n 4) para 92.
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however, the Nairobi Principles also mention the state’s core obligation to 
‘[r]efrain from using access to water as a political tool’.109 The political tool 
concern doubtlessly is in response to water precariousness experienced 
across Africa, and where ‘hydropolitics’ sometimes manifest as political 
leverage for vulnerable electorates.110 
It is appropriate to note that, in fulfilling their water core obligations, 
General Comment 15 emphasises that developing states are to be provided 
with international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical, by developed ICESCR state parties and other actors.111 While 
the ESCR Committee anchors the obligation of  international assistance 
and cooperation textually in article 2(1) of  ICESCR, a full analysis of  
the obligations of  developed contracting ICESCR state parties as regards 
developing states such as Namibia is outside the ambit of  this book.112
I turn to examine the minimum core content obligations framework, 
which I argue is substantively akin to the Constitution’s non-negatable 
essential content of  a right to water. 
6.5.1 A constitutional defence of  minimum core and essential content
While not entirely identical, the concepts of  minimum core and non-
negatable essential content in article 22(a) of  the Constitution share a 
common philosophical basis and significant doctrinal similarities.113 The 
terms thus are invoked interchangeably in this chapter. While the minimum 
core concept is the subject of  longstanding debate in both domestic and 
international human rights law, this analysis will take a bespoke approach 
to the Namibian context where the minimum core debate has barely found 
traction. 
109 As above.
110 See M Kitissou et al (eds) The hydropolitics of  Africa: A contemporary challenge (2007).
111 GC15 (n 2) para 38.
112 For an analysis of  the meaning of  ‘international assistance and cooperation’ and 
whether ICESCR obliges developed states to transfer resources to developing states 
and whether developing states are obliged to seek such ‘assistance and cooperation’, 
see Ssenyonjo (n 78) 983; A Khalfan ‘Development cooperation and extraterritorial 
obligations’ in Langford & Russell (n 60) 396.
113 See Riedel (n 75) 79, who identifies three notions of  core obligations: a minimum 
threshold; a minimum core obligation; and a minimum core content of  rights. The 
terminological shifts by the ESCR Committee in terms of  the minimum core has over 
time been traced through the ‘minimum subsistence rights’; ‘minimum essential levels’; 
‘international minimum threshold’; ‘core content’; ‘minimum core obligations’; and 
‘core obligations’. L Forman et al ‘Conceptualising minimum core obligations under 
the right to health: How should we define and implement the “morality of  the depths”’ 
(2016) 20 International Journal of  Human Rights 531 536.
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The primary social-moral attractiveness in asserting a minimum core 
concept is the reality that many Namibians do not enjoy the most basic 
content of  their right to water, as exposed in chapter 1. Beyond social-
moral reasoning, this part will develop legal arguments of  a normative 
and constitutional nature to justify the assertion of  the minimum core 
concept for human rights under the Constitution, generally, and for a right 
to water, specifically. First, we commence with an analysis of  the origins 
of  the minimum core concept.114
Origins of  the minimum core 
The minimum core concept represents the idea that certain essential 
elements of  a right are absolute, irreducible and unrelinquishable. The 
concept finds greatest prominence in the context of  positive obligations that 
arise out of  both civil-political and socio-economic rights. The normative-
cum-philosophical undergird of  the minimum core is aptly articulated by 
Örücü in 1986, who draws on German and Turkish perspectives on the 
irreducible essential content of  a right.115 Örücü queries how far a right 
can be regulated and limited before it reaches the state of  being vacuous or 
illusory. He analyses the issue by arguing for three distinct parts of  a right: 
the ‘guaranteed core’ which is indefeasible, the ‘circumjacence’ which is 
defeasible, and an ‘outer edge’.116 In other words, a right has a membrane 
that divides the circumjacent area from the core of  a right.117 
The minimum core concept today is a standard that is well-entrenched 
in international human rights law, most notably in General Comment 3 
where the ESCR Committee took the view that 
a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of  each of  the rights is incumbent upon every State 
party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of  
individuals is deprived of  essential foodstuffs, of  essential primary health 
care, of  basic shelter and housing, or of  the most basic forms of  education, 
is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If  the 
Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum 
114 For a historical development of  MC, the emergence of  the core concept, see Forman et 
al (n 113) 532.
115 E Örücü ‘The core of  rights and freedoms: The limit of  limits’ in T Campbell et al 
(eds) Human rights: From rhetoric to reality (1986) 37.
116 Örücü (n 115) 46.
117 Örücü (n 115) 48. See also Limburg Principles on the Implementation of  the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1987/17 para 25: ‘States parties are obligated, regardless of  the level of  
economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all.’
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core obligation, it would be largely deprived of  its raison d’être. By the 
same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has 
discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of  resource 
constraints applying within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) [ICESCR] 
obligates each State party to take the necessary steps “to the maximum of  its 
available resources”. In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure 
to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of  available resources it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are 
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of  priority, those minimum 
obligations.118
General Comment 3 has found subsequent endorsement in various 
substantive ESCR Committee General Comments that assert minimum 
core obligations for education,119 housing120 and, indeed, water. Here, I 
argue for the minimum core concept based on the use of  international 
agreements as interpretative aids for constitutional Bills of  Rights, as 
established in chapter 4.
When the ESCR Committee was established in 1985, the urgency 
of  clarifying the normative content of  each of  the ICESCR rights was 
identified as among the principal challenges to be addressed by the 
Committee.121 Alston, in a 1987 article published while serving as the 
founding Rapporteur of  the ESCR Committee, observed that ICESCR 
rights were particularly vague in their normative implications, a reality 
attributed to ICESCR not being based upon any significant bodies of  
domestic jurisprudence when contrasted with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the civil-political rights 
therein.122 Alston further draws on ICESCR’s drafting history to make 
a case for an absolute minimum core content and entitlement of  each 
right that cannot be diminished under the pretext of  permitted ‘reasonable 
differences’.123
118 General Comment 3 (n 105) para 10. I will return to address the issue of  the potential 
limitation of  minimum core obligations, as the last sentence of  this paragraph suggests, 
later in this chapter. 
119 General Comment 13: The Right to Education (Art 13 of  the Covenant), CESCR 
(8 December 1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10.
120 General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art 11(1) of  the Covenant), 
CESCR (13 December 1991) UN Doc E/1992/23.
121 P Alston ‘Out of  the abyss: The challenges confronting the new UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332 351.
122 As above. 
123 Alston (n 121) 352-353; see also B Andreassen et al ‘Assessing human rights 
performance in developing countries: The case for a minimal threshold approach to 
the economic and social rights’ in B Andreassen et al Human rights in developing countries 
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While the intellectual development of  the minimum core under 
international human rights law is often attributed to Alston, the concept’s 
genesis has been traced by scholars such as Young124 and Riedel125 to 
earlier domestic constitutional law, specifically the German basic 
law126 (grundgesetz) and the now obsolete 1961 Turkish Constitution.127 
More recently, the essential content concept has been incorporated in 
recent constitutions of  Kenya,128 Hungary129 and Angola.130 What these 
provisions share is that they all expressly assert an ‘essential content’ of  
certain constitutional rights that are peremptory and categorical, thus 
lying beyond the reach of  permissible limitation. This, I argue in the next 
part, is a feature shared by Namibia’s Constitution. 
Constitutionally justifying the minimum core/essential content
The most compelling argument for embracing a minimum core approach 
for fundamental rights such as water is anchored in the text of  the 
Namibian Constitution. As explained in chapter 3 of  the book, ‘the text 
is the surest guide’ to constitutional interpretation. Article 22 of  the 
Constitution states: 
1987/1988: A yearbook on human rights in countries receiving narcotic aid (1988) 
333. 
124 K Young Constituting social and economic rights (2012) 81.
125 Riedel (n 75) 79.
126 German Basic Law art 19(2) (official translation): ‘In no case may the essential content 
(wesengehalt) of  a basic right be encroached upon.’ See German analysis of  the essential 
content in I Leijten Core socio-economic rights and the European Court of  Human Rights 
(2018) 123-141.
127 See discussion of  the Turkish Constitutional Court’s approach to limitations that 
encroach upon the core of  a right in Örücü (n 115) 50, who refers to examples – albeit 
vague – such as where a limitation makes the exercise of  a right or freedom extremely 
difficult or even impossible, it binds a right to such conditions as to make it impotent, 
it is explicitly prohibitive, it is implicitly prohibitive, it takes away its efficacy, and so 
forth. 
128 2010 Kenyan Constitution art 24(2)(c): ‘Despite clause (1), a provision in legislation 
limiting a right or fundamental freedom – shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom 
so far as to derogate from its core or essential content’ (my emphasis).
129 2011 Hungarian Constitution art 1(3): ‘The rules for fundamental rights and obligations 
shall be determined by special Acts. A fundamental right may be restricted to allow 
the exercise of  another fundamental right or to defend any constitutional value to 
the extent absolutely necessary, in proportion to the desired goal and in respect of  the 
essential content of  such fundamental right’ (my emphasis).
130 2010 Angolan Constitution art 236(e): ‘Alterations to the Constitution must … respect 
essential core rights, freedoms and guarantees’ (my emphasis).
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Limitation upon Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
Whenever or wherever in terms of  this Constitution the limitation of  any 
fundamental rights or freedoms contemplated by this Chapter is authorised, 
any law providing for such limitation shall: 
(a) be of  general application, shall not negate the essential content thereof, and 
shall not be aimed at a particular individual; 
(b) specify the ascertainable extent of  such limitation and identify the Article 
or Articles hereof  on which authority to enact such limitation is claimed 
to rest.131
The limitation of  rights clause in article 22(a) protects the essential content 
of  fundamental rights. It thus envisages a ‘limit on the limitations’ that 
can be placed upon fundamental rights as specified in the general rights 
limitation clause of  article 22(b), in addition to a specific article’s internal 
limitation provisions. 
In dissecting the meaning of  a right’s essential content under article 
22(a), the cumulative nature and effect of  the following limitations 
elements are to be emphasised: the limitation (i) shall be of  general 
application; (ii) shall not negate the essential content of  any fundamental right 
or freedoms; and (iii) shall not be aimed at a particular individual. This 
analysis will sharpen its focus on the second element of  essential content. 
The Constitution makes no further reference to the meaning or scope 
of  the essential content of  a right, and there is a paucity in scholarship 
critiquing the phrase.132 However, the Namibian Supreme Court has relied 
on the essential content concept in Attorney-General v Minister of  Justice 
when called upon to consider the content of  the right to a fair trial in 
article 12 of  the Constitution, stating:133
[T]he essential content of  [the Article 12 right to a fair trial] in the determination 
of  all persons’ ‘civil rights and obligations or any criminal charges against 
them’ and that the rest of  the sub-articles, which only relates to criminal 
trials, expounds on the minimum procedural and substantive requirements 
for hearings of  that nature to be fair. A closer reading of  [Article] 12 in its 
entirety makes it clear that its substratum is the right to a fair trial. The list of  
specific rights embodied in [Article] 12(1)(b) to (f) does not, in my view, purport 
to be exhaustive of  the requirements of  the fair criminal hearing and as such it 
131 My emphasis.
132 See also F Bangamwabo ‘The justiciability of  socio-economic rights in Namibia: 
Challenges and opportunities’ (2013) 5 Namibia Law Journal 85.
133 Attorney-General v Minister of  Justice 2013 (3) NR 806 (SC) para 17 (my emphasis).
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may be expanded upon by the Courts in their important task to give substance to the 
overarching right to a fair trial.
Further, the Supreme Court in Alexander v Minister of  Justice considered 
section 21 of  the Extradition Act of  1996 that had imposed an absolute 
prohibition upon the granting of  bail for persons subjected to extradition 
proceedings. This was held to be a limitation that completely negated 
the essential content of  the right to liberty protected under article 7 of  
the Constitution. Relying on article 22(a), section 21 was found to be 
unconstitutional as it had ‘completely trumped’ the right to liberty, which 
was constitutionally impermissible as a fundamental right’s essential 
content could not be negated.134 Non-negatability should be understood 
as implying the immediacy of  compliance with the state’s obligations that 
form part of  the right’s essential content under article 22(a).
To buttress the Constitution’s textual justification of  the essential 
content of  a right, I argue for a purposive, transformative and re-
invigorative approach that affirms a right to water’s non-negatable and 
immediate minimum obligations through normative anchorage in the 
value of  ubuntu. Chapter 3 has elaborated upon the four interrelated 
principles of  ubuntu – community, interdependence, solidarity and 
dignity – to argue for ubuntu as a constitutional value. Collectively, these 
principles normatively justify recognising and determining minimum core 
obligations of  fundamental rights generally, and specifically water. The 
individual person is part of  the community, but the individual’s needs and 
concerns are not inferior to those of  the community.
Ubuntu demands that society affirms the value of  every individual, with 
the individual’s status being equal to that of  the community. Particularly 
in the context of  water provision that requires compliance with duties 
retaining resource implications, ubuntu rejects an adversarial notion of  
interests between the individual and the community in the distributive 
decision-making process. The state is responsible for all individuals and 
communities. Accepting the minimum core aspects of  a right to water 
would allow us to give credence to the notion that every individual is 
significant and is entitled, as an assertion of  the non-negatable essential 
content of  their right, to quantity and quality of  water not only for their 
survival but also for a dignified life. Dignity here is in the ubuntu sense 
– the indispensable concern for one’s livelihood and socio-economic well-
being – and thus justifies a right to water’s various immediate positive 
duties articulated in this chapter, duties that are borne by the state as the 
primary duty bearer for the AQuA elements of  water. This drives home 
134 Alexander v Minister of  Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 (SC) paras 119 & 126.
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the interdependence principle in ubuntu, which is motivated by a shared 
responsibility to one another and avoids the risk of  indefinitely postponing 
the state’s water obligations to the detriment of  the right-holder. 
An ubuntu-inspired approach to the minimum core is also instrumental 
in ensuring that those obligations that the state is to discharge are framed 
such that they move human interests from the periphery to the centre. 
The aim is to safeguard the sense of  ubuntu – in the dignitarian sense – 
of  individuals and the community given their inextricability.135 Ubuntu 
thus allows us to counteract the potential limitation of  an understanding 
of  the minimum core’s scope as referring merely to those minimum 
essential levels of  water that relate to human survival interests.136 
A right to water would be significantly diminished if  only the minimum 
essential levels for human survival were obligatory. Indeed, neither would 
ubuntu as a re-invigorative constitutionalism paradigm or transformative 
constitutionalism countenance such a narrow interpretation.137
I will turn to the democratic legitimacy and institutional competency 
reasons advanced by the South African Constitutional Court for rejecting 
the minimum core approach. These concerns are concomitant to the 
institutional justiciability objections to a right to water that were already 
addressed in chapter 5 and are navigated through an application of  the 
deliberative democracy model that I have advanced. 
Reconciling minimum core with the bounded deliberation model 
Having advanced a constitutional defence of  the minimum core, the 
challenge here is how to reconcile the minimum core approach with 
the bounded deliberative democracy model propounded in chapter 5 to 
address institutional justiciability concerns arising from a right to water. 
The potential difficulty is that embracing the minimum core undermines 
the effectiveness of  a bounded deliberation model as it does not sit 
well with the non-negatable and immediate nature of  minimum core 
obligations, which would be outside the remit of  deliberation between 
state organs. The concern is that a bounded deliberation model may leave 
135 See S Liebenberg ‘The value of  human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ 
(2005) 21 South African Human Rights Law Journal 1.
136 D Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the 
foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 1 11; S Fredman Comparative human rights law (2019) 70-71.
137 Similarly, Winkler argues against a narrow survival interests approach; Winkler (n 11) 
121. It can further be argued that ubuntu’s upper threshold excludes the provision of  
those goods that may be considered luxuries, particularly where individuals continue 
to lack a basic level of  material welfare. 
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the scope for non-compliance with the state’s water obligations, leaving 
open the possibility of  advancing reasons to justify a negation from the 
essential content of  a right when adjudicating the state’s obligations. 
Another objection is that the minimum core approach would introduce 
an intrusive rule-based approach which, as Steinberg has argued, is likely 
to stifle institutional conversation and collaboration between the state’s 
three organs.138 
In response, I argue that the ostensible incongruence between a 
bounded deliberation model and minimum core obligations can be 
overcome and reconciled. First, it is again stressed that the minimum 
core argument outlined above is constitutionally entrenched as it flows 
from the text of  the Constitution: Article 22(a) asserts the non-negatable 
essential content of  a right. It is only the non-core aspects of  the right – the 
‘circumjacence’ and outer edge – that can be the subject of  deliberation 
and reasoned justification. Any normative undesirability arguments 
against the minimum core concept are thus subsidiary to the Constitution’s 
predetermined imperatives. 
Second, it is pertinent that the Constitution’s Bill of  Rights provisions 
do not explicitly identify the precise aspects of  each right as forming part 
of  the essential content that is beyond negation. It would, therefore, be 
within the realm of  legitimate deliberation by the courts to decide what 
falls within the essential content through judicial review.139 This may be 
obvious with respect to certain aspects of  a right. For example, the right to 
a fair trial would doubtlessly include the presumption of  innocence as part 
of  its essential content. For many rights, however, the essential content 
may be less obvious. Indeed, in the context of  a right to water, a court 
would effectively first need to determine, through a process of  deliberation, 
precisely which aspects of  the state’s obligations would fall within the 
essential and non-negatable core of  a right to water. This process would 
inevitably involve constitutional interpretation that considers the text, as 
‘the surest guide’, and which is purposively interpreted while embracing 
transformative and re-invigorative constitutionalism paradigms. 
Nevertheless, given the normative paucity on the substantive content of  
a right to water in the Constitution, recourse should also be had to an 
amalgamation of  extraneous authorities that are strictly persuasive yet 
compelling as normative resources, such as ESCR Committee’s General 
Comments, the African Commission Principles and Guidelines, and the 
WHO Guidelines.
138 C Steinberg ‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of  South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264 274. 
139 Ssenyonjo (n 78) 975.
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Given the soft law nature of  these normative resources, nothing 
prevents the courts from engaging with the content of  the express 
core obligations and individually adjudicating whether a specific core 
obligation forms part of  the essential content of  a right to water under the 
Constitution. The bounded deliberative democracy model thus is relevant 
and useful in deliberating as to whether or not a given obligation actually 
forms part of  the right’s core. 
From the perspective of  evidence, this signifies an important 
clarification of  the burden of  proof  upon the state, as the primary duty 
bearer, to justify its actions and not the right holder who may be in an 
already disadvantaged socio-economic position. The state’s justificatory 
burden is critical to realising an ethos of  transformative constitutionalism 
in achieving meaningful socio-economic justice for all. Once the court 
has made a determination that a specific obligation forms part of  the 
core, then that duty would be cast in stone such that a failure to comply 
with a said duty would constitute a violation by the state without the 
further possibility for inter-institutional engagement through bounded 
deliberation. The Supreme Court’s approach in both Alexander v Minister 
of  Justice and Attorney-General v Minister of  Justice, discussed above in 
the context of  liberty and fair trial rights respectively, substantiate the 
feasibility of  this approach.
The core obligations would thus include all tripartite duties under 
a right to water. For example, the duty to respect includes the core 
obligation of  the state to refrain from using water as a political tool. The 
duty to protect would include the core obligation of  the state to ensure 
that, in addition to its constitutive organs, third parties do not contaminate 
existing water sources. The duty to fulfil would include a core obligation 
on the state to ensure that each individual has access to water of  a quantity 
and quality that ensures not just the bare necessaries of  life, but a dignified 
life as informed by ubuntu. 
The approach proposed ensures that bounded deliberation as a model 
for adjudicating water’s justiciability remains pivotal, given its normative 
appeal as constructed in chapter 5. The state would be required to justify 
the measures it has taken to fulfil the core obligations of  the right and 
justify its actions or inaction, with limited scope for judicial deference to 
the other organs of  the state. At the same time, it allows room for inter-
institutional deliberation on the state’s obligations to play a meaningful 
role in adjudicating the non-core aspects of  a right to water’s obligations. 
Appropriately, the bounded deliberative democracy model can most fully 
and effectively be deployed when courts seek to evaluate the aspects of  the 
state’s compliance with the progressively realisable dimensions of  water 
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in light of  the resource constraints of  the state. It is to the progressive 
realisation dimension of  the state’s obligations that I will turn later in this 
chapter. 
At this juncture it is necessary to highlight the strict nature of  the 
essential content approach in article 22(a) of  the Constitution as materially 
distinguishable from the minimum core approach under General Comment 
15 read together with General Comment 3. It will be recalled that General 
Comment 3 – while taking the view that several minimum core obligations 
arise from each socio-economic right – also allows a state ‘to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of  available 
resources’ where it has demonstrated that ‘every effort has been made to 
use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter 
of  priority, those minimum obligations’.140
Article 22(a) of  the Constitution, however, takes a strict approach – 
the essential content of  a right shall not be negated. The state can offer no 
justification even on the basis of  resource considerations. Therefore, this 
aspect of  General Comment 3’s minimum core approach must yield to 
article 22(a), given that the Constitution is not ‘equivocal or uncertain’.141 
A similar construction is advanced in the Maastricht Guidelines that 
compel ‘minimum core obligations irrespective of  national availability of  
resources or other factors or difficulties’.142
The essential content of  a right is irrefutably non-negatable. This 
thus forecloses the prospect of  the state invoking the principle in General 
Comment 3 to justify its failure to meet its minimum core obligations for 
a right to water based on resource limitations. Further, as this analysis 
is undertaken in the specific setting of  Namibia, one of  the foremost 
normative debates on the minimum core as determining a common 
universal minimum core that is unresponsive to country-specific needs is 
rendered redundant.
6.5.2 Distinguishing South African comparative jurisprudence on minimum 
core 
A reading of  the Constituent Assembly Debates to the Constitution sheds 
little light on the drafters’ choice of  protecting a right’s essential content 
that cannot be negated. However, this drafting style was not novel when 
the Constitution was drafted as it found expression in domestic and 
140 General Comment 3 (n 105) para 10.
141 Kauesa v Minister of  Home Affairs 1994 NR (HC) 135 141. See analysis in ch 4. 
142 Maastricht Guidelines (n 89) para 9.
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international law settings, although not with the precise formulation of  
article 22(a) of  the Constitution. I have already addressed the international 
law setting in the analysis of  the ESCR Committee’s General Comment 3. 
I turn to consider domestic constitutional jurisprudence on the minimum 
core with the view to distinguish those comparative South African 
decisions – being an appropriate comparator, as argued in chapter 1 – that 
have considered and rejected the minimum core approach in adjudicating 
socio-economic rights.143 
In Makwanyane144 the South African Constitutional Court, in deciding 
the constitutionality of  the death penalty, was called upon to interpret 
the content of  the right to life: whether the imposition of  the death 
penalty negated the essential content of  the right.145 Section 33(1)(b) of  
the 1993 Interim South African Constitution asserted that the law of  
general application may limit the rights entrenched in the Bill of  Rights, 
provided that such limitation, even where it was reasonable and necessary, 
‘shall not negate the essential content of  the right in question’. Six of  the 
judges in Makwanyane had considered the essential content text but found 
interpretative difficulty in determining its exact meaning and scope. They 
thus preferred to decide on other grounds such as reasonableness and 
values, including dignity and ubuntu.146 Notably, the non-negatability of  
the essential content of  a right formulation was subsequently omitted from 
section 36 in the final 1996 South African Constitution’s limitation of  rights 
clause. Commentators maintain that this omission was a consequence of  
Makwanyane’s difficulty in determining the exact meaning of  the essential 
content of  the right.147
Over a decade later, in Mazibuko,148 five applicants who were 
residents of  the township of  Phiri in Soweto sought to challenge the 
City of  Johannesburg’s water policy in the South African Constitutional 
Court. The principal issue for our purposes was whether the supply of  
free basic water of  6 kilolitres per month to every account holder in the 
143 See critique in Fredman (n 136) 71-73.
144 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
145 Makwanyane (n 144) paras 39, 98, 103 & 132-134.
146 Makwanyane (n 144) (Chaskalson P) paras 132-134; (Ackermann J) para 167; (Didcott 
J) para 175; (Kentridge J) paras 193-195; (Mohamed J) para 298, (O’Regan J) para 343. 
147 See analysis in H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of  property and its 
influence on the reform of  private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany: A 
comparative analysis (2002) 362-364.
148 Mazibuko & Others v City of  Johannesburg & Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). For a concise 
analysis of  right to water decisions in South African courts, see J Dugard et al 
‘Determining progress on access to water and sanitation: The case of  South Africa’ in 
Langford & Russell (n 60) 237-242.
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City – regardless of  the household size – was in conflict with section 
27(1)(b) of  the 1996 South African Constitution. Following the South 
African Constitution’s two-part formulation of  socio-economic rights, 
section 27(1)(b) entrenches a human right to access sufficient water, while 
the state is enjoined by section 27(2) to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of  the right.
Relevant here is the Constitutional Court’s approach in adjudicating 
the water policy of  the City in relation to the minimum core concept as a 
proper interpretation of  the relationship between section 27(1) and 27(2) 
of  the South African Constitution.149 In Mazibuko the minimum core issue 
arose as the applicants had invited the Court to determine the content of  
their right to water under section 27(1)(b) by quantifying the amount of  
water sufficient for a dignified life, which the applicants had argued was 
50 litres per person per day.150 
The Court recognised the minimum core argument as originating from 
international law, specifically the ESCR Committee’s General Comment 
3 minimum core approach.151 The Court noted its earlier rejection of  
the minimum core that the state is obliged to provide in South African 
constitutional socio-economic rights adjudication, as seen in Grootboom152 
and Treatment Action Campaign153 on housing and health rights respectively. 
The Court considered the minimum core approach inappropriate for two 
major reasons. The first reason arose from the text of  the South African 
Constitution while the second was from an understanding of  the proper 
role of  courts in South Africa as a constitutional democracy. The Court 
reasoned that sections 27(1) and (2) must be read together to delineate 
the scope of  the positive obligation to provide access to sufficient water 
imposed upon the state. The Court found that no right to claim ‘sufficient 
water’ from the state was conferred immediately but the state was obligated 
to take reasonable legislative and other measures progressively to achieve 
the right to sufficient water within available resources.154
149 Mazibuko (n 148) para 44. See critique in Fredman (n 136) 71-73. 
150 Mazibuko (n 148) para 50.
151 Mazibuko (n 148) para 52. Both the Mazibuko High Court and Supreme Court of  
Appeal decisions had prescribed a minimum quantity of  water per person per day of  
50 litres and 42 litres respectively. 
152 Government of  the Republic of  South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) paras 29-33.
153 Minister of  Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) paras 26-34.
154 Mazibuko (n 148) para 56.
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It is worth noting that a significant body of  scholarship exists that is 
critical of  the Constitutional Court’s repeated rejection of  the minimum 
core.155 However, the South African Constitution’s textual approach to the 
enforcement of  socio-economic rights – and the jurisprudence flowing 
therefrom such as Mazibuko which applies reasonableness as the standard 
of  review – can for our purposes be materially distinguished from the 
Namibian Constitution’s approach on a purely textual basis.156 As I have 
argued, article 22(a) affirms that every fundamental right in chapter 3 of  
the Namibian Constitution retains a non-negatable essential content with 
immediate obligations that the state must realise. This, therefore, affirms a 
binding application of  an essential content/minimum core approach when 
evaluating a right to water, as a right implied from the express right to life 
in article 6 of  the Constitution. Embracing a minimum core approach 
further prevent rights holders from the peril of  suffering irreparable harm 
to their lives, health and human dignity if  they do not receive urgent 
assistance in terms of  water provision,157 a reality that transformative and 
re-invigorative constitutionalism paradigms would not countenance. 
6.6 Water’s general obligations: Temporality and resources 
limitations
We can accept that a right to water, as part of  the broader category of  
socio-economic rights, gives rise to various duties placed upon the state 
that demand resources and that may not be immediately realised but are to 
be achieved through, among others, legislative, policy and programmatic 
measures. These progressively realisable aspects of  a right to water form 
the circumjacent, which is the non-core part of  the right. This would 
almost invariably bring to the fore two key concerns: temporality – the 
time scale within which the duties must be fulfilled for the right to be 
fully realised; and resources – the reality of  limited state resources to give 
effect to the full scope of  its duties to realise the right. Crucially, resources 
should not unduly emphasise financial and budgetary allocations. It 
should instead be understood as the more dynamic approach of  natural, 
human, regulatory, and educational resources, as Skogly argues.158 In the 
context of  water, it is a second-order difficulty maintained in chapter 5. 
155 See D Bilchitz Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of  socio-
economic rights (2007) 145; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (2010) 163.
156 In addition, South Africa is now also a party to ICESCR and therefore the normative 
objections to minimum core obligations are of  diminished force. 
157 Liebenberg (n 155) 164. 
158 S Skogly ‘The requirement of  using the “maximum of  available resources” for human 
rights realisation: A question of  quality as well as quantity?’ (2012) 12 Human Rights 
Law Review 393; Fredman (n 136) 75.
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To address these issues in our Namibian setting, we turn to international 
law as an interpretive resource given that the Constitution is silent on 
the standard of  adjudication for socio-economic rights. These temporal 
and resource considerations are most prominently captured through the 
‘progressive realisation’ of  socio-economic rights subject to ‘available 
resources’ as a principle to guide the state. This principle is captured in 
article 2(1) of  ICESCR, which frames the duty of  states as undertaking 
steps ‘to the maximum of  its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of  the [ICESCR] rights’. Riedel, writing 
in the context of  the ICESCR’s travaux préparatoires, sums up the concern 
that the principle of  progressive realisation sought to address as follows:159 
It was alleged, inter alia, that the minimum core concept might be used by 
States as an excuse or escape hatch to limit the scope of  the wider ambit of  
the rights in question, that in the end the minimum core would represent the 
ceiling of  the right in question, and thus limit the dimension of  progressive 
and full realization of  rights, and reduce the State Party obligations to a bare 
minimum.
While the analysis here is inspired by the progressive realisation formulation 
under ICESCR, it does not exclusively locate itself  in that treaty. Indeed, 
the progressive realisation principle is absent from the African Charter, 
which may invite the view that all rights therein present immediate and 
peremptory obligations on the state to take necessary legislative and other 
measures.160 While there is a significant threshold difference of  obligations 
between ICESCR and the African Charter, the African Commission has 
(controversially) subjected the state’s obligations to realise socio-economic 
rights under the African Charter to the progressive realisation subject to 
the availability of  resources,161 despite the absence of  a textual premise in 
the African Charter. 
The issues arising out of  the state’s general obligations mirror those 
of  justiciability and the proper role of  the courts when adjudicating the 
state’s duties where resource and temporal limitations may be cited for 
non-compliance with their obligations. The Namibian Constitution – 
159 Riedel (n 75) 79.
160 C Odinkalu ‘Analysis of  paralysis or paralysis by analysis: Implementing economic, 
social, and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 327 351.
161 Purohit & Moore v The Gambia (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003) para 84; Gunme & 
Others v Cameroon (2009) AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009) para 206; Nairobi Principles (n 4) 
paras 13-15; see also M Ssenyonjo ‘Analysing the economic, social and cultural rights 
jurisprudence of  the African Commission: 30 years since the adoption of  the African 
Charter’ (2011) 29 Netherlands Journal of  Human Rights 358 387.
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unlike the Kenyan162 and South African163 Constitutions, for example – 
does not expressly subject rights to progressive realisation. However, it 
can reasonably be argued that those duties that do not require immediate 
compliance can still be subjected to temporal and resource considerations.164 
While accepting the reality that any state, particularly developing 
states such as Namibia, would face difficulties in realising the full right to 
water, there nonetheless is an obligation to take steps and to demonstrate 
when full content realisation of  the right will be achieved.165 The state 
must not remain passive but must, as a baseline obligation, move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.166 Chapter 
5 has debunked the argument that socio-economic entitlements in the 
context of  the Constitution’s Principles of  State Policy (PSPs) are but 
unenforceable goals and aspirational. However, it is to be accepted that 
certain aspects of  the obligations arising out of  socio-economic rights 
such as water are to be realised progressively over time. The principal 
danger with progressive realisation is that it invites the view that the 
duties, being aspirational, cannot be enforced through the courts, and 
risks an indefinite postponement of  achieving the underlying right to 
water. Chapter 5, relying on Mwilima, has indeed already established that 
resource limitations cannot serve to overrule a constitutional fundamental 
right claim.
Valuable here is the approach of  the ESCR Committee’s General 
Comment 3167 in bifurcating the obligations of  conduct and obligations of  
result, drawing on international law on state responsibility. This approach 
offers clarity as to the temporality of  the state’s duties as obligations 
of  conduct are concrete and immediate, while obligations of  result are more 
aspirational. The full realisation of  a right to water would constitute an 
obligation of  result. However, the duty to institute legislative and other 
measures would be an unqualified obligation of  conduct. Through this 
conception, a right to water would give rise to an immediate obligation to 
162 2010 Kenyan Constitution art 21(2). 
163 The Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, 1996 sec 27(2).
164 An alternative approach is offered by Fredman who, in seeking to ‘reconcile the need 
for progressive realization without giving up on the substantive content of  [a socio-
economic] right’, relies on Alexy’s concept of  ‘principles as optimisation requirements’ 
whereby a principle is a norm that must be realised to the greatest extent possible given 
the legal and factual possibilities. Fredman (n 136) 73; Fredman (n 64) 73; R Alexy A 
theory of  constitutional rights (2004) 45-57.
165 General Comment 3 (n 105) para 9.
166 As above; Bulto (n 22) 100.
167 General Comment 3 (n 105) para 9; Fredman (n 136) 70.
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take steps towards that goal.168 It is these steps that would be the subject 
of  judicial scrutiny and accountability through bounded deliberation 
and would allow for an interpretative approach that gives substance to 
transformative constitutionalism in achieving socio-economic justice. 
The court’s role would be to hold the state accountable by determining 
the content of  the various duties of  the state and seeking justifications 
for the redistributive measures, in a deliberative manner, where there 
has been inadequate compliance. As argued in chapter 5, this reinforces 
accountability through the state’s duty of  explanation.169 Even where 
the state’s justifications for inadequate compliance are acceptable in the 
judgment of  the court, there would remain forward-looking obligations 
on the state to substantiate the steps it will take to comply with its duties 
towards full realisation through is distributive decisions. This is given that 
the state’s obligations of  conduct towards realising the full right to water 
should be regarded as immediate, constant and continuous.170 
In the context of  Namibia’s duties to realise the AQuA content 
of  a right to water, the approach of  both the Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines and the Special Rapporteur is instrumental. When considering 
the progressive realisation of  water supply, the phraseology employed 
in measuring water supply is that of  access to improved drinking water 
sources by households. Improved drinking water is a proxy for a water 
source that ‘by the nature of  its construction and design adequately 
protects the source from outside contamination, in particular by faecal 
matter’.171 The underlying assumption here is that improved sources are 
more likely to supply safe drinking water than unimproved sources. As 
such, the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines present the improvement of  
water supply technologies thus:172
168 See also Maastricht Guidelines (n 89) para 7: ‘The obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfil each contain elements of  obligation of  conduct and obligation of  result. The 
obligation of  conduct requires action reasonably calculated to realize the enjoyment of  
a particular right … The obligation of  result requires States to achieve specific targets 
to satisfy a detailed substantive standard.’
169 Fredman (n 64) 103.
170 Bulto (n 22) 108.
171 Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines (n 6) 85. 
172 As above.
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Unimproved drinking-water sources Improved drinking-water sources
unprotected dug well piped water into dwelling, yard or plot
unprotected spring public tap or standpipe
cart with small tank or drum provided 
by water vendor
tubewell or borehole
tanker truck provision of  water protected dug well
surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, 
stream, canal, irrigation channel) 
protected spring
bottled water173 rainwater collection
A Namibian illustration of  how the Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines 
can be applied in the adjudicative process may be helpful here. Where 
a rural community has been relying on an unimproved drinking water 
source such as an unprotected dug well at independence in 1990, when 
the Constitution was adopted, and yet continues to presently rely on such 
unimproved source, then there would be a strong claim that the state has 
failed to comply with its positive duties in relation to a right to water. It 
would be spurious for the state to seek to justify its inaction to improve 
the community’s water source based on resource limitations, or that 
taking positive measures would inevitably require the lapse of  time before 
realising the AQuA elements of  that community’s right to water. 
Indeed, an adequate and appropriate response to a right to water claim 
in Namibian courts would be intimately tied to the remedial possibilities 
arising from the state’s failure to comply with its obligations. This would 
require innovative remedies to be introduced by Namibian courts, such as 
supervisory orders that require judicial oversight over the state’s plan to 
173 Bottled water is considered ‘improved’ only when the household uses drinking water 
from an improved source for cooking and personal hygiene. Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines (n 6) 85.
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remedy right to water needs. An analysis of  remedial options is, however, 
beyond the ambit of  this book.174 
6.7 Conclusion
Having addressed the legal basis and justiciability objections to a right 
to water in earlier constituents of  this book, this chapter has sought to 
move the analysis to a more palpable argument of  what a right to water’s 
substantive and normative content would entail. This has been pursued 
by employing the evaluative framework of  the AQuA elements set out 
principally in General Comment 15. This allows a right to water claim to 
retain qualitative and quantitative features that can feasibly be determined 
by a court and enforced based on the Namibian state’s correlative 
obligations. 
I have argued that these obligations entail minimum core obligations 
that are immediate and general obligations that are subject to deliberativism, 
a process that includes the organs of  the state, with courts as the forum. 
The model advanced ensures that the temporality justifications for non-
realisation of  the substance of  a right to water through the state’s duties 
do not provide an indefinite excuse for non-compliance in the face of  
pervasive water needs in Namibia as exposed in the Special Rapporteur’s 
report. Moreover, the model I advance ensures that distributive decisions 
for resources are subject to the deliberative competence of  courts, with the 
state bearing a burden of  justification in realising a right to water while 
guided by values including ubuntu. 
174 See H Taylor ‘Optimisation through innovation: Judicial exercise of  discretionary 
remedial power to enforce the State’s positive human rights duties’ unpublished DPhil 
thesis, University of  Oxford, 2019. 
247
conclusion: Omeya OgO OmwenyO 
7
The status of  water as a binding human right has been the subject 
of  increasing debate and scholarship internationally. The traditional 
rationales for an enforceable human right to water can be roughly placed 
into three categories.1 The first is to act as a legal bulwark against social and 
economic inequality.2 The second is that governments should guarantee 
provision of  certain ‘primary goods’ essential for the realisation of  all 
other rights and responsibilities.3 The third is to advance governmental 
accountability.4 As discussed in chapter 4, several recent constitutions, 
such as those of  Zimbabwe, Kenya and South Africa, have explicitly 
included the right to water as a provision in their Bills of  Rights. The 
2010 UN General Assembly Resolution5 has also driven the right to water 
debate internationally. Further, initiatives such as the African Commission 
Guidelines on the Right to Water in Africa, which were published in July 
2020, are a welcome development to place water higher up on the social, 
political and legal agenda.6 Namibia is somewhat a latecomer to the 
human right to water debate, an idea of  which the time has come. This 
book has therefore argued for a human right to water that can be claimed 
through the Namibian courts. A right to water is implied from the right to 
life in article 6 of  the Constitution. 
In normatively justifying a right to water as an implied right, I 
argued for interpretative approaches that include asserting transformative 
constitutionalism and the substantive coinage of  re-invigorative 
constitutionalism. This has offered a robust basis upon which a 
1 R Larson et al ‘The human right to water’ in S Dadson et al (eds) Water science policy 




5 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 July 2010: ‘The human right to 
water and sanitation’ UNGA (3 August 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/292.
6 See also African Commission Guidelines on the Right to Water in Africa (adopted 
during the 26th extraordinary session of  the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights held from 16 to 30 July 2019, in Banjul, The Gambia).
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constitutional right to water is founded, particularly through recourse to 
the value of  ubuntu. International law’s relevance to right to water claims 
in the domestic courts is also expressed in the context of  directly applicable 
treaties and the interpretative value offered by ‘soft law’ sources. 
The book also addressed the various justiciability concerns that may 
arise: normative, institutional (competence and legitimacy) and textual 
(focusing on Principles of  State Policy (PSPs)). Most pertinently, in 
employing the distinction between first and second order scarcity, we are 
able to carve out a legitimate and effective judicial role in holding the state 
to account in complying with its right to water duties. These duties flow 
from the content of  a right to water I develop from a critical application of  
the Nairobi Principles, General Comment 15, the Drinking-Water Quality 
Guidelines, as well as ubuntu.
Since COVID-19 emerged and became a pandemic that rapidly 
spread across the globe in early 2020, there has been an increasing focus 
by states and non-state actors to ensure that all populations have access 
to basic water and sanitation needs. Water has been prioritised to ensure 
that the most vulnerable in society can mitigate the spread of  COVID-19 
by complying with basic hygiene.7 The mantra of  hands, space, mask has 
been repeated with the aim of  reminding populations to thoroughly 
wash their hands frequently so as to prevent them from contracting or 
spreading COVID-19. However, the most basic of  minimum core water 
needs of  many, especially in informal settlements in Namibia, were not 
met. The Namibian government, to its credit, did put in place important 
interventions when the COVID-19 pandemic arose to increase access to 
potable water. For example, under the state of  emergency regulations 
adopted in response to COVID-19 in Namibia, the Namibian President 
adopted regulations to ensure that local authorities were to ensure that 
residents with arrears and suspended water services have their water 
supply reconnected and that those without access to water supply are 
provided with access to potable water.8 While the prioritisation of  water in 
times of  pandemic is appropriate, access to water should be the minimum 
entitlement of  every individual and community, irrespective of  the 
existence of  a public health emergency.9
7 Food and Agriculture Organisation ‘Building water access for a COVID-19 response’, 
http://www.fao.org/land-water/overview/covid19/access/en/ (accessed 2 July 
2021).
8 Government Notice 104 – Directive Relating to Regional Councils and Local Authority 
Councils: COVID-19 Regulations sec 2; NAMWater ‘Clean water for a healthy nation 
during the lockdown period’, https://www.namwater.com.na/images/docs/Media_
NW_Lockdown_Period_Initiatives.pdf  (accessed 2 July 2021). 
9 S Chigudu The political life of  an epidemic: Cholera, crisis, and citizenship in Zimbabwe 
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This book offers a scholarly analysis of  and justification for socio-
economic rights through a right to water in Namibia. Socio-economic 
jurisprudence is acutely limited in Namibian courts, yet socio-economic 
injustice that prominently manifests through access to water challenges is 
a painfully pervasive reality in Namibia. The book thus is an endeavour 
to turn on the legal taps to allow right to water claims to be brought in 
Namibian courts. Ultimately, the aim is to realise the sense of  ubuntu for 
all by giving substance to the adage that omeya ogo omwenyo.10 
(2020) 93. 
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